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እገዳ ይለዓል ኣሎ

ብቐደሙ ስለምንታይ እገዳ?

ከምዡ ገቢሩ ሓቂ ኪዝረብ እንከሎ፡ ደቂ ኤርትራ ብሓበራ ንናይ ፍሒራ ደርፊ ከምዡይ ኣቢሎም ደጋጊሞም የዚሙ

“ሕጂ ግርም ግርም ሕጂ ግርም. . ሕጂ ግርም ኮነ ሕጂ ግርም!”

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Zmeselo wrote: ↑

07 May 2026, 10:23

PRESS RELEASE

https://shabait.com/2026/05/06/%e1%8c%8 ... %e1%8b%b3/

ጋዜጣዊ መግለጺ፡ “ምልዓል እገዳ”

ኣብ’ዚ፡ እቲ ንልዕሊ ዕስራ ዓመታት ኣብ ልዕሊ ኤርትራ ዝጸንዐ ዘይምኽኑይ እገዳታት ንኽለዓል ስጒምቲ ናይ ምውሳድ ተገዳስነት ከምዘሎ ዝእመተሉ ዘሎ ህሞት፡ ንታሪኽን ነቲ ዝበሃል ዘሎ ቅኑዕ ኣንፈት ንምትሓዝን፡ ንድሕሪት ተመሊስካ ዕቱብ ገምጋም ምክያድ ኣገዳሲ’ዩ።

ኣብ መወዳእታ 2009፡ ኣብ ቅንያት ‘ክሪስማስ’፡ ምምሕዳር ኦባማ ዝፈብረኮን ዝደፍኣሉን፡ ዝዀነ ጭብጢ ወይ መርትዖ ዘይነበሮ፣ ዝዀነ ሕጋዊ መስርሕ ዘይተኸተለ ዓላቚ እገዳ፡ ብስም ባይቶ ጸጥታ ሕቡራት ሃገራት ተበዪኑ። መጐታዊ ኲነኔና፡ ሽዑ ኣዊጅና።

እቲ ዝገርም፡ ሽዑ – ናይ ፈደረሽን ሩስያ ወኪል ኣብ ኒውዮርክ፡ ንናይ ምምሕዳር ኦባማ ዓሎቕ ብሙሉእ ኪድግፍ ከሎ፡ ናይ ቻይና ወኪል ከኣ ስማዊ ‘ኣብስተንሽን’ ኣብ’ቲ ግሁድ ዓሎቕ ኣመዝጊቡ።

....

ኣብ’ዚ ቅንያት’ዚ፡ እቲ ብሕቡራት መንግስታት ኣመሪካ ዝተበየነ ዘይሕጋዊን በይናዊን እገዳታት ኣብ ቀረባ ግዜ ክለዓል’ዩ ዝብል ጸብጻባት ኣሎ። እዚ ስጒምቲ’ዚ፡ ነቲ ግጉይ ፖሊሲታት ብዘላቕነት ብምእራም፡ ፍትሒ፡ ሕጋውነትን ርትዒን ዘረጋግጽ ክኸውን ተስፋ ንገብር።

ሚኒስትሪ ዜና
ኣስመራ
6 ግንቦት 2026


The Backdrop of Unwarranted Sanctions

At a time of heightened interest, and reportedly, positive and impending measures that may be on the offing to redress unwarranted sanctions imposed on Eritrea for more than two decades now, a sober and retrospective overview of the episodes is perhaps appropriate for matters of historical record and to place the current discourse in its proper perspective.

As it will be recalled, the Obama Administration managed to impose unfair and illicit sanctions on Eritrea on Christmas eve, 24 December 2009, through the UNSC by peddling fabricated allegations that had no basis on fact and law and that were not corroborated by any credible or substantive evidence.

Unfortunately, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation in New York unreservedly supported this deplorable charade while the Chinese Representative’s stance was confined to nominal “abstention”. Eritrea had no choice, but to deplore and put on record its utter dismay.

....

There are reports these days that the illegal and unilateral US sanctions will soon be lifted. We earnestly hope that this act will indeed herald an enduring rectification of misguided policies to ensure justice, legality and fairness.

