After blowing the bridge between Galla and Amhara, Abiy Ahmed is Restoration of ጋላማራ - A decoy and a Death Trap for Amhara.
ጋላ አብይ አህመድ በትግራይ ጦርነት ውስጥ የአማራ ሃይሎች እና ህዝብ የተሰውለትን አንዳች ነገር ሳይጠብቅ ለአጋሜ ወያኔ አስልፎ ከሰጠ ብኋላ አይኑን በጨው አጥቦ ድጋሜ የአማራ ህዝብ ለጋላማራ ጥምረት ይሰብካል። ዛሬ ራያ ኮረም አላማጣ የት ነው? ለአጋሜ ተላልፎ ተሰጥቷል፤ ወልቃይት እንድሁ እንደሚሰጥ እርግጠኛ ነው። ከወልቃይት በጌምድሬ ነው ወደ የወልቃይት አማርኛ ትግርኛ ያለው እኮ ከፕሪቶሪያ ማግስት ነው። ለመሆኑ ጋላ አብይ አህመድን የሚያምን ምን አይነት አንጎል የሌለው ነው። የጋላ እና የአጋሜዎች ጠብ እኮ አማራን ገድሎ በአማራ ላይ ዕጣ መጣጣል ነው።
Re: After blowing the bridge between Galla and Amhara, Abiy Ahmed is Restoration of ጋላማራ
A con artist. He went to Gurage zone and said good things about Gurages and they fall for it.
No. This will not work. He tried to do tha same thing with Tigray and failed.
Abiye the clown is finished. It would be a huge mistake if Ethiopians allow him to escape with his life.
Get this mfk and hang him in public square.
No. This will not work. He tried to do tha same thing with Tigray and failed.
Abiye the clown is finished. It would be a huge mistake if Ethiopians allow him to escape with his life.
Get this mfk and hang him in public square.
Re: After blowing the bridge between Galla and Amhara, Abiy Ahmed is Restoration of ጋላማራ
Abesha Elites Fighting PM Abiy Indicates He Is on the Right Track Regarding the Oromo
By Fayyis Oropia
The intensifying tensions between the hybrid political regime of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and segments of the Amhara elite within the broader Habesha political sphere represent a significant development in contemporary Ethiopian politics. This moment may be interpreted through the well-known observation attributed to Dr. Léncô Latà: “When Amhara elites support me, I ask myself whether I have done something wrong; when they oppose me, I know I am doing the right thing.” Viewed in this light, the current confrontation may indicate an important shift in Ethiopia’s political alignment.
As Dr. Abiy came to power through the bloody sacrifices of Oromo youth (Qérrô and Qarré), Amhara elites quickly sought to win him over to their side. They did everything possible to instrumentalize him, much as they had previously done with Mengistu H. Ayàna during the Derg era. To some extent, they succeeded, as Dr. Abiy cracked down on genuine Oromo liberation forces. Over time, however, they lost confidence in him and eventually sought to remove him from power. Today, they denounce him and his administration as the “oppressive racist OPDO.” In current political discourse, “OPDO regime” has become a code word replacing the phrase “evil Oromummà,” which had previously been used to demonize Oromo political aspirations.
The emerging divide between the northern hegemonist forces—often associated with Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane—and the ruling Prosperity Party (Biltsiginna) suggests that the Prime Minister may be recalibrating his political position. This repositioning appears to bring him closer to Oromo political constituencies, whether out of strategic necessity or evolving political conviction. Attempting to balance fundamentally opposing political blocs has become increasingly untenable, illustrating the political risks of divided loyalties.
Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to maintain support among both Amhara and Oromo elites have gradually eroded trust on both sides. Initially benefiting from broad-based backing, his administration has struggled to satisfy the divergent expectations of these constituencies. More recent indications of alignment with Oromo interests have further alienated segments of his earlier Amhara support base. If this shift proves substantive rather than tactical, it may represent a move toward greater political coherence. Policy measures such as elevating the Oromo language within federal institutions could further signal a meaningful departure from historically entrenched linguistic hierarchies.
