- Amani Al-Taweel: Will we find more than one Sudan at the end of the war?
Amani Al-Taweel
The current mutual interactions between the head of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” open the door wide to a division of Sudan that will not be less than three countries in the best of circumstances.
These trends emerged despite Al-Burhan’s trends towards forming a government in Port Sudan in response to the symbols of the old regime, especially the leaders of the National Congress Party, who are pushing for the continuation of the war.
On the other hand, declaring a government under any name of emergency or other would motivate Hemedti, according to his statements, to announce a parallel government in Khartoum, the country’s historical capital, which would mean a preliminary division of Sudan along the Libyan path. But perhaps the series of Sudanese divisions will not stop there, but rather It is expected to multiply according to complex and complex local and international dimensions.
With regard to the local component of the crisis, it is linked to historical dimensions, including that it is a newly formed country that did not know stable borders, as kingdoms were formed on its lands that are currently known to us, and the relations between these kingdoms were characterized by conflict based on the factors of ethnic division resulting from the Arab conquest in the seventh century, As well as the conflict over resources, which are the kingdoms of Al-Maqraa with its capital, Dongola, the Kingdom of Alwa and its capital, Soba, the Kingdom of Beja in eastern Sudan, the Kingdom of Dajo, and then in later historical stages the Kingdom of Funj.
This mosaic of peoples
In the 19th century, Muhammad Ali conquered Sudan in 1820 for reasons related to his conflict with Europe and securing his rule in Egypt. According to this development, the borders of modern Sudan were formed, which were completed in 1916 by annexing the Darfur region to it, and in the 1940s of the last century, South Sudan was annexed to it by a decision from Britain, which ruled it bilaterally with Egypt until 1956.
With regard to the social and cultural composition, Sudan is considered one of the most socially diverse and culturally diverse countries, and this diversity and pluralism even goes beyond it, as evidenced by the fact that many tribes are intertwined between Sudan and independent neighboring countries over the breadth of Sudan’s geographical borders, which enabled them to move between Sudan and other countries. Neighborhood.
Rural societies are characterized by their social structures and traditional ethnic and tribal subcultures. According to figures from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Sudanese Arabs constitute about two-thirds of the population in Sudan, including the Kababish in North Kordofan, who are famous for their camel breeding, and the Jaalun tribes, who are among the rulers of Sudan after independence. , the
Shaiqiyya who settled along the rivers, the nomadic Baggara communities in Kordofan and Darfur, and the Shukria and Batahin in eastern Sudan.
The rest of the population consists of other ethnic groups: the Beja in the east, the Nubians in the far north, the Fur and Zaghawa in Darfur, the Inqasna in the southern Blue Nile region, the Nuba in the mountains south of Kordofan, and others.
This mosaic of peoples is divided into about 600 tribes of different sizes, in addition to the presence of 300 languages. This diversity led to the outbreak of some civil wars that created a degree of threat to the overall Sudanese national security, and this indicates a weak ability to manage this diversity that could have been possible. To be a source of human and economic wealth for Sudan.
The weakness of the national integration process in Sudan was reflected in its historical political interactions, as it did not witness political stability even before its independence in 1956, as a civil war broke out in August 1955, and regional demands emerged in Darfur in 1961, and three outbreaks erupted in Sudan. Popular revolutions in the 1960s and 1980s.
After the December 2018 revolution that overthrew the regime of President Omar al-Bashir, the political transition process in Sudan extended for nearly four years, as the local political conflict, as well as the interactions of regional and international workers, resulted in armed conflicts in the capital, Khartoum, that extended mainly to the Darfur region. And some other areas according to the requirements of the military operation between the National Army and the “Rapid Support”.
