Mereja.Forum

[Odie]

Fano will go no where ወሬ ብቻ!!

***Chronic Low-Intensity Conflict (Most Likely: ~50–60%)


Core Game-Theory Structure

Think of Ethiopia as a multi-level game:

1. Federal government vs regional powers (Tigray, Amhara, Oromo factions)

This is a commitment problem:
Regions don’t trust Addis Ababa to honor autonomy.
The federal government doesn’t trust regions to disarm if they gain power.
Result: “No one disarms first” equilibrium → persistent instability
2. Elite fragmentation (especially in Tigray)

Now it’s not just federal vs TPLF—there are internal rival factions
This becomes a coordination game with spoilers
Even if peace is optimal, splinter groups defect to gain advantage
3. Ethiopia vs Eritrea (and regional geopolitics)

A security dilemma:
Ethiopia mobilizes → Eritrea responds → escalation spiral
Complicated by Ethiopia’s desire for sea access
Current Signals (2025–2026 reality)

Recent clashes show the ceasefire is fragile
Analysts warn Ethiopia is “on the brink of war again”
Tigray politics are fragmented and unstable
Elections in 2026 are expected to be contentious and destabilizing
Risk of regional war (especially with Eritrea) is rising
Five-Year Forecast (Game-Theoretic Scenarios)

Scenario 1: Chronic Low-Intensity Conflict (Most Likely: ~50–60%)

Game outcome: Repeated game with no stable equilibrium

Periodic clashes in Tigray, Amhara, possibly Oromia
Militias remain active; disarmament fails
Central government maintains partial control, not full sovereignty
Humanitarian crises persist
Why this equilibrium holds:

No actor can credibly commit to peace
War is costly—but defection is locally rational
Scenario 2: Renewed Large-Scale War (Moderate: ~25–35%)

Game outcome: Breakdown of deterrence

Triggers:

Collapse of Tigray ceasefire
Direct Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation
Election crisis in 2026 delegitimizes government
Evidence:

Troop buildups and border tensions are already visible
Proxy dynamics emerging (support to rival armed groups)
Game theory logic:

Preemptive war problem: each side fears future disadvantage → strikes early
Scenario 3: Authoritarian Stabilization (Moderate: ~20–30%)

Game outcome: One dominant player enforces equilibrium

Federal government centralizes power further
Elections occur but are managed / low-credibility
Violence decreases, but political freedoms shrink
Why possible:

If one actor (likely the state) gains military superiority, it can impose order
Risk:

This is stable but brittle—future shocks can reignite conflict
Scenario 4: Negotiated Federal Reset (Low: ~10–15%)

Game outcome: Cooperative equilibrium (hard to reach)

Would require:

Genuine power-sharing
Resolution of territorial disputes (e.g., Western Tigray)
Eritrea withdrawal
Credible third-party guarantees
Why unlikely:

Classic credible commitment problem
No strong external enforcer
Key Strategic Drivers to Watch

These variables will determine which path dominates:

1. 2026 Elections

If perceived as illegitimate → increases probability of war
2. Tigray internal cohesion

Fragmentation → chaos
Unity → stronger bargaining power
3. Eritrea’s role

External spoiler or stabilizer
Currently leaning toward destabilizing influence
4. Economic performance

Growth projections are strong on paper
But conflict could derail investment and reforms
Bottom Line

From a game-theory perspective:

Ethiopia is stuck in a “bad equilibrium”:
Peace is collectively better
But no actor trusts others enough to choose it
Most likely outcome (next 5 years):

Not full collapse, not full peace — but persistent instability with periodic violence

The biggest risk:

A single miscalculation (election crisis, border clash) could shift the system into full-scale war



**********************************

My choice would be the one bellow but based on hate and disrespect for one ethnic for another, contempt and history the cchance of happening is almost null and hope for that country for permanent peace is unlikely

Scenario 4: Negotiated Federal Reset (Low: ~10–15%)

Game outcome: Cooperative equilibrium (hard to reach)

Would require:

Genuine power-sharing
Resolution of territorial disputes (e.g., Western Tigray)
Eritrea withdrawal
Credible third-party guarantees
Why unlikely:

Classic credible commitment problem
No strong external enforcer

[Tiago]

What's the role of the Guragays in these?
-The major ethnic decide the future of Ethithiopia ,most likely the Amharas.

