Fanno and the OLA as Potential Instruments of Regional Power Politics? A Critical Reflection
Posted: 12 Jan 2026, 09:36
Fanno and the OLA as Potential Instruments of Regional Power Politics? A Critical Reflection
By Fayyis Oromia*
Recent political developments in Ethiopia evoke strong parallels with the events of 1991. Once again, Eritrea’s ruling party (Shabiya) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Woyane) appear to be coordinating their political strategies against the federal government in Finfinne. Central to this strategy is the apparent search for proxy actors—particularly within emerging Neo-ANDM and Neo-OPDO circles—who could function as political “Trojan horses” by mobilizing Amhara and Oromo youth in support of their broader agenda.
There is growing concern that the Fanno movement and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) may be drawn into this role. This possibility warrants serious reflection. Amhara and Oromo political elites must exercise caution to avoid repeating historical mistakes in which popular grievances were instrumentalized by experienced regional actors pursuing their own strategic objectives. Opposition to the authoritarian and repressive governance of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party, however justified, should not lead to the rehabilitation or return of political forces whose past governance records were marked by exclusion, domination, and conflict. History suggests that such outcomes would be deeply regretted.
There is little doubt that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has operated largely within an ideological framework that prioritizes Amharic language dominance and Amharanet political culture. His continued commitment to Amharic as the sole federal working language—despite the demographic, historical, and political legitimacy of Oromic—reflects this orientation. Political elites committed to maintaining Amharic hegemony have consistently supported Abiy Ahmed as a vehicle for preserving their influence within the federal state.
What remains less clear is the political role of Jawar Mohammed. He is viewed by some as another instrument of these same elite interests, while others regard him as a strategic actor attempting to navigate and outmaneuver dominant political structures. Oromo society today is deeply divided—along multiple axes: pro- and anti-Abiy, pro- and anti-Jawar. This polarization raises a fundamental question: are these figures serving as integrative leaders for the Oromo nation, or are they deepening internal fragmentation?
Abiy Ahmed: Integrator or Divider?
In a speech delivered in Ambo, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed referenced two major strands of Oromo historical identity. On the one hand, he acknowledged Oromo nationalists such as Mamo Mezemer and Alemu Qixessa, who struggled for Oromia’s freedom and sovereignty. On the other, he cited figures associated with Ethiopian unity—such as Habtegiorgis Dinagde and Laureate Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin—who are often identified with Ethiopianist traditions.
Oromo political elites have long failed to reconcile these two historical narratives. Sections of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) tend to recognize only the Oromianist tradition, while many within the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) emphasize Ethiopianist figures. Although Abiy’s rhetoric appears inclusive, his governance over the past seven years has instead deepened polarization within Oromo politics, dividing nationalists into anti-Abiy republican currents and pro-Abiy Prosperity loyalists.
The Prime Minister now faces a defining choice: either to further fragment Oromo political space or to pursue genuine reintegration. This decision will shape his historical legacy. A sincere effort toward unity would require the immediate release of Oromo political prisoners and the initiation of meaningful dialogue with the OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Failure to do so risks further alienation of the Oromo majority and may ultimately define Abiy Ahmed as a collaborator in Oromo historical memory.
Centralization and the Question of Timing
Abiy Ahmed’s apparent ambition to weaken ethnofederalism in favor of a centralized pan-Ethiopian federal structure raises serious concerns about timing and political feasibility. While such a model may appear forward-looking in theory, it disregards the continued vulnerability of Oromo political confidence and cultural security.
Ethnofederalism remains a necessary transitional framework, given the ongoing subordination of Oromummà and the marginalization of Oromic within federal institutions. Any future integrative Ethiopian federalism can only succeed if Oromic occupies a central, not peripheral, position within the state. The critical question, therefore, is whether the current administration is laying the groundwork for such inclusion or dismantling existing Oromo gains.
Although conditions today may be preferable to past eras of overt repression, Amharic continues to dominate Ethiopia’s political and cultural institutions. Shared elite power between Oromo and Amhara figures has not yet translated into Oromo political leadership over the state’s ideological direction.
Oromo Political Futures: Leadership or Liberation
The Oromo national project faces two broad strategic pathways: leading Ethiopia through transformation or pursuing full liberation of Oromia. Leadership within Ethiopia would require a fundamental redefinition of Ethiopianness, placing Oromummà at its core and relegating Amharanet to a secondary position. Given the Oromo people’s demographic and historical significance, such a transformation is both legitimate and necessary.
