In the Horn of Africa, Tsimdo is the guarantee of Ethiopian and regional unity, not the other way around.
Posted: 08 Aug 2026, 13:02
Africa
In the Horn of Africa, Tsimdo is the guarantee of Ethiopian and regional unity, not the other way around.
Described by Abiy Ahmed's government as a threat to Ethiopian security, Tsimdo, paradoxically, is precisely the opposite: by uniting in a single alliance the peoples of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan who desire peace and stability, it promotes unity, integration, and conflict prevention across a large part of the Horn of Africa.
From Philip Bovo
https://www.opinione-pubblica.com/nel-c ... contrario/
August 8, 2026
With the Pretoria Accords of November 2022, the conflict that had erupted two years earlier in Tigray between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) never truly ended, but rather froze without finding a definitive and concrete solution that addressed its fundamental roots. During those two years of conflict, the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments had found significant agreement precisely in their view of the TPLF as a serious obstacle to regional stability and integration; Indeed, Abiy Ahmed's arrival in 2018 had brought about a surprising paradigm shift in Ethiopian politics, with peace with Asmara and the recognition of the borders established by the UN commission (UNMEE) after the war that had opposed the two countries between 1998 and 2000. Incidentally, it was precisely the coalition of the then EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front), dominated by Meles Zenawi's TPLF, that had unleashed that war against Eritrea, with the support of the US and the EU; the Algiers Accords of 2000 had then seen Ethiopia and Eritrea cease hostilities, before the latter won, dashing the wishes of Addis Ababa's allies. Meles Zenawi's Ethiopia had then signed the Algiers Accords; However, with the support of the US, EU, and AU, it had not implemented them, fueling a "neither war nor peace" situation that dragged on until 2018. Meanwhile, serious protests in Ethiopia by the Amhara and Oromo communities, which had erupted since 2016, had begun to profoundly shake the government, signaling a necessary change of pace, which, however, in the long term would prove merely cosmetic.
Haile Mariam Desalegn, who had replaced the now deceased Zenawi, gave way to Abiy Ahmed, the first Oromo prime minister, linked to the OPD (Oromo Democratic Party, one of the forces present in the old EPRDF coalition). This marked the gradual but rapid exit of the TPLF from the coalition, with the EPRDF transforming on December 1, 2019, into a single and new umbrella, the PP (Prosperity Party). The seeds of conflict between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF had by then been sown, and indeed, just a few weeks later, they quickly sprouted, shaking Tigray with sinister flashes of war.
Faced with the 2018 experience, which they viewed as a political failure, the TPLF leadership at the time had effectively concluded that the way out lay in a renewed policy of separatism for Tigray from the rest of Ethiopia. This is especially true after the War of Independence fought by the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) against Addis Ababa, when its leader, Isaias Afewerki, later President of the newly liberated Eritrea, advised Meles Zenawi of the TPLF not to do so, and instead to commit to forming a governing coalition with other Ethiopian forces in order to preserve the political unity of Ethiopia, which had by then been evacuated by the defeated regime of Menghistu Haile Mariam.
Seeing Ethiopian fragmentation as having irreparable consequences for the stability of the Horn of Africa, where, among other things, Somalia was plunging into the chaos of civil war in 1991, Isaias Afewerki and Eritrea immediately positioned themselves as Ethiopia's best friends and guarantors of unity, far more loyal and farsighted in this respect than even Ethiopian internal forces. Thus, in 2020, a referendum was held in Tigray to sanction independence, in accordance with the Ethiopian Federal Constitution, which was ethnically based and allowed for secession without the consent of the central authorities. But, above all, there was an attack on Ethiopian soldiers stationed in Tigray, who, stripped and disarmed, were welcomed in Eritrea, re-armed, and sent to Addis Ababa. It goes without saying that at that time, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea were still good, with interesting and growing prospects for broader integration across the entire Horn of Africa region, benefiting not only themselves but also Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. Eritrea supported Abiy Ahmed, preventing his overthrow at the hands of the TPLF, precisely because it considered a geopolitical situation in which Ethiopia was divided to be apocalyptic, just as it might today, for the same reasons, consider a partition of Sudan. The Tigray conflict was harsh and not without its share of surprises, due to the political and military weakness of the Ethiopian Federal Army (ENDF), which was partially remedied by the Amhara of the FANO and, from the outside, especially by the EDF, the Eritrean army, among the ten strongest in Africa.