It seems to us that stopping the war in Sudan is organically linked to the future of the political equations in Sudan and their actors, and whether these equations can carry out the tasks of handing over full power to civilians in Sudan, and achieving democratic development with a modern concept that can respond effectively to the process of structural development of the Sudanese state so that it moves from a state of Before the state, in which primary affiliations, i.e. race, religion, and tribe, play the decisive element in interactions, to the state of the state in the sense of crystallizing an agreed-upon social contract based on equal citizenship.
It also seems to us that the challenges facing the ambition to stop the war are diverse, but with different weights. For example, the nature of the role of the Sudanese military component in the future period occupies a major weight, and this is against the background of two things. The first is the ambition of both Al-Burhan and Hemedti to continue with the future scene of Sudan according to each of them’s assessment that it is He is able to resolve the military conflict in his favor, even though five full months have passed without achieving this goal.
The second matter is the indicators of the movements of the President of the Sovereign Council, which indicate his desire to continue in the political scene as president of the country in future equations, which explains to us the nature of his interactions with the conflicting political forces internally, and also the nature of his external movements recently.
A parallel major challenge is the issue of the formation of the professional national army, because the Sudanese military component currently appears in nine armed manifestations of different weights and without a single military doctrine, and is classified on an ethnic or tribal basis, and hence it is governed in its performance by these sub-national considerations, and it exercises Its political alliances are accordingly, and in some way cause confusion in the political interactions that take place in response to regional and ethnic sensitivities without necessarily paying attention to national and national considerations.
Attention to national necessities
On the civil level, the Sudanese revolution produced two types of political elites: the first belonged to political parties with diverse trends and political weights, and the second could be considered mere political activists, most of whom were young people belonging to the project of change and democratic transformation with its revolutionary and principled frameworks.
Naturally, the authoritarian regime that extended for 30 years in Sudan contributed to these elites’ lack of the competence required to manage the transition process, as the new elites were not given sufficient training to practice the transition tasks that are usually guaranteed in democratic systems. The authoritarian regime also played a role in dividing and fragmenting political parties to ensure His grip on power continued, and his opponents did not have the ability or the national horizon necessary to overcome the challenge of political division, especially after the revolution, a situation that is still prolonged and has not been able to overcome polarizations despite the war and its tragedies.
In this context, it cannot be denied that there is a state of greed for power on the part of parties who were deprived of it for a long time, and other parties find in power a safety valve against abuses that were committed against them in different periods, and then the post-revolution elites of the civil and military components committed major mistakes that allowed for reconciliation. The old regime has been dispersed and its forces have been crystallized into new organizations opposed to the project of a state of equal citizenship. It possesses armed capabilities that are currently being activated on the battlefields between the National Army and the “Rapid Support.”
The overall current interactions in the Sudanese scene mentioned above indicate the possibility of independence for each political or military group over part of the Sudanese national territory, and Hemedti’s threat to announce a parallel government was only the first step on the path to dividing Sudan, where the “Rapid Support” and its regions will ultimately be the focal point. It is Darfur, while the Eastern Sudan region is moving towards conquering the rest of the country with its sea port, which gives it the opportunity for insatiable regional interaction with ports and beaches, while Abdulaziz Al-Hilu, the governor of the Nuba Mountains regions, is invading the National Army’s points in its focal areas in Kordofan State, which nominates this state. And its mountains to be an independent region.
And last but not least, for decades, Islamists have put forward the idea of independence in the“Hamdi Triangle” from the rest of the state of Sudan, that is, the region whose inhabitants profess Islam and belong to the Arab race in the eastern and central regions of the country. This was a proposal by the former Sudanese Minister of Finance, Abdel-Rahim Hamdi, so that those seeking Sharia law exiles the Gentiles, that is, the non-Arab Sudanese.
This exclusionary thought in Sudan has produced a war that no one wants to end, and it produces a division that meets the ambitions of those who are greedy for power and influence at the expense of the unity of the Sudanese national territory, and at the expense of the remains of the victims and the millions of Sudanese who are bereaved by the loss of family, loved ones, homes, shelter, and the entire country.
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