Historical and Cultural Case for Djibouti, Zeila, and Assab Belonging to Ethiopia
Ethiopia has strong historical, ethnic, and cultural claims to these coastal areas, which were separated largely due to 19th–20th century European colonialism and post-colonial border arrangements.
Djibouti (former French Somaliland / Territoire Français des Afars et des Issas)
Historically part of the Ethiopian cultural and trade sphere for centuries. The city of Djibouti was founded in 1888 by the French as a coaling station, but the surrounding Afar-inhabited territories were traditionally under Ethiopian imperial influence (e.g., Sultanates of Raheita and Tadjoura paid tribute to Ethiopian emperors in the 18–19th centuries).
Ethnic composition: ~60% Somali (Issa clan), ~35% Afar. The Afar are the same people who dominate Ethiopia’s Afar Region (over 1.5 million Afar live in Ethiopia vs ~300,000 in Djibouti). Afar identity transcends modern borders; many Afar nationalists openly call for reunification with Ethiopia.
Until 1977, Ethiopia had free-port rights in Djibouti under 1950s agreements; the railway from Addis Ababa to Djibouti (built 1897–1917) was originally the “Ethiopian Railway” owned jointly by Ethiopia and France.
Zeila (Zayla) – now in Somaliland (de facto independent region of Somalia)
One of the oldest and most important medieval ports of the Horn of Africa. Capital of the Adal Sultanate (1415–1577) that ruled much of highland Ethiopia.
For centuries the primary outlet for Ethiopian highland trade (coffee, slaves, ivory) to the Arabian peninsula. Ethiopian emperors from Yekunno Amlak (13th century) to Menelik II maintained influence or direct control over Zeila.
Population is overwhelmingly Somali (Gadabuursi and Issa clans), but the city’s historical identity is tied to Ethiopian interior trade more than to Mogadishu or the Somali south.
After the Egyptian withdrawal in 1884–85, Britain handed Zeila to British Somaliland in 1888, severing it from Ethiopia.
Assab – now in Eritrea
Purchased by the Rubattino Shipping Company (Italy) in 1870 from local Afar sultans who were nominal vassals of the Ethiopian emperor. Italy formally made it a colony in 1882.
Emperor Yohannes IV and later Menelik II repeatedly protested that Assab was Ethiopian territory sold without imperial consent.
From 1952–1993 it was part of the UN-sponsored Ethiopia–Eritrea Federation, and Ethiopia administered it directly until Eritrean independence in 1993.
In summary: All three ports were historically Ethiopian outlets to the sea before European colonial borders were drawn. Their separation in the 20th century left Africa’s second-most populous country landlocked.
Realistic Pathways for Ethiopia to Re-Integrate These Areas Through Economic Means (Without Military Force)
Ethiopia is unlikely to regain these territories by war (international backlash, strong local opposition in Djibouti and Somaliland, Eritrean military strength). The only plausible route is long-term economic integration so overwhelming that political reunification becomes a logical outcome or at least gives Ethiopia de facto control of the coasts.
Phase 1 – Make Ethiopia the Indispensable Economic Hinterland (next 10–20 years)
TerritoryCurrent GDP (2024 est.)Ethiopia’s LeverageEconomic Integration ToolsDjibouti~$4.5 billion95%+ of Djibouti’s port traffic is Ethiopian transit• Renegotiate port concessions (Ethiopia already owns 19% of Djibouti port via 2010s deals)
• Build parallel Ethiopian-run terminals inside Djibouti (like Doraleh Multipurpose Port stake)
• Develop Berbera (Somaliland) + Lamu (Kenya) + new Potash port at Dallol to reduce Djibouti monopoly, then offer Djibouti massive infrastructure investment in exchange for confederation/free economic zone statusZeila/Berbera (Somaliland)Somaliland total ~$3–4 billionDP World (UAE) runs Berbera; Ethiopia already has 19% stake• Increase Ethiopian stake in Berbera to 51% over time
• Extend Addis–Togochale–Berbera highway and railway
• Offer Somaliland recognition in exchange for Zeila + coastal economic zone under joint administrationAssab (Eritrea)Eritrea total ~$2.5 billionEritrea is isolated; Assab port almost idle since 1998• Offer full normalization + billions in trade/investment for 50–99-year lease of Assab + Massawa
• Chinese-built refinery at Assab could be revived jointly
• Use Afar ethnic links (Afar in both countries) to push “Afar autonomous region” with economic union
Phase 2 – Create Joint Economic Zones and Special Administrative Regions
Djibouti: Propose a “Ethio-Djibouti Economic Union” modeled on China–Hong Kong pre-2047: one country, two systems, joint currency peg, free movement, Ethiopian companies dominate logistics.
Zeila/Lughaya: Quietly fund Gadabuursi clan leaders to push for “Zeila Special Economic Region” administered jointly with Ethiopia (similar to China’s Shenzhen model).
Assab: Long-term lease (99 years) like Hong Kong was to Britain, with Ethiopian companies running the port and free zone.
Phase 3 – Soft Confederation or Referenda (30–50 year horizon)
When >70–80% of the local economy depends on Ethiopian trade, investment, remittances, electricity (Ethiopia already sells power to Djibouti), and infrastructure, political unification becomes thinkable.
Possible models:
Swiss-style cantons with high autonomy but shared foreign policy, currency, and defense.
EU-style confederation with open borders and single market.
Key Economic Projects That Would Accelerate Integration
Complete Addis–Djibouti second railway (electric, standard gauge) and build third line.
Extend railway from Awash to Berbera via Togochale–Hargeisa (already under discussion).
Build Ethiopia–Assab oil pipeline + refinery revival.
Export Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) electricity to all three territories at subsidized rates.
Develop Dallol (Afar Region) potash port as bargaining chip (“we don’t need Djibouti if you don’t cooperate”).
Bottom Line
Ethiopia’s path to the sea is not through tanks but through trade volumes, infrastructure ownership, and making its neighbors economically unable to live without it. If Ethiopia grows at 8–10% for another two decades while Djibouti, Somaliland, and Eritrea stagnate, the gravitational pull becomes irresistible. The historical claim provides the moral narrative; overwhelming economic dependence provides the practical mechanism. Many Afar and Somali elders already privately say “we were better off when the Emperor controlled the coast.” The task is to make that feeling universal through wallets, not weapons.1.2sFast
Ai directing Ethiopian Foreign Policy
here I asked AI how to integrate Assab, Djbouti and Zeila into Ethiopia. Ai response was not only fantastic but faboulous