Is Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Reproducing the Legacy of Emperor Menelik II in His Relationship with the Oromo?
Posted: 13 Jan 2026, 18:21
Is Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Reproducing the Legacy of Emperor Menelik II in His Relationship with the Oromo?
By Fayyis Oromia*
A significant and ongoing debate within the Oromo community concerns the historical legacy of Emperor Menelik II. Was Menelik a national hero or a colonial ruler? Was he ethnically Oromo, and if so, what implications does this hold for Oromo historical consciousness? These questions have been addressed extensively in my earlier writings. Drawing on my study of Ethiopian and Oromo history, I have argued that most Habesha groups are fundamentally of Agaw or Oromo origin. In particular, many monarchs who ruled Ethiopia from the era of Yekuno Amlak to Haile Selassie can be understood as Oromos who became culturally and politically Amharanized. Menelik II belongs to this historical category.
Nevertheless, Menelik II’s ethnic origins do not absolve him of responsibility for the policies he pursued. There is little doubt that he ruled with extreme brutality and that his state-building project was deeply hostile to the Oromo people. One of his most consequential decisions was the marginalization of Oromiffa (Oromic) and the elevation of Amharic as the dominant state language, thereby transforming the Ethiopian state into an instrument of Oromo oppression.
Today, a similar pattern appears to be unfolding under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—a phenomenon I describe as the emergence of a “Salisawi Menelik” (the Third Menelik). Although both Menelik II and Abiy Ahmed are biologically Oromo, their political orientation and psychological identification align with an Amhara-centered conception of Ethiopia (often referred to as “Amapia”) rather than with an inclusive Ethiopia grounded in Oromummà. Instead of constructing an Oromic-centered political order—what might be called Oropia—the current leadership continues to reproduce historical hierarchies.
It is therefore unsurprising that Prime Minister Abiy publicly celebrates Emperor Menelik II, despite the latter’s well-documented atrocities against the Oromo. Just as contemporary Germans do not identify with Adolf Hitler despite his German origin, the Oromo have the legitimate right to reject Menelik II irrespective of his ethnic background.
Decades ago, Hermann Cohn identified what he described as a psychological condition among segments of the Oromo elite: a tendency to revere Amhara rulers and culture while devaluing their own heritage. This phenomenon, now widely referred to as the Menelik Syndrome, continues to affect Oromo political leadership. For nearly three millennia, Oromo rulers and elites marginalized their own language in favor of Ge’ez and later Amharic. The translation of religious texts into Ge’ez imbued the language with sacred authority, leading to its association with divine legitimacy. Over time, Amharic inherited this prestige, gaining dominance over Oromiffa.
As a result, Oromo elites prioritized learning Amharic while neglecting their mother tongue. This long process of Ge’ezization and Amharanization persisted until the emergence of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) approximately five decades ago. The OLF played a critical role in reversing this trend by encouraging linguistic pride and cultural self-assertion. Today, Oromiffa enjoys growing recognition and usage; however, political leaders—including Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—continue to repeat historical errors by privileging Amharic at the expense of Oromiffa.
This issue must become the foremost political agenda of the Oromo people. The future of Ethiopia should be built upon a federal system in which Oromiffa serves as the primary working language. It should be the language of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and all major federal institutions. All other political considerations must be secondary to this objective.
The Oromo people are now largely free from domination by assimilative Amhara elites and hegemonistic Tigrayan elites. However, the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) continues to delay addressing core Oromo demands, largely out of concern for maintaining alliances with Abyssinian political forces such as the Amhara Prosperity Party (APP) and remnants of the TPLF. While the long-standing demand for bilisummaa (freedom) has been substantially achieved, the central task that remains is linguistic justice—specifically, the elevation of Oromiffa to primary federal working-language status.
There is no logical or moral justification for postponing this reform. A geo-federal arrangement could be considered, in which Finfinne remains the capital of Ethiopia without necessarily being administratively incorporated into Oromia. The national flag may remain green, yellow, and red, and the state may continue to be called Ethiopia. However, once Oromiffa becomes the federal working language, Ethiopia will, in effect, become either a de facto Orompia (an Oromic-led ethnic federation) or Oropia (an Oromic-led geo-federation).
The Oromo should not limit their political aspirations to self-rule within Oromia alone. They are capable of leading the federal system while granting other nations meaningful autonomy or even independence. The consolidation of Oromo political power at the federal center—symbolized by Café Aràrà—must go hand in hand with the institutionalization of Oromiffa at the national level.
The Enduring Debate: Ethiopian Democratization versus Oromian Decolonization
I entered Oromo cyber-political discourse in the late 1990s, during a period of intense debate within the Oromo liberation movement. The central question was whether the ultimate goal should be the democratization of Ethiopia or the decolonization of Oromia. This debate reached a critical moment at the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) conference around 1999, where figures such as Obbo Sisay Ibsa advocated decolonization, while others, including Obbo Lenc̣o Lata, emphasized Ethiopian democratization.