Ministry of Information
Asmara
6 May 2026

Meleket wrote: ↑

06 Dec 2022, 09:34

"ኣሜሪካ ተባረኪ!" የምንለው እኮ ለዚህ ነው። ...

Meleket wrote: ↑

08 May 2026, 10:57

“ንቕሓት ኢዩ ወሳኒ . . . ጽንዓት ኢዩ ወሳኒ” በለ ወዲ ትዅል! ሰበይ “ተደምረናል” ክትብል እንከላ፡ “ሄሄ ጉድ ከየምጽኡልና እቶም ታሕተዎት ሰፈር፡ ‘ፈለማ ዶብና ደኣ ብግብሪ አብ ባይታ ንሓንጽጽ’” ቢልና ብኤርትራዊ ጭዉነት ነጻ ርእይቶና ገሊጭና ነቢርና። ከም ሎም እቶም ታሕተዎት ሰፈር “የባህር በር” ዚብል ሙዚቃ ከይወልዑ እንከለዉ ምዃኑ’ኡ። ‘ጠርጥር በለ ወደባ ጥመር’፡ ይብሉኹም ከምዡይ ኢዩ።

ብዝዀነ ብቕንያቱ ዚነፍስ ነፋስ ናጽነት ሃገረ ኤርትራን፡ ከምቱይ ዚበሃሎ ዛሎ ምልኣል እገዳ ባህ ስለዘበለና ዳግማይ ከተስተማቕርዋ እዛ ግጥምና ወስ አቢልናልኩም፡ ንሕና ኤርትራዉያን ደያኑ ማእከልን መስመርን በቲ ልሙድ ኤርትራዊ ጭዉነት ሓበንን ፍናንን! viewtopic.php?f=17&t=169960&p=1619915#p1619915

Meleket wrote: ↑

15 Nov 2018, 02:33

እዚኣ ግጥሚ ኣብ ልዕሊ መቓብር ዚበርዐነ ጥንግናግ ሽርሒ ሓሳዳት ኾይና ዝገጠምናያ ያ፤ ምስትምቓር ንኣስተማቐርቲ ንገድፎ!

ማዕቀብ እገዳ ካብ ተላዕለ ደጊም

ማዕቀብ እገዳ ካብ ተላዕለ ደጊም፣
ብፍቕሪ ብህድገት እስከ ንሰዓዓም፣
ቅርሕንቲ ኣወጊድና መብጽዓና ንዕመም፣
እቲ ሃሳዲና ይምላእ እቲ ዓይኑ ደም፣
ይቕረ ክንበሃሃል እስከ ንቀዳደም፣
ናብ ደገ ዘይኮነስ ናብ ሃገር ንሳግም።

ደቂ ኤሩ ሽኾር ዓቢ ምስ ንእሽቶ፣
ካብ ዓዲ እንዳማትና ናብ ዓድና ንእቶ፣
ባህ አይበሎ ሓሳድ ሕድሕድ ንፈታቶ።

እቶም ጸላእትና እቶም ዘይሓንኹ፣
ህዝቢ ዚጥብሩ ተንኮል ዚሕርንኹ፣
ብሰላሕታ ወራር እንተ ተንፈሐኹ፣
ፈንጠርጠር እንተበሉ ናብ ዓዲ ኪሶልኩ፣
ኣብ ዓዱ ኣሎ ጅግና ከውድቆም ሓሊኹ።

ትልዝብ ኣቢልና ተፋቂርና ሕድሕድ፣
ሓርነት ኣዊጅና ንእሱር ንቕዩድ፣
ሕጂውን ከምትማል ንሓዝ ነታ ክሳድ፣
ብፍቅሪ ሟሚቕናስ ብስኒት ንሰውድ፣
ጸላኢ ስምረትና ‘እንጦርጦስ’ ይውረድ።

ደቂ ሃላል መሬት ፈለማ እሞ ንስመር፣
ዶብና ተሐንጺጹ በወግዒ ይሰመር፣
ሽዑ ንምርምሮ ጉዳይ ናይ “መደመር”!
ካብ’ቲ ግርሕነትና’ስ ሕጂዃ ንመሃር!
ጉድ ከየምጽኡልና እቶም ታሕተዎት ሰፈር።

