Preconditions for OLA Cooperation with Northern Hegemonist Forces
Posted: 29 Jul 2026, 05:13
Preconditions for OLA Cooperation with Northern Hegemonist Forces
By Fayyis Oropia
I read with great interest and encouragement the recent press release reportedly issued by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), in which it rejected any alliance with Woyane in particular and with the anti-Oromo northern forces in general. The statement emphasized the imperative of Oromo unity against what it described as northern hegemonist elites seeking to return to power in Finfinne.
If any cooperation were to occur, the OLA should engage with Fanno, Shabiya, or Woyane only under strict preconditions. These northern forces may assist the OLA in challenging the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP), but they should not attempt to enter Oromia, let alone seek to occupy political power in Finfinne.
If this press release is authentic, I commend the OLA for taking what I consider a wise and strategic position. I have consistently argued that, despite my criticisms of the Biltsigina government, it represents the lesser of two perceived political dangers when compared with the northern hegemonist forces—namely Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane. Genuine Oromo nationalists within the OFC, OLA, OLF, and even the OPP are capable of replacing the government of Dr. Abiy Ahmed if they choose to do so. However, no northern hegemonist force should be allowed to enter Oromia or assume power in Finfinne.
Echoes of 1991
Recent political developments in Ethiopia invite comparisons with the transformative events of 1991. In the current context, actors commonly described as hegemonist rebel movements—including Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane—appear to be coordinating political strategies in opposition to what is characterised here as an increasingly authoritarian government based in Finfinne.
Central to this dynamic is the perceived effort by these forces to identify and cultivate proxy actors, particularly within emerging Neo-OPDO circles, who might mobilise Oromo constituencies in support of broader strategic objectives.
Within this framework, concerns have emerged regarding the potential involvement of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in such a role. This possibility deserves careful consideration. Oromo political elites should avoid repeating historical patterns in which legitimate popular grievances were instrumentalised by more experienced regional actors pursuing their own political agendas. While opposition to the repressive tendencies attributed to the current administration under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed may be justified, such opposition should not facilitate the return of political forces whose previous periods in power have been associated with exclusion and conflict. Historical precedent suggests that such an outcome could prove detrimental.
It is widely argued that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed operates within an ideological framework that privileges the dominance of the Amharic language and the broader political culture often referred to as Amharanet. His continued support for Amharic as the sole federal working language, despite the demographic and historical significance of Afaan Oromoo, has been interpreted by critics as evidence of this orientation. Political actors committed to maintaining the primacy of Amharic language and culture have, in this view, found common ground with Abiy Ahmed’s leadership.
The political positioning of Jawar Mohammed, however, remains open to differing interpretations. Some observers regard him as aligned with hegemonist elite interests, while others view him as a strategic actor attempting to navigate and challenge entrenched power structures. Oromo society is presently marked by significant internal divisions, including opposing attitudes toward both Abiy Ahmed and Jawar Mohammed. This polarisation raises an important question: are these figures serving as unifying leaders, or are they contributing to deeper fragmentation within Oromo politics?
Abiy Ahmed: Integrator or Divider?
In public speeches, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has invoked two distinct strands of Oromo historical identity. On one hand, he has acknowledged Oromo nationalist figures such as Mamo Mezemer and Alemu Qixessa, who are associated with struggles for Oromo self-determination. On the other hand, he has referred to individuals linked to Ethiopianist traditions, including Habte Giyorgis Dinagde and Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin.
Historically, Oromo political elites have struggled to reconcile these competing narratives. Elements within the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) have emphasised Oromo nationalist perspectives, while segments of the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) have promoted Ethiopianist interpretations. Although Abiy Ahmed’s rhetoric may appear to bridge these traditions, his governance has, in practice, been associated with increasing political polarisation. Oromo political actors have become divided between anti-Abiy movements and pro-government supporters.
The Prime Minister now faces a critical choice: continue along a path that risks further fragmentation or pursue meaningful political reconciliation. Such a shift would likely require concrete measures, including the release of political prisoners and the initiation of an inclusive national dialogue involving opposition groups such as the OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Without such steps, there is a risk of further alienating Oromo constituencies.
Centralisation and the Question of Timing
The administration’s perceived inclination toward centralising state power, potentially at the expense of Ethiopia’s ethnofederal system, raises questions regarding both timing and feasibility. While a more centralised pan-Ethiopian framework may hold theoretical appeal for some, critics argue that it does not adequately address continuing concerns over cultural and political marginalisation, particularly among the Oromo.
Within this context, ethnofederalism is often viewed as a necessary transitional arrangement. Its continued relevance is linked to safeguarding linguistic, cultural, and political rights. Any future transition toward a more integrated federal system would likely require the meaningful inclusion of Afaan Oromoo as a central language of national governance rather than a peripheral one. Whether current policies advance or undermine this objective remains a matter of political debate.
Oromo Political Futures: Leadership or Independence?
