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The OLF Promoting Unity of Anti-Biltsigina Jawar, Marro... and Anti-Seftegna Daud, Léncô... !

By Fayyis Oromia*

Introduction
Oromo political elites currently face a profound strategic dilemma: whether to prioritize opposition to the authoritarian rule of Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party–led government (commonly referred to as Biltsigina), or to confront the resurgence of imperial revivalist forces associated with Seftegna (Semenawi Neftegna including Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane) elites. These revivalist currents—often linked to armed or ideological movements historically rooted in northern Ethiopia—continue to seek political dominance and access to state resources, particularly through control of the federal capital, Finfinne.

The persistence of these competing pressures places Oromo nationalists in a precarious position. While the current administration advances a centralizing agenda that reinforces Amharic dominance, rival forces simultaneously aspire to reassert imperial influence over Oromia, both demographically and territorially. This dual threat necessitates strategic clarity and internal unity among Oromo political actors.

Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s core political conflict is fundamentally structured along ethnic lines, with ideological disagreements operating largely as secondary considerations. Control of the federal center—and particularly of Finfinne—confers not only political authority but also disproportionate access to economic resources and state privileges. Historically, successive ruling elites have consolidated power through ethnic dominance rather than inclusive democratic processes.

From this perspective, Oromo political actors opposing the current administration must remain vigilant to avoid inadvertently facilitating the return of imperial revivalist forces. Intense opposition to the Abiy Ahmed government should not obscure the risks posed by alternative elites whose political projects are equally exclusionary. The removal of Biltsigina without a coherent Oromo-centered strategy risks reopening the path to renewed domination by these forces. Consequently, unity among Oromo elites of the two camps (Anti-Biltsigina and Anti-Seftegna) is not merely desirable but strategically indispensable.

A Three-Tier Framework of Political Struggle
Ethiopia’s political dynamics may be analytically understood through a three-tier framework: ethnic, party, and individual levels of struggle.

Ethnic Level
At the ethnic level, political competition is shaped by a triangular contest among the Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo peoples. Power shifts historically reflect changes in ethnic dominance rather than democratic choice. Under this logic, the imposition of liberal democratic norms at the ethnic level has proven ineffective, as political survival is determined by control over state power. From the era of Amhara dominance to post-1991 Tigrayan rule, and more recently to Oromo ascendancy, Ethiopian politics has revolved around control of the center. Advocacy for relinquishing such power through premature electoral competition may therefore be politically imprudent.

Party Level
Once an ethnic group consolidates national power, intra-ethnic political competition may proceed through relatively democratic means. For the Oromo, this would entail structured competition among Oromo-based parties—such as the Oromo Federalist Congress, the Oromo Liberation Front, and the Oromo People’s Party—after ensuring that exclusionary elites do not regain control of the state.

Individual Level
At the individual level, democratic principles can guide leadership contests within parties, including competition for executive office, provided that candidates remain aligned with collective Oromo national interests.

Thus, while democracy remains constrained at the ethnic level, it may function meaningfully at party and individual levels under conditions of ethnic security and political autonomy.

Oromo Political Trajectory and Language Policy
The Oromo people continue to advance—incrementally but steadily—toward political self-determination. The eventual transfer of power from the pro-Amharic Prosperity Party to Oromic-centered republican forces appears increasingly plausible. Once achieved, consolidation of political authority will be essential. A critical early reform would involve recognizing Oromic as the principal working language of the federation, replacing Amharic in federal administration.

Levels of Oromo Political Specialization
Effective governance and political sustainability require Oromo capacity-building across multiple administrative layers:
- Local (Ganda/Village)
- County (Araddà/Qebele)
- District (Ànà)
- Zone (Province)
- Oromia (State)
- Ethiopia (Federation)
- Horn of Africa (Regional)
- Africa (Continental)
- Global (United Nations)
Political engagement at each of these levels is essential for institutionalizing Oromummà and securing long-term influence.

Regional Diplomacy and Integration
Emerging diplomatic initiatives among Oromo elites have explored the possibility of a regional confederation tentatively described as the United States of the Horn of Africa. Preliminary discussions involving Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia suggest cautious optimism. Future participation by Djibouti and Somaliland could further institutionalize regional cooperation.

For the Oromo, consolidating authority in Finfinne, securing autonomy in Oromia, and democratizing the Ethiopian state constitute prerequisites for meaningful regional integration.

Competing Conceptions of “Ethiopia”
The concept of “Ethiopia” is contested and historically layered. Biblically, it denotes the land of Cush; in Greek, it refers to “the land of burnt faces.” For Tigrayan elites, it evokes the Axumite legacy; for Amhara nationalists, the Abyssinian kingdom; and for southern Ethiopianists, the contemporary state. Oromo nationalists, by contrast, often associate Ethiopia with structures of political and cultural domination.