This vision would require the elevation of Oromo culture (Aadà Oromo), language (Afàn Oromo), and collective political will (Angô Oromo). The OPP has thus far shown little willingness to pursue such a program. A future Oromo Republican Party—potentially uniting the OLA, OLF, and OFC—may be better positioned to articulate and advance this vision, whether within Ethiopia or as part of a broader Cushitic or regional federation.
Decolonization and Democratization
Despite the decline of TPLF dominance and the weakening of traditional Amhara elite control, Amharic language and Amharanet ideology continue to dominate Ethiopia’s federal institutions, including those in Finfinne. Historical experience demonstrates that leaders of Oromo origin—Menelik II, Haile Selassie, Teferi Banti, Mengistu Haile Mariam, and Meles Zenawi—governed through Amharanet frameworks. The critical question is whether Abiy Ahmed represents a meaningful departure from this pattern.
True democratization cannot occur without decolonization. Efforts to promote unity while marginalizing Oromummaa merely reproduce colonial relations under a modern guise. A sustainable Ethiopian state must be grounded in the freely expressed will of its constituent nations, particularly the Oromo.
Toward a Democratic Liberation Alliance
This analysis calls for the formation of a renewed democratic alliance among oppressed nations and peoples—including Oromo, Amhara, Sidama, Somali, Afar, Wolayta, Gurage, Benishangul-Gumuz, as well as regional partners in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Such an alliance should be modeled on past coalitions but rooted in greater ideological clarity and mutual respect.
The dual struggle confronting Ethiopia today is clear: liberation from domination (decolonization) and the construction of a voluntary multinational democracy (democratization). Historical evidence demonstrates that democratization imposed within an imperial framework cannot succeed.
Conclusion
The Oromo people have already rejected Amharic domination. Yet Amharanet continues to dominate Ethiopia’s central political institutions. The struggle for justice and equality will not conclude until Oromic becomes a foundational pillar of Ethiopian statehood, governance, and identity.
The forthcoming elections present a critical opportunity. Boycotts will only consolidate authoritarian rule. Instead, democratic and liberation forces must engage strategically through electoral participation, civic mobilization, and nonviolent resistance.
“Oromai” represents both an ending and a beginning: the rejection of subjugation and the affirmation of self-rule, dignity, and voluntary unity. A just future is possible—but only through unity, strategic clarity, and unwavering commitment to freedom, equality, and self-determination.
May Wàqa guide all oppressed peoples toward justice, peace, and genuine democracy. Oromai!
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/06/15/4057/
By Fayyis Oromia*
Recent political developments in Ethiopia evoke strong parallels with the events of 1991. Once again, Eritrea’s ruling party (Shabiya) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Woyane) appear to be coordinating their political strategies against the federal government in Finfinne. Central to this strategy is the apparent search for proxy actors—particularly within emerging Neo-ANDM and Neo-OPDO circles—who could function as political “Trojan horses” by mobilizing Amhara and Oromo youth in support of their broader agenda.
There is growing concern that the Fanno movement and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) may be drawn into this role. This possibility warrants serious reflection. Amhara and Oromo political elites must exercise caution to avoid repeating historical mistakes in which popular grievances were instrumentalized by experienced regional actors pursuing their own strategic objectives. Opposition to the authoritarian and repressive governance of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party, however justified, should not lead to the rehabilitation or return of political forces whose past governance records were marked by exclusion, domination, and conflict. History suggests that such outcomes would be deeply regretted.
There is little doubt that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has operated largely within an ideological framework that prioritizes Amharic language dominance and Amharanet political culture. His continued commitment to Amharic as the sole federal working language—despite the demographic, historical, and political legitimacy of Oromic—reflects this orientation. Political elites committed to maintaining Amharic hegemony have consistently supported Abiy Ahmed as a vehicle for preserving their influence within the federal state.
What remains less clear is the political role of Jawar Mohammed. He is viewed by some as another instrument of these same elite interests, while others regard him as a strategic actor attempting to navigate and outmaneuver dominant political structures. Oromo society today is deeply divided—along multiple axes: pro- and anti-Abiy, pro- and anti-Jawar. This polarization raises a fundamental question: are these figures serving as integrative leaders for the Oromo nation, or are they deepening internal fragmentation?
Abiy Ahmed: Integrator or Divider?
In a speech delivered in Ambo, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed referenced two major strands of Oromo historical identity. On the one hand, he acknowledged Oromo nationalists such as Mamo Mezemer and Alemu Qixessa, who struggled for Oromia’s freedom and sovereignty. On the other, he cited figures associated with Ethiopian unity—such as Habtegiorgis Dinagde and Laureate Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin—who are often identified with Ethiopianist traditions.