-The Guragays are insignificant and the best they can do is "to shut up and sit down".

Knowing one's limits is wisdom by itself,but the gutless guragays and their hybrids on this forum think otherwise .

[ethiopianunity]

Fano will go no where ወሬ ብቻ!!

***Chronic Low-Intensity Conflict (Most Likely: ~50–60%)


Core Game-Theory Structure

Think of Ethiopia as a multi-level game:

1. Federal government vs regional powers (Tigray, Amhara, Oromo factions)

This is a commitment problem:
Regions don’t trust Addis Ababa to honor autonomy.
The federal government doesn’t trust regions to disarm if they gain power.
Result: “No one disarms first” equilibrium → persistent instability
2. Elite fragmentation (especially in Tigray)

Now it’s not just federal vs TPLF—there are internal rival factions
This becomes a coordination game with spoilers
Even if peace is optimal, splinter groups defect to gain advantage
3. Ethiopia vs Eritrea (and regional geopolitics)

A security dilemma:
Ethiopia mobilizes → Eritrea responds → escalation spiral
Complicated by Ethiopia’s desire for sea access
Current Signals (2025–2026 reality)

Recent clashes show the ceasefire is fragile
Analysts warn Ethiopia is “on the brink of war again”
Tigray politics are fragmented and unstable
Elections in 2026 are expected to be contentious and destabilizing
Risk of regional war (especially with Eritrea) is rising
Five-Year Forecast (Game-Theoretic Scenarios)

Scenario 1: Chronic Low-Intensity Conflict (Most Likely: ~50–60%)

Game outcome: Repeated game with no stable equilibrium

Periodic clashes in Tigray, Amhara, possibly Oromia
Militias remain active; disarmament fails
Central government maintains partial control, not full sovereignty
Humanitarian crises persist
Why this equilibrium holds:

No actor can credibly commit to peace
War is costly—but defection is locally rational
Scenario 2: Renewed Large-Scale War (Moderate: ~25–35%)

Game outcome: Breakdown of deterrence

Triggers:

Collapse of Tigray ceasefire
Direct Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation
Election crisis in 2026 delegitimizes government
Evidence:

Troop buildups and border tensions are already visible
Proxy dynamics emerging (support to rival armed groups)
Game theory logic:

Preemptive war problem: each side fears future disadvantage → strikes early
Scenario 3: Authoritarian Stabilization (Moderate: ~20–30%)

Game outcome: One dominant player enforces equilibrium

Federal government centralizes power further
Elections occur but are managed / low-credibility
Violence decreases, but political freedoms shrink
Why possible:

If one actor (likely the state) gains military superiority, it can impose order
Risk:

This is stable but brittle—future shocks can reignite conflict
Scenario 4: Negotiated Federal Reset (Low: ~10–15%)

Game outcome: Cooperative equilibrium (hard to reach)

Would require:

Genuine power-sharing
Resolution of territorial disputes (e.g., Western Tigray)
Eritrea withdrawal
Credible third-party guarantees
Why unlikely:

Classic credible commitment problem
No strong external enforcer
Key Strategic Drivers to Watch

These variables will determine which path dominates:

1. 2026 Elections

If perceived as illegitimate → increases probability of war
2. Tigray internal cohesion

Fragmentation → chaos
Unity → stronger bargaining power
3. Eritrea’s role

External spoiler or stabilizer
Currently leaning toward destabilizing influence
4. Economic performance

Growth projections are strong on paper
But conflict could derail investment and reforms
Bottom Line

From a game-theory perspective:

Ethiopia is stuck in a “bad equilibrium”:
Peace is collectively better
But no actor trusts others enough to choose it
Most likely outcome (next 5 years):

Not full collapse, not full peace — but persistent instability with periodic violence

