Is Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Outsmarting His Oromo Opponents?
Posted: 15 Aug 2026, 17:44
Is Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Outsmarting His Oromo Opponents?
By Fayyis Oropia
I have begun to observe that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent moves are not only disturbing Habesha elites but also unsettling his Oromo opponents. His return to the camp of Oromo nationalism and his apparent tendency to endorse an inclusive politics of Oropia—an Oromic-led country—seem to be smart political moves. He sounds like a modern Haile Fida, with a politics characterized by high confidence. Contrary to other Oromo nationalists, who struggle for a smaller Oromia that is considered part of Ethiopia, he asserts that Oromia is even bigger than Ethiopia, since the Oromo are spread across Eastern Africa, from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south.
Interestingly, among his Oromo opponents, Jawar Mohammed has become increasingly critical of the OLF led by Ob. Daud Ibsa, while Abiy Ahmed has been heard speaking admiringly and respectfully of the organization and its leader in Parliament. Could this be an indication of a future in which Dr. Abiy emerges as the political winner while Jawar loses ground? Being openly opposed to the OLF is arguably one of the worst political strategies an Oromo politician can pursue, as the OLF remains a powerful symbol of the Oromo liberation struggle, despite its flaws and mistakes. Whether we like it or not, Ob. Daud’s group is the only viable OLF organization; the other factions have effectively become politically irrelevant. In my view, attempts to separate Daud’s OLF from Jàl Marro’s OLA, or to create divisions between the two, reflect political naivety.
Nowadays, Jawar Mohammed and Shimelis Abdissa are vehemently opposing Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to dismantle the ethnic federation, accusing the ruling party of pursuing anti-Oromia policies. Ob. Shimelis said in his recent speech: “Those who do not want to see an existing Oromia have only one alternative—to die not to see it.” Jawar has already gone through a difficult political transition, abandoning the OLF’s kàyyô (goal) of an independent Oromia and embracing the OFC’s kàyyô of Orompia—an Oromic-led ethnic federation. Today, he appears to be undergoing another difficult transition, shifting his kàyyô toward Oropia—an Oromic-led geofederation.
Dr. Abiy once said: “We chose the little Oromia because we were in trouble, but in reality, the Oromo own the whole of Ethiopia.” I also believe that, as long as Oromic remains the federation’s primary working language in the future, Dr. Abiy’s initiative can be viewed as a step forward toward Oropia, rather than a step backward toward Amapia—an Amharic-dominated geofederation.
For many years, the political trajectory of Jawar Mohammed, which is similar to that of Shimelis, has sparked considerable debate, particularly concerning his changing stance on Oromo nationalism and Ethiopian unity. Reflecting on the evolution of his views, I recall a time when I personally confronted Jawar Mohammed over his harsh criticism of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). During our discussion, I pointedly told him: “You cannot succeed in Oromo politics by being so vehemently anti-OLF, because the organization embodies the spirit of Bilisummà (freedom), irrespective of its internal flaws.” This remark seemed to contribute to a more conciliatory approach from Jawar thereafter. Additionally, I facilitated a constructive dialogue between him and Professor Messay Kebede on the broader Ethiopian question, further influencing his evolving political perspective. At a later time, I also attempted to defend him by writing an article titled Jawarawi Harakat, particularly when Neo-Naftagna elements targeted him after his declaration, “I am Oromo first.”
Some years ago, I read an insightful interview in which Jawar, speaking to the BBC, discussed Dr. Abiy Ahmed and the concept of Biltsiginnà (prosperity) in Ethiopia. No longer confining his rhetoric to Oromian politics, he broadened his focus to include Ethiopia’s future as a whole, suggesting indirectly that a democratic Ethiopia could transform into Oropia—a pluralistic, Oromic-led geofederal state. This recognition that Ethiopia’s future lies in national unity and territorial integrity, combined with an inclusive Oromo identity, represents a significant shift from his earlier stance. For the Oromo people, the preservation of Ethiopia’s unity in a diverse and democratic form presents the best path forward. Jawar, along with other Oromo nationalists, deserves commendation for his commitment to preventing the disintegration of the Ethiopian state. Thus, one might ask: Did my interactions with Jawar Mohammed influence his shift in slogan from “Ethiopia Out of Oromia” to “Ethiopia Shall Be Oropia”?