ኣስላማይ ክስታናይ ተጋዳላይ ገባር፣
ከምቲ መብጸዓና ሰሚርና ብሓባር፣
ሕድሪ ጀጋኑና ኣብ ሃገር ነተግብር፣
ዶብና እናስመርና ሕድሕድ ንጠማመር።

ህዝቢ ንመንግስቲ ጸኒዑ ዘጽነዐ፣
ሎቅመጽመጽ ከይበለ ብንዋይ ከይሰድዐ፣
ሳላ ዝተጸመመ ዘረባ ብድዐ፣
ሳላ እታ እምነቱ ንመትከል ዘይከድዐ፣
ልቦና ህዝብና ብሓቂ ተርነዐ፣
ኣብ ልዕሊ ክብሩ’ውን ክብሪ ተደረዐ።

ኢዋኡ በዳሊና እዝጊ ጸሊኡሉ፣
ወትሩ ናብ ሕስረቱ ኮሊሉ ኮሊሉ፣
ሳላ ጽንዓት ሕዝቢ ዝበደሀ ኩሉ፣
ፈጋግር ዞባና እቶም ተዃላሉ፣
ብመከተ ህዝቢ ምስተዐዃለሉ፣
እምነትን ጽንዓትን ካብ ልቢ ፈልፊሉ፣
ኣሎኹ ምስ በላ ንኤረይ ሓላሉ፣
ምስክር ኢዩ ኾይኑ ኩሉ ፈናቂሉ፣
ሓርበይናዊት ኣደ ደጊም ዓልልሉ።


ሳዕስዕሞ ሓዳርኻ ኣይትረስዕ!
ብዘይ ሃገር ክብረት የሎን!

Our Unity and Social Harmony: Guarantee for Our Existence.

Policy Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman, African Affairs Unit — Progress Center for Policies



Resetting US-Eritrean Relations: An Analysis Of Motivations And Regional Implications
By Capadmin On May 2, 2026

Introduction
On April 23, 2026, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration is considering resetting its relations with Eritrea and easing some of the sanctions imposed on it for decades. This move comes amid escalating threats to navigation security in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, transforming Asmara from an isolated state on the margins of American attention into a strategic card at the heart of the geopolitical equation. Yet this path carries profoundly complex regional risks — foremost among them the possibility of igniting an armed confrontation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the risk of President Isaias Afwerki exploiting this opening to consolidate his domestic authority without offering any genuine strategic concessions.

I. Context and Background
Eritrea controls more than 1,120 kilometers of Red Sea coastline, directly adjacent to one of the most critical international shipping lanes. Its location has acquired exceptional importance amid escalating Houthi threats at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, while Tehran has sought to restrict navigation through the Strait of Hormuz since its confrontation with the United States erupted.

According to reports, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi brokered a secret meeting in Cairo between Trump envoy Massad Boulos and Eritrean President Afwerki, covering sanctions relief and the opening of higher-level diplomatic channels. It bears noting that Eritrea is the only African country to have refused engagement with AFRICOM and the IMF, and has remained among the most heavily sanctioned states by Washington — excluded even from the SWIFT international financial transfer system.

II. American Motivations
Washington seeks to transform Eritrea into a “bulwark against Iranian influence,” drawing on its extended Red Sea coastline — through which approximately 13% of global oil passes — and its position opposite the Houthis’ area of operations. In the latest US National Security Strategy document, Eritrea is not listed under any terrorism classification or human rights priority; rather, it is referenced in the context of conflict prevention rather than intervention — a signal of fundamental reframing in the American stance.

This move fundamentally reflects the Trump administration’s adoption of an approach grounded in pure strategic interest with relative detachment from values — consistent with its behavior in other regional files. Yet there is an internal divide within the administration between a pragmatic current pushing for rapid normalization and another that argues any unconditional opening will weaken American leverage and send the wrong message to authoritarian regimes in the region.

