OFC, OLA, OLF and OPP Shall Agree on Fostering Transitional Government of Oromia!
It is good that OFC and OLF agreed now on fostering transitional government of Oromia. Surely OLA and OPP shall join them. In the past, we heared that the negotiation between OLA and OPP was interrupted because of their disagreement mainly regarding the necessity of fostering an inclusive government of Oromia. I think this demand of OLA was legitimate, useful and pragmatic. Oromo elites in OPP need to come to their sense and think beyond their ambition of maintaing own power. Now, it is about a choice and decision on the future of the Oromo: either stay devided and fail or be united and prevail. Such compromise for the sake of unifying all Oromo nationalists vis a vis anti-Oromo forces is very important at this time of moral, economic and political crisis. The die hard foes of the Oromo are doing what ever they can to reverse the hitherto 75% victory we achieved in our struggle for freedom. It is high time for Oromo nationalists to come together and push forward in order to complete our liberation struggle to its full position of 100%. The ongoing negotiation should continue. A strong government of Oromia including forces of OFC, OLA, OLF and OPP have to be established. Then, such strong government of Oromia can be a very stable backbone to support the federal government of Dr. Abiy. The PM should also be bold and strong enough to adress the not yet answered questions of the Oromo such as promoting Afàn Oromo to primary working language of the federation, putting Finfinné under the administration of Oromia and re-integrating Wallo including Raya into Oromia. No need of continuing to appease Amara elites, who are already determined to get rid of him and to undermine Oromummà’s legitimate leadership of Ethiopia.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/04/1 ... n-general/
Re: OFC, OLA, OLF and OPP Shall Agree on Fostering Transitional Government of Oromia!
Dreaming of many things is not difficult, but turning them into reality is. These groups you mentioned are Oromo Christians, and Muslims (especially people of Gurage, Arusi, Ittue, Anniya and Garso) will not accept this cheap propaganda. History has also proven that the Oromo elite has failed to manage Ethiopia, which means that they are unable to manage their internal affairs and build alliances with other communities (especially the Somalis and Amharas), and the solution is to remain under Abyssinia. The Oromo people will be free and can have their own Greater Oromo State from Nairobi to Assab only if they do these points, and clean their house from EPRDF/TPLF cadres and generals, and I don't think they are ready to accept such advice.
Re: OFC, OLA, OLF and OPP Shall Agree on Fostering Transitional Government of Oromia!
It was good to hear that the Pro-Oromummà (POE) Oromo republicans in OFC and OLF once formed Oromia’s Transitional Government. How nice to observe them forging coalition of the OFC and OLF in the form of coalition for democratic federation at level of Oromia and foster an alliance for democratic federation including OLF, ONLF, Agaw, Sidama, Qimant… etc at level of Ethiopia. It looked initially that EPP will lose power soon, but Dr. Abiy and his EPP already manipulated and rigged the 2021 “election”. There was no genuine election, but the already planned rule of force by EPP continued. It is also not bad that Tigrean elites are regaining their self-rule on the grave of unitarist dictators. But, I don’t want to see 1991 repeated, i.e TPLF coming to power in Finfinné. Finfinné’s power belongs to the Oromo, be it at the level of Oromia and/or Ethiopia. The OLF and OFC should be smart and strong enough to do this job of empowering the Oromo. Both Amhara and Tegaru elites must be checked. Oromo prosperitans have to lose only in favour of Oromo republicans, not to give chance for Abesha elites to take advantage. To keep Abesha elites away from the central power in Finfinne, a strong unity of Oromo nationalists is mandatory. It is a known fact that the non-stop theme of discussion among the Oromo nationals was the “conflict”: ‘Ethiopian Democratization vs. Oromian Liberation’; i.e the same to ‘Biyya-Kush Democratization vs. Biyya-Oromo Liberation’. This either or approach, as if the two goals were irreconcilably exclusive to each other, was the cause of “animosity” between the two Oromo camps. Some cadres in both camps looked at each other as foes, just forgetting the main enemy of the Oromo people – Abyssinian elites, which were on power at Caffé Aràrà palace in Finfinné. Couldn’t and wouldn’t we, the Oromo, liberate and democratize both Ethiopia and Oromia?