The Challenge of Amharic Dominance
Historically, the Ethiopia dominated by Amharic-speaking elites could be termed Amapia (an Amharic-dominated geofederation), while the present system could be called Amarpia (an Amharic-dominated ethnic federation), a state that continues under the leadership of Dr. Abiy Ahmed. Despite the rhetoric of change, the current regime has failed to address key Oromo demands, such as promoting Oromic as the primary working language of the federal government, reintegrating Wollo into Oromia, and placing Finfinné (Addis Ababa) under the administration of Oromia. These failures underscore the argument that the current government remains as pro-Amaranet as previous regimes, from Yekuno Amlak to Meles Z. Gobena. Therefore, labeling this regime as “Oromo rule” is misguided; it remains firmly entrenched in Amharic dominance, to the detriment of Oromic identity.
For more than five decades, the Oromo have struggled to replace Amaranet-dominated regimes with one led by Oromummà (Oromo identity), advocating two distinct visions for the future: one for an independent Oromia and another for an integrated Oropia. The former, supported by figures such as Jàl Marrô, calls for the independence of Oromia, while the latter, championed by Jawar Mohammed and his allies, envisions a democratic Ethiopia transformed into Oropia.
It is clear that, regardless of which path is chosen, the ultimate goal is the liberation of the Oromo people from both Seftegna (Seminawi-Neftegna) colonization and the authoritarian control exerted by the current Heftegna (hybrid-Neftegna) regime. Under the leadership of Abiy Ahmed, this Heftegna regime is composed primarily of Oromo elites who serve the interests of northern powers, prioritizing Amaranet/Amharic supremacy at the expense of Oromic identity. Once freed from the shackles of these pro-Amaranet elites, the Oromo will face a decision: whether to pursue a sovereign Oromia, a federal Orompia (an Oromic-led ethnic federation), or an inclusive Oropia. Both paths, as long as they free the Oromo from oppression, present viable options for a liberated people.
Oromo Elites and Political Orientations
Oromo elites can generally be categorized into three political camps: Abyssinianists, Ethiopianists, and Oromianists. Abyssinianists, such as those in the OPP (Oromo Prosperity Party), are characterized by a subservient attitude toward Amaranet, valuing it more than Oromummà. Ethiopianists, such as those in the OFC (Oromo Federalist Congress), seek to democratize Ethiopia within an Oromo framework, effectively transforming it into Orompia. Oromianists, represented by the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), advocate either for an independent Oromia or for a reimagined Ethiopia, renamed Oropia.
The Jawarawi Harakat Controversy
On February 5, 2013, ETV aired a controversial documentary titled Jihadawi Harakat(“Jihadi Movement”), which falsely equated the legitimate religious and political demands of Ethiopian Muslims with extremist terrorism. This was part of a broader campaign by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) regime to criminalize legitimate political movements. The Oromo national liberation movement has similarly been subjected to such smear campaigns.
At the same time, nostalgic Amhara elites, aiming to impose an assimilationist version of Ethiopia on the Oromo and other ethnic groups, produced their own defamatory documentary targeting Jawar Mohammed. Entitled “Jawar Mohammed – A Muslim OLF Radical – Ethiopians Out of Oromia,” it sought to portray him as a radical nationalist. The question remains: Was this documentary part of the Jawarawi Harakat—a genuine grassroots movement for Oromo liberation—or merely an attempt to criminalize a prominent Oromo nationalist?
The controversy surrounding Jawar was further fueled by Dr. Fikre Tolassa, an Abyssinianist Oromo scholar, who published an open letter advocating for a restructured Ethiopian history that rejected the Oromo alphabet (Qubé) and promoted Ethiopian nationalism. This sparked intense debates between Ethiopianists and Oromianists, with the latter group suggesting that the future of Ethiopia should be envisioned as Orompia/Oropia—distinct from the current model of Amapria (an Amharic-dominated ethnic federation).
