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[tarik]

U.S. Seeks to Reset Ties With Reclusive but Strategically Vital African State
Eritrea has been described as Africa’s North Korea, and its Red Sea coastline makes it a potential bulwark against Iranian influence

By Robbie Gramer

and Summer Said

Updated April 23, 2026 11:58 pm ET
Vehicles driving in Asmara, Eritrea.
A street in Eritrea’s capital, Asmara. Jemal Countess/AFP/Getty Images

The Trump administration is exploring ways to reset ties with a reclusive and autocratic state controlling prime geopolitical real estate along the Red Sea as Iran threatens to choke off a second vital maritime corridor against the backdrop of war with the U.S.

A senior Trump administration official, Massad Boulos, has told foreign counterparts that the U.S. aims to begin lifting some sanctions on Eritrea, a small African country with more than 700 miles of Red Sea coastline, according to current and former officials familiar with the matter. It is part of an effort by the U.S. administration to restore higher-level diplomatic relations with the country for the first time in decades. Other officials said the plan to normalize ties with Eritrea and lift sanctions on the country is undergoing review and hasn’t yet been finalized.

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Washington’s One-Dimensional Chess in the Horn of Africa

Trump’s inexplicable effort to lift sanctions on Eritrea reflects a deepening lack of strategy.

By Cameron Hudson, a former State Department and National Security Council official on Africa.

A vendor carries chickens past a fellow vendor at the spice market in Asmara, Eritrea, on Oct. 4, 2025. Jemal Countess/AFP via Getty Images
April 23, 2026, 1:53 PM

News this week that the Trump administration has been in secret talks with the Eritrean government to remove existing U.S. sanctions on the country is, on its surface, a head-scratcher. The removal of sanctions would normally signal the end of a path of marked reforms, such as when U.S. President Donald Trump lifted terrorism sanctions on Sudan in 2020, or acknowledge a wholescale change of regime necessitating a fresh start, as was the case in Syria last year. Eritrea has achieved neither of these benchmarks.
Trump’s Second Term

Ongoing reports and analysis

In fact, the internal political and human rights situation in the country remains much as it has been since President Isaias Afwerki came to power in 1993. In his more than 30 years at the head of this militarized dictatorship, Isaias has never stood for election and continues to wield absolute power absent a constitution. The national legislature has not met since 2010, and Isaias’s People’s Front for Democracy and Justice remains the only legally allowed political party, guaranteeing no formal checks on his unlimited power.

Isaias himself maintains what Human Rights Watch calls an “iron grip” over his people. Forced military conscription, coupled with a gulag system of thousands of political prisoners, has meant that as much as 1-2 percent of Eritrea’s 3.5 million people exit the country each year seeking formal asylum abroad, though even these figures underreport the true scale of the exodus. Perhaps most inexplicable, Eritrea remains one of the worst countries in the world for religious freedom and the persecution of Christians in particular, ranking fifth worst in Open Doors’ most recent World Watch List, with an outright ban on evangelical, Pentecostal, Baptist, and Adventist churches.

Since there has been no change in the fundamental nature of the Eritrean regime, one might normally imagine that a decision to provide sanctions relief comes because the justification for imposing the sanctions—Eritrea’s involvement and gross human rights abuses in the 2020-22 Tigray conflict in neighboring Ethiopia—has been addressed. But this could not be further from the truth. Four years post-conflict, Ethiopia and Eritrea are on the verge of a new catastrophic outbreak of violence. Eritrea was itself never a party to the 2022 Pretoria Agreement that ended the conflict between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray region. That war cost more than 600,000 lives by some estimates. Not bound by the terms of the peace deal, Eritrea has been fueling Ethiopian division for the past several years, in a bid to destabilize its larger and more powerful neighbor while also trying to undercut Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s aggressive pursuit of Red Sea access through the Eritrean port of Assab. The region is today a tinderbox that could reignite and recommence the kinds of atrocity crimes that landed Eritrea on Washington’s sanctions list in the first place.

In recent policy pronouncements, Trump appointees at the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs have made clear their belief that engagement is a tool, “not an endorsement” of how governments came to power, and that the United States should engage governments “as they are, and not as Washington wishes them to be,” with diplomacy that “respects sovereignty” and avoids “lectures” on democracy and human rights. But to what end?

For sure, the Red Sea region has emerged in recent years as a new theater for geopolitical competition, one where Washington has a strategic interest in increasing its presence and influence. A normalized relationship with Eritrea may, on its face, create such an opportunity. But this also ignores the fundamental nature of its new partner in Eritrea and how Isaias has succeeded in maintaining his grip on the country while suffering very few real consequences.

Isaias has demonstrated his facility in managing competing external influences and adeptly switching alliances and allegiances as it suits his own strategic agenda. Washington should proceed with its eyes wide open about how it is choosing to advance its Red Sea interests.

In that context, the Trump administration has articulated no strategy for the Red Sea or the Horn of Africa, despite being engaged across multiple issues in the region. How would the decision to lift sanctions on Eritrea impact efforts to mediate a peace agreement in neighboring Sudan? The regime in Eritrea has allied itself closely to Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in its war against the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Normalization with Asmara now would be viewed in that context as a sign of support for Sudan’s army, along with Egypt’s position on the inviolable nature of Sudan’s unity and the SAF’s position as Sudan’s last functioning state institution.

Cairo, which is reported to have brokered the rapprochement between Washington and Asmara, has its own strategy for the region and may have activated Trump as a sort of “useful idiot” in its effort to both preserve the Sudanese state under the SAF and construct a coalition to pressure Ethiopia to restart negotiations on the use and continued filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cairo had previously convinced Trump to use his position to restart GERD talks that Ethiopia has been deeply resisting and Egypt remains desperately in search of. How does recognition of Ethiopia’s mortal enemy in neighboring Eritrea, with which Ethiopia is locked in a sort of cold war that could quickly turn hot, entice Ethiopia to join Trump’s initiative on the Nile?