Why couldn’t Oromo liberation forces from both camps come to terms and cooperate in building at least an alliance based on common denominator of freedom, which we could call Tumsa Bilisummà Oromô (TBO)/Alliance for Freedom of the Oromo (AFO)? Was it really because of the above mentioned ideological difference? Our common sense dictates that if we want to prevent reversal of the victories we achieved up to now, to keep the status quo and to move forwards, we have to come together and build a strong leadership of Biyya-Oromo in particular and Biyya-Kush in general. It was only in this way that we could defeat the hegemonist TPLF and could hinder the possible coming of the backward looking conservative Amhara elites to power.
The fact on the ground was that both our foes and our misguided friends intensified the instrumentalization of minor ideological conflict we do have for their mission of divide and weaken the Oromo camp. They continuously accused certain part of Oromo nationalists (the federalists) as being Ethiopianists (as if they were fighting only to democratize New Ethiopia/Biyya-Kush, but not to liberate Oromia/Biyya-Oromo. Was this true or only an allegation? Was it wrong if some Oromo nationalists do apply different rhetorics (if they were double-tongued) as they were sometimes accused to be? What was wrong if these forces of ours talked about Ethiopia’s democratization (genuine union/true federation) and about Oromia’s independence, both tactically and strategically, based on the political contexts and situations? Didn’t Eritrean and South Sudan nationalists move in the same way at different times before they could liberate their respective nations and bring them to level of referendum on: independence vs. union?
According to the information I have, there was a time when Eritrean liberation forces talked about and almost agreed to settle for federation within Ethiopia, but the move had consequently failed because of stubborn position of Derg, who refused to accept this option. South Sudan nationalists also used to talk about autonomy within a united Sudan, just not to lose support of Ethiopia’s government, which wanted Sudan not to be disintegrated. Simply put, elites of these two nations did use different rhetorics during their struggles. What was wrong if Oromo nationalists do the same? Why did our foes and our misguided friends blame these Oromo nationals as if they were deceitful? After all, who is an Ethiopianist Oromo in a true sense of the word? Does it include federalists, who talk about Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union as their goal? How can Oromo nationalists, who want to bring our nation to the status of exercising self-determination per referendum, be designated as Ethiopianists in a sense of Habesh, not Kush?
Specially at this moment, it seems that the Oromo are asking about the benefit of our own movement for independence. Why did two of our neighbours, Eritrea and South Sudan, succeed quickly, whereas our movement was suffering from division of our liberation camp? Was it because of only our mistakes or were there some other external factors, which have made the difference? Surely, there were many factors; one of the major ones being support the two liberation movements of Eritrea and South Sudan had got from Arab world (in case of Eritrea) and Western world, in contrast to support the Oromo movement was lacking. There was even a strong opposition from Western world, which our Oromo liberation movement faced. We all know how Eritrean liberation movement had been supported by the Arabs, Italians and other Western regimes. They also had a very secure sanctuary in neighbouring countries like the Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. We also know how South Sudan had been supported by the regimes of America, Britain and other Western countries. South Sudan liberation forces had also a relatively secure sanctuary in Kenya, Uganda and Zaire. On the contrary, were not Western forces the supporters of our Habeshanized internal colonizers, who were working continuously to divide Oromo liberation camp? Were not Oromo liberation forces denied any sort of sanctuary in neighbouring countries?
Unfortunately, Oromo liberation movement, not only lacked such regional sanctuary and international support, but both our neighbouring countries and Western friends of the TPLF also opposed an attempt of the Oromo to liberate from colonization. Especially, the Western world seemed to have an opposite policy in comparison to what they had towards South Sudan. In case of South Sudan, they supported “Christian” south to be free from influence of the Arabinized north, whereas in case of Oromo region they tended to support domination by Habeshanized (Christian) north on the mainly traditional south, including the Oromo. If they had had no such double standard as usual, they should have supported liberation movement of the Oromo from domination of Habeshanized north, just as they have done to protect South Sudan from the Arabinized north.
