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[sarcasm]

Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray: A Powder Keg in the Horn of Africa

18 February 2026

The risk of hostilities involving Ethiopia, its northernmost Tigray region and its neighbour Eritrea remains high three years after the last major war in the area. African states and outside powers should urgently open back channels among the three governments to defuse tensions.


What’s new? Tensions are running high among the Ethiopian federal government, Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region and neighbouring Eritrea, threatening a return to deadly conflict three years after the last war ended. With several possible triggers, a slide toward hostilities would be easy to start but much more difficult to stop.

Why does it matter? A war would be devastating for all three players in a region where past conflicts have cost hundreds of thousands of lives. It would also overlap with the fighting in neighbouring Sudan, dragging in powerful states from outside the Horn of Africa and further roiling the volatile Red Sea region.

What should be done? Influential African states, alongside outside powers with interests in the Horn of Africa, should engage in quiet diplomacy to deter the onset of conflict. Concerned states should initiate efforts to address each side’s grievances, including Ethiopia’s desire for reliable sea access and Eritrea’s fears of an attack on its sovereignty.


I. Overview
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VI.Preventing a New War

Tensions among the potential belligerents in Tigray, Addis Ababa and Asmara are high, as mistrust between the sides festers and potential flashpoints proliferate. Foreign powers with influence in the Horn should pay heed to the threat and look for ways to curb the risks of further escalation before it is too late.

The first step should be to develop back channels among all the main players that could help ensure conflict triggers are managed peacefully. The brokers of the peace agreement between the federal government and the TPLF – Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria – should endeavour to re-engage both sides under the aegis of the African Union.72 Rather than attempting to solve all the thorny problems surrounding the agreement, their objective should be to prevent the rapid unwinding of an already fragile peace. Approaches could include kindling talks between Addis Ababa and more pragmatic leaders in Mekelle, including Tadesse Werede, head of the regional administration. Key areas to focus on are preventing escalation of the clashes between the TPLF and the breakaway TPF militia, backed by the Ethiopian federal government; deterring further military action by the TPLF in territories disputed with the Amhara region; and stopping the build-up of proxy forces by Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Another focus should be the path to the 2026 federal elections. In the absence of a deal allowing the TPLF to re-register as a political party, and by extension participate in a vote, the two sides should seek to settle on a pragmatic compromise. A continuation of the administrative status quo in Tigray – through another extension of the interim administration’s mandate – appears the most realistic option, given the huge political barriers to holding polls in the region that would be recognised by the federal government.

A diplomatic back channel could also be useful in enabling Addis Ababa to convey to Tigrayan authorities what it regards as the acceptable limits to their relationship with Eritrea. The federal government could signal that it is prepared to accept continuation of the tsimdo cross-border cultural rapprochement, while drawing the line at an Eritrean military presence inside Tigray and deepening military contacts between the TPLF and Asmara.

To dilute the ill-will [between Ethiopia and Eritrea], outside powers should aim to provide space for discussions that could help avert the most disastrous outcomes.

Foreign involvement could also help manage tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Relations between the two capitals are now steeped in acrimony. To dilute the ill-will, outside powers should aim to provide space for discussions that could help avert the most disastrous outcomes. Major powers, including the U.S., the EU and its member states, China, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, should reiterate that they reject any attempt by either side to use military force against the other, even if indirectly, and that any further move toward war will badly damage the international standing of the party that makes it. As for Ethiopia, foreign powers with influence over the IMF and World Bank, particularly the U.S. and European states, should make clear that a grab for the port of Assab would force them to reconsider support from these institutions.73 They should also stress their recognition of both Ethiopian and Eritrean sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the terms of the Algiers Agreement, which ended the last Ethiopia-Eritrea war, and the findings of the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission.74

There are several parties whose intervention could help turn down the temperature in different ways. Saudi Arabia, which sits across the Red Sea from Eritrea, is a major diplomatic power in the region, and is already discreetly engaging both sides, including on the risks of a conflict.75 Despite scaling back its presence in the Horn of Africa in recent years, the U.S. is also trying to deter military action, particularly through private warnings to Ethiopia. It has the diplomatic muscle to influence Addis Ababa.76 The EU, especially in conjunction with Italy, which has cultivated friendly relations with both Addis Ababa and Asmara, can transmit the same message.77 China, which has major investments in Ethiopia and in Eritrea’s mining sector as well a military base in neighbouring Djibouti, would have much to lose from a war and could throw its weight behind preventing one. Finally, the UN, whose special envoy for the Horn is based in Addis Ababa, should continue playing a coordinating role, bringing interested parties together.

In the near term, these foreign powers should work to secure commitments from Addis Ababa that it will not resort to direct military confrontation to secure its objectives; and from Asmara that it will cease its proxy activities within Ethiopia. Nearby states, especially Djibouti, Somalia (and breakaway Somaliland), Eritrea and Kenya, could in turn encourage Ethiopia to seek credible ways of satisfying the country’s legitimate desire for improved sea access. They should redouble efforts to diversify the number of seaports available for Ethiopian use and improve the infrastructure needed to reach them.78 While Addis Ababa’s ambitions to become a Red Sea power would remain unfulfilled, these steps would demonstrate that Ethiopia’s neighbours are taking its concerns seriously, especially its search for affordable, diversified, secure and reliable outlets for maritime commerce.


VII. Conclusion

Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray are at risk of descending into a new conflict only four years after the region’s last major conflagration ended. While all sides appear wary of igniting a new war, simmering grievances, overblown rhetoric and military preparations indicate that they are readying themselves for that eventuality. Recent skirmishes between Tigrayan and federal forces, which triggered a response from Addis Ababa involving drone strikes on TPLF targets, illustrate how local flare-ups could set a wider fight in motion. If that were to happen, Eritrea could be drawn into an interstate conflict.

Such a catastrophic turn of events is by no means inevitable. But without concerted regional and international action aimed at curbing tensions, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray could find themselves party to a new regional war that would prove difficult to contain or end. Every effort should be made to avert it.

Nairobi/Brussels, 18 February 2026

Continue reading https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/ ... orn-africa

[Fiyameta]

Abiy Ahmed's gamble in his explicit goals to recognizing Somaliland, and his clear intents on abandoning the use of Djibouti's port in favor of the UAE-operated Somaliland's Berbera port, has strained Ethiopia's relations with Djibouti that has since sign agreements with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia to manage its ports.

For us, Eritreans, this is a blessing, for Abiy Ahmed's gamble has ensnared him in the Geo-political game of Chess, making him the most despised puppet regime in Ethiopia, the wider Horn of Africa region, and beyond.

His blatant lies about Ethiopia "lacking access to the sea" may fool some uneducated people in his own country who are mislead into equating "access" with "ownership", but his lies will eventually unravel the tangled web of deception spun by his paid cadres.

Isn't it sad that an estimated 10 million children in the Amhara and Tigray regions have been out of school for the last 5 years? There seems to be an orchestrated effort by the Abiy Ahmed regime to keep Ethiopians illiterates so that they can't differentiate lies from the truth. SAD!

[sarcasm]

“Fighting the TPLF in its challenging home mountainous terrain is a forbidding prospect “ Crisis Group