Oromo Turn (Teregninet) or Oromo’s Legitimate Leadership of Ethiopia?
Posted: 11 Jan 2026, 03:42
Oromo Turn (Teregninet) or Oromo’s Legitimate Leadership of Ethiopia?
By Fayyis Oromia*
Debates surrounding political power, representation, and leadership in Ethiopia have increasingly centered on the role of the Oromo people within the state. Some political elites, particularly from historically dominant groups, resist or question the legitimacy of Oromo leadership. Such resistance, however, fails to account for demographic realities and the principles of proportional representation and political equity.
The Oromo constitute the largest population group in Ethiopia, widely estimated to represent a significant plurality—if not a majority—of the country’s population. On this basis, it is reasonable to expect proportional Oromo representation across national institutions, from executive leadership to civil service and economic sectors. Historically, Oromo participation in federal and urban institutions has remained disproportionately low. Estimates indicating Oromo representation at approximately 15–16 percent underscore a long-standing structural imbalance rather than political overrepresentation.
Correcting this imbalance should not be misconstrued as domination. Rather, increasing Oromo participation to reflect demographic proportions constitutes a process of institutional correction and inclusion. Resistance to such correction often arises from groups accustomed to historical privilege, for whom equity may appear as loss rather than justice.
This process should also be understood as distinct from the notion of teregninett (rotational or temporary ethnic dominance). Oromo political leadership, grounded in demographic reality and democratic legitimacy, is not a transitional phenomenon but a rightful and sustainable component of Ethiopia’s political future. Claims that Oromo leadership merely replaces one form of ethnic domination with another overlook the fact that current reforms remain incomplete and cautious, often constrained by the need to maintain fragile political coalitions.
A comparative examination of representation in federal and Finfinne (Addis Ababa) institutions further illustrates this point. When representation among major population groups is compared with their demographic proportions, disparities become evident. Some groups continue to hold institutional shares well above their population size, while others—most notably the Oromo—remain underrepresented. Addressing these disparities requires systematic adjustment: reducing overrepresentation where it exists and increasing participation for historically marginalized groups. Such measures align with the principle articulated by scholars such as Dr. Merera Gudina: that all peoples of Ethiopia should receive representation proportional to their population size.
This raises a broader question: is proportional correction equivalent to domination? Domination can only be reasonably alleged when a group exceeds its demographic share in order to monopolize power. Until such a threshold is crossed, corrective inclusion remains a matter of justice rather than hegemony.
Beyond representation, Ethiopia’s political crisis also reflects unresolved ideological divisions between forces advocating territorial integrity and those supporting the right of nations to self-determination. Liberation movements organized under alliances such as the Patriotic Alliance of Federalist Democratic Forces (PAFD) have consistently upheld self-determination as a foundational principle. In contrast, elements within the Ethiopian National Movement (ENM) prioritize unconditional territorial integrity.
Proponents of territorial integrity argue that unconditional unity is necessary to sustain democracy and prevent fragmentation. They maintain that self-determination undermines commitment to a shared political project. Critics of this position counter that unity imposed without consent reproduces historical patterns of coercion and fails to generate durable legitimacy. From this perspective, only a voluntary union of free peoples—each possessing the recognized right to decide its political future—can produce a stable and democratic state.
The persistent mistrust between these two camps has inadvertently strengthened authoritarian rule, allowing ruling elites to exploit polarization. Sustainable change requires a shared strategic framework that reconciles unity with freedom. One possible solution is a sequenced democratic process in which peoples first determine their sovereignty through referendum, followed—where chosen—by negotiations on federal arrangements within a voluntary union.
Such an approach distinguishes between “unity” and “union.” Unity imposed from above reflects a pre-modern political logic, whereas union based on consent corresponds to post-modern political integration, exemplified by supranational entities such as the European Union. Ethiopia’s long-term stability depends on transitioning from enforced unity toward consensual union.
The right to self-determination, far from being obsolete or ideological, remains enshrined in international law, including the United Nations Charter. Dismissing it as outdated or extremist ignores its central role in contemporary democratic governance.
In this context, current efforts by Oromo political actors to address historical injustices—particularly in employment and institutional representation—should be understood as corrective rather than domineering. Domination would only arise if Oromo representation exceeded proportional demographic limits. Until then, ongoing reforms remain within the bounds of equity and democratic legitimacy.
