Is Ethiopia Part of Oromia or Vice Versa?
By Fayyis Oropia
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent political assertion that “Oromia is bigger than Ethiopia” raises a critical question: Is Ethiopia part of Oromia, or is Oromia part of Ethiopia? Hitherto, Oromo politics has generally assumed the latter. Dr. Abiy’s statement, however, suggests that the former may be a more accurate way of understanding the relationship—a position I personally endorse.
I believe that the homeland of the Oromo, Oromia, encompasses a much larger part of Eastern Africa, of which present-day Ethiopia is only one component. What is required is the confidence to conceptualise the Oromo homeland on this broader regional scale, rather than limiting it to the core Oromo-speaking areas within the borders of Ethiopia.
Dr. Léncô Latà described the Horn of Africa as a common home for all Cushitic peoples, including Habeshanised communities such as the Amhara, Tigrayans, and Eritreans. Above all, it is a homeland of the Oromo, whose population extends across a vast area from Sudan to Tanzania. For this reason, the most effective Oromo political strategy should ultimately be oriented toward the integration of this wider region rather than toward the independence of a narrowly defined territorial entity.
The Oromo could therefore conceptualise their political journey through several stages: first liberating Orocaffé (the palace), then Orofinné (the capital city), followed by Oromia (the core homeland), Oropia (an Oromic-led Ethiopia), and ultimately Orohorn (an Oromic-led integration of the Horn of Africa).
Toward a Multilingual and Integrated Horn of Africa
One notable initiative of the Prosperity Party under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been the recognition of several major languages of the Horn of Africa as working languages. Moving beyond a system historically dominated by Amharic to give greater institutional recognition to Oromic, Tigrinya, Af-Somali, and Afaraf could contribute to a more inclusive political and cultural framework for the region.
Given the demographic size and geographic centrality of the Oromo people, such a transformation could naturally elevate the role of Oromic within a multilingual regional system. Ideally, however, this should occur within a broader commitment to linguistic equality rather than the dominance of any single language or ethnic group.
Oromo opposition groups could likewise benefit from adopting broader and more inclusive regional perspectives. A vision grounded in cooperation among peoples and languages may provide a stronger foundation for long-term cultural, economic, and political integration.
In this context, a more integrated Horn of Africa—whether through a confederation or as part of a wider East African federation—could emerge through shared institutions, mutual recognition, and respect for diversity. Such a future would be built not on the primacy of one identity, but on collaboration among all communities of the region.
The admission of Somalia as the eighth member of the East African Community (EAC) marked a significant step toward deeper regional integration and renewed discussions about a future East African political federation. In this evolving context, Ethiopia has also been discussed as a potential future candidate for membership.
Should Ethiopia, under an Oromic-led government, effectively function as Oropia, an Oromic-led geographical federation, and eventually join an expanding East African common market, the long-standing geopolitical concern over access to ports such as Assab could diminish in strategic importance. Ports in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania could instead become increasingly accessible through regional economic and political integration.
For the Oromo people, whose communities are geographically dispersed across the Horn of Africa and East Africa, such a development could represent a historic opportunity. Participation in a supranational federation of free peoples could promote economic integration, political cooperation, and cultural reconnection.
This vision also invites reflection on the Oromo national struggle, its historical trajectory, and the strategic choices facing Oromo political forces today.
The David and Goliath Metaphor in Oromo Political Thought
The biblical story of David and Goliath has long resonated among Oromo communities across religious and regional divides. At its core, the story illustrates how confidence, strategic clarity, and unity can enable a seemingly weaker party to overcome a far more powerful adversary.
In the narrative, the Israelite army, paralysed by fear, faced the Philistine giant Goliath for forty days without taking action. David, a young shepherd, interpreted the situation differently. While others saw an invincible giant, David saw a mortal adversary challenging a people whose cause he believed to be legitimate. Rejecting the king’s unfamiliar armour, he relied on his own tools and experience and ultimately defeated Goliath through precision and resolve.
The metaphor offers enduring lessons for the Oromo national struggle. Fear and hesitation can immobilise even a large population, whereas self-confidence and clarity of purpose can fundamentally alter political dynamics. Strategic patience may sometimes be necessary, but it must ultimately be accompanied by decisive action grounded in collective will and self-reliance.
The Oromo Struggle as a David-versus-Goliath Conflict
Within the Oromo political context, David represents the Oromo nation—a large but historically marginalised people who, in the view of Oromo nationalists, have experienced political repression, cultural suppression, and state violence. Goliath symbolises entrenched ruling elites and structures of domination, including oppressive regimes and the international actors that have supported them.
The often-repeated claim that a “small Tigrayan population ruled a much larger Oromo population” oversimplifies the historical reality. The TPLF’s dominance was not simply a function of population size; it was also shaped by military organisation, financial resources, diplomatic relationships, and international support. With substantial external assistance, sophisticated political communication, and regional alliances, the TPLF acquired institutional and strategic capabilities that far exceeded what its demographic size alone would suggest.
By contrast, the Oromo nation, despite its demographic strength, lacked comparable institutional capacity and international leverage.