Similarly, what message would a breakthrough with Eritrea send to other Gulf states active in the region? Saudi Arabia will likely interpret Washington’s move as an effort to help mitigate future conflict in the Red Sea region. But this might be misleading, given that Washington has previously shown itself to be a reluctant actor in the arena.

The United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, perhaps the most active external actor in the Horn of Africa region, will likely interpret Washington’s move as threatening to its actions in both Ethiopia and Sudan. The UAE has emerged as the largest investor and principal backer of Abiy and is using him, along with other regional leaders, to increase support to the RSF in Sudan in their bid to defeat Sudan’s army and fundamentally remake the Sudanese state. Washington has previously been accused of being too close to the Emirati position in Sudan, though this move would seem to undermine that.

[Right]

I thought the Eris hate America.
It turned out they have been crying all the time because they have been rejected by the US.

A US can’t rescue a dying nation. Sure, they will be delighted to use the useful idiots. Ask the Kurds.

The Eris will be happy to invade Yemen behalf of the US. It will be fun for the Houthis to kill the Eris mercenaries.
The Eris did it to Mussolini and MBS, why not for Trump?

[Abere]

I think America has been the daddy of Eritrea province since Mengistu H/Mariam. Eritrea is the crybaby rather test-tube baby of Meles Zenawi and America. It has been a miscarriage/still born and will remain so, because it naturally cannot be a country until the end of the world. It is just artificially made for eternal condemnation into rebel land. It is Al-Shabia desolated land. Only some fools think there has been disagreement Shabia and America, not at all.

I thought the Eris hate America.
It turned out they have been crying all the time because they have been rejected by the US.

A US can’t rescue a dying nation. Sure, they will be delighted to use the useful idiots. Ask the Kurds.

The Eris will be happy to invade Yemen behalf of the US. It will be fun for the Houthis to kill the Eris mercenaries.
The Eris did it to Mussolini and MBS, why not for Trump?

[tarik]

Nakfa Press
Yesterday at 8:45 AM
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Strategic Rationale for Eritrea-U.S. Engagement (ጽምዶ)

By Alexander Tekie | CEO

National Interest Consideration

In Eritrea’s broader macroeconomic framework, the oil and gas sector is unequivocally a matter of national strategic interest. True self-reliance is achieved through production, not consumption.
U.S. oil & gas companies’ entry into Eritrea should be deemed a matter of national interest, both geoeconomically and geopolitically. Partnering with US companies would not only unlock Eritrea’s offshore hydrocarbon potential but also enhance its international standing and attract major investment flows.
Thus, a pragmatic path forward is for Eritrea to engage the U.S. through “commercial diplomacy”, by proactively signaling its readiness for economic partnership and initiating structured discussions on oil and gas opportunities that allow U.S. firms to invest with confidence. In this context, commercial diplomacy becomes the practical bridge that aligns Eritrea’s national interests with U.S. strategic and commercial engagement.

Why is this a geopolitical and diplomatic advantage?

U.S. oil & gas companies’ global stature gives Eritrea a channel of soft power into Washington, especially under the Trump administration, which strongly supports U.S. oil & gas and mining investment abroad.
The entries could serve as a stabilizing bridge in Eritrea–U.S. relations, prompting Washington to choose dialogue over confrontation and cooperation over isolation.
The timing is opportune: energy diplomacy is once again central to U.S. engagement in Africa.
Eritrea must act decisively to capitalize on this geopolitical window or risk missing a rare and valuable opportunity.
Catalyst for Wider Industry Participation
U.S. companies’ engagement would send a powerful market signal that Eritrea is open for business.Its presence would immediately attract interest from other International Oil Companies (IOCs) and National Oil Companies (NOCs) seeking follow-on opportunities.
The resulting competition would maximize government value and accelerate the development of Eritrea’s hydrocarbon sector.

Commentary on China’s Approach

China’s quest for energy security continues to accelerate, driving its pursuit of overseas oil and gas assets. However, Chinese state-owned enterprises (CNOOC, CNPC, Sinopec) generally avoid high-risk exploration, preferring instead to enter after commercial discoveries have been proven by IOCs.
Example 1: CNOOC’s farm-in with ExxonMobil in Guyana, acquiring a 25% working interest only after Exxon’s Liza discovery had established Guyana as a new oil province.

Example 2: CNPC joined TotalEnergies in Uganda’s Lake Albert project post-discovery.

Example 3: Sinopec entered Angola’s deepwater blocks following successful exploration by Western operators.

These patterns confirm that China prioritizes access to the commodity itself, the producing asset, rather than assuming the geological risk of frontier exploration.
For Eritrea, this presents a clear sequencing advantage: by engaging U.S. companies now to open and de-risk the basin, Eritrea will be in a position to invite Chinese participation later, on stronger commercial terms, ensuring maximum value and strategic leverage for the nation.
Ultimately, the state has a duty to prudently develop its natural resources for the long-term benefit of its people, and hydrocarbons, if confirmed, can play a transformative role in Eritrea’s economic self-sufficiency. To that end, commercial diplomacy serves as a catalyst for a strategic rationale for Eritrea-U.S. engagement. This is ጽምዶ in action.

About the Author

Alexander Tekie is the CEO of Nakfa Energy. In 2002, Alex established U.S. Eritrea Business Council and served as its Executive Director. See less

[ethiopianunity]

Shabia when it took leadership against Ethiopia it knows the West will be by its side because Eritrea is part of British common wealth nation assigned with Egypt to disintegrate Ethiopia