Despite such lack of consistency in policy of the Western world, no question that Oromo nation is one of the biggest African peoples – which should be liberated from any sort of colonization or domination. This nation has been under colonial rule since conference of the European colonialists in Berlin at the end of the nineteenth century, when they planned Scramble for Africa. The Habeshanized king Minilik was treated by European Christians benevolently to have his share of the colony and “to civilize as well as to Christanize” the Oromo and other non-Christian nations in southern part of the present empire. Since then, the Oromo and other occupied nations in the region have been struggling for their national freedom. Particularly, the Oromo were at a worst colonial situation; we were not only occupied and oppressed, but our colonizers were also selling our land and our labour to international capitalists for the very dirty cheap price. Aite Abay Tsehaye’s bravado also showed us how determined they were to do it further till the Oromo will be reduced to the situation of Red Indians in North America.
Being in such dire situation, Oromo nationalists seemed to enjoy a luxury of quarreling on minor issues like discussing on the conflict ‘Ethiopian democratization vs. Oromian liberation,’ be it that we used both concepts as a means or as an end of our struggle. It was not surprising when we observed TPLF cadres persuading us to dwell on such debates and discussions, for they knew very well that it was a good way to hinder unity of Oromo liberation forces from being realized. But interesting was also to observe few of our politicians making the same rhetoric by antagonizing two concepts again and again. Some of them liked to talk and write about this antagony; some of them wanted to make the conflict be seen as irreconcilable, also at the first phase of liberation struggle. Considering the two phases of our struggle (the first freedom phase and the second referendum phase), we can see that the two goals can be irreconcilable only during the second phase, in the time of voting on them. It seemed that we did not come to our sense and look at the two concepts, as either a means or an end, that they are not contradictory, but complementary to each other at the first phase, until we come to the status of exercising our self-determination per referendum.
This difference of outlook regarding Ethiopian democratization and Oromian liberation in the process of the Oromo national struggle had been there from the very beginning of our struggle. Some Oromo nationalists wanted to liberate Oromo from oppression within Ethiopian context; the others wanted separate and independent republic of Oromia. Regarding this outlook, it seemed that we had three political movements in Oromo society:
– pro-unity Oromo, who were interested in liberating the Oromo in a sense of democratizing Ethiopia and achieving individual liberty for all citizens disregarding an existence and necessary emancipation of Oromia. They were not necessarily against right of Oromo people to self-determination through referendum, but their wish was to keep territorial integrity of the country intact and, if possible, foster a state lead by the Oromo. This was the group whom I consider as classical Ethiopianists in a Sense of Kush, not Habesh.
– pro-federation Oromo, for whom liberation can be same as Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union (true ethnic federation). I think we can designate this group as loyal to Oromia, thus they were not classical Ethiopianists, but they used the name Ethiopia as far as they were operating “legally” under the gunpoint of the Habeshanized colonizers or getting support from other non-Oromo forces.
– pro-independence Oromo, who did believe in and advocate Oromia’s independence. To my understanding, many members of Oromo rebel organizations belonged here, even though they had different rhetorics based on contexts and situations. All Oromo nationalists in this group could be considered as hard core Oromianists.
The common denominator for these three movements was freedom of the Oromo people or self-determination per referendum. Any Oromo individual or group against this right to self-determination could be considered as part and parcel of our colonizers, who denief us this right; they were simply collaborators. So, we needed to differentiate Oromo politicians, who wantef to have liberated Oromo people within Ethiopian context from the Habeshanized colonists and their collaborators, who wanted to oppose our right to self-determination with a pretext of unconditional “Ethiopian unity”, an euphemism to keep the system of colonization intact. Even, Habeshanized forces could be divided into two, based on their position regarding our right to self-determination: Habeshanized democrats, who in principle accept and respect our right to self-determination; and Habeshanized colonialists, who do oppose our right with a pretext of unconditional “Ethiopian unity”.
