Ethiopia’s Future Survival Fate: Amapia, Confepia, or Oropia?
By Fayyis Oromia*
If Ethiopia survives as a nation in the future, it will most likely do so under one of three possible scenarios:
Amapia – a country dominated by Amaranet (Amhara nationalism), as it has been historically.
Confepia – a confederation of free nations, following the complete liberation of Oromia, Tigray, Ogadenia, Amharia, and others.
Oropia – a state led by Oromummaa (Oromo identity and nationalism).
Today’s Ethiopian politics are not fundamentally about class struggle (e.g., capitalism vs. communism), religious conflict (e.g., Waaqeffannaa vs. Abrahamic faiths), or Killil-sovereignty (territorial federalism vs. ethno-federalism). Rather, the central political tension is between Amapia and Oropia.
Amhara elites and other pro-Amaranet forces are determined to preserve the status quo. In contrast, genuine Oromo nationalists and their allies within the Oromummaa movement are striving to transform Ethiopia from Amapia into Oropia. No political actor in Ethiopia can remain neutral in this context—they must either support continued Amaranet domination or endorse the transformation to Oropia.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party (PP) must also choose between two paths: maintaining Amapia or promoting Oropia. A possible middle-ground compromise between the conservative Amapianists and the radical Oropianists is offered by the Confepianists, who advocate for a quasi-independent Amharia and a fully independent Oromia. According to this vision, Ethiopia can evolve into a colorful, multi-national confederation without Amaranet domination or exclusive Oromummaa leadership. Such an Ethiopia would be Confepia.
The End of the TPLF Era and the Rise of a New Binary Struggle
The 2018 defeat of the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) marked the end of Tigrayan influence in the Finfinne (Addis Ababa) palace. The previous triangular power struggle—between Amhara, Tigrayan, and Oromo elites—has now shifted into a bipolar confrontation between Amhara and Oromo elites.
Amhara elites, backed by pro-Amaranet elites (PAEs) from other ethnic groups, are determined to maintain the current domination of Amaranet and Amarigna, under the banner of “Ethiopiawinet” (Ethiopian nationalism). In contrast, Oromo elites—especially the pro-Oromummaa elites (POEs)—must prepare for a new, more complex struggle. Their most difficult challenge is not the old foes: Amhara Naftagnas (A-Naftagnas) defeated in 1991, or the Tigrayan Naftagnas (T-Naftagnas) who were recently ousted. It is the Oromo Naftagnas (O-Naftagnas)—internal collaborators currently in power—whom the writer considers the most dangerous enemies of the Oromo cause.
This internal threat is particularly difficult to fight for two main reasons:
- Internal Division: The Oromo nationalist movement has been split between pro-Abiy and anti-Abiy factions.
- External Alliance: The Amhara Naftagnas continue to support the incumbent government in order to maintain the ongoing Amaranet domination.
Three Directions of Opposition Against the Prosperity Party
Opposition to Dr. Abiy’s Prosperity Party (PP) is now emerging from three main camps:
- Conservative Amhara elites
- Hegemonist Tigrayan elites
- Republican Oromo elites
All three factions initially tried to co-opt Abiy and bring his administration into alignment with their respective goals:
- Amhara elites saw him as a natural ally due to his rhetoric promoting Ethiopian unity.
- Tigrayan elites expected him to remain loyal to their interests, as he emerged from the EPRDF coalition.
- Oromo elites hoped he would prioritize the interests of his own people.
However, Dr. Abiy appears to be attempting to balance the interests of all three factions by fostering contradictions among them—perhaps in an effort to preserve his own grip on power. The key question remains: Can he succeed?
Can Abiy transform this triangular conflict into triangular cooperation? If so, what could be the common denominatorfor such an alliance?
The reality on the ground, however, suggests otherwise. He cannot maintain power without the support of the Republican Oromo bloc, which he is currently losing. Ironically, it is now becoming clear that what many of us wrote or predicted years ago is unfolding before our eyes.
Historical Context: Cushland, Language, and Identity
Years ago, I explained the necessity of the triangular power struggle among Amhara, Tigrayan, and Oromo elites. At the time, the TPLF was actively exploiting conflicts between Amhara and Oromo groups to maintain its grip on power through a classic “divide and rule” strategy.
Historically, Ethiopia—referred to in the Bible as Cushland—is located south of Egypt and stretches from Meroe to Mombasa. Although there is academic debate over the exact location of Biblical Cush—some claiming it was in Arabia—for the purpose of this discussion, Cushland is defined as the territory inhabited by Cushitic-speaking peoples, spanning northeastern Sudan to northeastern Tanzania. Under this definition, modern-day Ethiopia is part of Cushland.