Psychological warfare also played an important role in weakening Oromo resistance. Narratives portraying the Oromo liberation movement as ineffective, divided, or historically unsuccessful were, according to Oromo political interpretations, used to demoralise the population and delegitimise Oromo leadership. Such narratives often overlook the broader geopolitical context, including the disarmament of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) during the peace negotiations of the early 1990s and the military and political support provided to the TPLF by external actors.
Historical Patterns of External Intervention and Fragmentation
The Oromo struggle must be understood within a longer historical continuum of external interference and internal fragmentation. Oromo resistance has repeatedly been weakened, according to Oromo nationalist historiography, through foreign-backed campaigns, political division, co-optation, and the fragmentation of indigenous leadership.
Notable examples include:
- External support for Abyssinian rulers in dismantling Yejju Oromo authority in Gondar and subjugating Wallo.
- Forced religious conversions imposed on Wallo Oromos under Yohannes IV.
- European support for Menelik II’s southern expansion and the incorporation and colonisation of Oromo territories.
- The removal of Prince Iyasu, a Wallo Oromo heir, from imperial succession.
- The suppression of Oromo uprisings in Bale, Raya, and other regions amid varying forms of international involvement.
- The hijacking or political redirection of Oromo-led popular movements in 1974, 1991, and 2005.
The systematic isolation and fragmentation of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) through the creation or promotion of competing factions.
A consistent strategy of “divide and rule” has, in this interpretation, been employed to prevent Oromo political unity. Significant resources have allegedly been devoted to sowing discord within Oromo political organisations, thereby weakening the national movement from within.
The Imperative of Unity and Strategic Convergence
To counter these historical patterns, Oromo political forces must prioritise unity and strategic coherence. Fragmentation remains one of the greatest vulnerabilities of the Oromo national movement. A united political, diplomatic, and, where applicable, security strategy is essential for building domestic legitimacy and strengthening international recognition.
Importantly, unity does not require uniformity. Oromo political organisations represent different strategic approaches to self-determination:
- The OPP emphasises autonomy within a reformed Amarpia, understood here as an Amharic-led ethnic federation.
- The OFC advocates parliamentary opposition and democratic reform toward Orompia, understood as an Oromic-led ethnic federation.
- The OLF and OLA emphasise national liberation through mass mobilisation and armed resistance, with political visions ranging from an independent Oromia to an integrative Oropia, an Oromic-led geographical federation.
Pro-independence and pro-union Oromo perspectives therefore represent different possible routes toward the same fundamental objective: Oromo freedom and self-rule.
These strategies should be understood as potentially complementary rather than inherently contradictory. Ultimately, the political status of Oromia—whether autonomy, independence, or participation in a broader regional union—should be determined by the Oromo people through a free, fair, and inclusive democratic process.
A Conceptual Framework for Oromo Political Futures
The Oromo political journey may be conceptualised through a series of symbolic stages:
- Djibouti symbolises the current condition of colonial subjugation.
- Ayisha represents genuine federal autonomy within Amarpia.
- Dire Dawa symbolises an independent Oromo republic.
- Adama represents Orompia, an Oromic-led Ethiopia.
- Finfinne represents a future supranational union of free peoples in the Horn of Africa, with Oropia as one of its central pillars.
The final three stages represent legitimate political aspirations. None should be dismissed as betrayal so long as the right of the Oromo people to determine their political future is respected.
International Relations and the Question of Alliances
Efforts to cooperate with anti-regime Amhara forces have largely failed, in my view, because many Amhara political elites have been unwilling to recognise the principle of national self-determination. Continued attachment to imperial unity and centralised political dominance has alienated many Oromo political actors and made broader alliances more difficult.
The current hybrid Biltsigina regime has also exploited these divisions by fuelling intercommunal conflict: Oromo versus Oromo, Amhara versus Amhara, and Oromo versus Amhara. By presenting itself as an ally of opposing political extremes at different times, the regime has deepened mistrust and violence, often with the unwitting participation of genuine activists.
Historically, the OLF effectively balanced unionist and independence narratives as strategic instruments. This flexibility strengthened its bargaining position and reduced unnecessary polarisation. Reclaiming such strategic pluralism remains essential.
Conclusion: Toward Irreversible Oromo Freedom
The Oromo national struggle, symbolised by the David-versus-Goliath metaphor, has achieved significant milestones, but the task of consolidation remains unfinished. Success depends on four critical pillars:
- Oromo self-reliance.
- Strategic diplomacy and international engagement.
- Strong, disciplined, and accountable liberation institutions.
- Unity across all Oromo political pathways.
The future form of sovereignty should not be predetermined by political elites or external actors. Rather, it should ultimately be decided by the Oromo people themselves through democratic means once genuine self-rule has been restored.
A unitary Ethiopia rooted in imperial nostalgia is no longer, in my view, a viable political project. Pseudo-federalism is increasingly losing legitimacy. Transitional ethnic federalism may provide short-term stability, while independence remains a legitimate option.
Ultimately, however, a union of free and equal peoples in the Horn of Africa, with Oropia as one of its central pillars, may offer the most durable long-term solution.
If unity, wisdom, and strategic patience prevail, Oromo freedom can become irreversible, and the future of Bigger Oromia and/or Oropia will finally rest in the hands of its people.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2018/12/1 ... r-goliath/