Two broad strategic pathways are frequently proposed for the Oromo political project: pursuing transformative leadership within Ethiopia or seeking full political independence. The first would require a redefinition of Ethiopian national identity that places Oromo language, culture, and political participation at its centre. Supporters argue that such a transformation would better reflect Ethiopia’s demographic realities and historical development.
Achieving this vision would require strengthening key elements of Oromo identity, including language, cultural traditions, and collective political institutions. Critics argue that existing political organisations, including the Oromo Prosperity Party, have not demonstrated sufficient commitment to this agenda. Alternative political alliances involving the OLA, OLF, and OFC are sometimes proposed as possible vehicles for advancing these objectives.
Decolonisation and Democratisation
Despite significant political changes in recent years, including the decline of TPLF dominance, critics contend that the ideological and institutional legacy of Amharic linguistic and cultural dominance continues to influence Ethiopia’s federal structures. Historically, leaders from diverse ethnic backgrounds have governed within this framework, raising questions about the extent to which current leadership represents a genuine departure from the past.
From this perspective, democratisation is inseparable from processes of decolonisation. Efforts to promote national unity without addressing underlying inequalities in cultural and political power risk reproducing existing imbalances. A sustainable and inclusive political system would therefore need to be grounded in the voluntary participation and consent of Ethiopia’s constituent nations.
Toward a Democratic Liberation Alliance
This analysis points to the potential value of a renewed democratic alliance among various national and regional communities, including the Oromo, Amhara, Sidama, Somali, Afar, Wolayta, Gurage, and Benishangul-Gumuz peoples, together with neighbouring actors in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Such an alliance should be founded on principles of mutual respect, political inclusion, and ideological clarity.
Ethiopia’s contemporary political challenge can therefore be understood as twofold: overcoming historical systems of domination while building a genuinely democratic and multinational state. Past experience suggests that democratisation efforts which fail to address underlying structural inequalities are unlikely to succeed.
Conclusion
The Oromo people have, in various ways, expressed resistance to political and cultural domination. Nevertheless, critics argue that institutional structures reflecting such dominance continue to influence Ethiopia’s central government. In this view, the pursuit of justice and equality depends upon recognising Afaan Oromoo as a foundational component of national identity and governance.
Upcoming electoral processes present both risks and opportunities. While political disengagement may reinforce existing power structures, strategic participation, combined with civic mobilisation and non-violent political action, could contribute to meaningful political change.
Ultimately, the call is for a balanced and vigilant political approach: to challenge perceived systems of domination while critically assessing the intentions and strategies of all political actors. The aspiration is for a future grounded in justice, equality, democracy, and self-determination, achieved through unity, strategic clarity, and sustained commitment to democratic principles.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/06/15/4057/
By Fayyis Oropia
I read with great interest and encouragement the recent press release reportedly issued by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), in which it rejected any alliance with Woyane in particular and with the anti-Oromo northern forces in general. The statement emphasized the imperative of Oromo unity against what it described as northern hegemonist elites seeking to return to power in Finfinne.
If any cooperation were to occur, the OLA should engage with Fanno, Shabiya, or Woyane only under strict preconditions. These northern forces may assist the OLA in challenging the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP), but they should not attempt to enter Oromia, let alone seek to occupy political power in Finfinne.
If this press release is authentic, I commend the OLA for taking what I consider a wise and strategic position. I have consistently argued that, despite my criticisms of the Biltsigina government, it represents the lesser of two perceived political dangers when compared with the northern hegemonist forces—namely Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane. Genuine Oromo nationalists within the OFC, OLA, OLF, and even the OPP are capable of replacing the government of Dr. Abiy Ahmed if they choose to do so. However, no northern hegemonist force should be allowed to enter Oromia or assume power in Finfinne.
Echoes of 1991
Recent political developments in Ethiopia invite comparisons with the transformative events of 1991. In the current context, actors commonly described as hegemonist rebel movements—including Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane—appear to be coordinating political strategies in opposition to what is characterised here as an increasingly authoritarian government based in Finfinne.
Central to this dynamic is the perceived effort by these forces to identify and cultivate proxy actors, particularly within emerging Neo-OPDO circles, who might mobilise Oromo constituencies in support of broader strategic objectives.
Within this framework, concerns have emerged regarding the potential involvement of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in such a role. This possibility deserves careful consideration. Oromo political elites should avoid repeating historical patterns in which legitimate popular grievances were instrumentalised by more experienced regional actors pursuing their own political agendas. While opposition to the repressive tendencies attributed to the current administration under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed may be justified, such opposition should not facilitate the return of political forces whose previous periods in power have been associated with exclusion and conflict. Historical precedent suggests that such an outcome could prove detrimental.
It is widely argued that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed operates within an ideological framework that privileges the dominance of the Amharic language and the broader political culture often referred to as Amharanet. His continued support for Amharic as the sole federal working language, despite the demographic and historical significance of Afaan Oromoo, has been interpreted by critics as evidence of this orientation. Political actors committed to maintaining the primacy of Amharic language and culture have, in this view, found common ground with Abiy Ahmed’s leadership.