Historical and linguistic evidence suggests that Cushitic nations have existed in eastern Africa for over 8,000 years, sharing a common cultural heritage. Around 5000 BCE, ancient Cushitic languages began splitting into distinct branches, which today correspond to different linguistic and national identities.
Core Values of Cushitic Civilization
The Cushitic peoples, including the Oromo and Agaw, have historically upheld some core values:
- Monotheism: Belief in a single Supreme Being—Wàqa (for the Oromo) or Higelibona (for the Agaw)—without a concept of Satan or Hell.
- Egalitarianism: A strong tradition of democratic governance, exemplified by the Oromo Gadaa system.
- Social Harmony: A cultural emphasis on love, peace, and nonviolent transfer of power.
However, with the rise of the Axumite Empire (in present-day Tigray and Eritrea), these values were increasingly replaced or assimilated into foreign-influenced systems, including:
-Aristocracy and Theocracy from the Middle East.
- Foreign naming systems within royal and religious elites.
- The Ge‘ez language, a hybrid of Agaw, Hebrew, and South Arabian languages.
Some scholars even argue that the so-called Solomonic dynasty of Axum had Agaw origins and initially adopted these non-Cushitic traditions voluntarily. This dynasty was eventually replaced by the Zagwe dynasty, considered more explicitly Cushitic.
Domination of Cushitic Peoples by Northern Elites
Before the Axumite Empire, most of northern Ethiopia was inhabited by Cushitic peoples. Over time, many of them—like the Agaw—underwent linguistic and cultural assimilation rather than being physically displaced.
The rise of emperors like Tewodros, Yohannes IV, Menelik II, and Haile Selassie marked a shift toward northern dominance, which had lasting effects on Cushitic nations such as:
- Forced religious conversions (Judaism and Orthodox Christianity).
- Autocratic governance, replacing traditional democratic norms.
- War culture, violence, and coups as methods of transferring power.
The Oromo managed to resist these pressures until the mid-19th century, when Atse Tewodros launched the first significant military campaign against them. Later, Menelik and Gobana led a more successful campaign, completing the subjugation of southern Cushitic and Nilotic peoples.
The Oromo: Dominated and Dominant in Ethiopian History
When we examine modern Ethiopian history, the Oromo nation stands out as both a contributor to state-building and a victim of northern elite domination.
From the time of King Yekunno Amlak to Emperor Haile Selassie, many rulers—especially those of the Shewa dynasty—had Oromo ancestry. These rulers were deeply involved in shaping the Ethiopian state, and yet, their own people often lived under oppressive political and cultural conditions.
Here are just a few examples of the Oromo’s complex historical role:
- 16th Century Conflicts: The Oromo successfully defended their territory against foreign invasions by Ottoman Turks and Portuguese forces, preserving sovereignty during an era when many African states fell to colonial powers.
- Gondar Era Monarchs: Several Oromo kings ruled Ethiopia, particularly during the Zemene Mesafint (“Era of the Princes”). The influential Ejju Oromo dynasty, including leaders like Ras Ali I and Ras Ali II, held significant power during this time.
- Strategic Marriages and Alliances: Oromo royal women such as Tewabech (wife of Tewodros II) and Empress Taytu Bitul (wife of Menelik II) played pivotal roles in the political and military strategies of the era.
- Generals and Patriots: Oromo generals such as Quse Dinagde, Jagama Kello, Tsigie Dibu, and others were instrumental in either defending the monarchy or challenging oppressive regimes.
- World War II Resistance: Oromo patriots like Abune Petros, Abebe Aregai, Belay Zeleke, and Abdissa Agafought against the Italian fascist invasion and occupation.
- Revolutionary Leaders: Oromo intellectuals and revolutionaries like Haile Fida, Baro Tumsa, Senay Likke, and Walelign Mekonnen played leading roles in ideological movements and resistance to monarchy and military dictatorship.
- Derg-Era Challenges: Oromo generals like Merid Nuguse, Demisse Bulto, and Tesfaye Dinka resisted the brutality of the Derg regime. During its collapse, figures like Tesfaye Gebrekidan attempted to prevent Ethiopia’s disintegration.
- Post-1991 Struggles: After the fall of the Derg, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was a decisive force in toppling tyranny and continues to be a leading voice in the fight for democracy, justice, and national rights.