However, in November 2022, that conflict ended, finding in the Pretoria Accords, brokered by the AU and promoted by the US, IGAD, and the UN, what should have been its path to definitive recovery; namely, the disarmament of the TPLF, its reintegration into national political life, and so on. Needless to say, they were not respected: a new paradigm shift, in fact, struck Addis Ababa's policy, from that moment realigned with Washington as if the previous four years had been meaningless. Abiy Ahmed's government began pursuing the same policies as his EPRDF predecessors, destroying all integration and reconciliation efforts pursued until then with Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan: not bad for a government whose prime minister had received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 for paving the way for peace with Asmara, a peace that at the time seemed destined for a long life, only to later prove ephemeral. Eritrea was among the first coastal nations to come under increasing Ethiopian political and military pressure, even to the point of outright threats, to gain access to the Red Sea. Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya responded that there would be no problem in opening economic agreements with Ethiopia to allow access to their ports, or with increased volumes, in full compliance with international law; but certainly not by selling or giving away their territories, like common merchandise. From that moment on, the warmongering rhetoric of the Ethiopian government, influenced by the US, Israel, and the UAE, only intensified. Examples abound, but those explicit demands for access to the Red Sea, "by hook or by crook," uttered by Abiy Ahmed to the Ethiopian Parliament, remain etched in most people's memories. Are they meant to cover up the growing problems facing Ethiopia today, amid rising inflation and debt, with 80 million of its 120 million inhabitants living in extreme poverty and threatened by starvation, with political and military organizations like TPLF, FANO, OLF, ANURF, and others rebelling against the central government, prevailing over the ENDF, many of whose troops and weapons are defecting to join them? Certainly, but meanwhile, the path Ethiopia has taken under Abiy Ahmed is now more dangerous than ever. It's no longer just the political and territorial integrity of Ethiopia that is at stake, but that of the entire Horn of Africa.
The conflict in Tigray, which flared up again on August 1st, proves this. This time, it is the government in Addis Ababa that is attacking the TPLF, not the other way around. After the Pretoria Accords, the Ethiopian government had attempted to use the TPLF as an ally against Eritrea, waging a war that would allow it to successfully conquer the Eritrean port of Assab. The growing threats, the siege, and the Ethiopian government's blockade of economic and food supplies to Tigray have only forced the TPLF to reconsider its political line. Within the TPLF, Debretsion Gebremichael and his faction (TPLF-D) prevailed over Getachew Reda, who was ousted and expelled along with his faction (TPLF-G) and is now a satellite, with his own small formation, of Abiy Ahmed's PP. The TPLF has thus drawn ever closer to Asmara, as have FANO, OLF, and ANURF, etc., with a common solidarity alliance known as Tsimdo or Ximdo, which has since extended to the Beja communities of eastern Sudan. This too represents a momentous paradigm shift, viewed with terror by Abiy Ahmed and his allies, who describe Tsimdo as a threat to Ethiopian security, namely to his government's pursuit of regional dominance.
Tsimdo, however, is not an alliance against Ethiopia, but rather between communities from three countries who, burying past conflicts, have decided to unite to address common threats and challenges. It promotes dialogue, cooperation, and conflict prevention among them, while also countering the harsh isolation to which the Tigray population would otherwise be forced. Between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, the peoples and movements that meet in Tsimdo include TPLF, FANO, OLA, ONLF, Uguugumo, Beja, Tigre, Amhara, Oromo, Somali, Saho, Kunama peoples, and so on: an impressive initiative that started from below, which can be explained by the need for life and peace of entire communities tired of war.