The biggest risk:

A single miscalculation (election crisis, border clash) could shift the system into full-scale war



**********************************

My choice would be the one bellow but based on hate and disrespect for one ethnic for another, contempt and history the cchance of happening is almost null and hope for that country for permanent peace is unlikely

Scenario 4: Negotiated Federal Reset (Low: ~10–15%)

Game outcome: Cooperative equilibrium (hard to reach)

Would require:

Genuine power-sharing
Resolution of territorial disputes (e.g., Western Tigray)
Eritrea withdrawal
Credible third-party guarantees
Why unlikely:

Classic credible commitment problem
No strong external enforcer

ሻቦ/ወያኔ ኦዲ

ሁለት ግዜ ምኞትህን ገለፀክ ለ ምራብ ትግራይ። እስቲ ግለፅልን ምን ማለትህ እንደሆነ ምራብ ትግራይ?

[Odie]

What's the role of the Guragays in these?
-The major ethnic decide the future of Ethithiopia ,most likely the Amharas.

-The Guragays are insignificant and the best they can do is "to shut up and sit down".

Knowing one's limits is wisdom by itself,but the gutless guragays and their hybrids on this forum think otherwise .

ጤባው ጤባ-ጎ አህያው🫏🫏🫏🫏🫏

why not we start with your non-existent ቆሞ ቀረ ኦሮሞ and Tigre +other ethnic ጠል በቀንድ ቆጠራ 30 ሚልዮን ንኝ የሚል በአንድ ነገር ትስማምቶ ዩማያውቀው ሞተ-አንብሳ ጠመንጃ ካነሳው መንግስት እገለብጣለሁ ከሚለው የደብተራ መንጋ ብንጀምርስ?

ጉራጌ እንዳንተ ዘር ጉራ ነፊ ደም ፍላተኛና ደዴብ አይደለም ሁሉም ነገር analyse የሚያደርግ ስላምተኛ ህዝብ ነው!! እንደ ባስታርድ አማራ ሴረኛና incorrigible አይደለም!! አገሪቷ ብዙ እንደዛ አይነት ዘርና የስራ ህዝብ ያስፈልጋታል

[Odie]

Fano will go no where ወሬ ብቻ!!

***Chronic Low-Intensity Conflict (Most Likely: ~50–60%)


Core Game-Theory Structure

Think of Ethiopia as a multi-level game:

1. Federal government vs regional powers (Tigray, Amhara, Oromo factions)

This is a commitment problem:
Regions don’t trust Addis Ababa to honor autonomy.
The federal government doesn’t trust regions to disarm if they gain power.
Result: “No one disarms first” equilibrium → persistent instability
2. Elite fragmentation (especially in Tigray)

Now it’s not just federal vs TPLF—there are internal rival factions
This becomes a coordination game with spoilers
Even if peace is optimal, splinter groups defect to gain advantage
3. Ethiopia vs Eritrea (and regional geopolitics)

A security dilemma:
Ethiopia mobilizes → Eritrea responds → escalation spiral
Complicated by Ethiopia’s desire for sea access
Current Signals (2025–2026 reality)

Recent clashes show the ceasefire is fragile
Analysts warn Ethiopia is “on the brink of war again”
Tigray politics are fragmented and unstable
Elections in 2026 are expected to be contentious and destabilizing
Risk of regional war (especially with Eritrea) is rising
Five-Year Forecast (Game-Theoretic Scenarios)

Scenario 1: Chronic Low-Intensity Conflict (Most Likely: ~50–60%)

Game outcome: Repeated game with no stable equilibrium

Periodic clashes in Tigray, Amhara, possibly Oromia
Militias remain active; disarmament fails
Central government maintains partial control, not full sovereignty
Humanitarian crises persist
Why this equilibrium holds:

No actor can credibly commit to peace
War is costly—but defection is locally rational
Scenario 2: Renewed Large-Scale War (Moderate: ~25–35%)

Game outcome: Breakdown of deterrence

Triggers:

Collapse of Tigray ceasefire
Direct Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation
Election crisis in 2026 delegitimizes government
Evidence:

