Amara’s Goal: Amapia or Amaria vs. Oromo’s Vision: Oromia or Oropia
By Fayyis Oropia*
Interestingly, nowadays, all Amhara elites—starting from Ato Andargachew Tsige—are removing their Ethiopiawinet mask and openly striving either to maintain Amapia (an Amharanet-dominated Ethiopia) or to forge Amaria, consisting of the former provinces of Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo, and Shoa, with Addis Ababa as its capital. They sense that Dr. Abiy’s Ethiopia is slowly but surely being transformed into Oropia (an Oromummà-led Ethiopia), and they want to hinder this transformation at all costs.
The question yet to be answered is whether Amhara and Oromo elites can find a middle ground—i.e., fostering a rainbow Ethiopia, where all nations in the country share power culturally, economically, and politically. This could mean proportional representation in all aspects of national life: at least 40% Oromo, 20% Agaw, 10% Amhara, 6% Somali, 5% Tigray, 4% Sidama, 3% Gurage, and so on.
It is clear that the Oromo vision can be summarized as Oromia and/or Oropia. That means we either:
- Achieve an independent Oromia without Oropia,
- Foster Oromia within Oropia (a genuine multinational federation), or
- Opt for Oropia without Oromia (a geographically based federation with Oromummà leadership).
According to Dr. Léncô Latà, the politics of Amhara elites has long been aimed at upward hom'ogenization—turning Ethiopia into an Amharic-speaking nation. This process, ongoing since the reign of Yekuno Amlak in 1270, has effectively used all other nations as raw material to be processed into “finished products”—Amharic speakers. As a result, about 90% of Agaws, 40% of Oromos, and many others have lost their original identities and assimilated into the Amhara fold. This is how Amharanet and the Amharic language have come to dominate Ethiopia, making the country a de facto Amapia.
Oromo elites have resisted this process and envisioned the creation of an independent Oromia. Their plan is to liberate the Afàn Oromô-speaking regions—excluding the already Amharanized Oromo areas such as North Shoa, East Wollo, South Gojjam, parts of Gondar, and Tigray. This movement is considered a downward hom'ogenization. Ethnic federalism has often been regarded as a compromise between these two approaches.
I would like to suggest a role reversal between Amhara and Oromo elites. Oromos could consider upward hom'ogenization, promoting Afàn Oromô to its legitimate position as the federal primary working language. Through this, re-Oromization of the country can gradually occur, transforming Ethiopia into Oropia and erasing Amapia. Oropia, in this view, would be more beneficial than a smaller, independent Oromia.
Of course, this may provoke Amhara elites to attempt downward hom'ogenization to resist this Oromummà-led transformation. They may start advocating for an independent Amaria. Just as they opposed the dismantling of regional special forces, they may soon become the loudest proponents of ethnic federalism or outright separation.
Ethiopian politics—especially Oromo politics—is now at a crossroads. The pseudo-ethnofederalist Prosperity Party of Abiy Ahmed is losing ground. Two forces are now competing to replace the regime:
Confederalists, led by the OLF and TDF, who aim to establish a truly autonomous Oromia and Tigrai.
Geo-federalists, led by Ezema and NaMA, who are attempting to manipulate Abiy Ahmed to “save Ethiopia from disintegration” through a geographically based federation.
These camps are effectively at war. The confederalists clearly aim for Oromia’s establishment. Abiy Ahmed’s goal, however, remains unclear. Is he fighting for a geo-federation dominated by Amharanet/Amharic? Or one led by Oromummà/Afàn Oromô?
If it’s the former, Oromos should not support him. If it’s the latter, then a geo-federation with Afàn Oromô as the federal language is essentially Oropia. Thus, Oromos can also consider an integrative Oropia as a visionary alternative to an independent Oromia.
But the time is overdue—the game is over. Both Naftagna Amharas and Tigrayan hegemonists have lost the battle for the palace in Finfinné. Dr. Abiy is not naive enough to empower the old guard. Though his Prosperity Party remains largely pro-Amharanet, it is still more supportive of Oromummà and Afàn Oromô than either the Derg (Amhara) or the Woyane (Tigray) ever were.
It is only a matter of time before the OLF mindset of bilisummà infiltrates and eventually transforms the pro-Amharanet Biltsigina party into a pro-Oromummà one. Whether through the current OPP or a future Oromo Republican Party (ORP) to be fostered by OFC and OLF, the bilisummà mindset will consolidate Oromo power in Finfinné and check both the hegemonists and the Naftagnas.
This debate was initially raised by Gadaa.com, which invited us to reflect on the future of Oromia. I began writing in the cyber world after noticing internal division among Oromo nationalists in the OLF—mainly between the Galasa group, which advocated for Kàyyô Ganamà (the original goal of full independence), and the Dawud group, which favored self-determination within Ethiopia due to geopolitical realities.
In my view, the goal has never been different, only the route and tactical approach to it. The OLF mindset—whether in OLF, OFC, or elsewhere—generally follows a three-stage process:
Limited cultural autonomy, which we have more or less achieved.
Full cultural, economic, and political autonomy of Oromia within a union.
Final decision via referendum on full independence or union with other liberated nations.
Different factions of the OLF and similar movements (like ULFO and FIO) all share the goal of freedom (Tullü Dàlattī), after which sovereignty can be realized in one of three forms:
Independent Oromia (as Galàsà envisions),
Federal Oromia (as Léncô proposes), or
Integrative Oropia (as Andargachew may support).
Thus, there is no inherent contradiction among these factions—only strategic variation.
In summary, the Oromo liberation journey can be imagined as a path from Djibouti (symbolizing colonization) through Dire Dawa (limited autonomy) and Adama (full autonomy) to Finfinne (freedom and sovereignty). The OLF mindset must now unify these various efforts and help Oromo organizations coordinate toward the final goal.
As part of Gadaa.com’s initiative, let us agree on a shared vision for the coming decade. The last decade was marked by unproductive divisions within the OLF. The next one must be the decade of unity, merger, and consolidation—not just of OLF factions but of all Oromo liberation forces. First, we must secure real autonomy for Oromia, then proceed to a public referendum to decide the form of our sovereignty—be it national independence or supranational union.
Whether Oromia joins the United Nations as an independent state or forms a supranational regional union with other free nations will be up to the people. This union could exclude former colonizers, or include them only if they genuinely respect the right to self-determination. Before any union, all nations—including Abyssinian ones—must be free from colonial dominance and domination mentality.
Our freedom from colonization and their freedom from colonizing mentality are the two essential prerequisites for a future union. We must first secure that freedom, then debate our union.
Let’s now begin working toward the future envisioned by Gadaa.com for the next decade. With unity, commitment, and strategic action—Wàqayyo will help us, if we help ourselves.
Galatôma!
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/04/1 ... or-oropia/