In conclusion, Ethiopia’s future depends on embracing proportional representation, voluntary union, and democratic self-determination. Any political order that denies these principles risks perpetuating instability and injustice. A durable Ethiopian union can only be built on the free consent of its constituent peoples, not on coercion or predetermined outcomes.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/03/2 ... domiation/
By Fayyis Oromia*
Debates surrounding political power, representation, and leadership in Ethiopia have increasingly centered on the role of the Oromo people within the state. Some political elites, particularly from historically dominant groups, resist or question the legitimacy of Oromo leadership. Such resistance, however, fails to account for demographic realities and the principles of proportional representation and political equity.
The Oromo constitute the largest population group in Ethiopia, widely estimated to represent a significant plurality—if not a majority—of the country’s population. On this basis, it is reasonable to expect proportional Oromo representation across national institutions, from executive leadership to civil service and economic sectors. Historically, Oromo participation in federal and urban institutions has remained disproportionately low. Estimates indicating Oromo representation at approximately 15–16 percent underscore a long-standing structural imbalance rather than political overrepresentation.
Correcting this imbalance should not be misconstrued as domination. Rather, increasing Oromo participation to reflect demographic proportions constitutes a process of institutional correction and inclusion. Resistance to such correction often arises from groups accustomed to historical privilege, for whom equity may appear as loss rather than justice.
This process should also be understood as distinct from the notion of teregninett (rotational or temporary ethnic dominance). Oromo political leadership, grounded in demographic reality and democratic legitimacy, is not a transitional phenomenon but a rightful and sustainable component of Ethiopia’s political future. Claims that Oromo leadership merely replaces one form of ethnic domination with another overlook the fact that current reforms remain incomplete and cautious, often constrained by the need to maintain fragile political coalitions.
A comparative examination of representation in federal and Finfinne (Addis Ababa) institutions further illustrates this point. When representation among major population groups is compared with their demographic proportions, disparities become evident. Some groups continue to hold institutional shares well above their population size, while others—most notably the Oromo—remain underrepresented. Addressing these disparities requires systematic adjustment: reducing overrepresentation where it exists and increasing participation for historically marginalized groups. Such measures align with the principle articulated by scholars such as Dr. Merera Gudina: that all peoples of Ethiopia should receive representation proportional to their population size.
This raises a broader question: is proportional correction equivalent to domination? Domination can only be reasonably alleged when a group exceeds its demographic share in order to monopolize power. Until such a threshold is crossed, corrective inclusion remains a matter of justice rather than hegemony.
Beyond representation, Ethiopia’s political crisis also reflects unresolved ideological divisions between forces advocating territorial integrity and those supporting the right of nations to self-determination. Liberation movements organized under alliances such as the Patriotic Alliance of Federalist Democratic Forces (PAFD) have consistently upheld self-determination as a foundational principle. In contrast, elements within the Ethiopian National Movement (ENM) prioritize unconditional territorial integrity.
Proponents of territorial integrity argue that unconditional unity is necessary to sustain democracy and prevent fragmentation. They maintain that self-determination undermines commitment to a shared political project. Critics of this position counter that unity imposed without consent reproduces historical patterns of coercion and fails to generate durable legitimacy. From this perspective, only a voluntary union of free peoples—each possessing the recognized right to decide its political future—can produce a stable and democratic state.
The persistent mistrust between these two camps has inadvertently strengthened authoritarian rule, allowing ruling elites to exploit polarization. Sustainable change requires a shared strategic framework that reconciles unity with freedom. One possible solution is a sequenced democratic process in which peoples first determine their sovereignty through referendum, followed—where chosen—by negotiations on federal arrangements within a voluntary union.
Such an approach distinguishes between “unity” and “union.” Unity imposed from above reflects a pre-modern political logic, whereas union based on consent corresponds to post-modern political integration, exemplified by supranational entities such as the European Union. Ethiopia’s long-term stability depends on transitioning from enforced unity toward consensual union.
The right to self-determination, far from being obsolete or ideological, remains enshrined in international law, including the United Nations Charter. Dismissing it as outdated or extremist ignores its central role in contemporary democratic governance.
In this context, current efforts by Oromo political actors to address historical injustices—particularly in employment and institutional representation—should be understood as corrective rather than domineering. Domination would only arise if Oromo representation exceeded proportional demographic limits. Until then, ongoing reforms remain within the bounds of equity and democratic legitimacy.
In conclusion, Ethiopia’s future depends on embracing proportional representation, voluntary union, and democratic self-determination. Any political order that denies these principles risks perpetuating instability and injustice. A durable Ethiopian union can only be built on the free consent of its constituent peoples, not on coercion or predetermined outcomes.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/03/2 ... domiation/