With its attacks in the Sherarina region of western Tigray, amidst the conflict with Sudan, the Ethiopian army has demonstrated its willingness to act against this community initiative, immediately encountering its own enormous internal difficulties: the ENDF emerged weak from the confrontation with the TPLF's Army 70, despite having heavy artillery, armored units, and attack drones. This is not the first time that the Ethiopian army, demotivated and divided, has crumbled in the face of fire, handing over its expensive arsenal to perceived enemies. But, in addition to violating the regional sovereignty of Tigray, its federated state, the Ethiopian government has also violated that of Sudan, where, meanwhile, government forces (SAF) are increasingly prevailing over the RSF rebels. Ethiopian units have in fact crossed the border into Sudan, where some of their attacks have been directed against them. It's no secret that, acting as a go-between for the UAE and Israel, Addis Ababa supports the RSF against the Khartoum government, which is also supported by countries such as Eritrea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Ethiopia, which hosts an RSF training camp in the Benishangul-Gumuz region bordering Sudan, is thus forced to retreat, along with its Emirati and Israeli partners. Meanwhile, by supporting the Sudanese government, the TPLF is increasingly viewed by Addis Ababa as its enemy, and this is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the renewed aggression against Tigray. The Ethiopian-Sudanese border has now become a single conflict, as demonstrated, for example, by the disputed area of Al-Fashaga; just as Ethiopia's chain of internal conflicts has now become a single conflict, with various ethno-political movements battling the government in Addis Ababa.
It's the end of Abiy Ahmed's dream, presented as his political panacea, of "two waters": on the one hand, drawing closer, thanks to the RSF, to the Sudanese state of the Blue Nile, even seizing it; and on the other, gaining access to the Red Sea, targeting Assab. Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia form an increasingly solid alliance, as evidenced by the recent Cairo summit; while even the latest dream of Abiy Ahmed and his partners, that of breaking the Tsimdo, currently appears to be in poor health. The Horn of Africa and the Nile Valley, and their peoples, are tired of war and want only peace; and that unity which, in a climate of constructive and respectful cooperation, is precisely the first guarantee of its stable affirmation.
In the Horn of Africa, Tsimdo is the guarantee of Ethiopian and regional unity, not the other way around.
Described by Abiy Ahmed's government as a threat to Ethiopian security, Tsimdo, paradoxically, is precisely the opposite: by uniting in a single alliance the peoples of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan who desire peace and stability, it promotes unity, integration, and conflict prevention across a large part of the Horn of Africa.
From Philip Bovo
https://www.opinione-pubblica.com/nel-c ... contrario/
August 8, 2026
With the Pretoria Accords of November 2022, the conflict that had erupted two years earlier in Tigray between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) never truly ended, but rather froze without finding a definitive and concrete solution that addressed its fundamental roots. During those two years of conflict, the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments had found significant agreement precisely in their view of the TPLF as a serious obstacle to regional stability and integration; Indeed, Abiy Ahmed's arrival in 2018 had brought about a surprising paradigm shift in Ethiopian politics, with peace with Asmara and the recognition of the borders established by the UN commission (UNMEE) after the war that had opposed the two countries between 1998 and 2000. Incidentally, it was precisely the coalition of the then EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front), dominated by Meles Zenawi's TPLF, that had unleashed that war against Eritrea, with the support of the US and the EU; the Algiers Accords of 2000 had then seen Ethiopia and Eritrea cease hostilities, before the latter won, dashing the wishes of Addis Ababa's allies. Meles Zenawi's Ethiopia had then signed the Algiers Accords; However, with the support of the US, EU, and AU, it had not implemented them, fueling a "neither war nor peace" situation that dragged on until 2018. Meanwhile, serious protests in Ethiopia by the Amhara and Oromo communities, which had erupted since 2016, had begun to profoundly shake the government, signaling a necessary change of pace, which, however, in the long term would prove merely cosmetic.