Initially, the media campaign appeared to foster constructive dialogue between Ethiopian and Oromo nationalists, both of whom opposed the TPLF. However, Abyssinianist participants soon began imposing preconditions, insisting on the non-negotiable nature of Ethiopiawinet (Ethiopianism) as a political framework. This approach alienated Oromianists, who insisted on the centrality of Oromia and Oromummà as the foundation for any future Ethiopian state.
The media backlash against Jawar reached a peak when Al Jazeera asked him directly: “Are you Oromo first or Ethiopian first?” His response—“I am Oromo first; Ethiopian identity is imposed on me”—was seen as a bold reaffirmation of Oromo identity. This stance was met with fury by the Abyssinianist camp, which attempted to force him to retract his statement. However, Jawar remained resolute, and Oromo nationalists rallied behind him, while Abyssinian elites launched a campaign of defamation.
The Future of the Oromo National Liberation Movement
The rise of Oromo political consciousness signals the end of an era of subjugation under Abyssinian nationalism, which has historically been imposed on the Oromo. Today, Oromo nationalism is in direct competition with the nationalisms of Amhara and Tigrayan elites. The Jawarawi Harakat period highlighted this divide, with Abyssinian elites attempting to criminalize Oromo resistance and even enlisting Oromo collaborators in the process. However, the Oromo national liberation movement continues to gain traction, whether through self-rule within a federal union (Orompia), full independence (Oromia), or the transformation of Ethiopia into Oropia.
In conclusion, the case of Jawar Mohammed exemplifies the complex relationship between Oromo nationalists and the broader Ethiopian state. Despite efforts to criminalize him, Jawar’s commitment to Oromo liberation remains steadfast. Whether through the vision of an integrative Oropia or the advocacy of an independent Oromia, the future of the Oromo people lies in their ability to resist oppression and chart their own political course. The Jawarawi Harakat, therefore, represents not only a response to defamation but also a significant step forward in the ongoing struggle for Oromo freedom. Today, the move of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed seems to outsmart even the Jawarawi Harakat.
Galatôma.
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/04/1 ... s-amharia/
By Fayyis Oropia
I have begun to observe that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent moves are not only disturbing Habesha elites but also unsettling his Oromo opponents. His return to the camp of Oromo nationalism and his apparent tendency to endorse an inclusive politics of Oropia—an Oromic-led country—seem to be smart political moves. He sounds like a modern Haile Fida, with a politics characterized by high confidence. Contrary to other Oromo nationalists, who struggle for a smaller Oromia that is considered part of Ethiopia, he asserts that Oromia is even bigger than Ethiopia, since the Oromo are spread across Eastern Africa, from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south.
Interestingly, among his Oromo opponents, Jawar Mohammed has become increasingly critical of the OLF led by Ob. Daud Ibsa, while Abiy Ahmed has been heard speaking admiringly and respectfully of the organization and its leader in Parliament. Could this be an indication of a future in which Dr. Abiy emerges as the political winner while Jawar loses ground? Being openly opposed to the OLF is arguably one of the worst political strategies an Oromo politician can pursue, as the OLF remains a powerful symbol of the Oromo liberation struggle, despite its flaws and mistakes. Whether we like it or not, Ob. Daud’s group is the only viable OLF organization; the other factions have effectively become politically irrelevant. In my view, attempts to separate Daud’s OLF from Jàl Marro’s OLA, or to create divisions between the two, reflect political naivety.
Nowadays, Jawar Mohammed and Shimelis Abdissa are vehemently opposing Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to dismantle the ethnic federation, accusing the ruling party of pursuing anti-Oromia policies. Ob. Shimelis said in his recent speech: “Those who do not want to see an existing Oromia have only one alternative—to die not to see it.” Jawar has already gone through a difficult political transition, abandoning the OLF’s kàyyô (goal) of an independent Oromia and embracing the OFC’s kàyyô of Orompia—an Oromic-led ethnic federation. Today, he appears to be undergoing another difficult transition, shifting his kàyyô toward Oropia—an Oromic-led geofederation.
