Is the US a Neutral Mediator? Judge for Yourself
Ghidewon Abay-Asmerom
March 16, 2000
The minority government in Ethiopia has clearly rejected the Technical Arrangements and this action is proving to be a huge obstacle to the OAU peace process. I don't think it is yet time to write off the OAU peace plan and we shouldn't begin writing an epithet for the OAU Framework's tombstone. But, unless the way the OAU writes its peace proposals, handles its clarifications, conducts its mediations and involves non-African parties changes, there can not be progress in peace making in Africa. In short, unless the OAU changes its norms and procedures conflict prevention and peace making is going to remain an unattainable goal. Preventing conflicts and making peace were the two main goals of the OAU from its very inception. However, in the 37 year of existence the OAU has yet to mediate a single African conflict successfully. There is no African conflict that the OAU can claim a credit for helping bring to an end. It is sad but that is the history of the organization. This conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia would have given it a chance to redeem itself, but thanks to its incompetence it is failing miserably.
Peace Cannot be Found by Outsiders
From the very beginning we need to accept one fact. This fact was clearly spelled out to the OAU by Vice President
Kapwepwe of Zambia more than 30 years ago. He said it in one of OAU's unsuccessful bid of mediation.
[Any] formula for peace had to be acceptable for both sides with neither [side] losing face and the formula had to be found by the two parties, not by outsiders.
This statement was true then and it is true now. In regards to the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, unless both Eritrea and Ethiopia find a peace plan that works for both of them no peace plan imposed on them by the OAU, the UN, or other third party mediators will work. This we have to know.
Eritrea had been asking, from day one, for face-to-face negotiations with the Ethiopian government. However, Ethiopia said "
NO" to direct talks. Eventually the two have to talk. It might take a third round or a fourth round of fighting but the conflict will end only by talking. Only both parties, not outsiders, can find the formula for peace.
Since Ethiopia's preconditions had made it hard for a direct talk, the need for facilitators or mediators was a must from the start. Fortunately there was not shortage of volunteers. There were many countries and organization that were willing to offer their good offices. The US, Rwanda, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Italy, France, Libya, Egypt, the OAU, the UN, the EU, the list is long. The people of Eritrea and Ethiopia should be grateful for all these offers.
Neutrality is a must in Mediation
A cardinal characteristic of a mediator or a facilitator should be: neutrality. If this is compromised, even for a split of a second, then the parties to a conflict will loose confidence in the mediator and the path to peace will eventually lead to a dead end. Lack of neutrality seems to be at the core of the problem the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Why are we where we are now? Is it because of the OAU's incompetence? Or is it because of the other mediator not so "
neutral" role? Let's look at the role the
US played over the course of the conflict and see how the US measures up as a "
neutral" peace broker.
The dictionary meaning of the word "
mediator" is:
One that reconciles differences between disputants. One who interposes between parties at variance for the purpose of reconciling them.
In this spirit, during the first two weeks of the conflict, the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Susan Rice, and her Rwandan counterpart, shuttled back and forth between Eritrea and Ethiopia to come up with a peace plan. That was commendable. The role of mediators is to table a plan that both sides can agree to accept. If the plan is not acceptable to either party mediators have to be persistent enough to continue fine-tuning the plan so as it could be acceptable to both sides. In short mediation is not an academic exercise but an art of wisdom. As mediation continues one hopes situations would not change on the ground. In many cases, prudent mediators would try to seek temporary restraint from both sides as to not change facts on the ground. However that was not what had happened in the Eritrea Ethiopia case.
US-Rwanda Peace Plan Presented:
On May 30-31, 1998 the US and Rwandan representatives presented their
US-Rwanda peace plan
to both Eritrea and Ethiopia.
However, on May 31st, before Eritrea got a chance to have a look at the peace plan, Ethiopia opened a new warfront. This front was around Aiga and Altiena; the eastern flank of what later came to be known as the Mareb-Altiena front. That is facts are changing on the ground.
Premature Announcement
The last week of May US officials were quoted saying they were optimistic and making progress in the mediation process. But on the 3rd of June 1998 date, in a press release from Washington, the US announced its regret that the two sides did not accept the US-Rwanda plan and the four-point plan was made public. What was the motive? May be the mediators were trying to pressure the two parties to accept their peace plan. That was a big mistake. Going public with a plan before you have something tangible is breaking cardinal rules of mediation, patience and secrecy.