III. Eritrean Calculations
Afwerki has shown openness to engaging with the United States differently under the Trump presidency, sensing a rare opportunity to break out of international isolation. Yet history reveals he has mastered the art of using everyone without aligning with anyone, and he will seek to extract maximum material and diplomatic gains while preserving a wide margin of strategic independence. This move grants him a highly valuable domestic and regional pressure card amid accumulated pressures from prolonged economic isolation — with a strong likelihood he will repeat his historical pattern of taking without giving.

IV. Regional Implications
Ethiopia represents the most sensitive variable in this equation. Worsening tensions over sea access and Asmara’s relations with groups opposed to the Ethiopian government raise the probability of clashes along the border that could rapidly escalate into a broader military confrontation. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has described Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a “prison,” and reclaiming the port of Assab has become a demand with wide popular support cutting across political affiliations. Military movements toward the border have been observed alongside escalating mobilizing rhetoric. Eritrean forces continue to occupy areas inside Ethiopian borders seized during the Tigray war, despite UN demands for withdrawal, while Asmara maintains ties with opposition factions in Tigray.

Sudan adds a dimension that cannot be overlooked: Iran is working to leverage its influence over Sudan’s Red Sea coast to reinforce its presence in the maritime corridor, complicating American calculations and rendering any one-dimensional security equation inadequate. Somalia and Djibouti will also recalibrate their positions, as both maintain complex and contradictory relationships with both Washington and Asmara.

V. Critique of American Strategy
Critics at prominent research institutes argue that the strategic logic is “theoretically comprehensible but catastrophically applicable in practice,” warning that lifting sanctions on Eritrea could produce an American strategic defeat. They invoke Gaddafi’s fate as a historical warning — arguing he fell not because he refused to engage with the West, but because he accepted engagement — and that Washington is repeating a recurring pattern with African states: isolation, then pressure, then re-engagement, then subjugation. Furthermore, marginalizing Ethiopian calculations in this equation may push Addis Ababa toward more hardline options on sea access, turning the Horn of Africa into a new flashpoint.

VI. Likely Scenarios
First — Most probable: Limited Partial Normalization. Selective sanctions relief and the opening of diplomatic channels while preserving pressure tools — granting Asmara limited legitimacy without binding it to substantive concessions.

Second — Negotiation Track Collapse. Should Afwerki push to extract maximum gains without reciprocity, drawing on his history of managing relationships with full autonomy.

Third — Most dangerous: Full-Scale War. A transformation of Ethiopia-Eritrea border tensions into comprehensive war should diplomatic intervention fail — repeating the devastating 1998–2000 conflict in a far more entangled regional context at far higher humanitarian cost.

Conclusion
This move embodies one of the deepest dilemmas of foreign policy: the trade-off between immediate strategic interest and the long-term costs of regional stability. Turning Eritrea into a card in the Red Sea war without managing its regional repercussions resembles extinguishing one fire by igniting another. Any unconditional opening will send a deeply dangerous message — that Washington is prepared to trade away human rights considerations when strategic necessity demands it.

For the sake of regional stability, Washington would be better served by tying any sanctions relief to concrete and measurable benchmarks, engaging Ethiopia and regional mediation bodies in managing this transition, and remembering that Isaias Afwerki, in his dealings with major powers, speaks only one language: taking without giving.

https://www.arabprogress.org/en/resetti ... lications/

Washington’s Eritrea Reset: From Sanctioned Spoiler to Licensed Spoiler
MAY 10, 2026



Washington’s reported plan to remove sanctions on Eritrea marks a significant moment in the evolving security architecture of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. On the surface, the logic appears pragmatic: Eritrea controls a long Red Sea coastline, sits opposite Saudi Arabia, and occupies a decisive position in the corridor linking the Horn, the Gulf, and the wider maritime-security ecosystem. Yet the strategic paradox is difficult to avoid. A policy designed to stabilize a volatile frontier may end up rewarding a state whose regional posture has repeatedly complicated the very stability Washington seeks to preserve.[1]

According to a Reuters report published in May 2026, the United States is preparing to remove sanctions on Eritrea, with analysts linking the move to Asmara’s strategic location along the Red Sea shipping route and Washington’s interest in easing regional tensions.[1] This is not merely a bilateral diplomatic adjustment. It reflects a broader strategic recalibration in which the Horn is no longer treated as a secondary African theater, but as part of a transregional continuum connecting Red Sea security, Gulf politics, maritime trade, and African institutional order.

