Is Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Pro-Amaranet or Pro-Oromummà?
By Fayyis Oromia*
Ethiopia’s contemporary political crisis is frequently framed as a contest between two opposing ideological and national projects: Amaranet, which seeks to preserve the historical dominance of Amharic language and Abyssinian political culture, and Oromummaa, which represents not only Oromo liberation but also the broader struggle of Ethiopia’s historically marginalized nations. In this polarized context, political actors—particularly those occupying the highest offices of state—are often perceived as aligned decisively with one camp or the other.
Oromummaa, in this framework, transcends Oromo identity alone. It symbolically encompasses the aspirations of other oppressed national communities, including Tigrayan, Somali, Gurage, Sidama, and others, whose political, cultural, and linguistic rights have long been subordinated within the Ethiopian state.
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s political identity and trajectory invite critical examination. Rising to power on the momentum of the Qeerroo movement, which embodied Oromo youth resistance and demands for structural change, Abiy was initially perceived as a product of the Oromo liberation struggle. However, his governance record since assuming office raises a fundamental question: does he represent a strategic defender of Amaranet, or an Oromo leader whose political orientation ultimately reinforces Amharic dominance?
If Abiy Ahmed is best understood as an elite aligned with Amaranet, his ascent may be interpreted as a calculated strategy—one that successfully mobilized Oromo grievances to stabilize and preserve Ethiopia’s traditional power structures. If, on the other hand, he is viewed as an Oromo leader disconnected from Oromummaa, then his leadership reflects a recurring historical pattern in which Oromo elites, once empowered, distance themselves from the liberation project that enabled their rise.
Historically, Oromo individuals have held prominent positions within Ethiopian governments, yet many adopted Amharic cultural and political norms rather than advancing Oromummaa. From this perspective, Abiy Ahmed’s leadership represents not merely political pragmatism, but a profound departure from the Oromo liberation agenda. His administration’s actions—including the marginalization of Oromo nationalist voices and the repression of key Oromo political organizations—have further deepened this perception.
Notably, even segments of Oromo nationalist movements, including factions associated with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), initially extended support to Abiy Ahmed. Over time, however, this support has eroded as Oromo language, symbolism, and political priorities were sidelined in favor of a renewed emphasis on Ethiopian unity framed through Amharic cultural dominance. The contrast with leaders such as Bulcha Demeksa—who asserted Oromo linguistic rights even within hostile political environments—has become increasingly stark.
Abiy Ahmed may thus be described as a complex hybrid figure, shaped by multiple identities—biological, marital, and ideological. Yet his political conduct suggests a stronger affinity with Amaranet than with Oromummaa. Through this orientation, his administration has effectively curtailed the growing influence of Oromo nationalism and the broader liberation movements of Ethiopia’s marginalized nations.
This shift has had significant political consequences. In the lead-up to the 2021 elections, pro-Amaranet elites increasingly viewed Abiy’s leadership as an opportunity to reclaim influence through the language of reform, democracy, and national unity. Meanwhile, the Oromo liberation project faces what many perceive as its third major setback—following defeats in 1974, 1991–92, and now the current political transition.
Each of these historical moments reflects a similar dynamic: Oromo-led political change undermined from within. After 1974, the Mengistu regime dismantled Oromo nationalist forces. In the early 1990s, Oromo political elites aligned with dominant external actors, weakening Oromo self-determination. Today, critics argue that Abiy Ahmed’s administration has again marginalized Oromo nationalists, suppressing dissent while enabling the re-emergence of traditional ruling elites.
The growing division among Oromo political actors—particularly between pro- and anti-Abiy factions—has further weakened the Oromummaa camp. This fragmentation has created strategic openings for entrenched power structures to reassert themselves.
One of the most troubling manifestations of this crisis is the armed conflict between the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces under Abiy’s command. While some initially viewed this confrontation as strategic maneuvering against centralized domination, the imprisonment and intimidation of OLF leaders undermine such interpretations. If these actions are not part of a broader, carefully coordinated strategy, they represent a serious political miscalculation.
Despite internal weaknesses and leadership challenges, the OLF remains a powerful symbol of bilisummà—freedom—for many Oromo. Efforts to dismantle or delegitimize it are therefore widely perceived as attacks on the Oromo liberation struggle itself. Through these actions, the Prosperity Party—once viewed by some as a transitional vehicle for reform—has increasingly come to resemble earlier Ethiopian ruling elites.
At this juncture, Abiy Ahmed and his party face a defining choice: either re-align with genuine Oromo liberation forces and facilitate a transfer of power consistent with Oromo self-determination, or continue reinforcing a centralized system historically hostile to Oromo aspirations. The former path offers the possibility of historical redemption; the latter risks permanent alienation from the Oromo political consciousness.
Finally, it is necessary to clarify misconceptions regarding divisions within the OLF. While the organization currently operates through multiple factions, its foundational objective remains unchanged: the right of the Oromo people to self-determination. Differences among OLF factions reflect strategic interpretations shaped by political context, not abandonment of principle. These strategies include independence within a union of free nations, self-determination through referendum, or complete independence.
As the International Crisis Group has observed, despite organizational fragmentation, the OLF retains profound symbolic and emotional significance among Oromos. This enduring legitimacy is rooted not merely in institutional structures but in a deeply internalized liberation mindset shared by millions.
Political rhetoric may vary, and tactical positions may shift, but the underlying conviction remains consistent: the Oromo people will determine their political future. Attempts to dilute, delay, or delegitimize this aspiration have repeatedly failed—and will continue to do so.
The struggle for Oromummaa endures, not only as an organized movement but as a collective consciousness. Its course may be long and contested, but its direction remains unchanged.
Galatoma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/0 ... pid-oromo/