Mereja.Forum

[Za-Ilmaknun]

As much as one is right in deploring Fano’s divisions, one should not discount the genuine efforts made by Fano groups to form larger sub-regional commands, including their effort, albeit so far unsuccessful, to bring all Fano units under one military and political command. Nor should one lose sight of or underestimate the common cause binding the various Fano groups.

the Amhara subregional divisions of Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo, and Shewa were traditionally part of the history of the Amhara people. Each subregion was a political center endowed with its own defense force and standing in competition against the other centers, including a competition for the highest power of “king of kings” of Ethiopia. The fact that Fano groups have coalesced around these subregional identities is little surprising for someone who pays attention to the history of the Amhara people. Even if the ethno-nationalist norm of political organization under the TPLF’s rule has erased the political importance of the subregional identities, it has not succeeded in uprooting them from the minds of the Amhara people. Seeing, against all odds, the long survival of Ethiopia, the conclusion that the subregional organizational scheme of Fano is necessarily a bad outcome may be too rushed a judgment.

The alleged shortcomings are hard to digest because they clash with Fano’s well-known astonishing accomplishments. To begin with the underestimation of Fano leaders, in light of their rapid and effective military victories against a vast, well-armed, and better financed government army, one cannot avoid the recognition that Fano’s accomplishments require the ability to organize, select achievable goals, and design careful plans to implement them in a flexible but determined manner. In the words of one supporter, in this short time frame, Fano has sustained its operations and shown significant tactical adeptness. Despite being pitted against well-equipped and trained government forces, Fano’s strategies have often outmaneuvered these forces, leveraging local knowledge and community support to offset the government’s superiority in arms and resources. This illustrates Fano’s strategic competence and highlights its rapid adaptability and learning curve under pressure.

https://borkena.com/2024/10/25/ethiopia ... ard-unity/

[Za-Ilmaknun]

Against the argument of political and ideological incompetence, one must underline the professional and educational diversity composing Fano’s social make-up. From peasants, workers, soldiers, and officers, to engineers, university teachers, and diverse professionals, Fano’s composition shows a remarkable variety of skills, educational levels, and professional aptitudes. Given this composition, to assume that able leaders cannot emerge from a situation that is, moreover, extremely challenging is disrespectful both to the Amhara people and Fano fighters [ከዚው ውስጥ መሪ አይወጣም ማለት ለህዝብም ለታጋዮቹም ንቀት ያስመስለዋል።]10.

The combination of able leadership with the varied composition of Fano compels us to come up with objective reasons, rather than incompetence, to account for the divisions and lack of a unifying political manifesto. One such reason draws attention to the formation and growth of Fano’s fighting force. What is specific about the force is that it has gone through the process of building itself from the ground up. As a rule, armed insurgencies are initiated by dedicated small and ideologically united groups of people who recruit other people over time so that the organizational process goes from top to bottom. In such a case, centralized command and ideological unity are built into the organization and always accompany its process of expansion. This style of growth changes the establishment of unified command and the acquisition of a common manifesto into nothing more than an officialization of what is already in existence.

Such is not the case with a fighting force that grew from the ground up. Unity and ideological convergence between fighters must be built step by step, county by county, district by district. Not only does this form of organization require more time and numerous discussions, but it is also faced with the difficult task of instituting an accepted leadership, as it is bound to select among competing candidates. Yet, these time-consuming difficulties do not come without their compensatory benefits. For one thing, the process of building from the ground up indicates that the insurrection has started in various localities and has grown in a centripetal fashion. This suggests that it has wide popular support and that it has its roots in grievances felt across the entire Amhara society. Unlike the centrifugal form of expansion, which involves steady growth using persuasion and indoctrination, the Amhara uprising looked spontaneous and spread like a bushfire.

[Za-Ilmaknun]

For another, leadership constituted by a centripetal form of organization offers the distinct benefit of being selective and merit-based. A fighting organization built from the bottom up has the advantage of instituting committed, disciplined, and battle-hardened leaders. Moreover, leaders have little chance of being selected unless they show prudence, insightfulness, care, and tactical mindfulness. In short, the centripetal fashion guarantees the kind of leadership that is wise and trustworthy. The selection by merit of the leadership explains, among other things, the ethical behavior of Fano fighters, a behavior attested by their treatment of the civilian population as well as of prisoners captured from the government’s army.

The other benefit of a merit-based selection is the opportunity given to Fano and the Amhara people to revise some accepted misconceptions. Those who complain about Fano’s inability to agree on a common platform and political leadership little realize that their criticisms originate from the engrained belief of Ethiopians that an organization works properly only if it is centralized, hierarchical, and ideologically one. The belief is an internalization of the bad bent inherited from the successive dictatorial governments that ruled and continue to rule Ethiopia since the introduction of modernity. The imperative demand that Fano fighters come under one military and political center, under pain of not being able to defeat Abiy’s government, is bred by the belief that decentralization and diversity entail anarchy and confusion as to who should lead the fight. In other words, the absence of tightly centralized control and command considerably weakens the ability to fight efficiently, encourages further fragmentation, and obstructs the design of an all encompassing vision. Yet, the more the virtues of centralization are hailed, the more they bring to mind whether, in embodying them, Fano does not abandon its leaning towards the cause of democracy in the future Ethiopia. If democracy is not implemented internally in the first place, does it not raise a legitimate concern as to Fano’s determination to democratize Ethiopian politics?