Amha-Tsion Tekle Haimanot, in an article posted in Dehai, says it better:
It is axiomatic that any mediation effort should be based on private consultation at the highest possible level and in great confidentiality before any major proposals are made public. It is also true that a successful mediation requires a long and tedious pre-negotiation to narrow differences and to minimize the political risks that may be taken by the concerned parties
http://www.primenet.com/~ephrem2/eritreanoau/salim.html
If the US mediators were still in the Horn of Africa, what was the motive of the US press release from Washington? Could it be the openness of the US culture and the desire to inform the press? Or is it the ignorance and neglect of the cultures of the Horn of Africa? Or was it arrogance based on "
the west knows best"?
In the Horn of Africa, for that matter anywhere, let alone for a deadly conflict like what they had in their hands, even for a domestic dispute one doesn't go public with details of a mediation effort before he/she has a plan that is accepted by both sides. Of course one can give up and can spill the details of the effort out in the public for the sake of the record. But if the peace plan was presented on the 31st can we really say they gave up in only 3 days? After all the peace plan was in a language that is foreign to both parties. Don't they need at least a week to study it? Patience was needed and it seems the US team didn't have one. As if making peace was like serving a hamburger in a fast-food restaurant the US team went for "
a quick fix" and that backfired. While Susan Rice was still in Addis, negotiating with
Meles and conferring with the OAU, going out to public with the US-Rwanda plan only makes one suspect of the motive. Just wait it doesn't get better but only worse.
Attack on Ambeset-Geleba
The morning of June 3, Ethiopia attacked Eritrean positions along the Ambeset-Geleba area of Eritrea. This was also a new front, the middle part of the Mereb-Altiena front. The government of Eritrea announced to the world that it had protested to the facilitators about these new attacks. It further underlined that
the attack could impede the facilitation process underway provoking a larger confrontation.
Second Mistake
On the afternoon of June 4, 1998, a day after the public announcement of the peace plan in Washington, before Ethiopia announced its acceptance of the US-Rwanda plan, Susan Rice held a news conference, this time in Addis Ababa. In her words:
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has indicated to me that he would be prepared to accept the proposal after consulting his government.
Two mistakes in two days! No one will know what Susan Rice was thinking, but it looks and sounds that the news conference was designed to force Eritrea to accept the US-Rwanda plan. This is not the way sincere and neutral mediators conduct mediation.
The act makes one ask a question. Did Susan Rice know that very evening, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia was going to declare "
acceptance" of the US-Rwanda plan on one hand and in the same breath order Ethiopian defense forces to take all necessary measures to attack Eritrea? We might never get an answer, but we have to ask.
The Bombing of Asmara
Late Thursday night (June 4, 1998), Susan Rice arrived in Asmara. Within hours of her arrival the US State Department ordered the evacuation of its citizens from Asmara. The
BBC reported the news. The time stamp for the BBC's report was Friday, June 5, 1998 at 04:39 GMT 05:39. This is 7:39 A.M Asmara time. You can check it for yourself from the BBC's archive. Here is the address
http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ ... 107130.stm
Note that this was before Susan Rice held talks with Eritrean Officials. Why then did her office (the State Department) order the evacuation of US citizens from Asmara? If it was out of a general fear, how come US citizens were not ordered to evacuate from northern Ethiopia as well? Sure there were travel warnings along the border but a wholesale evacuation of your own citizens from a country that you are trying to bring peace makes you look suspicious? Could Meles have told her that he was bombing Asmara the next day? Even if he did couldn't the US, as a mediator, ask him not to do it? By evacuating one's own citizens you are just giving him a green light to bomb those very Africans you were mediating to save their lives.
After Susan Rice and her entourage left, in the early hours of the afternoon of June 5, 1998, at 14:10 local time Ethiopian fighter jets attacked Eritrea's capital, Asmara that is miles away from the border.
Which one Reads like a Rejection?
Not anticipating the bombing of Asmara, the Eritrean government had already reacted in a positive manner to the US-Rwanda plan. Here is what it had said the morning of June 5 1998:
The four-point recommendations that have evolved in the facilitation process address the paramount issues that the Government of Eritrea has been raising and are, therefore, not controversial at all to the Government of Eritrea. At the same time, the Government of Eritrea believes that the facilitation process has not been consummated and that there are still serious issues of detail and implementation that need to be worked out in the period ahead.
