Did Dr. Abiy Ahmed Disappoint Amhara Elites Who Sought to Use Him as They Did Mengistu?
By Fayyis Oromia*
The growing tension between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s hybrid political regime and segments of the Amhara elite within the so-called Habesha camp is a revealing development in contemporary Ethiopian politics. As the late Dr. Lenco Lata once observed, “When Amhara elites support me, I ask myself whether I have done something wrong; when they oppose me, I know I am doing the right thing.” Viewed through this lens, the current confrontation suggests a significant political realignment.
The conflict between Amhara-Habesha elites and the Prosperity Party indicates that Dr. Abiy may be repositioning himself closer to the Oromo political bloc—whether out of tactical necessity or genuine ideological reassessment. It is possible that he has begun to recognize the dangers of attempting to balance two fundamentally opposed political camps, a predicament akin to the proverbial dog that eats from two households only to be devoured while wandering between them.
Dr. Abiy’s effort to appease both Amhara and Oromo elites has already cost him substantial political capital. Initially, he benefited from the support of both groups, each expecting him to advance their respective agendas. Over time, however, his inability—or unwillingness—to fully satisfy either camp resulted in widespread disillusionment. His recent inclination toward the Oromo side has alienated many Amhara supporters. If this shift is sincere, it represents a step toward political clarity. A deeper commitment—such as elevating Afaan Oromo to the status of primary federal working language and implementing it across state institutions—could signal a genuine break with the historical dominance of Amharic and help rebuild trust with Oromo constituencies.
Ethiopian history demonstrates a recurring pattern: Amhara elites have often sought Oromo figures to advance Amhara-centric state projects while neutralizing genuine Oromo nationalism. Menelik II turned against Gobana; Haile Selassie persecuted Iyasu; Mengistu Haile Mariam executed Haile Fida; and Abiy Ahmed imprisoned Jawar Mohammed and other Oromo activists. In each case, Oromo collaborators were instrumentalized to undermine Oromo political aspirations. The Oromo were rarely defeated militarily by Amhara forces; instead, political control was maintained through co-opted Oromo elites who prioritized Amharic cultural and political dominance over Oromummaa.
During the 1974 revolution, despite significant Oromo participation, political power ultimately consolidated under Mengistu—Oromo by origin but ideologically detached from Oromo nationalism—who presided over the repression of Oromo political movements. Amhara elites benefited from and supported this arrangement, using state power to suppress Oromo political identity.
A similar dynamic unfolded during the recent political transition. Oromo participation was decisive, yet Oromo members of the Prosperity Party, led by Dr. Abiy, chose to preserve Amharic linguistic dominance and centralized political control. Amhara elites once again rallied behind a hybrid leader to weaken both Oromummaa and Tigrayan political autonomy, resulting in wars against the OLF/OLA and the TPLF. Having marginalized Tigrayan elites, the regime has increasingly targeted Oromo resistance figures. Dr. Abiy appeared poised to serve as a disposable instrument in this strategy—though he may now be reconsidering his position.
All nations within Ethiopia historically resisted the Naftagna system, characterized by Amhara cultural and linguistic dominance. Today, this system persists in modified form under what may be described as a neo-Naftagna order, embodied by the Prosperity Party. Resistance to this order is led primarily by Oromo liberation forces, the TPLF, and other marginalized national groups. The struggle is complicated by Dr. Abiy’s political ambiguity and performative rhetoric, which has divided opposition movements and delayed unified resistance.
The Oromo public is increasingly recognizing the authoritarian nature of the Prosperity Party and questioning the feasibility of democratic reform within the existing imperial framework. The argument—advanced by the OLF since the early 1990s—that the Ethiopian state is structurally resistant to genuine democratization is gaining broader acceptance.
The labeling of parties supporting this system as “pan-Ethiopian” obscures their functional role in sustaining Amhara elite interests, particularly linguistic dominance and assimilationist policies. The continued requirement of Amharic proficiency for federal employment exemplifies the persistence of Amarization. While these parties may be ethnically diverse, they remain culturally and ideologically Amharanized. Oromo political forces must recognize this reality and build principled alliances with others resisting the Prosperity Party, including Tigrayan forces, while remaining vigilant against regime infiltration.
Encouragingly, some Amhara nationalists have begun to engage critically with the concept of internal colonization, opening space for dialogue between Oromo and Amhara liberation movements. The current primary adversary is not the TPLF but the Prosperity Party and its neo-Naftagna project. Liberation from this system, rather than inter-ethnic rivalry, should define the political agenda.
Expectations of Western support for genuine democratization must also be reconsidered. Historically, Western governments have favored weak, dependent regimes that reliably serve external interests. Truly popular and sovereign African governments tend to challenge such arrangements. Relying on Western intervention is therefore misguided.
The future political trajectory of the Horn of Africa will likely be shaped by Oromo and Amhara political forces, much as Franco-German cooperation shaped the European Union. Coordinated resistance against the Prosperity Party is both timely and necessary. Debates over future political structures—whether federal or confederal—can follow the dismantling of the current regime.
The Prosperity Party is actively working to prevent such alliances through infiltration, disinformation, and the manipulation of ethnic and religious divisions. Countering these tactics requires internal consolidation within Oromo politics and strategic cooperation across national lines. Amhara political forces must relinquish aspirations of restoring pre-1991 dominance and instead envision a future of equality among self-governing nations within a voluntary union.
Ultimately, Africa may move toward a broader union of free peoples, preceded by the emergence of independent nations that voluntarily federate at regional or continental levels. Political change will be driven not only by armed struggle but also by civil resistance, urban mobilization, and coordinated political strategy.
Oromo and Amhara liberation movements must strengthen internally while advancing a unified anti-Prosperity Party front. Progress in Amhara–Oromo relations is evident and should be deepened. An alliance among Oromo forces, Amhara resistance groups, and the TPLF represents a serious challenge to the regime.
Vigilance against infiltration remains essential. Liberation movements unify; authoritarian regimes divide. The central task is confronting the Prosperity Party—not one another.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/1 ... -h-mariam/