At the time, I questioned whether these positions were truly contradictory. Seeking a neutral and analytical perspective, I engaged in extensive discussions and correspondence aimed at bridging the divide. These efforts contributed to initiatives such as the formation of ULFO, support for AFD, and later the emergence of OFC and Medrek. I supported these coalitions because I believed—and continue to believe—in unity, strategic cooperation, and broad-based alliances.
From an early age, I witnessed the sacrifices made by Oromo individuals and families, including members of my own, who participated in movements such as MEISON, ICHAT, and the OLF. Many paid with their lives and livelihoods for the cause of Oromo freedom. At the same time, I observed with deep disappointment how some Oromo individuals were co-opted by hostile regimes such as the Derg and Woyane, ultimately betraying their people’s struggle.
Divisions among Oromo nationalists—often framed as ideological—have long weakened the movement and provided opportunities for adversaries to exploit internal differences. The perceived contradiction between “Ethiopian democratization” and “Oromian decolonization” has been overstated. In reality, these approaches are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
The Oromo national project can be understood through three interrelated objectives:
- Strategic Goal: Regional integration of free nations for mutual benefit.
- Core Goal: Full independence of Oromia.
- Tactical Goal: Democratization of Ethiopia as a pathway to genuine Oromo autonomy.
This framework does not require a fundamental paradigm shift but rather a recalibration of tactics. The decisive instrument for achieving these goals is Oromo unity—not symbolic unity, but functional, strategic, and action-oriented unity.
While some scholars, including Professor Megalommatis, have expressed skepticism regarding unity under current geopolitical conditions—arguing that global powers and regional actors such as the TPLF will inevitably undermine it—I maintain that unity, when strategically constructed, remains a source of strength rather than vulnerability. Initiatives such as ULFO, OFC, PAFD, and Medrek, though imperfect, represented meaningful efforts to counter divide-and-rule strategies and foster cooperation among oppressed nations.
Conclusion: After Political Freedom, the Struggle for Language Continues
With the question of Oromo political freedom largely resolved, the central struggle that remains is linguistic justice. Establishing Oromiffa as the primary federal working language—while recognizing Amharic as secondary based on demographic realities—must become the highest priority for Oromo nationalists. No other issue is more urgent or consequential at this historical juncture.
May Wàqa guide Oromia and the Oromo nation as they enter this new phase of their collective struggle.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2020/06/2 ... amharinya/
By Fayyis Oromia*
A significant and ongoing debate within the Oromo community concerns the historical legacy of Emperor Menelik II. Was Menelik a national hero or a colonial ruler? Was he ethnically Oromo, and if so, what implications does this hold for Oromo historical consciousness? These questions have been addressed extensively in my earlier writings. Drawing on my study of Ethiopian and Oromo history, I have argued that most Habesha groups are fundamentally of Agaw or Oromo origin. In particular, many monarchs who ruled Ethiopia from the era of Yekuno Amlak to Haile Selassie can be understood as Oromos who became culturally and politically Amharanized. Menelik II belongs to this historical category.
Nevertheless, Menelik II’s ethnic origins do not absolve him of responsibility for the policies he pursued. There is little doubt that he ruled with extreme brutality and that his state-building project was deeply hostile to the Oromo people. One of his most consequential decisions was the marginalization of Oromiffa (Oromic) and the elevation of Amharic as the dominant state language, thereby transforming the Ethiopian state into an instrument of Oromo oppression.
Today, a similar pattern appears to be unfolding under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—a phenomenon I describe as the emergence of a “Salisawi Menelik” (the Third Menelik). Although both Menelik II and Abiy Ahmed are biologically Oromo, their political orientation and psychological identification align with an Amhara-centered conception of Ethiopia (often referred to as “Amapia”) rather than with an inclusive Ethiopia grounded in Oromummà. Instead of constructing an Oromic-centered political order—what might be called Oropia—the current leadership continues to reproduce historical hierarchies.
It is therefore unsurprising that Prime Minister Abiy publicly celebrates Emperor Menelik II, despite the latter’s well-documented atrocities against the Oromo. Just as contemporary Germans do not identify with Adolf Hitler despite his German origin, the Oromo have the legitimate right to reject Menelik II irrespective of his ethnic background.
Decades ago, Hermann Cohn identified what he described as a psychological condition among segments of the Oromo elite: a tendency to revere Amhara rulers and culture while devaluing their own heritage. This phenomenon, now widely referred to as the Menelik Syndrome, continues to affect Oromo political leadership. For nearly three millennia, Oromo rulers and elites marginalized their own language in favor of Ge’ez and later Amharic. The translation of religious texts into Ge’ez imbued the language with sacred authority, leading to its association with divine legitimacy. Over time, Amharic inherited this prestige, gaining dominance over Oromiffa.