So, our enemies are those, who are against our right to self-determination, whereas the above mentioned three Oromo movements and the Habeshanized democrats are not necessarily enemies to each other, as long as they wanted to liberate the Oromo, i.e. as long as they wanted to bring Oromo people to the level of exercising self-determination per referendum, making Oromo free from any external influence. Now, after liberating the Oromo and bringing us to the status of voting in referendum, they can agitate for their preferred visions. That means, they can campaign respectively for only democratic Ethiopia, disregarding Oromia (vision of pro-unity Oromo); for Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union (internal self-determination), which is vision of Oromo federalists; and for Oromia’s independence within the African union (external self-determination), which is goal of pro-independence Oromo. But now, all the three Oromo groups can and should work together in order to get completely rid of the occupying and oppressing forces. Here, we can also have an empowering alliance with Amharinya speaking Habeshanized democrats, whereas I do advise for caution in trying to work with Tigrinya speaking democrats. Such Tigrinya speakers may claim to oppose the present regime, but surely they can have loyality conflict, when it comes to domination by their kins.
For pro-unity Oromo democrats, Ethiopia’s democratization is both a means and an end to realize their vision; whereas for pro-federation Oromo, it is more a means to an end for they seem to use their explicit objective (Oromia’s autonomy) as a prelude for the bigger goal (Oromia’s independence). Despite the fact that democracy under the TPLF rule was practically impossible, these two Oromo groups just tried to instrumentalize the democratization process in order to put pressure on TPLF regime. But, pro-independence Oromo’s explicit goal is crystal clear, even though it seems there is a division on the strategy they try to use. This taking different routes was the main area of discord between different factions of our rebelling liberation fronts. The difference was not necessarily based on the conflict, ‘Ethiopian democratization vs. Oromian liberation,’ but on the variety of rhetorics they did use at different times for tactical reasons.
Thus, the difference between Oromo federalists, which were usually painted as “Ethiopianists” by their rivals, and those which were considered as Oromianists, was not as such the matter of being Ethiopianist or Oromianist as our foes and our misguided friends tried to convince us. The difference was that of evolutionary approach of some nationalists (including their acceptance of Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union as a prelude to Oromian independence) and the revolutionary way of others in trying to achieve the same goal of Oromian liberation (tendency to advocate independence without a necessary prelude of autonomy within the union). That was why, calling any of such federalists as Ethiopianist was morally and truly wrong. They only differed in a strategy they have chosen towards the same goal. This helped us to hope that all Max Foster a possible unity of Oromo freedom fighters in due time for the liberation of Oromia, so that at the end of the day, we will only have one strong and efficient alliance, which could lead us to the promised land. I didn’t see any reason why this artificial difference of goal between Oromo liberation forces could be a cause of division. Not only pro-independence Oromo, but also all other groups, i.e. anti-independence and the Oromo who wanted to stay neutral till the day of referendum could agree on common purpose of freedom of the Oromo (to liberate Oromo and bring the nation to level of referendum).
The way forward was thus firstly empowering our Oromo camp, which comprised all the three groups of movements (pro-independence, pro-federation and pro-unity). In the first phase of our liberation struggle, they all could fight together against colonialists, and after liberation, in second phase, they now can agitate for their respective vision in order to win in a possible public referendum. That is why the conflict, ‘Ethiopian democratization vs. Oromian liberation’ at first phase was not as such irreconcilable. We do surely have irreconcilable conflict with our colonizers and with their collaborators, who are against our right to self-determination, but not with pro-unity Oromo, pro-federation Oromo or not even with Amhara democrats. Let alone the mentioned different Oromo forces, even other organizations, including the Amhara democratic forces, which accept and respect our right to self-determination, were welcome to foster alliance with us to compel the TPLF to leave power in Finfinne palace.
