Recent reports indicate that Andargachew Tsege, a prominent Ethiopian opposition figure and former leader of the banned Ginbot 7 movement, alongside Gedu Andargachew, former president of the Amara region and a key political figure, are set to travel to Asmara, to engage in high- level discussions with Eritrean government officials.
This development comes at a critical juncture in the Horn of Africa, where regional tensions, Ethiopia's internal conflicts, and shifting alliances continue to shape geopolitical dynamics.
1. Background: who are Andargachew Tsege and Gedu Andargachew?

Andargachew Tsege: From armed struggle to political opposition
• Former leader of Ginbot 7, an armed opposition group that was designated as a terrorist organizations by Ethiopia before its dissolution following Abyi Ahmed's reforms in 2018.
• Arrested in 2014 in Yemen, extradited to Ethiopia, and sentenced to death in absentia for alleged coup plotting.
• Released in 2018 as part of PM Abyi's political reforms but later became critical of the government, accusing it of authoritarian tendencies.
• Maintains strong ties with Eritrea, having previously operated from there during his opposition activities.

Gedu Andargachew: A key Amara Political Figure.
• Served as President of the Amara region (2013-2019) under the EPRDF government.
• Initially supported Abyi Ahmed's reforms but later clashed with the Prosperity Party (PP), particularly over the Amara nationalist movement and the Fano militia's role.
• Arrested in 2023 amid rising tensions between Federal forces and Amara regional forces but later released under unclear circumstances.
• Seen as a moderate but influential figure in Amara politics, balancing between federal authority and regional demands.
2. The purpose of the Asmara meeting: Key discussion points.
The delegation's visit to Eritrea suggests a strategic effort to coordinate opposition voices and seek regional support amid Ethiopia's escalating crises. Possible discussion topics include:
A. Ethiopia's political crises under Abyi Ahmed.
• Growing discontent with Abyi's government over centralization of power, ethnic conflicts, and economic instability.
• Oromo- Amara tensions: the government's perceived favoritism towards Oromo factions has alienated Amara elites.
B. Eritrea's Role in Ethiopian Politics.
• Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki has historically supported Ethiopian opposition groups (e.g., Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF] in the 1990's and later Ginbot 7)
• Potential Eritrean support for anti- government forces, including intelligence sharing or political backing.
C. Regional Stability in the Horn of Africa
• Sudan's civil war and its spillover effects on Eritrea and Ethiopia.
• Somalia's tensions with Ethiopia over the Somaliland port deal, which Eritrea opposes.
• Red Sea security and Ethiopia's quest for sea access, a contentious issue with Eritrea.
3. Implications for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa
A. Escalating opposition to Abyi Ahmed's government.
• If Eritrea provides tacit or explicit support to Ethiopian opposition figures, it could embolden anti-Abyi movements, including armed factions.
• A unified opposition front (Amara nationalists, Oromo dissidents and former Ginbot 7 members) could destabilise the Prosperity Party's hold.
B. Eritrea's strategic calculations
• Isaias Afwerki may exploit Ethiopia's instability to regain leverage after years of Ethiopian dominance in Regional politics.
• Possible mediation role: Eritrea could position itself as a power broker between Ethiopia factions.
C. Impact on Regional Alliances
• Deterioration of Eritrea-Ethiopia relations if Asmara is seen as undermining Abyi.
• Potential realignment of Regional.powers (e.g., Egypt, UAE, Somalia) depending on Ethiopia's political trajectory.
A pivotal Moment for Ethiopia.
The upcoming meeting between Andargachew Tsege, Gedu Andargachew, and Eritrean officials marks a significant development in Ethiopia's political landscape. If Eritrea decides to support anti-Abyi factions it could lead to:
Increased domestic pressure on Abyi Ahmed's government.
Further militarisation of opposition movements, particularly in Amara.
A shift in HoA alliances, with Eritrea reassuring itself as key player.
As Ethiopia grapples with internal fractures and external pressures, the outcome of these talks could determine whether the country moves toward reconciliation or deeper conflict.
Final Thoughts
This mission to Asmara underscores the fragility of Ethiopia's political order and the enduring influence of Eritrea in Ethiopian affairs. The Horn of Africa remains a volatile region where shifting loyalties and external interventions can rapidly alter the balance of power.
Will Eritrea play the role of spoiler or mediator?
The answer may reshape Ethiopia's future- and the wider region's stability.