-- Eritrean MOFA, June 5, 1998
This statement was taken as "
a rejection" and the Ethiopians must have got an indirect go ahead to bomb Eritrea into an acceptance. This was another big mistake. In any case, let's compare this Eritrean statement with what the Ethiopian government has been saying for the last eight months on the OAU Technical Arrangements. Here is a sample from September 4, 1999
In general, while the clarifications provided by the OAU have been helpful, Ethiopia needs to be certain that its territories taken by force are restored. IT CANNOT COMPROMISE ITS VITAL INTERESTS FOR THE SAKE OF APPEARING TO STAND FOR PEACE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA HAS MADE A COMMITMENT TO ITS PEOPLE THAT IT WILL NOT ALLOW AGGRESSION TO STAND. THE PROMISE MUST BE KEPT. This requires the Ethiopian Government to insist on the removal of all loopholes that might impede the full restoration of the status quo ante. Ethiopia seeks nothing more than the restoration of its sovereignty.
--Ethiopian MOFA September 4, 1999 [Emphasis added]
Let's remember that Ethiopia made this statement two weeks after the OAU delivered its clarification on August 23, 1999. It was also a week after a trio of high-ranking US delegation had held talks with Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa. The trio consisted of Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice, US Special Envoy
Anthony Lake, and
Gàyle Smith of the National Security Council. According to news reports the delegation was in Addis for four days, August 29- September 1. We can also remember that Ethiopia had fabricated another ghost attack by Eritrea around Zalambessa on September 2, 1999.
What is interesting is the following statement by Anthony Lake in defense of Ethiopia's stand on the Technical Arrangements. Here is Anthony Lake, a man who had never spoken a word in over a year, talking. The
Boston Globe's
John Donnelly is quoting him.
President Clinton's chief negotiator on the Ethiopia-Eritrea war said yesterday that Ethiopia is expected to decide in days whether to sign or reject a cease-fire deal. ... Soon after the US delegation left Addis Ababa, it was widely reported that Ethiopia had rejected the peace deal. But Lake said ETHIOPIA NEVER REJECTED the terms and asked for further clarifications. 'Ethiopia has informed us authoritatively that they HAVE NOT REACHED A FINAL DECISION, and so we remain in close contact with them,' he said.
--The Boston Globe, September 18, 1999. (Emphasis added)
If the statement from September 4, 1999 was not clear enough to the US mediator who insisted Ethiopian leaders haven't reached a final decision, they repeated their decision for him in even more clear language. It came 80 days after Anthony Lake's Ethiopia
have not reached a final decision
statement.
Here is Ethiopian statement:
[W]hat we have realized is that up until recently the preoccupation of the various quarters that have the leverage of influencing the international community has to a major part been to force Ethiopia through arms twisting into accepting the document WHICH IS FAR FROM COMPLETE AND REPLETE WITH SHORTCOMINGS. We believe the focus should have been on correcting the issues over which the Ethiopian government has voiced its concern and ultimately give peace a chance. In my own belief, THERE IS ONE AND ONLY ONE OPTION FOR THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. Our position remains that THIS IS THE ONLY WAY PEACE CAN BE REALIZED. I don't believe that peace can be ACHIEVED WITHOUT SECURING A DOCUMENT THAT WOULD HELP REALIZE THIS, and through arms twisting of the Ethiopian government.
-- Meles Zenawi's Interview with
Ethiopian TV, December 6, 1999. [Emphasis added]
If the international community is truly interested in facilitating peace, however, IT NEEDS TO TAKE A NEW APPROACH. Rather than pressuring Ethiopia to SIGN THE FLAWED TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS, the world community needs to apply pressure to the invader, Eritrea. Had the international community early on identified and condemned Eritrea as the aggressor party, rather than putting it on the same footing as Ethiopia, the victim of aggression, much loss of life and property could have been avoided.
-- Ethiopian MOFA, December 8, 1999 [emphasis added]
This being Ethiopia's reaction to the Technical Arrangements, we are still being told, again by the US, Ethiopia
REMAINS FULLY ENGAGED
in the OAU peace process.
Read for yourself.
The United States calls upon the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia to REMAIN FULLY ENGAGED IN THE OAU PEACE PROCESS, and extends its unqualified support to the continuing efforts of the OAU and the Personal Representative of the Algerian President, Mr. Ahmed Ouayahia.
-- Press statement by
James P. Rubin, March 9, 2000.
This is indeed a puzzle. What is it that the US mediators are not getting? Is it that the party that they had favored all along told them "
NO", or they really believe the Woyanes are not saying NO? From what it looks the Americans seem to tell the Ethiopian government,
you haven't rejected the plan,
when in fact Ethiopia is telling them in clear and uncertain language that the Technical Arrangement is dead unless it meets the Ethiopian position.