I think the decolonized and democratized Oromia, with its tradition of Gadaa democracy, can be the center of an emission for rays of bright light of democracy in future United States of Africa (USAfrica) based on the mere fact that Finfinne will be the seat of upcoming Union Government of Africa (UGA). On the contrary, any attempt of keeping this great people of Africa under TPLF’s occupation and oppression would continue to be a curse for the Horn region in particular, and for African continent in general. That was why I wanted to encourage all Oromo liberation movements (pro-independence, pro-federation and pro-unity) to work together in order to liberate Oromo nation from the occupying forces and bring the nation to state of exercising self-determination per referendum, which can result into one of the three goals of the three movements: 1. to democratic Ethiopia devoid of Oromia as pro-unity Oromo wish, 2. to federated and democratic Ethiopia with Oromia’s autonomy as pro-federation Oromo want, and 3. to an independent democratic republic of Oromia as pro-independence Oromo envision.
That was why, I did see no reason for these Oromo groups to attack each other at the first phase of our struggle – where we needed, not only unity of Oromo forces, but also seeked alliance with other nations. Let Oromo groups, which believe in unity forge it; let those which think an alliance is advantageous also do it; and let others, which oppose either of the two or reject both of them also move forward against colonizers without antagonizing other Oromo liberation forces, but by organizing a supportive tandem activity against our archenemy, the Abyssinian system of domination. We needed to see the fact that, until we come to level of exercising our self-determination per referendum, both concepts (Ethiopian democratization and Oromian liberation), as a means and/or as an end, were not irreconcilable and contradictory to each other as our foes wanted to convince us, but they were complementary to each other. There was nothing wrong if our liberation forces talked about the two concepts under different contexts and situations. The two concepts are irreconcilable only in second phase, i.e. during referendum, where we have to vote on them, but not when we were fighting for our freedom. If we were smart enough, we could even have consensus on doing both jobs in unison: liberation and democratization of Oromia in particular and the whole Ethiopia in general, so that the Oromo can accept both as Biyya-Keenya (our country). Biyya-Oromo (Oromia) is our country for we are Oromo and Biyya-Kush (Ethiopia) is our country, because we belong to Kush family. Thanks to Waaqa for helping us understand this fact that the conflict was reconcilable in the first liberation phase. May He help all Oromo forces to foster beneficial Alliance for Freedom of Oromo AFO)/Tumsa Bilisummà Oromô (TBO) in order to make the Oromo victorous!
Why couldn’t Oromo liberation forces from both camps come to terms and cooperate in building at least an alliance based on common denominator of freedom, which we could call Tumsa Bilisummà Oromô (TBO)/Alliance for Freedom of the Oromo (AFO)? Was it really because of the above mentioned ideological difference? Our common sense dictates that if we want to prevent reversal of the victories we achieved up to now, to keep the status quo and to move forwards, we have to come together and build a strong leadership of Biyya-Oromo in particular and Biyya-Kush in general. It was only in this way that we could defeat the hegemonist TPLF and could hinder the possible coming of the backward looking conservative Amhara elites to power.
The fact on the ground was that both our foes and our misguided friends intensified the instrumentalization of minor ideological conflict we do have for their mission of divide and weaken the Oromo camp. They continuously accused certain part of Oromo nationalists (the federalists) as being Ethiopianists (as if they were fighting only to democratize New Ethiopia/Biyya-Kush, but not to liberate Oromia/Biyya-Oromo. Was this true or only an allegation? Was it wrong if some Oromo nationalists do apply different rhetorics (if they were double-tongued) as they were sometimes accused to be? What was wrong if these forces of ours talked about Ethiopia’s democratization (genuine union/true federation) and about Oromia’s independence, both tactically and strategically, based on the political contexts and situations? Didn’t Eritrean and South Sudan nationalists move in the same way at different times before they could liberate their respective nations and bring them to level of referendum on: independence vs. union?
According to the information I have, there was a time when Eritrean liberation forces talked about and almost agreed to settle for federation within Ethiopia, but the move had consequently failed because of stubborn position of Derg, who refused to accept this option. South Sudan nationalists also used to talk about autonomy within a united Sudan, just not to lose support of Ethiopia’s government, which wanted Sudan not to be disintegrated. Simply put, elites of these two nations did use different rhetorics during their struggles. What was wrong if Oromo nationalists do the same? Why did our foes and our misguided friends blame these Oromo nationals as if they were deceitful? After all, who is an Ethiopianist Oromo in a true sense of the word? Does it include federalists, who talk about Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union as their goal? How can Oromo nationalists, who want to bring our nation to the status of exercising self-determination per referendum, be designated as Ethiopianists in a sense of Habesh, not Kush?
