The Hitherto Inclusive Cooperations That Could Make a Difference in Ethiopia
By Fayyis Oromia*
In the liberation struggle against the oppressive Abyssinian empire, we have passed through various phases and formed different alliances. This struggle has almost always involved two ideologically opposing political camps: unionists, who seek to liberate oppressed nations within the empire and, where possible, establish a union of free peoples; and unitarists, who disregard national autonomy but aim to liberate individual citizens from all forms of oppression. In other words, the struggle has been between those emphasizing group (national) liberty and those prioritizing individual (citizen) freedom.
Despite their shared socialist ideology, a key difference between Me’ison and Ihapa was their orientation: the former leaned toward unionism, the latter toward unitarism. Me’ison, led primarily by Oromo intellectuals, advocated for the self-determination of nations through national autonomy within an Ethiopian union. Conversely, Ihapa, dominated by Tigrean intellectuals, interpreted self-determination as the ability to exercise cultural rights within a unitary Ethiopia—without granting national autonomy.
Eventually, after suffering brutal repression under the Ethio-fascist Derg regime, politicians from both Me’ison and Ihapa joined their ethnic kin in the OLF and TPLF, respectively. Ihapa, maintaining its unitarist stance, came to power in the form of the TPLF, while Me’ison, represented by the OLF, remained the main opposition/rebel group against this Ihapa-dominated regime. Simply put, the ideological struggle between unionist Me’ison and unitarist Ihapa continues, albeit in a different form.
After seizing power, the unitarist TPLF was compelled to formally accept certain unionist principles—signing the 1991 Charter, which recognized the right of all nations and nationalities to self-rule. However, in practice, the TPLF prioritized centralization, effectively rendering Ethiopia a de facto unitary state, despite its de jure federal structure.
Leaving pre-1974 revolutionary history to historians and focusing only on the alliances formed since then, we can observe the rise and fall of the following coalitions:
Major Political Alliances Since 1974
IMALEDIH: Initially, unionists Me’ison and Ici’at tried to forge an alliance with unitarists like Seded, Wezlig, and Malerid against the military regime. The unionists were eventually sidelined and persecuted. Their activists later joined the OLF in the armed struggle against the Derg.
IHADEG: A hierarchical alliance led by the dominant TPLF, with subordinate ethnic parties like EPDM (later ANDM), OPDO, and SEPDM. This coalition served to give TPLF national legitimacy while concentrating power in its hands. TPLF’s core interest was economic dominance, especially in favor of Tigray.
COEDF: Formed in April 1991 in Washington by Ihapa (unitarist), Me’ison (unionist), and others. It had little political impact and did not participate in the creation of the 1991 transitional charter, eventually dissolving.
CAFPDE: Formed after the 1993 Finfinne opposition conference. It was led by the unionist Hadiya National Democratic Organization but included unitarists like EDU. It failed due to the exclusion of major unionist forces, especially from the Oromo.
ULFO: An exclusive alliance of Oromo unionists formed to confront the hegemonist TPLF regime. It refused to engage with unitarist actors, leading TPLF cadres to manipulate both camps by pretending to support Oromo independence and attacking Amhara unitarists—thus preventing any anti-TPLF alliance.
UEDF: A mixed alliance of unionists and unitarists, but without the participation of OLF or ONLF. Major unitarist parties AEUP and EDP soon withdrew, rendering the alliance ineffective.
CUD: A coalition of hardline unitarists aiming to reverse national autonomy provisions. Its creation contributed to UEDF’s downfall and ultimately led to its own demise due to strong opposition from unionists.
AFD: The first serious alliance combining both Oromo unionists (e.g., OLF) and Amhara unitarists (e.g., CUD). It posed a real threat to the TPLF, prompting an intense propaganda campaign that ultimately destroyed it.
MEDREK: A legal but still ineffective continuation of AFD. It included OFC (unionist) and UDJ (unitarist), but again, the TPLF used divisive tactics to pit Oromo unionists against Amhara unitarists, leading to UDJ’s withdrawal.
AGER-ADIN: A proposed all-inclusive alliance that eventually became a coalition of only unitarists, despite some earlier cooperation between an OLF faction and Ginbot-7. Again, the TPLF employed identity-based polarization to undermine the effort.
PAFD: Formed by unionist liberation fronts only. It is not comparable to the inclusive AFD, as it lacks participation from major unitarist groups.
ENM (Ethiopian National Movement): A relatively recent alliance including both unionists and unitarists, but excluding pro-independence groups like OLF and ONLF. It is not as inclusive as AFD once was.
The Path Forward: Toward an Inclusive Alliance
The critical question remains: Can both unionists and unitarists overcome the TPLF’s divisive tactics and forge a truly inclusive alliance to consolidate the power that has been taken from the TPLF?
To achieve this:
- Step 1: Each camp should consolidate its internal bloc—unitarists through movements like ENM, and unionists through coalitions like PAFD.
- Step 2: These consolidated blocs can then form an effective alliance against the fascist Biltsiginà regime.
For this to succeed, democratic unitarists must distance themselves from two regressive stances:
- The colonial mindset of Amhara autocrats who envision assimilation into a unitary, Amharic-speaking Ethiopia.
- The hegemonic designs of Tigrayan elites who prefer a British-style indirect rule—cultural autonomy without political freedom.
Once democratic unitarists align with future-oriented unionists to confront the fascist Biltsiginà regime, the path to an inclusive and stable alliance will open. This requires resisting Biltsiginà’s tactics of exploiting controversial topics—like secession rights or Nile water disputes—to divide the opposition.
Both sides must agree on a two-phase struggle:
- Liberation phase – Ending tyranny and dismantling the fascist regime.
- Democratization phase – Establishing institutions, ensuring public participation, and respecting the people’s verdict.
We may have already achieved liberation, at least partially. Now is the time to build democratic institutions and foster national consensus.
Unionists, particularly Oromo nationalists, must broaden their struggle to include all oppressed peoples, including the Habesha nations, acknowledging the internal domination perpetuated by their elites. This shift will encourage democratic unitarists to collaborate sincerely.
Conclusion: A Different Cooperation That Can Make a Difference
It is both necessary and possible to build an inclusive alliance—one that unites Oromo democratic unionists and Amhara democratic unitarists—to dismantle the Biltsiginà regime. Without this, we risk enduring another century of rule where our homelands are sold to foreign capitalists, and our people live under continued domination.
Let us choose alliance over subjugation, cooperation over division, and unity over propaganda.
May Waaqa grant us the wisdom, understanding, and courage to forge this inclusive alliance—one that is truly different and that can make a difference.
Galatôma!
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/01/0 ... -ethiopia/