Ethiopian political history reveals recurring patterns of alliance and instrumentalization. Under Menelik II, figures such as Gobana played pivotal roles before eventually falling out of favor. Likewise, Emperor Haile Selassie confronted political challenges involving Lij Iyasu, while the Derg regime under Mengistu H. Ayàna executed Haile Fida. More recently, the imprisonment of Jawar Mohammed reflects similar tensions. In each instance, Oromo actors were incorporated into state structures in ways that often undermined independent Oromo political aspirations.
During the 1974 Revolution, despite substantial Oromo participation, political power ultimately consolidated under Mengistu H. Ayàna, whose government suppressed ethno-political movements, including Oromo nationalism. This pattern underscores the broader dynamic in which centralized state authority has frequently overridden the political agency of Ethiopia’s constituent national groups.
Comparable dynamics have persisted in the contemporary period. Although Oromo participation was instrumental in the political transition that brought Abiy Ahmed to power, the Prosperity Party leadership maintained core elements of centralized governance and linguistic continuity. This approach contributed to conflicts involving both the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), reflecting unresolved tensions within Ethiopia’s multinational political framework.
Historically, resistance to the Naftagna system—associated with cultural and political centralization—has been widespread among Ethiopia’s diverse national groups. Critics argue that elements of this system continue to persist in contemporary political institutions. Opposition movements, including Oromo and Tigrayan forces, continue to challenge these structures, although their efforts have been complicated by fragmentation and political ambiguity.
Within Oromo political discourse, skepticism is growing regarding the prospects for meaningful reform within existing institutional arrangements. Longstanding arguments advanced by organizations such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)—that the Ethiopian state structure resists substantive democratization—are receiving renewed attention.
The characterization of certain political actors as “pan-Ethiopian” has also come under increased scrutiny. Critics contend that this label may obscure underlying continuities in linguistic and cultural dominance, particularly the continued privileging of Amharic within federal institutions. This has implications for political participation and representation, especially for non-Amharic-speaking populations.
At the same time, there are indications of evolving perspectives among segments of Amhara political thought, including greater engagement with concepts such as internal colonization. Such developments may create opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between Oromo and Amhara political actors. In this context, the principal point of contention is increasingly framed as the structure and direction of the current political system rather than as interethnic rivalry.
Expectations of external support for democratization also warrant critical reassessment. Historical experience suggests that international actors often prioritize stability and strategic interests over transformative political change. As a result, domestic political agency remains the decisive factor in shaping Ethiopia’s future political trajectory.
Looking ahead, the political evolution of the Horn of Africa may be significantly influenced by the relationship between Oromo and Amhara political forces. Constructive engagement between these groups could play a role comparable to other historical examples of regional cooperation. Such collaboration, however, would require mutual recognition, political equality, and a shared commitment to democratic principles.
The Prosperity Party continues to face opposition from multiple fronts while also employing strategies aimed at preventing unified resistance. These include political fragmentation, narrative control, and the exacerbation of societal divisions. Addressing these challenges will require both greater internal cohesion within political movements and broader coalition-building efforts.
Ultimately, sustainable political transformation in Ethiopia will depend on the ability of its diverse national groups to articulate a shared vision grounded in equality, self-governance, and voluntary cooperation. Whether pursued through a strengthened federal system or alternative constitutional arrangements, the emphasis is likely to remain on creating inclusive political institutions capable of accommodating the country’s complex social fabric.
In this context, the central political challenge remains clear: achieving systemic reform while avoiding further polarization. From this perspective, the rejection of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed by northern hegemonist forces may be interpreted as an indication that he is moving in the direction described by Dr. Léncô Latà’s observation.