As a result, Oromo elites prioritized learning Amharic while neglecting their mother tongue. This long process of Ge’ezization and Amharanization persisted until the emergence of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) approximately five decades ago. The OLF played a critical role in reversing this trend by encouraging linguistic pride and cultural self-assertion. Today, Oromiffa enjoys growing recognition and usage; however, political leaders—including Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—continue to repeat historical errors by privileging Amharic at the expense of Oromiffa.
This issue must become the foremost political agenda of the Oromo people. The future of Ethiopia should be built upon a federal system in which Oromiffa serves as the primary working language. It should be the language of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and all major federal institutions. All other political considerations must be secondary to this objective.
The Oromo people are now largely free from domination by assimilative Amhara elites and hegemonistic Tigrayan elites. However, the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) continues to delay addressing core Oromo demands, largely out of concern for maintaining alliances with Abyssinian political forces such as the Amhara Prosperity Party (APP) and remnants of the TPLF. While the long-standing demand for bilisummaa (freedom) has been substantially achieved, the central task that remains is linguistic justice—specifically, the elevation of Oromiffa to primary federal working-language status.
There is no logical or moral justification for postponing this reform. A geo-federal arrangement could be considered, in which Finfinne remains the capital of Ethiopia without necessarily being administratively incorporated into Oromia. The national flag may remain green, yellow, and red, and the state may continue to be called Ethiopia. However, once Oromiffa becomes the federal working language, Ethiopia will, in effect, become either a de facto Orompia (an Oromic-led ethnic federation) or Oropia (an Oromic-led geo-federation).
The Oromo should not limit their political aspirations to self-rule within Oromia alone. They are capable of leading the federal system while granting other nations meaningful autonomy or even independence. The consolidation of Oromo political power at the federal center—symbolized by Café Aràrà—must go hand in hand with the institutionalization of Oromiffa at the national level.
The Enduring Debate: Ethiopian Democratization versus Oromian Decolonization
I entered Oromo cyber-political discourse in the late 1990s, during a period of intense debate within the Oromo liberation movement. The central question was whether the ultimate goal should be the democratization of Ethiopia or the decolonization of Oromia. This debate reached a critical moment at the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) conference around 1999, where figures such as Obbo Sisay Ibsa advocated decolonization, while others, including Obbo Lenc̣o Lata, emphasized Ethiopian democratization.
At the time, I questioned whether these positions were truly contradictory. Seeking a neutral and analytical perspective, I engaged in extensive discussions and correspondence aimed at bridging the divide. These efforts contributed to initiatives such as the formation of ULFO, support for AFD, and later the emergence of OFC and Medrek. I supported these coalitions because I believed—and continue to believe—in unity, strategic cooperation, and broad-based alliances.
From an early age, I witnessed the sacrifices made by Oromo individuals and families, including members of my own, who participated in movements such as MEISON, ICHAT, and the OLF. Many paid with their lives and livelihoods for the cause of Oromo freedom. At the same time, I observed with deep disappointment how some Oromo individuals were co-opted by hostile regimes such as the Derg and Woyane, ultimately betraying their people’s struggle.
Divisions among Oromo nationalists—often framed as ideological—have long weakened the movement and provided opportunities for adversaries to exploit internal differences. The perceived contradiction between “Ethiopian democratization” and “Oromian decolonization” has been overstated. In reality, these approaches are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
The Oromo national project can be understood through three interrelated objectives:
- Strategic Goal: Regional integration of free nations for mutual benefit.
- Core Goal: Full independence of Oromia.
- Tactical Goal: Democratization of Ethiopia as a pathway to genuine Oromo autonomy.
This framework does not require a fundamental paradigm shift but rather a recalibration of tactics. The decisive instrument for achieving these goals is Oromo unity—not symbolic unity, but functional, strategic, and action-oriented unity.
While some scholars, including Professor Megalommatis, have expressed skepticism regarding unity under current geopolitical conditions—arguing that global powers and regional actors such as the TPLF will inevitably undermine it—I maintain that unity, when strategically constructed, remains a source of strength rather than vulnerability. Initiatives such as ULFO, OFC, PAFD, and Medrek, though imperfect, represented meaningful efforts to counter divide-and-rule strategies and foster cooperation among oppressed nations.
Conclusion: After Political Freedom, the Struggle for Language Continues
With the question of Oromo political freedom largely resolved, the central struggle that remains is linguistic justice. Establishing Oromiffa as the primary federal working language—while recognizing Amharic as secondary based on demographic realities—must become the highest priority for Oromo nationalists. No other issue is more urgent or consequential at this historical juncture.
May Wàqa guide Oromia and the Oromo nation as they enter this new phase of their collective struggle.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2020/06/2 ... amharinya/