Historically governed by feudal monarchy under Haile Selassie, followed by military dictatorship under Mengistu Haile Mariam, and revolutionary authoritarianism under Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia has yet to realize a genuinely inclusive federal system. The challenge remains to move beyond the centralized tendencies of the TPLF era toward a substantive ethnic federation grounded in self-determination.

Toward an African Administrative Model
A sustainable African governance model should prioritize the rights of nations and nationalities to self-rule. A five-tier administrative structure—African Federation, States, Provinces, Districts, and Communities—organized around ethnic and linguistic identities rather than arbitrary colonial borders, may offer a viable framework for political stability and development.

Conclusion
Ethiopia’s political evolution—from monarchy to dictatorship to an incomplete ethnic federation—offers instructive lessons for Africa. Oromo political movements present a vision that emphasizes unity, self-determination, and institutional federalism. Achieving this vision requires coordinated action among Oromo political organizations and sustained strategic foresight.

If realized, Oromia—anchored by Finfinne—could emerge as a cornerstone of democratic federalism in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The Oromo struggle thus represents not only a national project but also a potential blueprint for reimagining political order across the continent.

Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/03/2 ... ndividual/

Oromo political elites currently face a profound strategic dilemma: whether to prioritize opposition to the authoritarian rule of Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party–led government (commonly referred to as Biltsigina), or to confront the resurgence of imperial revivalist forces associated with Seftegna (Semenawi Neftegna including Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane) elites. These revivalist currents—often linked to armed or ideological movements historically rooted in northern Ethiopia—continue to seek political dominance and access to state resources, particularly through control of the federal capital, Finfinne.

The persistence of these competing pressures places Oromo nationalists in a precarious position. While the current administration advances a centralizing agenda that reinforces Amharic dominance, rival forces simultaneously aspire to reassert imperial influence over Oromia, both demographically and territorially. This dual threat necessitates strategic clarity and internal unity among Oromo political actors.

Ethiopia’s core political conflict is fundamentally structured along ethnic lines, with ideological disagreements operating largely as secondary considerations. Control of the federal center—and particularly of Finfinne—confers not only political authority but also disproportionate access to economic resources and state privileges. Historically, successive ruling elites have consolidated power through ethnic dominance rather than inclusive democratic processes.

From this perspective, Oromo political actors opposing the current administration must remain vigilant to avoid inadvertently facilitating the return of imperial revivalist forces. Intense opposition to the Abiy Ahmed government should not obscure the risks posed by alternative elites whose political projects are equally exclusionary. The removal of Biltsigina without a coherent Oromo-centered strategy risks reopening the path to renewed domination by these forces. Consequently, unity among Oromo elites of the two camps (Anti-Biltsigina and Anti-Seftegna) is not merely desirable but strategically indispensable.

Ethiopia’s political dynamics may be analytically understood through a three-tier framework: ethnic, party, and individual levels of struggle.

At the ethnic level, political competition is shaped by a triangular contest among the Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo peoples. Power shifts historically reflect changes in ethnic dominance rather than democratic choice. Under this logic, the imposition of liberal democratic norms at the ethnic level has proven ineffective, as political survival is determined by control over state power. From the era of Amhara dominance to post-1991 Tigrayan rule, and more recently to Oromo ascendancy, Ethiopian politics has revolved around control of the center. Advocacy for relinquishing such power through premature electoral competition may therefore be politically imprudent.

Once an ethnic group consolidates national power, intra-ethnic political competition may proceed through relatively democratic means. For the Oromo, this would entail structured competition among Oromo-based parties—such as the Oromo Federalist Congress, the Oromo Liberation Front, and the Oromo People’s Party—after ensuring that exclusionary elites do not regain control of the state.

At the individual level, democratic principles can guide leadership contests within parties, including competition for executive office, provided that candidates remain aligned with collective Oromo national interests.
Thus, while democracy remains constrained at the ethnic level, it may function meaningfully at party and individual levels under conditions of ethnic security and political autonomy.

Thus, while democracy remains constrained at the ethnic level, it may function meaningfully at party and individual levels under conditions of ethnic security and political autonomy.

The Oromo people continue to advance—incrementally but steadily—toward political self-determination. The eventual transfer of power from the pro-Amharic Prosperity Party to Oromic-centered republican forces appears increasingly plausible. Once achieved, consolidation of political authority will be essential. A critical early reform would involve recognizing Oromic as the principal working language of the federation, replacing Amharic in federal administration.