Galatôma
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/1 ... -h-mariam/
By Fayyis Oropia
The intensifying tensions between the hybrid political regime of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and segments of the Amhara elite within the broader Habesha political sphere represent a significant development in contemporary Ethiopian politics. This moment may be interpreted through the well-known observation attributed to Dr. Léncô Latà: “When Amhara elites support me, I ask myself whether I have done something wrong; when they oppose me, I know I am doing the right thing.” Viewed in this light, the current confrontation may indicate an important shift in Ethiopia’s political alignment.
As Dr. Abiy came to power through the bloody sacrifices of Oromo youth (Qérrô and Qarré), Amhara elites quickly sought to win him over to their side. They did everything possible to instrumentalize him, much as they had previously done with Mengistu H. Ayàna during the Derg era. To some extent, they succeeded, as Dr. Abiy cracked down on genuine Oromo liberation forces. Over time, however, they lost confidence in him and eventually sought to remove him from power. Today, they denounce him and his administration as the “oppressive racist OPDO.” In current political discourse, “OPDO regime” has become a code word replacing the phrase “evil Oromummà,” which had previously been used to demonize Oromo political aspirations.
The emerging divide between the northern hegemonist forces—often associated with Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane—and the ruling Prosperity Party (Biltsiginna) suggests that the Prime Minister may be recalibrating his political position. This repositioning appears to bring him closer to Oromo political constituencies, whether out of strategic necessity or evolving political conviction. Attempting to balance fundamentally opposing political blocs has become increasingly untenable, illustrating the political risks of divided loyalties.
Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to maintain support among both Amhara and Oromo elites have gradually eroded trust on both sides. Initially benefiting from broad-based backing, his administration has struggled to satisfy the divergent expectations of these constituencies. More recent indications of alignment with Oromo interests have further alienated segments of his earlier Amhara support base. If this shift proves substantive rather than tactical, it may represent a move toward greater political coherence. Policy measures such as elevating the Oromo language within federal institutions could further signal a meaningful departure from historically entrenched linguistic hierarchies.
Ethiopian political history reveals recurring patterns of alliance and instrumentalization. Under Menelik II, figures such as Gobana played pivotal roles before eventually falling out of favor. Likewise, Emperor Haile Selassie confronted political challenges involving Lij Iyasu, while the Derg regime under Mengistu H. Ayàna executed Haile Fida. More recently, the imprisonment of Jawar Mohammed reflects similar tensions. In each instance, Oromo actors were incorporated into state structures in ways that often undermined independent Oromo political aspirations.
During the 1974 Revolution, despite substantial Oromo participation, political power ultimately consolidated under Mengistu H. Ayàna, whose government suppressed ethno-political movements, including Oromo nationalism. This pattern underscores the broader dynamic in which centralized state authority has frequently overridden the political agency of Ethiopia’s constituent national groups.
Comparable dynamics have persisted in the contemporary period. Although Oromo participation was instrumental in the political transition that brought Abiy Ahmed to power, the Prosperity Party leadership maintained core elements of centralized governance and linguistic continuity. This approach contributed to conflicts involving both the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), reflecting unresolved tensions within Ethiopia’s multinational political framework.
Historically, resistance to the Naftagna system—associated with cultural and political centralization—has been widespread among Ethiopia’s diverse national groups. Critics argue that elements of this system continue to persist in contemporary political institutions. Opposition movements, including Oromo and Tigrayan forces, continue to challenge these structures, although their efforts have been complicated by fragmentation and political ambiguity.
Within Oromo political discourse, skepticism is growing regarding the prospects for meaningful reform within existing institutional arrangements. Longstanding arguments advanced by organizations such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)—that the Ethiopian state structure resists substantive democratization—are receiving renewed attention.
The characterization of certain political actors as “pan-Ethiopian” has also come under increased scrutiny. Critics contend that this label may obscure underlying continuities in linguistic and cultural dominance, particularly the continued privileging of Amharic within federal institutions. This has implications for political participation and representation, especially for non-Amharic-speaking populations.