Oromo political elites have long failed to reconcile these two historical narratives. Sections of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) tend to recognize only the Oromianist tradition, while many within the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) emphasize Ethiopianist figures. Although Abiy’s rhetoric appears inclusive, his governance over the past seven years has instead deepened polarization within Oromo politics, dividing nationalists into anti-Abiy republican currents and pro-Abiy Prosperity loyalists.
The Prime Minister now faces a defining choice: either to further fragment Oromo political space or to pursue genuine reintegration. This decision will shape his historical legacy. A sincere effort toward unity would require the immediate release of Oromo political prisoners and the initiation of meaningful dialogue with the OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Failure to do so risks further alienation of the Oromo majority and may ultimately define Abiy Ahmed as a collaborator in Oromo historical memory.
Centralization and the Question of Timing
Abiy Ahmed’s apparent ambition to weaken ethnofederalism in favor of a centralized pan-Ethiopian federal structure raises serious concerns about timing and political feasibility. While such a model may appear forward-looking in theory, it disregards the continued vulnerability of Oromo political confidence and cultural security.
Ethnofederalism remains a necessary transitional framework, given the ongoing subordination of Oromummà and the marginalization of Oromic within federal institutions. Any future integrative Ethiopian federalism can only succeed if Oromic occupies a central, not peripheral, position within the state. The critical question, therefore, is whether the current administration is laying the groundwork for such inclusion or dismantling existing Oromo gains.
Although conditions today may be preferable to past eras of overt repression, Amharic continues to dominate Ethiopia’s political and cultural institutions. Shared elite power between Oromo and Amhara figures has not yet translated into Oromo political leadership over the state’s ideological direction.
Oromo Political Futures: Leadership or Liberation
The Oromo national project faces two broad strategic pathways: leading Ethiopia through transformation or pursuing full liberation of Oromia. Leadership within Ethiopia would require a fundamental redefinition of Ethiopianness, placing Oromummà at its core and relegating Amharanet to a secondary position. Given the Oromo people’s demographic and historical significance, such a transformation is both legitimate and necessary.
This vision would require the elevation of Oromo culture (Aadà Oromo), language (Afàn Oromo), and collective political will (Angô Oromo). The OPP has thus far shown little willingness to pursue such a program. A future Oromo Republican Party—potentially uniting the OLA, OLF, and OFC—may be better positioned to articulate and advance this vision, whether within Ethiopia or as part of a broader Cushitic or regional federation.
Decolonization and Democratization
Despite the decline of TPLF dominance and the weakening of traditional Amhara elite control, Amharic language and Amharanet ideology continue to dominate Ethiopia’s federal institutions, including those in Finfinne. Historical experience demonstrates that leaders of Oromo origin—Menelik II, Haile Selassie, Teferi Banti, Mengistu Haile Mariam, and Meles Zenawi—governed through Amharanet frameworks. The critical question is whether Abiy Ahmed represents a meaningful departure from this pattern.
True democratization cannot occur without decolonization. Efforts to promote unity while marginalizing Oromummaa merely reproduce colonial relations under a modern guise. A sustainable Ethiopian state must be grounded in the freely expressed will of its constituent nations, particularly the Oromo.
Toward a Democratic Liberation Alliance
This analysis calls for the formation of a renewed democratic alliance among oppressed nations and peoples—including Oromo, Amhara, Sidama, Somali, Afar, Wolayta, Gurage, Benishangul-Gumuz, as well as regional partners in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Such an alliance should be modeled on past coalitions but rooted in greater ideological clarity and mutual respect.
The dual struggle confronting Ethiopia today is clear: liberation from domination (decolonization) and the construction of a voluntary multinational democracy (democratization). Historical evidence demonstrates that democratization imposed within an imperial framework cannot succeed.
Conclusion
The Oromo people have already rejected Amharic domination. Yet Amharanet continues to dominate Ethiopia’s central political institutions. The struggle for justice and equality will not conclude until Oromic becomes a foundational pillar of Ethiopian statehood, governance, and identity.
The forthcoming elections present a critical opportunity. Boycotts will only consolidate authoritarian rule. Instead, democratic and liberation forces must engage strategically through electoral participation, civic mobilization, and nonviolent resistance.
“Oromai” represents both an ending and a beginning: the rejection of subjugation and the affirmation of self-rule, dignity, and voluntary unity. A just future is possible—but only through unity, strategic clarity, and unwavering commitment to freedom, equality, and self-determination.
May Wàqa guide all oppressed peoples toward justice, peace, and genuine democracy. Oromai!
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/06/15/4057/