By the way the Ethiopian government was not speaking in Amharic or Wagagoda, the Esperanto-type synthesis of four languages the Ethiopian government created, it spoke in English. Thus it is hard to fathom why the Americans are still in denial. Let's continue with June 1998.
Taking over the OAU at Ouagadougou
Immediately after Susan Rice heard from the Eritrean officials, which was not a rejection by any standard, but it must have been taken as rejection by her, she left for Burkina Faso.
It was with Susan Rice's arrival at Ouagadougou that the OAU entered the mediation process full force. At the Ouagadougou meeting, through the help and collaboration of OAU's Secretary General,
Salim Ahmed Salim, the US team was successful to get an OAU backing for its plan. Here is how one informed source put it:
In collusion with Ethiopia and under pressure by the US, [Salim Ahmed Salim] decided to take the unprecedented step of introducing the facilitators' proposal at the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Ouagadougou in June 1998. Mr. Salim even managed to have the afternoon meeting during which the Eritrean-Ethiopian dispute was to be discussed postponed until the evening to ensure the participation of Susan Rice.
-- Amha-Tsion Tekle Haimanot, Dehai Post,
http://www.primenet.com/~ephrem2/eritreanoau/salim.html
Again the OAU Secretary General's motive might have been noble, but if you are a mediator, what matters is not what you think, but rather how the fighting parties perceive your motives. Let's look more from the source quoted above:
The participation of a non-African country [US] in an OAU meeting in any but a ceremonial nature was not only unprecedented but a flagrant violation of the Charter and the Rules of Procedure. Even worse, one of the Facilitators [Susan Rice]- and the non-African at that- was allowed to dominate the discussion from the podium. Such domination of the discussion, and some US lobbying, resulted in rushing the ministers into accepting the facilitators' formula.
-- ibid
What was the US doing in the halls of the OAU? Did the OAU ask for the US help or was the US trying to force its Peace-Plan on the OAU? One way or the other, the US was successful in convincing, thanks to being the only rich superpower of the world, the OAU to adopt its US-Rwanda plan as its own.
Not only this, the US also used its influence in the UN, and made the UN Security Council to assume the responsibility of enforcing the US plan (now OAU plan). In a matter of one month, by June 26, 1998, the plan that was born as a US-Rwanda was baptized as an "
OAU plan" and was adopted as a UN Security Council Resolution 1177. Even when the OAU, came up with a "
new" plan four months later, the Framework for Agreement, in the words of a highly placed US official, was also authored by the US.
The OAU Framework, Clarifications and UN Resolutions
The OAU presented its draft peace plan in November 1998. Eritrea and Ethiopia were asked to give comments on it. Eritrea submitted its questions on December 12, 1998. On December 17, 1998, before replying to Eritrea's questions, the OAU adopted the Framework as final. Five weeks were going to pass, until January 26, 1999, before the OAU gave an answer to Eritrea. It could only be by design. Otherwise fairnes would demand that Eritrea's questions get answered before the OAU votes on the document.
Even when it answered, from the way the answers were written to Eritrea and compared with the way the OAU responded to Ethiopia's questions nine months later, one could see a world of a difference. I am not convinced it was only because the chairmanship was transferred from Burkina Faso to Algeria. It has to do with the way the mediators, basically the US, wanted to handle Eritrean and Ethiopian concerns.
After Eritrea got OAU's "
sarcastic answers", within 72 hours, the US rushed to the Security Council on January 29, 1999. It had drafted a Resolution that was adopted without a debate as UNSC Resolution 1226. Here are parts of it.
3. STRESSES that it is of primary importance that THE OAU FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BE ACCEPTED, and calls for cooperation with the OAU and full implementation of the Framework Agreement without delay;
4. Welcomes the acceptance by Ethiopia of the OAU Framework Agreement;
5.... notes the fact that THE OAU HAS RESPONDED TO ERITREA'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATIONS of the Framework Agreement and, in this regard, STRONGLY URGES ERITREA TO ACCEPT THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT as the basis for a peaceful resolution of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea without delay.
We have already read what Anthony Lake had told the Boston Globe on September 18, 1999. That was a month after the OAU had given detailed answers to Ethiopian questions. We also have read how the US press release of March 9, 2000 read after the Ethiopian Prime Minister clearly said his government will not accept the Technical Arrangements. Ethiopian decision was clear. Ethiopia had said it has rejected the document unless the OAU rewrites the Technical Arrangements to comply with Ethiopia's demand and in full. By mid January the OAU was quoted as having given a second reply to Ethiopia. This time to the 14 pages of questions the Ethiopians said they had submited to the OAU. The following was how the Chinese news agency
Xinhua reported it.