Specially at this moment, it seems that the Oromo are asking about the benefit of our own movement for independence. Why did two of our neighbours, Eritrea and South Sudan, succeed quickly, whereas our movement was suffering from division of our liberation camp? Was it because of only our mistakes or were there some other external factors, which have made the difference? Surely, there were many factors; one of the major ones being support the two liberation movements of Eritrea and South Sudan had got from Arab world (in case of Eritrea) and Western world, in contrast to support the Oromo movement was lacking. There was even a strong opposition from Western world, which our Oromo liberation movement faced. We all know how Eritrean liberation movement had been supported by the Arabs, Italians and other Western regimes. They also had a very secure sanctuary in neighbouring countries like the Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. We also know how South Sudan had been supported by the regimes of America, Britain and other Western countries. South Sudan liberation forces had also a relatively secure sanctuary in Kenya, Uganda and Zaire. On the contrary, were not Western forces the supporters of our Habeshanized internal colonizers, who were working continuously to divide Oromo liberation camp? Were not Oromo liberation forces denied any sort of sanctuary in neighbouring countries?
Unfortunately, Oromo liberation movement, not only lacked such regional sanctuary and international support, but both our neighbouring countries and Western friends of the TPLF also opposed an attempt of the Oromo to liberate from colonization. Especially, the Western world seemed to have an opposite policy in comparison to what they had towards South Sudan. In case of South Sudan, they supported “Christian” south to be free from influence of the Arabinized north, whereas in case of Oromo region they tended to support domination by Habeshanized (Christian) north on the mainly traditional south, including the Oromo. If they had had no such double standard as usual, they should have supported liberation movement of the Oromo from domination of Habeshanized north, just as they have done to protect South Sudan from the Arabinized north.
Despite such lack of consistency in policy of the Western world, no question that Oromo nation is one of the biggest African peoples – which should be liberated from any sort of colonization or domination. This nation has been under colonial rule since conference of the European colonialists in Berlin at the end of the nineteenth century, when they planned Scramble for Africa. The Habeshanized king Minilik was treated by European Christians benevolently to have his share of the colony and “to civilize as well as to Christanize” the Oromo and other non-Christian nations in southern part of the present empire. Since then, the Oromo and other occupied nations in the region have been struggling for their national freedom. Particularly, the Oromo were at a worst colonial situation; we were not only occupied and oppressed, but our colonizers were also selling our land and our labour to international capitalists for the very dirty cheap price. Aite Abay Tsehaye’s bravado also showed us how determined they were to do it further till the Oromo will be reduced to the situation of Red Indians in North America.
Being in such dire situation, Oromo nationalists seemed to enjoy a luxury of quarreling on minor issues like discussing on the conflict ‘Ethiopian democratization vs. Oromian liberation,’ be it that we used both concepts as a means or as an end of our struggle. It was not surprising when we observed TPLF cadres persuading us to dwell on such debates and discussions, for they knew very well that it was a good way to hinder unity of Oromo liberation forces from being realized. But interesting was also to observe few of our politicians making the same rhetoric by antagonizing two concepts again and again. Some of them liked to talk and write about this antagony; some of them wanted to make the conflict be seen as irreconcilable, also at the first phase of liberation struggle. Considering the two phases of our struggle (the first freedom phase and the second referendum phase), we can see that the two goals can be irreconcilable only during the second phase, in the time of voting on them. It seemed that we did not come to our sense and look at the two concepts, as either a means or an end, that they are not contradictory, but complementary to each other at the first phase, until we come to the status of exercising our self-determination per referendum.
