Did Fayyis Help Jawar Change His Slogan from “Ethiopia Out of Oromia” to “Ethiopia Shall Be Oropia”?
By Fayyis Oromia*
I remember how I once confronted Jawar Mohammed when he was harshly critical of the OLF. I literally told him: “Boy, you can’t survive in Oromo politics by being so anti-OLF, for the organization is already the spirit of Bilisummà, whether it does right or wrong.” After that, he became somewhat more reconciliatory. Secondly, I once initiated a fruitful discussion between him and Prof. Messay Kebede on the Ethiopian question. Thirdly, I tried to defend him by writing an article titled Jawarawi Harakat, especially when Neo-Naftagna elements targeted him after he asserted, “I am Oromo first.”
Now, I read a very mature interview he gave to the BBC regarding Dr. Abiy in particular and Biltsiginnà in general. He no longer focuses solely on Oromian politics but is also concerned about broader Ethiopian issues—clearly recognizing that the future democratic Ethiopia should be Oropia (an Oromummà-led, colorful rainbow state). No other nation stands to benefit more than the Oromo from maintaining the national unity and territorial integrity of such an Ethiopia. That is why I would like to commend Jawar and other Oromo nationalists who are genuinely concerned about the disintegration of the Ethiopian state.
Did I, perhaps, contribute to Jawar changing his slogan from “Ethiopia out of Oromia” to “Ethiopia shall be Oropia”?
The Ethiopia that has so far been dominated by Amaranet/Amarigna can be termed Amapia. Dr. Abiy’s regime still upholds this status quo. The failure to address three key Oromo demands—promoting Afàn Oromô as the federal working language, reintegrating Wollo into Oromia, and placing Finfinné under the administration of Oromia—proves that the current regime remains more pro-Amaranet than pro-Oromummà. Therefore, it is absolutely incorrect to designate this regime as “Oromo rule.” It is as Amaranet-dominated as the regimes from Yekuno Amlak to Meles Zenawi.
For over 50 years, the Oromo have been striving to replace this regime of domination with an Oromummà-led administration, following two parallel visions: an independent Oromia and an integrative Oropia. The former is advocated by Jàl Marrô and others, while the latter is championed by Jawar Mohammed and his allies.
There is no doubt that the Oromo, having rid themselves of both Abyssinian colonizers (Amhara assimilationists and Tegaru hegemonists), will also liberate themselves from the current dictatorial regime of Oromo Prosperitans led by Abiy Ahmed. This regime is dominated by Oromo elites who are merely doing the bidding of Abyssinian dominators. It is committed to maintaining Amaranet/Amarigna dominance at the expense of Oromiffa/Oromummà. Once we achieve our bilisummà (freedom) from these pro-Amaranet elites, the Oromo will choose between two post-freedom sovereign models: either Oropia as envisioned by Jawar Mohammed, or Oromia as advocated by Jàl Marrô. Either path benefits the Oromo, as long as we are free from Abyssinian dictatorship.
In general, Oromo elites can be divided into three camps based on their political orientation: Abyssianists, Ethiopianists, and Oromianists. Abyssianists, like those in OPP, display a slave mentality—adoring Amaranet rather than respecting Oromummà. Ethiopianists, such as those in OFC, aim to democratize Ethiopia on Oromo terms, effectively transforming it into Oropia. Orom(p)ianists, such as those in the OLF, advocate either for an independent Republic of Oromia or for renaming democratic Ethiopia as Oropia.
On February 5, 2013, Ethiopia’s only publicly funded television station, ETV, aired a controversial documentary titled Jihadawi Harakat (“Jihadi Movement”) during primetime—despite a court injunction. Falsely subtitled “Boko Haram in Ethiopia,” the film criminalized the legitimate demands of Ethiopian Muslims for religious freedom. This was the first of many fictitious “documentaries” used by the regime to criminalize civic and political movements. The Oromo national liberation movement (OLF) has faced similar smear campaigns.
In a parallel move, nostalgic Amhara elites—who aim to impose an assimilationist version of Ethiopia on the Oromo and other nations within the empire—produced a defamatory documentary titled Jawar Mohammed – A Muslim OLF Radical – Ethiopians Out of Oromia (YouTube Link). Was this Jawarawi Harakat or simply an attempt to criminalize a young Oromo nationalist for being Oromo? This shows the striking similarity between rival Abyssinian elites—Amhara and Tigrai alike—when it comes to the criminalization of Oromo individuals or organizations.
This controversy surrounding Jawar Mohammed began after Dr. Fikre Tolassa, an Abyssianist Oromo scholar, published an open letter to Dr. Bayan Asoba of the ODF, urging a restructured Oromo history that favored Ethiopian nationalism and rejected Qubé (the Afàn Oromô alphabet). The proposal sparked fierce debates between Ethiopianists and Oromianists. In response, some, including myself, suggested envisioning Oropia—not Ethiopia in a sense of Amapia—as the future common home ([Reference](http://gadaa.com/oduu/20124/2013/06/06/ … ty-amhara/)).
Initially, the media campaign seemed like a constructive dialogue between Ethiopian and Oromian nationalists—two sides with opposing political visions, but a common enemy in the TPLF. However, Abyssianist participants began to impose preconditions—namely, accepting Ethiopia and Ethiopiawinet as non-negotiable. This shift antagonized Oromianists, who asserted their preference for Oromia and Oromummà as national identity.
Even prominent Ethiopian media figures joined the campaign, ridiculing Oromia and Oromummà. Tensions rose, and dialogue gave way to confrontation, further inflamed by TPLF agents. During this time, Al Jazeera asked Jawar a critical question: “Are you Oromo first or Ethiopian first?” (Video). Jawar’s response—“I am Oromo first; Ethiopian identity is imposed on me”—infuriated the Abyssianist camp. They tried to force him to apologize in another interview, but he instead reaffirmed his stance. Oromo nationalists celebrated him, while Abyssianists launched a campaign of defamation, including the notorious Jawarawi Harakat video.
Jawar, once seen by Ethiopianists as a moderate voice open to compromise, was quickly demonized as a radical. This reflects a pattern: Abyssinian elites value Oromo talents only as long as they serve their interests. Once Oromo leaders act independently, they are discarded—as happened during the eras of Menelik, Haile Selassie, Mengistu, and Meles.
Thankfully, that era is ending. Oromo political awareness is growing. More Oromo are realizing that Abyssinian nationalism—disguised as Ethiopiawinet—is fundamentally opposed to Oromummà. These two nationalisms are now in direct competition for the hearts and minds of the Oromo. During the Jawarawi Harakat period, Abyssinian elites openly campaigned against Oromia and Oromummà, even using Oromo collaborators, as revealed in this audio ([Link](http://www.zehabesha.com/ethiopian-orom … statement/)). Such tactics are not new—every Abyssinian regime has relied on Oromo collaborators to suppress Oromo resistance.
Despite all this, the Oromo national liberation movement is gaining momentum. Whether through self-rule within a federal union, full independence, or the transformation of Ethiopia into Oropia, the ultimate goal remains Oromo freedom. The Jawar case vividly illustrates the divide between friends and foes of the Oromo cause. While Abyssinian elites sought to criminalize him, the Oromo stood united in defense of Oromia and Oromummà.
So I ask again: was it Jawarawi Harakat—a grassroots Oromo movement—or merely another attempt to criminalize a genuine Oromo nationalist? For the Oromo national liberation camp, it was clearly Harakat. And thanks to Wàqa, the movement was used to further intensify the Oromo struggle for freedom.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/04/1 ... s-amharia/