Troop buildups and border tensions are already visible
Proxy dynamics emerging (support to rival armed groups)
Game theory logic:

Preemptive war problem: each side fears future disadvantage → strikes early
Scenario 3: Authoritarian Stabilization (Moderate: ~20–30%)

Game outcome: One dominant player enforces equilibrium

Federal government centralizes power further
Elections occur but are managed / low-credibility
Violence decreases, but political freedoms shrink
Why possible:

If one actor (likely the state) gains military superiority, it can impose order
Risk:

This is stable but brittle—future shocks can reignite conflict
Scenario 4: Negotiated Federal Reset (Low: ~10–15%)

Game outcome: Cooperative equilibrium (hard to reach)

Would require:

Genuine power-sharing
Resolution of territorial disputes (e.g., Western Tigray)
Eritrea withdrawal
Credible third-party guarantees
Why unlikely:

Classic credible commitment problem
No strong external enforcer
Key Strategic Drivers to Watch

These variables will determine which path dominates:

1. 2026 Elections

If perceived as illegitimate → increases probability of war
2. Tigray internal cohesion

Fragmentation → chaos
Unity → stronger bargaining power
3. Eritrea’s role

External spoiler or stabilizer
Currently leaning toward destabilizing influence
4. Economic performance

Growth projections are strong on paper
But conflict could derail investment and reforms
Bottom Line

From a game-theory perspective:

Ethiopia is stuck in a “bad equilibrium”:
Peace is collectively better
But no actor trusts others enough to choose it
Most likely outcome (next 5 years):

Not full collapse, not full peace — but persistent instability with periodic violence

The biggest risk:

A single miscalculation (election crisis, border clash) could shift the system into full-scale war



**********************************

My choice would be the one bellow but based on hate and disrespect for one ethnic for another, contempt and history the cchance of happening is almost null and hope for that country for permanent peace is unlikely

Scenario 4: Negotiated Federal Reset (Low: ~10–15%)

Game outcome: Cooperative equilibrium (hard to reach)

Would require:

Genuine power-sharing
Resolution of territorial disputes (e.g., Western Tigray)
Eritrea withdrawal
Credible third-party guarantees
Why unlikely:

Classic credible commitment problem
No strong external enforcer

ሻቦ/ወያኔ ኦዲ

ሁለት ግዜ ምኞትህን ገለፀክ ለ ምራብ ትግራይ። እስቲ ግለፅልን ምን ማለትህ እንደሆነ ምራብ ትግራይ?

ምእራብ ትግራይ አማራ ከትግሬ በስልጣን ዘመኑ እንዳይንፈራፈርና እንዲራብ የቀማው መሬት ነው ይላል መፅሃፉ

[Horus]

The true political dynamics of Ethiopia is not governed by the highly mathematical and rational game theory. Most of the Ethiopian game players are stupid entities who can't define their interest and strategies rationally and intelligently. As the result in real life the AI proposed game probabilities and possible outcomes collapse.

If game theory ever applies in our political case, it will be a 'one dominant player' model or environment. And, in that case, I give it a higher possible outcome than 30%. My gut guess is 60% one dominant player outcome and 40% unstable equilibrium.

This scenario I have been calling a VUCA political world. While the central government and one dominant leader (Abiy) constitutes the 60% order, the remaining 40% of the system will remain VUCA - volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.

All four systems are VUCA: the Tsimdo concept is 100% VUCA; the Tigre political environment is 80% VUCA; the Amara political environment is 50% VUCA & the Oromo political environment is 30% VUCA.

The very foundation of Tsimdo - Egypt and Sudan are themselves heading a highly VUCAized future as the consequence of the Iran war and the emerging post-Iran regional world order.

In the very near future, GoE (government of Ethiopia) will avoid any major military engagement with element of Tsimdo to conduct internationally acceptable election. (By the way election in itself is not in the interest of Ethiopian people). The people need order and development. If most of the socalled opposition not participating means less instability. It is good for the people. But Abiy wants a rudiment of election to placate his western watchers.