- The Oromo as a Bridge Between Domination and Liberation
Despite being targeted for cultural suppression, linguistic marginalization, and political exclusion, the Oromo people have also shaped the core of Ethiopian politics, often acting as a balancing force in the country’s turbulent history.
Consider:
- Many “unitarist” opposition leaders today, such as Birtukan Mideksa and Andargachew Tsige, come from Oromo backgrounds, showing that Oromo identity intersects across ideological lines.
- The current government led by Dr. Abiy Ahmed, himself of Oromo heritage, exists because of decades of resistance and sacrifice by Oromo nationalists.
- The Oromo people’s openness, particularly in cities like Finfinne, has made them more tolerant of diversity than many other groups. For instance, Gurage merchants, known for their mobility and trade, are far more welcome and numerous in Oromia than in the north.
This tolerance, combined with strong values rooted in Gadaa democracy, makes the Oromo uniquely capable of leading a peaceful, inclusive liberation struggle—not just for themselves, but for all oppressed nations in the region.
Strategic Triangles: The “Two Against One” Model in Elite Struggles
In Ethiopia’s complex political terrain, three primary elite blocs have historically contested state power:
- Amhara elites (often advocating for a unitary, centralized Ethiopian identity),
- Tigrayan elites (primarily represented by the TPLF),
- Oromo elites (pushing for national self-determination and equitable federalism).
This “triangle of power” has defined political developments for decades. One strategic model that repeatedly surfaces is the “two-against-one” approach — wherein two forces temporarily align to neutralize or overpower the third.
1. Before 1991: Amhara-Tigrayan Domination vs. Oromo Resistance
Until the fall of the Derg in 1991, Oromo forces were largely excluded from power.
Tigrayan (TPLF) and Amhara elites often cooperated or competed within the ruling class, leaving Oromo voices marginalized or criminalized.
2. 1991–2005: TPLF-Oromo Alliance vs. Amhara Nationalists
After the fall of Mengistu’s regime, TPLF and OLF initially cooperated under the Transitional Government of Ethiopia.
However, OLF’s demand for true federalism and self-determination clashed with TPLF’s dominance, leading to OLF’s withdrawal.
TPLF then co-opted some Oromo elites into OPDO (now PP), but sidelined independent Oromo voices.
During this period, the Amhara elite opposition (e.g., Coalition for Unity and Democracy – CUD) rejected ethnic federalism, creating a TPLF-Oromo vs. Amhara dynamic.
3. 2005–2018: Amhara-Oromo Opposition vs. TPLF Rule
The TPLF’s authoritarian rule and marginalization of both Amhara and Oromo created opportunities for cross-ethnic opposition.
Despite ideological differences, both Amhara activists and Oromo youth movements (notably Qeerroo) began challenging TPLF hegemony.
The formation of AFD (Alliance for Freedom and Democracy) in 2006 was a brief but significant attempt at bridging this divide.
4. Post-2018: Oromo-led Government vs. Conservative Amhara and Exiled Tigrayans
The fall of TPLF from central power in 2018 was made possible by Oromo protests and internal fractures within the EPRDF.
Dr. Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, became Prime Minister — leading to the rise of Prosperity Party.
However, his ambiguous stance — trying to appease all three blocs — deepened fractures:
Amhara conservatives expected him to promote Ethiopian nationalism and suppress federalism.
Tigrayan elites accused him of betrayal and eventually launched armed rebellion (Tigray War).
Oromo republicans began criticizing his regime for failing to uphold Oromo national interests and tolerating the revival of Amhara domination.
TPLF’s Divide-and-Rule Legacy
One of TPLF’s most effective tools was the manipulation of elite conflicts. By:
- Promoting Amharic as the sole federal working language, and
- Sidelining Afan Oromo, the TPLF alienated Oromo nationalists,
while simultaneously:
- Framing Amhara elites as still dominant, they stoked Oromo resentment,
- Convincing Amhara elites that they were being marginalized by Oromo and Tigrayans.
This mutual distrust between Oromo and Amhara elites benefited TPLF, allowing it to consolidate power while opposition groups remained divided.
The Missed Alliance: AFD and Aftermath
The Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD) in 2006 was a landmark moment, signaling potential cooperation between Oromo liberation fronts and Amhara democratic forces. However:
- Deep-rooted mistrust and ideological incompatibilities,
- TPLF infiltration and sabotage, and
- Disagreements on unitarism vs federalism, independence vs unionism, etc., led to its eventual collapse.
