Mereja.Forum

[Noble Amhara]

Assessment of Probability
No formal quantitative models (e.g., from ACLED or Uppsala Conflict Data Program) provide an exact percentage as of October 2025, but expert analyses converge on a moderate-to-high risk (50–70%) of renewed violence in Tigray within the next 6–12 months, potentially escalating to Ethiopia-Eritrea war (30–50% chance). This is based on:
• Escalation Indicators: Border militarization, factional clashes (e.g., March 2025), and inflammatory rhetoric (e.g., Abiy’s July 2025 speech urging religious leaders to avert war).
• Restraining Factors: Mutual exhaustion—Ethiopia’s multi-front wars, Eritrea’s conscript army weaknesses, and economic strains (e.g., Red Sea disruptions already inflate global shipping by 20–30%). International pressure (UNSC briefings, AU mediation) has averted immediate crisis.
• Catalysts for Restart: A TPLF push to retake western Tigray or Ethiopian “stabilization” operations could ignite fighting, pulling in Eritrea.
Analysts like those at the Institute for the Study of War and Foreign Policy describe a “balance of uncertainty” eroding, with Tigray as the “key catalyst.” Former US Assistant Secretary Tibor Nagy warned in October 2025 that “saber-rattling” benefits no one except rivals like Egypt.