At the same time, there are indications of evolving perspectives among segments of Amhara political thought, including greater engagement with concepts such as internal colonization. Such developments may create opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between Oromo and Amhara political actors. In this context, the principal point of contention is increasingly framed as the structure and direction of the current political system rather than as interethnic rivalry.
Expectations of external support for democratization also warrant critical reassessment. Historical experience suggests that international actors often prioritize stability and strategic interests over transformative political change. As a result, domestic political agency remains the decisive factor in shaping Ethiopia’s future political trajectory.
Looking ahead, the political evolution of the Horn of Africa may be significantly influenced by the relationship between Oromo and Amhara political forces. Constructive engagement between these groups could play a role comparable to other historical examples of regional cooperation. Such collaboration, however, would require mutual recognition, political equality, and a shared commitment to democratic principles.
The Prosperity Party continues to face opposition from multiple fronts while also employing strategies aimed at preventing unified resistance. These include political fragmentation, narrative control, and the exacerbation of societal divisions. Addressing these challenges will require both greater internal cohesion within political movements and broader coalition-building efforts.
Ultimately, sustainable political transformation in Ethiopia will depend on the ability of its diverse national groups to articulate a shared vision grounded in equality, self-governance, and voluntary cooperation. Whether pursued through a strengthened federal system or alternative constitutional arrangements, the emphasis is likely to remain on creating inclusive political institutions capable of accommodating the country’s complex social fabric.
In this context, the central political challenge remains clear: achieving systemic reform while avoiding further polarization. From this perspective, the rejection of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed by northern hegemonist forces may be interpreted as an indication that he is moving in the direction described by Dr. Léncô Latà’s observation.
Galatôma
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/1 ... -h-mariam/
-
ethiopianunity
- Senior Member
- Posts: 11203
- Joined: 30 Apr 2007, 17:38
Re: After blowing the bridge between Galla and Amhara, Abiy Ahmed is Restoration of ጋላማራ
Who is he Aby, eliminating right now thinking he has backing from Westerners after signing off for corporation he thinks the West is going to support him, l don't think so. He just goes to war without any strategic plan because he is taking orders from them. Abere maybe right, Meles eliminated many Ethiopian soldiers that are pro Ethiopians using the Badme border as excuse ,war with Eritrea. When he knew Ethiopia was winning the war and the soldiers want to continue the war against Isayas, Meles ordered Tplf soldiers to kill Ethiopian soldiers from behind ! Utter betrayal , enemy of the people and Ethiopia! 
when you are on the same side fighting but sneak behind and killing Ethiopian soldiers!
I will not believe there is animosity between Isayas and Aby, Olf who are appointed by Shabia. My guess is to repeat Meles type war to eliminate Orthodox majority left over in Amara and Tigray! You can always make excuse against Shabia, war to eliminate the people you don't want to. Even if pp doesn't want this war, West particularly Brit, U.S, Egypt and Israel want this war to control the Nile! They know that at least Amara will not allow them take natural resources Nile that came from Amara region, now called Benshangul purposely carved out by Tplf creating war between Benshangul people and Amara. Benshangul people emigrated to this region planned by Brit, it was not their land, they should go to S Sudan!
when you are on the same side fighting but sneak behind and killing Ethiopian soldiers! I will not believe there is animosity between Isayas and Aby, Olf who are appointed by Shabia. My guess is to repeat Meles type war to eliminate Orthodox majority left over in Amara and Tigray! You can always make excuse against Shabia, war to eliminate the people you don't want to. Even if pp doesn't want this war, West particularly Brit, U.S, Egypt and Israel want this war to control the Nile! They know that at least Amara will not allow them take natural resources Nile that came from Amara region, now called Benshangul purposely carved out by Tplf creating war between Benshangul people and Amara. Benshangul people emigrated to this region planned by Brit, it was not their land, they should go to S Sudan!