Haile Mariam Desalegn, who had replaced the now deceased Zenawi, gave way to Abiy Ahmed, the first Oromo prime minister, linked to the OPD (Oromo Democratic Party, one of the forces present in the old EPRDF coalition). This marked the gradual but rapid exit of the TPLF from the coalition, with the EPRDF transforming on December 1, 2019, into a single and new umbrella, the PP (Prosperity Party). The seeds of conflict between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF had by then been sown, and indeed, just a few weeks later, they quickly sprouted, shaking Tigray with sinister flashes of war.
Faced with the 2018 experience, which they viewed as a political failure, the TPLF leadership at the time had effectively concluded that the way out lay in a renewed policy of separatism for Tigray from the rest of Ethiopia. This is especially true after the War of Independence fought by the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) against Addis Ababa, when its leader, Isaias Afewerki, later President of the newly liberated Eritrea, advised Meles Zenawi of the TPLF not to do so, and instead to commit to forming a governing coalition with other Ethiopian forces in order to preserve the political unity of Ethiopia, which had by then been evacuated by the defeated regime of Menghistu Haile Mariam.
Seeing Ethiopian fragmentation as having irreparable consequences for the stability of the Horn of Africa, where, among other things, Somalia was plunging into the chaos of civil war in 1991, Isaias Afewerki and Eritrea immediately positioned themselves as Ethiopia's best friends and guarantors of unity, far more loyal and farsighted in this respect than even Ethiopian internal forces. Thus, in 2020, a referendum was held in Tigray to sanction independence, in accordance with the Ethiopian Federal Constitution, which was ethnically based and allowed for secession without the consent of the central authorities. But, above all, there was an attack on Ethiopian soldiers stationed in Tigray, who, stripped and disarmed, were welcomed in Eritrea, re-armed, and sent to Addis Ababa. It goes without saying that at that time, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea were still good, with interesting and growing prospects for broader integration across the entire Horn of Africa region, benefiting not only themselves but also Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. Eritrea supported Abiy Ahmed, preventing his overthrow at the hands of the TPLF, precisely because it considered a geopolitical situation in which Ethiopia was divided to be apocalyptic, just as it might today, for the same reasons, consider a partition of Sudan. The Tigray conflict was harsh and not without its share of surprises, due to the political and military weakness of the Ethiopian Federal Army (ENDF), which was partially remedied by the Amhara of the FANO and, from the outside, especially by the EDF, the Eritrean army, among the ten strongest in Africa.
However, in November 2022, that conflict ended, finding in the Pretoria Accords, brokered by the AU and promoted by the US, IGAD, and the UN, what should have been its path to definitive recovery; namely, the disarmament of the TPLF, its reintegration into national political life, and so on. Needless to say, they were not respected: a new paradigm shift, in fact, struck Addis Ababa's policy, from that moment realigned with Washington as if the previous four years had been meaningless. Abiy Ahmed's government began pursuing the same policies as his EPRDF predecessors, destroying all integration and reconciliation efforts pursued until then with Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan: not bad for a government whose prime minister had received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 for paving the way for peace with Asmara, a peace that at the time seemed destined for a long life, only to later prove ephemeral. Eritrea was among the first coastal nations to come under increasing Ethiopian political and military pressure, even to the point of outright threats, to gain access to the Red Sea. Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya responded that there would be no problem in opening economic agreements with Ethiopia to allow access to their ports, or with increased volumes, in full compliance with international law; but certainly not by selling or giving away their territories, like common merchandise. From that moment on, the warmongering rhetoric of the Ethiopian government, influenced by the US, Israel, and the UAE, only intensified. Examples abound, but those explicit demands for access to the Red Sea, "by hook or by crook," uttered by Abiy Ahmed to the Ethiopian Parliament, remain etched in most people's memories. Are they meant to cover up the growing problems facing Ethiopia today, amid rising inflation and debt, with 80 million of its 120 million inhabitants living in extreme poverty and threatened by starvation, with political and military organizations like TPLF, FANO, OLF, ANURF, and others rebelling against the central government, prevailing over the ENDF, many of whose troops and weapons are defecting to join them? Certainly, but meanwhile, the path Ethiopia has taken under Abiy Ahmed is now more dangerous than ever. It's no longer just the political and territorial integrity of Ethiopia that is at stake, but that of the entire Horn of Africa.