This difference of outlook regarding Ethiopian democratization and Oromian liberation in the process of the Oromo national struggle had been there from the very beginning of our struggle. Some Oromo nationalists wanted to liberate Oromo from oppression within Ethiopian context; the others wanted separate and independent republic of Oromia. Regarding this outlook, it seemed that we had three political movements in Oromo society:
– pro-unity Oromo, who were interested in liberating the Oromo in a sense of democratizing Ethiopia and achieving individual liberty for all citizens disregarding an existence and necessary emancipation of Oromia. They were not necessarily against right of Oromo people to self-determination through referendum, but their wish was to keep territorial integrity of the country intact and, if possible, foster a state lead by the Oromo. This was the group whom I consider as classical Ethiopianists in a Sense of Kush, not Habesh.
– pro-federation Oromo, for whom liberation can be same as Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union (true ethnic federation). I think we can designate this group as loyal to Oromia, thus they were not classical Ethiopianists, but they used the name Ethiopia as far as they were operating “legally” under the gunpoint of the Habeshanized colonizers or getting support from other non-Oromo forces.
– pro-independence Oromo, who did believe in and advocate Oromia’s independence. To my understanding, many members of Oromo rebel organizations belonged here, even though they had different rhetorics based on contexts and situations. All Oromo nationalists in this group could be considered as hard core Oromianists.
The common denominator for these three movements was freedom of the Oromo people or self-determination per referendum. Any Oromo individual or group against this right to self-determination could be considered as part and parcel of our colonizers, who denief us this right; they were simply collaborators. So, we needed to differentiate Oromo politicians, who wantef to have liberated Oromo people within Ethiopian context from the Habeshanized colonists and their collaborators, who wanted to oppose our right to self-determination with a pretext of unconditional “Ethiopian unity”, an euphemism to keep the system of colonization intact. Even, Habeshanized forces could be divided into two, based on their position regarding our right to self-determination: Habeshanized democrats, who in principle accept and respect our right to self-determination; and Habeshanized colonialists, who do oppose our right with a pretext of unconditional “Ethiopian unity”.
So, our enemies are those, who are against our right to self-determination, whereas the above mentioned three Oromo movements and the Habeshanized democrats are not necessarily enemies to each other, as long as they wanted to liberate the Oromo, i.e. as long as they wanted to bring Oromo people to the level of exercising self-determination per referendum, making Oromo free from any external influence. Now, after liberating the Oromo and bringing us to the status of voting in referendum, they can agitate for their preferred visions. That means, they can campaign respectively for only democratic Ethiopia, disregarding Oromia (vision of pro-unity Oromo); for Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union (internal self-determination), which is vision of Oromo federalists; and for Oromia’s independence within the African union (external self-determination), which is goal of pro-independence Oromo. But now, all the three Oromo groups can and should work together in order to get completely rid of the occupying and oppressing forces. Here, we can also have an empowering alliance with Amharinya speaking Habeshanized democrats, whereas I do advise for caution in trying to work with Tigrinya speaking democrats. Such Tigrinya speakers may claim to oppose the present regime, but surely they can have loyality conflict, when it comes to domination by their kins.
For pro-unity Oromo democrats, Ethiopia’s democratization is both a means and an end to realize their vision; whereas for pro-federation Oromo, it is more a means to an end for they seem to use their explicit objective (Oromia’s autonomy) as a prelude for the bigger goal (Oromia’s independence). Despite the fact that democracy under the TPLF rule was practically impossible, these two Oromo groups just tried to instrumentalize the democratization process in order to put pressure on TPLF regime. But, pro-independence Oromo’s explicit goal is crystal clear, even though it seems there is a division on the strategy they try to use. This taking different routes was the main area of discord between different factions of our rebelling liberation fronts. The difference was not necessarily based on the conflict, ‘Ethiopian democratization vs. Oromian liberation,’ but on the variety of rhetorics they did use at different times for tactical reasons.