Following the election, GOE will conduct major moves against OLA and Fano. TPLF is essentially left to rote into decay. Ethiopia will not move against Eritrea until 2028. I will not tell you the reason. But I will tell you, between June and December 2026, Fano and OLA will be hit very hard and rendered ineffective or choose to negotiate to get some governmental positions.

Remember that all of these global investors have made their own deep analysis and reached the conclusion that GoE is fundamentally stable and worthy of billions of loans and investment.

These are the facts not opposition noise and drama.

[Horus]

What's the role of the Guragays in these?
-The major ethnic decide the future of Ethithiopia ,most likely the Amharas.

-The Guragays are insignificant and the best they can do is "to shut up and sit down".

Knowing one's limits is wisdom by itself,but the gutless guragays and their hybrids on this forum think otherwise .

ጤባው ጤባ-ጎ አህያው🫏🫏🫏🫏🫏

why not we start with your non-existent ቆሞ ቀረ ኦሮሞ and Tigre +other ethnic ጠል በቀንድ ቆጠራ 30 ሚልዮን ንኝ የሚል በአንድ ነገር ትስማምቶ ዩማያውቀው ሞተ-አንብሳ ጠመንጃ ካነሳው መንግስት እገለብጣለሁ ከሚለው የደብተራ መንጋ ብንጀምርስ?

ጉራጌ እንዳንተ ዘር ጉራ ነፊ ደም ፍላተኛና ደዴብ አይደለም ሁሉም ነገር analyse የሚያደርግ ስላምተኛ ህዝብ ነው!! እንደ ባስታርድ አማራ ሴረኛና incorrigible አይደለም!! አገሪቷ ብዙ እንደዛ አይነት ዘርና የስራ ህዝብ ያስፈልጋታል

ትክክል ነው ። ጉራጌ በስመ ነጋ አይኖርም ። ለምሳሌ ጉራጌ ኤርትራ ውስጥ አይንቀሳቀስም ፣ አይነግድም ። ስለዚህ የኤርትራ መበጥበጥ የጉራጌ አጭር ግዜ ወይ፣ ረጅም ግዜ ችግር አይደለም። ጉራጌ ትግሬ ውስጥ አይንቀሳቀስም ፣ አይነግድም፣ አይኖርም። ስለዚህ ትግሬ 24/7 ቢበጣበጥ ፣ ቢናጋ ያችር ወይም የረጅም ግዜ ችግሩ አይደለም። ድሮ ድሮ ደሴ ውስጥ ጥቂት ጉራጌዎች ይነግዱ ነበር። ወደ ሰሜ ሸዋ ጥቂት ነበሩ ። የዛሬን አላውቅም። ጎንደርና ባህር ዳር ጥቂት ተማሪዎች ነበሩ ። ይህም ሆነ ያ የዛሬ ደሴ፣ የዛሬ ባህር ዳር ጉራጌ ንግድና ኢንዱስትሪ ለማቆም የሚሄድባቸው ከተሞች አይደሉም ። ዛሬ ሙሉ በሙሉ የተበጠበጡት ኤርታ፣ ትግሬና አማራ ናቸው። ጉራጌ ይህ ነው የሚባል ጥቅም የለውም ።

ጉራጌ ቢሾፍቱ ፣ ናዝሬት፣ ዝዋይ ፣ አሰላ ፣ ድሬ ደዋ፣ ሃረር ፣ ጂማ የመሳሰሉት ከተሞች ውስጥና በመላው ሲዳማ ሰፊ ያጭርና የረጅም ግዜ ትቅሞቹ የተከማቹበት ቦታዎች ናቸው ። ስለሆነም የኦሮሚያ ሰላም ጉራጌን በቀጥታ የመለከተዋል ፣ የኦሮሚያ ንጥብጥ ጉራጌን በቀጥታ ይጎዳዋል ። ይህ ነው የአዋቂ ጉራጌ ትንተና ትኩረትና የትብብርም ሆነ የግጭት ነጥቡ። ስለሆነም የአቢይ አህመድ መንግስት ኦሮሚያን ሰላም ለማድረግ የሚያደርገው ጥረት በቀጥታ የጉራጌ ጥቅም ነው።