Still, the 2018 upheaval that brought Abiy Ahmed to power showed that when Oromo and Amhara temporarily aligned, they could shake the status quo.
But that alliance was short-lived.
The Internal Challenge: Oromo Fragmentation and the Quest for Unity
While external domination by northern elites (Amhara and Tigrayan) remains a persistent challenge, internal fragmentation within the Oromo nationalist movement presents an equally significant obstacle to the realization of Oromo self-determination and the broader vision of a Cushitic renaissance.
1. Multiple Factions, One Goal
The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), historically the symbol of Oromo resistance, has splintered into various factions over time. Despite sharing a common goal of liberating Oromia, these factions often:
Disagree on strategies (armed struggle vs. peaceful politics),
Compete for influence, and
Distrust each other, fearing infiltration or sabotage.
This division weakens the movement, confuses the public, and provides opponents with ammunition to delegitimize the cause.
2. Unity Without Uniformity
True unity does not require total ideological uniformity. Instead, the movement should:
Allow for strategic diversity (e.g., some factions engaging in electoral politics while others maintain an armed struggle),
Maintain mutual respect and coordination, and
Establish a central political structure or unified front for external negotiations and representation.
In this regard, efforts to merge OLF factions and to create a unified Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) are commendable. A coordinated movement is far more likely to:
- Win the trust of other oppressed nations,
- Effectively challenge the Ethiopian state structure, and
- Represent the Oromo in any future negotiations for a restructured federation or confederation.
- The Broader Vision: Cushitic Renaissance and Wàqeffannà Revival
The Oromo liberation struggle should be understood not only as a political and territorial project but also as a cultural renaissance — a reawakening of Cushitic identity, values, and worldview.
1. Rediscovering Wàqeffannà
Wàqeffannà, the indigenous Oromo monotheistic faith, represents:
- A spiritual philosophy of peace, justice, and harmony with nature,
- A rejection of hierarchical religious systems imposed through foreign conquest,
- A core part of Cushitic civilization, linking Oromo to other Cushitic nations such as Agaw, Sidama, Somali, and Afar.
Reviving Wàqeffannà serves not only as a cultural reclamation but also as a political act — asserting independence from the northern-imposed religious order and affirming a distinct Oromo identity.
2. Cushitic Christianity and Islam
Instead of rejecting Abrahamic religions, the call is for:
A Cushitic interpretation of Christianity and Islam,
Emphasis on tolerance, egalitarianism, and spiritual unity, rather than dogma or theocratic authoritarianism.
This approach fosters interfaith harmony and can unite Cushitic Muslims and Christians under a common cultural umbrella.
Cushitic Renaissance: Political and Cultural Transformation
The Cush Renaissance refers to a broader transformation of the Horn of Africa, based on:
- Decolonizing historical narratives, which were distorted to favor northern (Abyssinian) elite domination,
- Promoting democratic, inclusive, and decentralized governance,
- Reviving Cushitic values like:
- The Gadaa system (egalitarian, age-based governance),
The Qallu institution (spiritual guardianship and moral leadership),
- Collective land stewardship and cultural tolerance.
This renaissance aspires to replace the centralized, authoritarian state with a confederation of free peoples — each with autonomy and dignity.
The Final Vision: Union of Free Peoples
The ultimate political goal, as outlined, is not an isolated Oromo state, nor a unitarist Ethiopian empire. Rather, the vision is:
A Confederation (Confepia), where all nations — Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan, Somali, Sidama, Afar, Agaw, etc. — coexist as equals, not as subjects of a dominant center.
A voluntary union, based on mutual respect, shared values, and self-determination.
This model can serve as a regional framework not only for Ethiopia but for the entire Horn — moving away from imperialism and conflict, toward democracy, identity-based coexistence, and pan-Cushitic solidarity.
Conclusion
The transformation of Ethiopia — whether into Amapia, Oropia, or Confepia — hinges on:
The resolution of historical grievances,
The unification of fragmented liberation fronts, especially among the Oromo,
The recognition of Cushitic identity as a foundational pillar of the region’s past and future.
Whether Dr. Abiy Ahmed positions himself as a transitional figure toward Oropia, a preserver of Amapia, or a facilitator of Confepia remains to be seen. But history teaches us this: no state structure will endure if it fails to respect the dignity and self-determination of its peoples.
May Wàqa grant all nations the wisdom to choose freedom over domination, truth over propaganda, and union over coercion.
Galatooma.
read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/06/1 ... -politics/