Thus, the difference between Oromo federalists, which were usually painted as “Ethiopianists” by their rivals, and those which were considered as Oromianists, was not as such the matter of being Ethiopianist or Oromianist as our foes and our misguided friends tried to convince us. The difference was that of evolutionary approach of some nationalists (including their acceptance of Oromia’s autonomy within Ethiopian union as a prelude to Oromian independence) and the revolutionary way of others in trying to achieve the same goal of Oromian liberation (tendency to advocate independence without a necessary prelude of autonomy within the union). That was why, calling any of such federalists as Ethiopianist was morally and truly wrong. They only differed in a strategy they have chosen towards the same goal. This helped us to hope that all Max Foster a possible unity of Oromo freedom fighters in due time for the liberation of Oromia, so that at the end of the day, we will only have one strong and efficient alliance, which could lead us to the promised land. I didn’t see any reason why this artificial difference of goal between Oromo liberation forces could be a cause of division. Not only pro-independence Oromo, but also all other groups, i.e. anti-independence and the Oromo who wanted to stay neutral till the day of referendum could agree on common purpose of freedom of the Oromo (to liberate Oromo and bring the nation to level of referendum).
The way forward was thus firstly empowering our Oromo camp, which comprised all the three groups of movements (pro-independence, pro-federation and pro-unity). In the first phase of our liberation struggle, they all could fight together against colonialists, and after liberation, in second phase, they now can agitate for their respective vision in order to win in a possible public referendum. That is why the conflict, ‘Ethiopian democratization vs. Oromian liberation’ at first phase was not as such irreconcilable. We do surely have irreconcilable conflict with our colonizers and with their collaborators, who are against our right to self-determination, but not with pro-unity Oromo, pro-federation Oromo or not even with Amhara democrats. Let alone the mentioned different Oromo forces, even other organizations, including the Amhara democratic forces, which accept and respect our right to self-determination, were welcome to foster alliance with us to compel the TPLF to leave power in Finfinne palace.
I think the decolonized and democratized Oromia, with its tradition of Gadaa democracy, can be the center of an emission for rays of bright light of democracy in future United States of Africa (USAfrica) based on the mere fact that Finfinne will be the seat of upcoming Union Government of Africa (UGA). On the contrary, any attempt of keeping this great people of Africa under TPLF’s occupation and oppression would continue to be a curse for the Horn region in particular, and for African continent in general. That was why I wanted to encourage all Oromo liberation movements (pro-independence, pro-federation and pro-unity) to work together in order to liberate Oromo nation from the occupying forces and bring the nation to state of exercising self-determination per referendum, which can result into one of the three goals of the three movements: 1. to democratic Ethiopia devoid of Oromia as pro-unity Oromo wish, 2. to federated and democratic Ethiopia with Oromia’s autonomy as pro-federation Oromo want, and 3. to an independent democratic republic of Oromia as pro-independence Oromo envision.
That was why, I did see no reason for these Oromo groups to attack each other at the first phase of our struggle – where we needed, not only unity of Oromo forces, but also seeked alliance with other nations. Let Oromo groups, which believe in unity forge it; let those which think an alliance is advantageous also do it; and let others, which oppose either of the two or reject both of them also move forward against colonizers without antagonizing other Oromo liberation forces, but by organizing a supportive tandem activity against our archenemy, the Abyssinian system of domination. We needed to see the fact that, until we come to level of exercising our self-determination per referendum, both concepts (Ethiopian democratization and Oromian liberation), as a means and/or as an end, were not irreconcilable and contradictory to each other as our foes wanted to convince us, but they were complementary to each other. There was nothing wrong if our liberation forces talked about the two concepts under different contexts and situations. The two concepts are irreconcilable only in second phase, i.e. during referendum, where we have to vote on them, but not when we were fighting for our freedom. If we were smart enough, we could even have consensus on doing both jobs in unison: liberation and democratization of Oromia in particular and the whole Ethiopia in general, so that the Oromo can accept both as Biyya-Keenya (our country). Biyya-Oromo (Oromia) is our country for we are Oromo and Biyya-Kush (Ethiopia) is our country, because we belong to Kush family. Thanks to Waaqa for helping us understand this fact that the conflict was reconcilable in the first liberation phase. May He help all Oromo forces to foster beneficial Alliance for Freedom of Oromo AFO)/Tumsa Bilisummà Oromô (TBO) in order to make the Oromo victorous!