[Dama]

Game Theory described here:
https://www.google.com/search?client=ms ... fId=ChxjMe

[Odie]

[quote=Horus post_id=1614083 time=1774218946 user_id=41933]
[quote=Odie post_id=1614077 time=1774216110 user_id=1752183]
[quote=Tiago post_id=1614075 time=1774214113 user_id=48390]
[b][size=150][color=#000080] What's the role of the Guragays in these?
-The major ethnic decide the future of Ethithiopia ,most likely the Amharas.

-The Guragays are insignificant and the best they can do is "to shut up and sit down".

Knowing one's limits is wisdom by itself,but the gutless guragays and their hybrids on this forum think otherwise .[/color][/size][/b]
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ጤባው ጤባ-ጎ አህያው🫏🫏🫏🫏🫏

why not we start with your non-existent ቆሞ ቀረ ኦሮሞ and Tigre +other ethnic ጠል በቀንድ ቆጠራ 30 ሚልዮን ንኝ የሚል በአንድ ነገር ትስማምቶ ዩማያውቀው ሞተ-አንብሳ ጠመንጃ ካነሳው መንግስት እገለብጣለሁ ከሚለው የደብተራ መንጋ ብንጀምርስ?

ጉራጌ እንዳንተ ዘር ጉራ ነፊ ደም ፍላተኛና ደዴብ አይደለም ሁሉም ነገር analyse የሚያደርግ ስላምተኛ ህዝብ ነው!! እንደ ባስታርድ አማራ ሴረኛና incorrigible አይደለም!! አገሪቷ ብዙ እንደዛ አይነት ዘርና የስራ ህዝብ ያስፈልጋታል :lol:
[/quote]

ትክክል ነው ። ጉራጌ በስመ ነጋ አይኖርም ። ለምሳሌ ጉራጌ ኤርትራ ውስጥ አይንቀሳቀስም ፣ አይነግድም ። ስለዚህ የኤርትራ መበጥበጥ የጉራጌ አጭር ግዜ ወይ፣ ረጅም ግዜ ችግር አይደለም። ጉራጌ ትግሬ ውስጥ አይንቀሳቀስም ፣ አይነግድም፣ አይኖርም። ስለዚህ ትግሬ 24/7 ቢበጣበጥ ፣ ቢናጋ ያችር ወይም የረጅም ግዜ ችግሩ አይደለም። ድሮ ድሮ ደሴ ውስጥ ጥቂት ጉራጌዎች ይነግዱ ነበር። ወደ ሰሜ ሸዋ ጥቂት ነበሩ ። የዛሬን አላውቅም። ጎንደርና ባህር ዳር ጥቂት ተማሪዎች ነበሩ ። ይህም ሆነ ያ የዛሬ ደሴ፣ የዛሬ ባህር ዳር ጉራጌ ንግድና ኢንዱስትሪ ለማቆም የሚሄድባቸው ከተሞች አይደሉም ። ዛሬ ሙሉ በሙሉ የተበጠበጡት ኤርታ፣ ትግሬና አማራ ናቸው። ጉራጌ ይህ ነው የሚባል ጥቅም የለውም ።

ጉራጌ ቢሾፍቱ ፣ ናዝሬት፣ ዝዋይ ፣ አሰላ ፣ ድሬ ደዋ፣ ሃረር ፣ ጂማ የመሳሰሉት ከተሞች ውስጥና በመላው ሲዳማ ሰፊ ያጭርና የረጅም ግዜ ትቅሞቹ የተከማቹበት ቦታዎች ናቸው ። ስለሆነም የኦሮሚያ ሰላም ጉራጌን በቀጥታ የመለከተዋል ፣ የኦሮሚያ ንጥብጥ ጉራጌን በቀጥታ ይጎዳዋል ። ይህ ነው የአዋቂ ጉራጌ ትንተና ትኩረትና የትብብርም ሆነ የግጭት ነጥቡ። ስለሆነም የአቢይ አህመድ መንግስት ኦሮሚያን ሰላም ለማድረግ የሚያደርገው ጥረት በቀጥታ የጉራጌ ጥቅም ነው።
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That is what I thought so!
This idiot thinks Gurage is everywhere and even he was calling KOMCHE to boycot Gurage business.
Addis is cosmopolitan and does not necessarly think komche way!