Dr. Abiy once said: “We chose the little Oromia because we were in trouble, but in reality, the Oromo own the whole of Ethiopia.” I also believe that, as long as Oromic remains the federation’s primary working language in the future, Dr. Abiy’s initiative can be viewed as a step forward toward Oropia, rather than a step backward toward Amapia—an Amharic-dominated geofederation.
For many years, the political trajectory of Jawar Mohammed, which is similar to that of Shimelis, has sparked considerable debate, particularly concerning his changing stance on Oromo nationalism and Ethiopian unity. Reflecting on the evolution of his views, I recall a time when I personally confronted Jawar Mohammed over his harsh criticism of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). During our discussion, I pointedly told him: “You cannot succeed in Oromo politics by being so vehemently anti-OLF, because the organization embodies the spirit of Bilisummà (freedom), irrespective of its internal flaws.” This remark seemed to contribute to a more conciliatory approach from Jawar thereafter. Additionally, I facilitated a constructive dialogue between him and Professor Messay Kebede on the broader Ethiopian question, further influencing his evolving political perspective. At a later time, I also attempted to defend him by writing an article titled Jawarawi Harakat, particularly when Neo-Naftagna elements targeted him after his declaration, “I am Oromo first.”
Some years ago, I read an insightful interview in which Jawar, speaking to the BBC, discussed Dr. Abiy Ahmed and the concept of Biltsiginnà (prosperity) in Ethiopia. No longer confining his rhetoric to Oromian politics, he broadened his focus to include Ethiopia’s future as a whole, suggesting indirectly that a democratic Ethiopia could transform into Oropia—a pluralistic, Oromic-led geofederal state. This recognition that Ethiopia’s future lies in national unity and territorial integrity, combined with an inclusive Oromo identity, represents a significant shift from his earlier stance. For the Oromo people, the preservation of Ethiopia’s unity in a diverse and democratic form presents the best path forward. Jawar, along with other Oromo nationalists, deserves commendation for his commitment to preventing the disintegration of the Ethiopian state. Thus, one might ask: Did my interactions with Jawar Mohammed influence his shift in slogan from “Ethiopia Out of Oromia” to “Ethiopia Shall Be Oropia”?
The Challenge of Amharic Dominance
Historically, the Ethiopia dominated by Amharic-speaking elites could be termed Amapia (an Amharic-dominated geofederation), while the present system could be called Amarpia (an Amharic-dominated ethnic federation), a state that continues under the leadership of Dr. Abiy Ahmed. Despite the rhetoric of change, the current regime has failed to address key Oromo demands, such as promoting Oromic as the primary working language of the federal government, reintegrating Wollo into Oromia, and placing Finfinné (Addis Ababa) under the administration of Oromia. These failures underscore the argument that the current government remains as pro-Amaranet as previous regimes, from Yekuno Amlak to Meles Z. Gobena. Therefore, labeling this regime as “Oromo rule” is misguided; it remains firmly entrenched in Amharic dominance, to the detriment of Oromic identity.
For more than five decades, the Oromo have struggled to replace Amaranet-dominated regimes with one led by Oromummà (Oromo identity), advocating two distinct visions for the future: one for an independent Oromia and another for an integrated Oropia. The former, supported by figures such as Jàl Marrô, calls for the independence of Oromia, while the latter, championed by Jawar Mohammed and his allies, envisions a democratic Ethiopia transformed into Oropia.
It is clear that, regardless of which path is chosen, the ultimate goal is the liberation of the Oromo people from both Seftegna (Seminawi-Neftegna) colonization and the authoritarian control exerted by the current Heftegna (hybrid-Neftegna) regime. Under the leadership of Abiy Ahmed, this Heftegna regime is composed primarily of Oromo elites who serve the interests of northern powers, prioritizing Amaranet/Amharic supremacy at the expense of Oromic identity. Once freed from the shackles of these pro-Amaranet elites, the Oromo will face a decision: whether to pursue a sovereign Oromia, a federal Orompia (an Oromic-led ethnic federation), or an inclusive Oropia. Both paths, as long as they free the Oromo from oppression, present viable options for a liberated people.