The political positioning of Jawar Mohammed, however, remains open to differing interpretations. Some observers regard him as aligned with hegemonist elite interests, while others view him as a strategic actor attempting to navigate and challenge entrenched power structures. Oromo society is presently marked by significant internal divisions, including opposing attitudes toward both Abiy Ahmed and Jawar Mohammed. This polarisation raises an important question: are these figures serving as unifying leaders, or are they contributing to deeper fragmentation within Oromo politics?
Abiy Ahmed: Integrator or Divider?
In public speeches, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has invoked two distinct strands of Oromo historical identity. On one hand, he has acknowledged Oromo nationalist figures such as Mamo Mezemer and Alemu Qixessa, who are associated with struggles for Oromo self-determination. On the other hand, he has referred to individuals linked to Ethiopianist traditions, including Habte Giyorgis Dinagde and Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin.
Historically, Oromo political elites have struggled to reconcile these competing narratives. Elements within the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) have emphasised Oromo nationalist perspectives, while segments of the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) have promoted Ethiopianist interpretations. Although Abiy Ahmed’s rhetoric may appear to bridge these traditions, his governance has, in practice, been associated with increasing political polarisation. Oromo political actors have become divided between anti-Abiy movements and pro-government supporters.
The Prime Minister now faces a critical choice: continue along a path that risks further fragmentation or pursue meaningful political reconciliation. Such a shift would likely require concrete measures, including the release of political prisoners and the initiation of an inclusive national dialogue involving opposition groups such as the OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Without such steps, there is a risk of further alienating Oromo constituencies.
Centralisation and the Question of Timing
The administration’s perceived inclination toward centralising state power, potentially at the expense of Ethiopia’s ethnofederal system, raises questions regarding both timing and feasibility. While a more centralised pan-Ethiopian framework may hold theoretical appeal for some, critics argue that it does not adequately address continuing concerns over cultural and political marginalisation, particularly among the Oromo.
Within this context, ethnofederalism is often viewed as a necessary transitional arrangement. Its continued relevance is linked to safeguarding linguistic, cultural, and political rights. Any future transition toward a more integrated federal system would likely require the meaningful inclusion of Afaan Oromoo as a central language of national governance rather than a peripheral one. Whether current policies advance or undermine this objective remains a matter of political debate.
Oromo Political Futures: Leadership or Independence?
Two broad strategic pathways are frequently proposed for the Oromo political project: pursuing transformative leadership within Ethiopia or seeking full political independence. The first would require a redefinition of Ethiopian national identity that places Oromo language, culture, and political participation at its centre. Supporters argue that such a transformation would better reflect Ethiopia’s demographic realities and historical development.
Achieving this vision would require strengthening key elements of Oromo identity, including language, cultural traditions, and collective political institutions. Critics argue that existing political organisations, including the Oromo Prosperity Party, have not demonstrated sufficient commitment to this agenda. Alternative political alliances involving the OLA, OLF, and OFC are sometimes proposed as possible vehicles for advancing these objectives.
Decolonisation and Democratisation
Despite significant political changes in recent years, including the decline of TPLF dominance, critics contend that the ideological and institutional legacy of Amharic linguistic and cultural dominance continues to influence Ethiopia’s federal structures. Historically, leaders from diverse ethnic backgrounds have governed within this framework, raising questions about the extent to which current leadership represents a genuine departure from the past.
From this perspective, democratisation is inseparable from processes of decolonisation. Efforts to promote national unity without addressing underlying inequalities in cultural and political power risk reproducing existing imbalances. A sustainable and inclusive political system would therefore need to be grounded in the voluntary participation and consent of Ethiopia’s constituent nations.
Toward a Democratic Liberation Alliance
This analysis points to the potential value of a renewed democratic alliance among various national and regional communities, including the Oromo, Amhara, Sidama, Somali, Afar, Wolayta, Gurage, and Benishangul-Gumuz peoples, together with neighbouring actors in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Such an alliance should be founded on principles of mutual respect, political inclusion, and ideological clarity.
Ethiopia’s contemporary political challenge can therefore be understood as twofold: overcoming historical systems of domination while building a genuinely democratic and multinational state. Past experience suggests that democratisation efforts which fail to address underlying structural inequalities are unlikely to succeed.
Conclusion
The Oromo people have, in various ways, expressed resistance to political and cultural domination. Nevertheless, critics argue that institutional structures reflecting such dominance continue to influence Ethiopia’s central government. In this view, the pursuit of justice and equality depends upon recognising Afaan Oromoo as a foundational component of national identity and governance.
Upcoming electoral processes present both risks and opportunities. While political disengagement may reinforce existing power structures, strategic participation, combined with civic mobilisation and non-violent political action, could contribute to meaningful political change.
Ultimately, the call is for a balanced and vigilant political approach: to challenge perceived systems of domination while critically assessing the intentions and strategies of all political actors. The aspiration is for a future grounded in justice, equality, democracy, and self-determination, achieved through unity, strategic clarity, and sustained commitment to democratic principles.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/06/15/4057/