The conflict in Tigray, which flared up again on August 1st, proves this. This time, it is the government in Addis Ababa that is attacking the TPLF, not the other way around. After the Pretoria Accords, the Ethiopian government had attempted to use the TPLF as an ally against Eritrea, waging a war that would allow it to successfully conquer the Eritrean port of Assab. The growing threats, the siege, and the Ethiopian government's blockade of economic and food supplies to Tigray have only forced the TPLF to reconsider its political line. Within the TPLF, Debretsion Gebremichael and his faction (TPLF-D) prevailed over Getachew Reda, who was ousted and expelled along with his faction (TPLF-G) and is now a satellite, with his own small formation, of Abiy Ahmed's PP. The TPLF has thus drawn ever closer to Asmara, as have FANO, OLF, and ANURF, etc., with a common solidarity alliance known as Tsimdo or Ximdo, which has since extended to the Beja communities of eastern Sudan. This too represents a momentous paradigm shift, viewed with terror by Abiy Ahmed and his allies, who describe Tsimdo as a threat to Ethiopian security, namely to his government's pursuit of regional dominance.
Tsimdo, however, is not an alliance against Ethiopia, but rather between communities from three countries who, burying past conflicts, have decided to unite to address common threats and challenges. It promotes dialogue, cooperation, and conflict prevention among them, while also countering the harsh isolation to which the Tigray population would otherwise be forced. Between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, the peoples and movements that meet in Tsimdo include TPLF, FANO, OLA, ONLF, Uguugumo, Beja, Tigre, Amhara, Oromo, Somali, Saho, Kunama peoples, and so on: an impressive initiative that started from below, which can be explained by the need for life and peace of entire communities tired of war.
With its attacks in the Sherarina region of western Tigray, amidst the conflict with Sudan, the Ethiopian army has demonstrated its willingness to act against this community initiative, immediately encountering its own enormous internal difficulties: the ENDF emerged weak from the confrontation with the TPLF's Army 70, despite having heavy artillery, armored units, and attack drones. This is not the first time that the Ethiopian army, demotivated and divided, has crumbled in the face of fire, handing over its expensive arsenal to perceived enemies. But, in addition to violating the regional sovereignty of Tigray, its federated state, the Ethiopian government has also violated that of Sudan, where, meanwhile, government forces (SAF) are increasingly prevailing over the RSF rebels. Ethiopian units have in fact crossed the border into Sudan, where some of their attacks have been directed against them. It's no secret that, acting as a go-between for the UAE and Israel, Addis Ababa supports the RSF against the Khartoum government, which is also supported by countries such as Eritrea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Ethiopia, which hosts an RSF training camp in the Benishangul-Gumuz region bordering Sudan, is thus forced to retreat, along with its Emirati and Israeli partners. Meanwhile, by supporting the Sudanese government, the TPLF is increasingly viewed by Addis Ababa as its enemy, and this is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the renewed aggression against Tigray. The Ethiopian-Sudanese border has now become a single conflict, as demonstrated, for example, by the disputed area of Al-Fashaga; just as Ethiopia's chain of internal conflicts has now become a single conflict, with various ethno-political movements battling the government in Addis Ababa.
It's the end of Abiy Ahmed's dream, presented as his political panacea, of "two waters": on the one hand, drawing closer, thanks to the RSF, to the Sudanese state of the Blue Nile, even seizing it; and on the other, gaining access to the Red Sea, targeting Assab. Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia form an increasingly solid alliance, as evidenced by the recent Cairo summit; while even the latest dream of Abiy Ahmed and his partners, that of breaking the Tsimdo, currently appears to be in poor health. The Horn of Africa and the Nile Valley, and their peoples, are tired of war and want only peace; and that unity which, in a climate of constructive and respectful cooperation, is precisely the first guarantee of its stable affirmation.