That recalibration is understandable. Eritrea’s geography gives Asmara leverage that few regional actors can ignore. Its ports, coastline, and proximity to Yemen and Saudi Arabia make it relevant to shipping security and crisis management. Its relationship with Ethiopia, the Horn’s demographic and diplomatic center of gravity, also gives Eritrea outsized importance in any regional de-escalation framework. For Washington, engaging Asmara may appear to offer a channel through which Red Sea security, Ethiopia-Eritrea confidence-building, and wider geopolitical competition can be managed at once.

Historically, however, Eritrea’s strategic relevance has not translated into constructive regional integration. The United States imposed sanctions in 2021 on Eritrean entities and individuals under Executive Order 14046, citing their contribution to the crisis then affecting Ethiopia and the wider Horn.[2] Those measures were not incidental. They formed part of a pressure architecture aimed at constraining destabilizing behavior, encouraging withdrawal from contested spaces, and protecting the stability and integrity of regional states.

The current concern is therefore not whether Eritrea matters. It clearly does. The concern is whether Washington is converting Eritrea’s strategic geography into diplomatic impunity. Ethiopia has pursued a consistent regional interest in secure, negotiated, and economically viable access to the sea, a question rooted in its landlocked status and long-term development requirements. At the same time, Addis Ababa has formally communicated concerns regarding Eritrean troop presence near contested areas and alleged support for armed groups, while also signaling willingness to engage peacefully on maritime access and related issues.[3] This combination of principled sovereignty and negotiated access should be treated as an opening for regional diplomacy, not as a justification for empowering unilateral disruption.

At the same time, Asmara has weakened the very institutional channels that could help manage these tensions. In December 2025, Eritrea withdrew from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, only two years after rejoining the regional bloc.[4] IGAD noted that Eritrea had not participated in the organization’s meetings, programmes, or activities since June 2023, while expressing continued openness to constructive engagement.[5] IGAD is one of the few African-led arenas through which Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions, Red Sea insecurity, Sudan’s war, and Somalia’s security transition can be discussed within a regional framework. Eritrea’s exit reinforces a familiar pattern: maximum sovereignty claim, minimum institutional constraint.

What we are witnessing is the possible emergence of a “licensed spoiler” model. Under this model, an actor with a record of disruption is not rehabilitated because its conduct has clearly changed, but because external powers decide that its geography has become too valuable to ignore. The spoiler is not transformed. It is repackaged as a necessary partner. Its leverage rises precisely because the surrounding security environment deteriorates.

Seen from that angle, Washington’s calculation is not irrational, but it is incomplete. The United States may believe that engagement can moderate Asmara, create channels for de-escalation, strengthen Red Sea coordination, and limit the space available to rival powers. This is the strongest argument for a reset. Isolation has not liberalized Eritrea, reduced its domestic militarization, or integrated it into regional institutions. A managed opening could, in theory, create incentives that pressure alone has failed to produce.

Yet that argument depends entirely on conditionality. Without clear benchmarks, sanctions relief risks becoming a unilateral concession rather than a calibrated instrument. Eritrea’s operating model links domestic militarization with external maneuvering. Indefinite national service sustains a highly securitized state structure; political closure reduces internal accountability; and regional disruption then becomes a mechanism for projecting strength outward while insulating the regime at home. In this sense, Eritrea’s foreign policy cannot be separated from its domestic architecture. The same state that organizes society around permanent mobilization also benefits from a neighborhood kept under strategic pressure.

In practical terms, Washington’s reset should not be judged by whether it opens a channel to Asmara. It should be judged by what that channel requires. Any serious framework would need to tie sanctions relief and diplomatic upgrading to verifiable security de-escalation, non-interference in neighboring states, renewed cooperation with IGAD and AU mechanisms, humanitarian access where relevant, and measurable reform of Eritrea’s national-service system. These conditions would not resolve the Eritrean question in full. They would, however, prevent engagement from becoming a reward for coercive leverage.

