Oromic Marginalization and the Role of Oromo Elites in Ethiopian State Power
By Fayyis Oromia*
Over time, it has become increasingly evident that a number of Oromo elites—ranging historically from Yekuno Amlak in 1270 to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed since 2018—have governed Ethiopia while marginalizing Oromic and privileging Amharic. Despite their Oromo origins, these elites have consistently occupied the seat of state power in Finfinné while aligning themselves with a political and cultural order centered on Amharic linguistic dominance. In doing so, they have frequently acted against the aspirations of movements advocating for Oromic-centered leadership and cultural recognition. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, like his predecessors Mengistu Ayana and Meles Zenawi, appears to follow this longstanding pattern by preserving the hegemony of Amharic rather than advancing Oromic and the broader project of Oromummaa.
Paradoxically, despite their loyalty to the Amharic-dominant political order, Oromo elites within this system have rarely been fully trusted by its traditional beneficiaries. Their Oromo identity has remained a source of suspicion. As a result, these elites are often abandoned or politically undermined once they are perceived as no longer useful. The current political pressures facing Prime Minister Abiy may be understood within this historical context. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that future Oromo leaders who ascend to power may no longer be willing to serve a political order that systematically marginalizes their linguistic and cultural heritage. Any future Oromo leadership, if it is to break with this past, would need to commit itself to a genuinely pro-Oromic political vision—one that challenges the entrenched dominance of Amharic in Ethiopia’s state institutions.
The roots of this divide can be traced back to the rise of Yekuno Amlak in 1270, a ruler often described as biologically Oromo but culturally Amharanized. From this period onward, political power in the Ethiopian state became closely tied to language and class. The royal court spoke Lisane Negus (Amharic), while the broader population communicated in languages such as Agawigna and Oromic, collectively understood as Lisane Hizb (the languages of the people). Over time, the language of the ruling elite was elevated and institutionalized, while popular languages were devalued and excluded from state functions. This dynamic encouraged social mobility through linguistic assimilation, leading many Agaw communities in Gojjam, Gondar, and Lalibela, as well as Oromo populations in Raya, Shoa, and Wollo, to undergo extensive Amharanization.
The tendency of some Oromo elites to devalue Oromic while venerating Amharic can also be examined through a psychological and sociological lens. Historically, Amharic became associated with political authority, religious legitimacy, modernity, and access to privilege. Oromic, by contrast, was framed as the language of rural, non-elite, and marginalized populations. It is a common human tendency to adopt the language of power while distancing oneself from the language associated with social disadvantage. This internalized hierarchy continues to shape the attitudes of some Oromo elites today, including those within the current governing structure.
This process of linguistic assimilation is particularly visible in urban centers, beginning with Finfinné. Many families now witness younger generations losing fluency in their ancestral languages and speaking only Amharic. The Prosperity Party under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed exemplifies this trend by prioritizing Amharic while failing to meaningfully promote Oromic and Agawigna within federal institutions. Even some former members of the Oromo Liberation Front—once committed to advancing Oromic as a working language—have adopted Amharic fluency as a marker of political relevance, neglecting their earlier commitments to linguistic equity.
From a broader historical perspective, the rigid ethnic categories commonly invoked in Ethiopian politics warrant closer scrutiny. What are often described as “Amhara” or “Tigrayan” identities may more accurately be understood as Amharic- and Tigrinya-speaking Cushitic populations, largely of Agaw and Oromo origin. From the rise of Menelik II in the late nineteenth century until 1991, the Ethiopian state was largely governed by Amharic-speaking Oromos from Shoa, supported by Oromic-speaking allies. Menelik II symbolized the Amharic-speaking Oromo elite, while figures such as Gobana Dacche represented Oromic-speaking factions. During this period, Amharic-speaking Agaw populations from Gondar, Lasta, and Gojjam benefited secondarily from the prevailing political order.
The political shift of 1991 brought Tigrinya-speaking Agaw elites from Tigray to power, supported by their Agawigna-speaking base. Their rule was marked by authoritarian governance, systematic repression, and prolonged marginalization of Oromo communities. While Tigrinya-speaking Oromos from Raya and Azebo played limited roles, Amharic-speaking Agaw and Oromo populations across Gojjam, Gondar, Shoa, and Wollo—as well as Oromic-speaking Oromos—found themselves politically excluded.
In response to these historical patterns of domination, Oromo and other marginalized groups articulated a shared vision of resistance and self-determination, aspiring toward a political union based on equality and freedom—whether framed as a reimagined Ethiopia or as Oropia.
The responsibility for transforming this entrenched system now lies with genuine Oromo nationalists. Central to this task is persuading the current leadership to abandon its reverence for Amharic and to accord Oromic its rightful status within the federal system. Oromic, spoken by the largest population group in the country, merits recognition as the primary working language of the federation. The reluctance of prominent Oromo figures to use Oromic in national institutions—contrasted with earlier examples of linguistic assertion—raises serious questions about political courage and commitment to cultural dignity.
Ultimately, the contemporary political conflict in Ethiopia cannot be fully understood through the lenses of class, ethnicity, region, ideology, or religion alone. At its core, it is a struggle over language and symbolic power—a contest between two linguistic orientations within the same ethnic foundation. In essence, it is a conflict between Oromo elites who revere Amharic and those who respect and defend Oromic. The resolution of this struggle will significantly shape the future of the Ethiopian state.
May Waaqa guide the pursuit of justice and dignity.
Galatoma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2018/12/0 ... ng-agaw-2/