አብይ በዙርያው ሲፋቁ ኦሌፍ የሚሆኑ ኦፒዲኦ አቀንቃኞች ኦሌፎችና የአማራ ነን ባይ ኩበቶች ተከቧል:: እርሱ እራሱ የህቡእ OLF አባል የነበረ የዘር የበላይነት አራማጅ ፖለቲካ አራማጅ ነው:: አማራን ለማዳከም TPLF ሊያጠፋ ባለመፈለጉ ለራሱ የጭቃ ውስጥ እሾህ ሆኖበት እያንዽረዽረው ነው! አማራን ለመጨፍለቅ ብሎም ethnic cleansing ሲካሄድ በመፍቀዱ ሌላም ሌላም ለህዝቡ ነፃነት የሚታገል ፋኖ ተውለደ:: ከዚህም የተነሳ ከ ሻብያ bromance ወጣና ሌላ የግጭት front ከፈተ::
እንግዲህ አቢይ ጭቃ እያላቆጠ ወይም ከቃዴስ ወደቃዴስ እየተመላለስ ውሃ እየመታ እምቦጭ እያለ እየባስ እንጂ የተለወጠ ነገር የለም ግን አገር እየፈረስ ነው ወይም ፈርሷል የሚባለው ለዚህ ነው::
ለማንኛውም OPDO/TPLF/PP/OLF መቀረፍ የማይፈልጉዋቸው ወይም መፍትሄ ያጡ ችግሮች እንዲህ ተዘርዝረዋል!
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In 2025, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s approach to Ethiopia’s ethnic federalist system remains a central point of national crisis, characterized by a complex mix of political survival, elite fragmentation, and stalled reform.
1. Tactical Manipulation for Power Consolidation
Rather than dismantling ethnic federalism, Abiy is widely viewed as repurposing the existing framework to maintain control.
Divide-and-Rule Strategy: Critics argue Abiy deliberately inflames tensions between major groups—Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray—to prevent a unified resistance against his leadership.
Shifting Alliances: His administration has transitioned through multiple strategic alignments, first leveraging Oromo and Amhara movements to gain power, then turning against those same groups (e.g., the Amhara Fano militias) when they threatened central authority.
2. Fragmentation of Oromo and Tigray Elites
The "hegemonic" forces of the past are currently weakened by internal divisions, yet they remain unwilling to abandon the system that protects their regional autonomy.
Tigray Internal Rift: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is deeply fractured. A major dispute pits the group loyal to Getachew Reda (Interim Regional Administration) against the faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael. This infighting has left Tigray without a cohesive post-war vision.
Oromo Fragmentation: While some Oromo nationalist groups seek to maintain the status quo, others, like the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), continue armed resistance against the federal government. There is persistent resentment that Abiy’s "unity" agenda betrays Oromo national interests.
3. Barriers to Radical Constitutional Overhaul
While many advocate for a "major hauling" of the 1995 Constitution, Abiy has avoided radical legal changes due to high risks:
Legal Protections: The current constitution enshrines ethnic self-determination and the right to secession (Article 39). Dismantling this without a broad national consensus could trigger widespread demands for independence from various regions.
Failed Reform Dialogue: Although a National Dialogue Commission was established to address these structural issues, observers in 2025 describe the process as "flawed" and "repressive," often serving to legitimize the government rather than foster genuine pluralism.
4. Limited Alternatives and Economic Priority
The government has pivoted toward economic reform as a substitute for political restructuring.
Macroeconomic Focus: In late 2024 and throughout 2025, Abiy has prioritized a "Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda," including a currency float and a $10.5 billion IMF/World Bank assistance package, hoping that development will eventually pacify ethnic grievances.
Lack of Civic Consensus: Despite the existence of "civic nationalist" alternatives that advocate for non-ethnic governance, these models lack the grassroots mobilization power currently held by ethnic identity.
In summary, Abiy has not abolished ethnic politics because it remains his most effective tool for managing a fractured country, even as that same system continues to fuel the "sheer chaos" of ongoing conflicts in Amhara and Oromia.