The African organization has responded adequately to Ethiopia's request for clarifications of technical arrangement designed to solve the conflict peacefully, an unidentified OAU official was quoted as saying. After all the detailed clarifications made by the OAU to Ethiopia, it will be surprising if war is to resume, the official said, adding that the clarifications should enable Ethiopia to have the confidence to sign the peace plan.
-- XINHUA, January 14, 2000
Eritrea had said, it doesn't know the content of this reply or either Ethiopia's 14-page questions. This is another unfair way of mediating. Six weeks after these reported clarifications, by the end of February, there were hints that the OAU is thinking of amending its Technical Arrangements. What should one say to this?
What about the UN Security Council?
The UN Security Council response came 60 days (exactly 20 times the time it gave to Eritrea; 3 days x 20 = 60 days). Even there it was nowhere close to the "
urging of acceptance" that it had used on Eritrea. Here is a news release the UNSC issued on March 14, 2000:
14 March -- Members called upon both Eritrea and Ethiopia to cooperate fully and urgently with the OAU and participate constructively in its ongoing efforts to achieve implementation of the peace plan contained in the Framework Agreement and its Modalities for Implementation.
The issue here is not why didn't the UNSC pass a resolution urging the Ethiopian government to accept the Technical Arrangements, but why is the UNSC treating the two countries differently? If the ways the OAU, the UNSC and the US treatment of the two countries are different, the reason must be because of the common denominator that exists in the three bodies. The US hand.
The Past is an Indication
Let's go back in history and let's look how a US Secretary of State put saw the concern of the Eritrean people 50 years ago.
From the point of view of justice, the opinion of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the US in the Red Sea Basin and world peace make it necessary that the country be linked with our ally Ethiopia.
--
John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State.
Here is also what Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, at the time a Professor of International Affairs at the Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service thought of the Eritrean armed struggle for independence.
Without offending Eritreans, I think we can not really say they are the freedom fighters of the Horn, they are the Mujahadeen or somebody that is really alright is on their side. It is a very complex question. Haile Selassie had trouble with the issue. There has been this separatist movement in that area and I think your earlier question Peter, as to whether we are for more and more small countries and drawing lines is a very hard question. The Eritreans, theoretically, also have been used by the Palestinians or PLO fragments, in order to disrupt Ethiopia. So it is very hard to make an assessment.
-- "
Great Decisions", a
PBS weekly program,
Peter Krogh host, 1988
If the past is any indication to the present, here we have it! It is a State Department lead by Ms. Albright that is handling the Eritrea-Ethiopia issue. It is the same department that dedicated a month of debate on African issues at the UNSC, but the most urgent issue of Africa, the Eritrea-Ethiopia was declared off limits. It is the same department that is advising the US Congress not to hold open hearings on the issue and it is the same Department that had told Algeria and the OAU to back off from pressuring Ethiopia between September and December. Thus can we really say the US is a fair mediator? Is there evenhandedness in the way Eritrea and Ethiopia are treated by the US? Unless the issue of evenhandedness is taken care of it will be hard to bring meaningful peace.
Finally we all know that Ethiopia is going to "
remain engaged" in the peace process as long as
Badme and its immediate surrounding
gets interpreted to have a 1000-km radius, and "
non amendable" document is going to be amended.
For justice and fairness sake, let the mediators be evenhanded. In short the US has to choose, either to remain a true mediator and continue fine-tuning the peace process until both parties accept it, or consistently use its power at the UN Security Council to demand the demarcation of the border by the UN Cartographic Unit without delay. Yes when the US wants to use the UNSC it can use it.
Dark Energy wrote: ↑01 Aug 2025, 10:18
Zmeselo,
I don’t think you are a bad person. What is in it for you ? the administrations of US democratic presidents starting from President Clinton were not against the people of Eritrea. Eritreans deadly enemy is the man who calls himself Isayas Afewerqi. you are certainly an agent of Isayas Afewerqi. Now, coming back to President Tramp who knows very well how who Isayas is. But, President Tramp will not be softer than the democrats were. He is far more allied to Egypt than Ethiopia, he wants to find a home for Palestinians outside of Gaza, obviously the RedSea security is very critical for him. Does he admire Isayas Afewerqi, give me a break .
But, he is far more dangerous to Isayas than any of his predecessors were.
's annexation of 
would've been prevented in the absence of US/UN '