[ethiopianunity]

The true political dynamics of Ethiopia is not governed by the highly mathematical and rational game theory. Most of the Ethiopian game players are stupid entities who can't define their interest and strategies rationally and intelligently. As the result in real life the AI proposed game probabilities and possible outcomes collapse.

If game theory ever applies in our political case, it will be a 'one dominant player' model or environment. And, in that case, I give it a higher possible outcome than 30%. My gut guess is 60% one dominant player outcome and 40% unstable equilibrium.

This scenario I have been calling a VUCA political world. While the central government and one dominant leader (Abiy) constitutes the 60% order, the remaining 40% of the system will remain VUCA - volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.

All four systems are VUCA: the Tsimdo concept is 100% VUCA; the Tigre political environment is 80% VUCA; the Amara political environment is 50% VUCA & the Oromo political environment is 30% VUCA.

The very foundation of Tsimdo - Egypt and Sudan are themselves heading a highly VUCAized future as the consequence of the Iran war and the emerging post-Iran regional world order.

In the very near future, GoE (government of Ethiopia) will avoid any major military engagement with element of Tsimdo to conduct internationally acceptable election. (By the way election in itself is not in the interest of Ethiopian people). The people need order and development. If most of the socalled opposition not participating means less instability. It is good for the people. But Abiy wants a rudiment of election to placate his western watchers.

Following the election, GOE will conduct major moves against OLA and Fano. TPLF is essentially left to rote into decay. Ethiopia will not move against Eritrea until 2028. I will not tell you the reason. But I will tell you, between June and December 2026, Fano and OLA will be hit very hard and rendered ineffective or choose to negotiate to get some governmental positions.

Remember that all of these global investors have made their own deep analysis and reached the conclusion that GoE is fundamentally stable and worthy of billions of loans and investment.

These are the facts not opposition noise and drama.

Horus,

Less you forget in 2018 who increased and worsen the VUCA if not Aby government or during the transition applying your liberation fronts and Eprps agenda, if not Aby and newly Eprdf#2 govt PP? How? Remember, under Tplf regime, the entire Ethiopians were against Tplf. Why? Obviously, Tplf and Shabia created the ethnic division in Ethiopia that never existed before! Throughout Tplf's reign, Tplf put the controllable Olf factions such as Aba Dula next to Tplf while the terroris Shabo fed Olf was in Eritrea waiting for today's moment to come to Ethiopia and rule after Tplf. This was planned all along! Aby campaigned under ኢትዮዸረያ ሱሴ only because he saw that Ethiopians at the time of Tplf were one but hated Tplf. He tricked Ethiopian people until he got hold of Ethiopia after Tplf then we began to see unspeakable act from Aby government letting in Olf, Jawar and Eprps! Immediately restructuring and controlling regions especially Oromiya and the youth telling them to clean up Orthodox and Amara from Oromiya region! Killing throughout Addis, Oromiya and everywhere began by Olf groups ! To make matters worse, the so called completed the plan by inviting in Shabia! So now all three Liberation Fronts the enemies of Ethiopia are operating in Ethiopia! Killing, abducting, raping until this day theses groups are now control the economy, the military, the social aspect of the country. Worse, inviting in Arabs, Pente, every foreign entities beliefs into the country that is alien to Ethiopia and divisive! Not to mention the unnecessary war against Tigray, the killings of Amara and targeting the victimized Amara as the enemy! PP is the number one creator of VUCA, who are you kidding? The fact that you are talking about VUCA still under the govt you support says the volume of the slave PP's chaos

[Odie]

ቆምጬ will stay begging, ሽፍታ and p@imp🤣