Oromo Elites and Political Orientations
Oromo elites can generally be categorized into three political camps: Abyssinianists, Ethiopianists, and Oromianists. Abyssinianists, such as those in the OPP (Oromo Prosperity Party), are characterized by a subservient attitude toward Amaranet, valuing it more than Oromummà. Ethiopianists, such as those in the OFC (Oromo Federalist Congress), seek to democratize Ethiopia within an Oromo framework, effectively transforming it into Orompia. Oromianists, represented by the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front), advocate either for an independent Oromia or for a reimagined Ethiopia, renamed Oropia.
The Jawarawi Harakat Controversy
On February 5, 2013, ETV aired a controversial documentary titled Jihadawi Harakat(“Jihadi Movement”), which falsely equated the legitimate religious and political demands of Ethiopian Muslims with extremist terrorism. This was part of a broader campaign by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) regime to criminalize legitimate political movements. The Oromo national liberation movement has similarly been subjected to such smear campaigns.
At the same time, nostalgic Amhara elites, aiming to impose an assimilationist version of Ethiopia on the Oromo and other ethnic groups, produced their own defamatory documentary targeting Jawar Mohammed. Entitled “Jawar Mohammed – A Muslim OLF Radical – Ethiopians Out of Oromia,” it sought to portray him as a radical nationalist. The question remains: Was this documentary part of the Jawarawi Harakat—a genuine grassroots movement for Oromo liberation—or merely an attempt to criminalize a prominent Oromo nationalist?
The controversy surrounding Jawar was further fueled by Dr. Fikre Tolassa, an Abyssinianist Oromo scholar, who published an open letter advocating for a restructured Ethiopian history that rejected the Oromo alphabet (Qubé) and promoted Ethiopian nationalism. This sparked intense debates between Ethiopianists and Oromianists, with the latter group suggesting that the future of Ethiopia should be envisioned as Orompia/Oropia—distinct from the current model of Amapria (an Amharic-dominated ethnic federation).
Initially, the media campaign appeared to foster constructive dialogue between Ethiopian and Oromo nationalists, both of whom opposed the TPLF. However, Abyssinianist participants soon began imposing preconditions, insisting on the non-negotiable nature of Ethiopiawinet (Ethiopianism) as a political framework. This approach alienated Oromianists, who insisted on the centrality of Oromia and Oromummà as the foundation for any future Ethiopian state.
The media backlash against Jawar reached a peak when Al Jazeera asked him directly: “Are you Oromo first or Ethiopian first?” His response—“I am Oromo first; Ethiopian identity is imposed on me”—was seen as a bold reaffirmation of Oromo identity. This stance was met with fury by the Abyssinianist camp, which attempted to force him to retract his statement. However, Jawar remained resolute, and Oromo nationalists rallied behind him, while Abyssinian elites launched a campaign of defamation.
The Future of the Oromo National Liberation Movement
The rise of Oromo political consciousness signals the end of an era of subjugation under Abyssinian nationalism, which has historically been imposed on the Oromo. Today, Oromo nationalism is in direct competition with the nationalisms of Amhara and Tigrayan elites. The Jawarawi Harakat period highlighted this divide, with Abyssinian elites attempting to criminalize Oromo resistance and even enlisting Oromo collaborators in the process. However, the Oromo national liberation movement continues to gain traction, whether through self-rule within a federal union (Orompia), full independence (Oromia), or the transformation of Ethiopia into Oropia.
In conclusion, the case of Jawar Mohammed exemplifies the complex relationship between Oromo nationalists and the broader Ethiopian state. Despite efforts to criminalize him, Jawar’s commitment to Oromo liberation remains steadfast. Whether through the vision of an integrative Oropia or the advocacy of an independent Oromia, the future of the Oromo people lies in their ability to resist oppression and chart their own political course. The Jawarawi Harakat, therefore, represents not only a response to defamation but also a significant step forward in the ongoing struggle for Oromo freedom. Today, the move of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed seems to outsmart even the Jawarawi Harakat.
Galatôma.
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/04/1 ... s-amharia/