That framework would also serve Ethiopia’s constructive regional agenda. Addis Ababa’s long-term interest lies in negotiated maritime access, corridor diversification, regional economic integration, and predictable security relations with its neighbors. A stable Red Sea order cannot be built by isolating Ethiopia’s legitimate development requirements from the wider architecture of ports, trade corridors, and African-led diplomacy. Nor can it be built by allowing Asmara to convert its coastline into a veto point over regional integration. The sustainable path is one in which Ethiopia’s search for access is addressed through lawful negotiation and mutual economic benefit, while Eritrea is encouraged to re-enter regional mechanisms under clear rules of conduct.

The better approach, therefore, is conditional engagement anchored in regional architecture. Washington can speak to Asmara without laundering its behavior. It can recognize Eritrea’s Red Sea significance without converting geography into exemption. It can support Ethiopia-Eritrea de-escalation while strengthening, rather than bypassing, African institutional channels. The key test is whether the United States uses engagement to pull Eritrea into a rules-based regional framework or simply accepts Asmara’s role as a hard-edged gatekeeper on the Red Sea.

The Horn’s emerging security order is already marked by corridor competition, port politics, external military positioning, and fragile institutions. In such an environment, great powers often privilege access over accountability and short-term deterrence over long-term order. If Washington removes sanctions without enforceable conditions, it may not be stabilizing the Horn’s Red Sea frontier. It may be turning Eritrea from a sanctioned spoiler into a licensed one.

References
[1] Reuters reported in May 2026 that the United States was set to remove sanctions on Eritrea, linking the move to Eritrea’s Red Sea location and shifting regional alignments. (Reuters)
[2] The U.S. Treasury announced November 2021 sanctions on Eritrean entities and individuals under Executive Order 14046. (U.S. Department of the Treasury)
[3] Reuters reported in February 2026 that Ethiopia formally communicated concerns regarding Eritrean troop presence and support for armed groups, while noting Ethiopia’s stated openness to peaceful negotiations on maritime access. (Reuters)
[4] AP reported Eritrea’s December 2025 withdrawal from IGAD. (AP News)
[5] IGAD said Eritrea had not participated in IGAD meetings, programmes, or activities since June 2023 and stated that it remained open to constructive engagement. (igad.int)

By Dinaol Ibraahim, IFA

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አረብ ኤምሬቶቹ ጌቶቻችን በኤርትራ ህዝብ ላይ ተጥሎ የነበረውን ማእቀብ በመነሳቱ ምክንያት የተሰማቸው ጥልቅ ሐዘን የብልፅግናው ወንድማችን Meleket በፅሁፍ መልክ ስላጋራን በጣም እናመሰግናለን። አረብ ኤምሬቶች የሚፈልጉትን ካላገኙ ንዴታቸውና ቁጣቸው አይጣል ነው። ሲቆጡ በጣም ያስፈራሉ። ፅሁፉን የሚያነቡት ኤርትራውያን እንዴት እንደሚርበደበዱ ለማወቅ አያስቸግርም።

አረብ ኤምሬቶች በኤርትራ ህዝብ ላይ አውጀውት የነበረውን የውክልና ጦርነት በሆርሙዝ ሰርጥ መዘጋት ምክንያት ሳይጀመር በመክሸፉ ሞራላቸው እጅግ ስለተጎዳ፣ ሐዘናቸው ሐዘናችን፣ ስቃያቸው ስቃያችን፣ ህመማቸው ህመማችን፣ ስለሆነ ድምፅ ማሰማታችንን እንቀጥላለን። የብልፅግናው ወንድማችን Meleket የጀመረውን ለአረብ ኤምሬቶች ድምጽ የመሆን ዘመቻን ለማስቀጠል ከጎኑ ተሰልፈን በፅናት ለመታገል ቃል እንገባለን። አይዞህ ወንድሜ ፤ ፈፅሞ ብቻህ አትሆንም።