The Incremental Victories of the Oromo National Liberation Movement
By Fayyis Oromia*
There is compelling evidence that the Oromo national liberation movement has achieved incremental but significant victories. Approximately 25 percent of political freedom was attained during the first revolution of 1974, which weakened centralized imperial domination. This progress expanded to roughly 50 percent following the defeat of the Derg regime in 1991, and further advanced to an estimated 75 percent after the political transition of 2018. In this sense, the first phase of the Oromo liberation struggle—liberation from Abyssinian domination—has already been largely accomplished.
The present period represents a transitional phase toward democratic self-determination. During this phase, the Oromo people must decide the form of sovereignty they wish to pursue: either an independent Oromia or a reconstituted Ethiopian state led by Oromic political principles. The removal of the current authoritarian Prosperity Party (Biltsigina) regime is essential to achieving full political freedom—freedom not only from historical Habesha domination but also from contemporary hybrid systems of oppression.
Despite these gains, elements within the ruling political elite continue to operate in ways that resemble past systems of domination. These include suppressing Oromo claims to Finfinné as an integral part of Oromia, obstructing the recognition of Afaan Oromo as a primary federal working language, persecuting and imprisoning members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and hesitating to assert Oromo rights without compromise. Such actions raise critical questions: What forces now prevent the implementation of genuinely pro-Oromo policies? Is there still an external Abyssinian authority exercising control? The more plausible explanation is that sections of the current leadership suffer from what psychologists describe as “learned helplessness.”
Learned helplessness occurs when individuals or groups, after repeated exposure to repression or punishment, internalize a belief that resistance is futile. Even when constraints are removed, they continue to behave as though they remain trapped. The conduct of some Oromo leaders today appears to reflect this condition. Although they have emerged as political victors, they continue to act as if they are victims.
While victory did not strictly require alliances, alliances played a critical role in advancing the struggle. The political environment of the past allowed the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to employ divide-and-rule strategies effectively for nearly three decades. Oromo organizations and allied movements could have neutralized these tactics earlier. This reality informed persistent advocacy for strategic alliances against the TPLF. However, such alliances required compromise. Rigid adherence to either immediate independence or unconditional unity proved counterproductive, as the TPLF benefited from polarization between these extremes.
Although the Oromo population possessed the numerical and moral capacity to pursue liberation independently, history demonstrates that even powerful states rely on alliances. The United States, for example, built broad coalitions to defeat far smaller adversaries. Alliances increase efficiency and legitimacy. Relying solely on demographic strength and moral conviction was insufficient. Attempts to promote alternative strategic perspectives were sometimes met with personal attacks or accusations of disloyalty. Yet strategic disagreement should be resolved through rational debate, not character judgments.
The TPLF’s dominance was underpinned by substantial military and financial resources—the “bank and tank”—which could only be countered by comparable or greater capacity. Commitment alone was not enough. Throughout the late twentieth century, successful liberation movements in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Eritrea, and South Sudan benefited from the support of major global powers. The Oromo movement lacked such backing, making pragmatism essential.
Securing international support requires a clear, communicable political objective. Yet pro-independence Oromo leaders rarely articulated their case for sovereignty in international forums. Advocacy was often confined to internal audiences, limiting global engagement. Importantly, pro-union perspectives should not be interpreted as opposition to independence. Rather, they may reflect a more flexible strategy aimed at achieving independence through incremental and tactically sound steps.
Rigid ideological posturing does not attract international support or material resources. Political effectiveness depends on adaptability to evolving global realities. Persisting with strategies shaped by outdated contexts is akin to attempting to open new doors with old keys. Progress toward the next stage of liberation was delayed largely because the movement lacked the necessary financial and military leverage. Ideological purity alone could not substitute for strategic capacity.
Recent developments suggest meaningful convergence between pro-independence and pro-union Oromo forces around a shared objective: ending Abyssinian domination of Oromia. There is now consensus that the final question of sovereignty—union or independence—should be resolved through a democratic referendum following political transition. This consensus reflects an important recognition: the Oromo are no longer merely subjects of domination but active agents shaping their political future.
The current political contest is increasingly between Oromo factions themselves—particularly between Prosperity Party Oromos (OPP) and republican Oromos associated with the OLF. Continued persecution and imprisonment of Oromo political activists by the Prosperity Party is deeply concerning and suggests the persistence of authoritarian habits inherited from the TPLF era. A genuine break from this legacy requires internal reform and the abandonment of repression.
It is hoped that the current leadership will fully free itself from these constraints and act with confidence and responsibility as representatives of a victorious people—no longer as cautious survivors, but as architects of a democratic Oromo future.
May Waaqa guide this process.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/04/0 ... -a-victim/