Dr. Abiy is neither Mengistu H/Mariam, nor H/Mariam Desalegn, and certainly not Bàrô Tumsà!
By Fayyis Oromia*
When Dr. Abiy came to power, he received triangular support from the three major ethnic groups (Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo). The Amhara elites saw in him a figure similar to Mengistu H/Mariam, someone they could use in the name of Ethiopiawinet. The Tigray elites thought they could manipulate him as a puppet, just as they did with H/Mariam Desalegn. For some Oromo elites, he seemed to be the one to implement the vision Dr. Bàrô Tumsà once outlined. Gradually, all three groups realized that he was neither of the figures they had hoped for. At least it is clear that the Amhara elites could not instrumentalize him like Mengistu H/Mariam, and the Tigray elites could not use him as they did with H/Mariam Desalegn. What remains unclear is whether he can be considered akin to Dr. Bàrô Tumsà. As of now, he seems more like an antithesis to Bàrô. Whether his recent attempts to re-align with the Oromo camp will change this trajectory remains to be seen.
At that time, I wrote: “Bàrô’s message is already done, and the Oromo are in power, but are we ready to fulfill Fayyis’ idea of keeping Oromo power in Caffé Aràrà by any means?” Now, after two years, I doubt whether Dr. Abiy is the right person to realize Dr. Bàrô’s vision. Obbo Bàrô Tumsà (1938–1978), a pharmacist, lawyer, Oromo nationalist, and political leader in Oromia, is considered one of the primary founders of the OLF. He was one of the revolutionary students of the 1960s who once said, “We, the Oromo, must capture state power by any means necessary. In order to do this, we must clandestinely organize all sectors of our society. It is the responsibility of educated Oromo youth, like you, to disseminate the spirit of Oromo nationalism when you return to your respective communities. We can only change the deplorable condition of our people by being tolerant to one another and reestablishing necessary Oromo national unity. In this way, we can build a strong organization, capture state power, and take actions that facilitate fundamental social transformation.”
Eci’at, one of the legal opposition parties during the Derg era, was also led by Obbo Bàrô Tumsà. He was truly an Oromo liberation leader who successfully combined both nonviolent struggle and armed resistance as complementary means in the Oromo liberation movement. It is unfortunate that different Oromo organizations have often alienated one another, viewing each other as enemies simply due to differing approaches—choosing one means over the other for practical reasons. It is disheartening to hear that some members and supporters of one organization regard other Oromo nationalists as enemies (or vice versa) simply because they prefer one method over another. Additionally, it is unfortunate that Dr. Abiy seems to be preserving the dominance of Amharanet over Oromummaa and other national identities. He appears to be the antithesis of Dr. Bàrô Tumsà.
It seems that Obbo Bàrô Tumsà spoke to Oromo youth about 40 years ago, offering a solution to our contemporary issues. We know what the level of consciousness among the Oromo people was at that time regarding his five points: 1) disseminate the spirit of Oromo nationalism; 2) be tolerant of one another and reestablish Oromo national unity; 3) build a strong organization; 4) capture state power; 5) take actions that facilitate fundamental social transformations. Is our level of consciousness and practice now different from that time? Do we still need to focus on these five points as we did many years ago? A lot has changed in that time span: now, the spirit of Oromo nationalism is already disseminated throughout the Oromo nation; at least, we know that without tolerance and national unity, success is not near; we do pay lip service to building a strong organization, even though we lag behind in practice; we now recognize that capturing state power at Caffé Aràrà (CA) palace is key, whether we democratize Ethiopia or decolonize Oromia; and we have seen since 1991 how easy it is to take any action of transformation after obtaining that key from TPLF.
Like it or not, the essence of the struggle in that country is a triangular conflict between Amhara elites, Tigray warlords, and Oromo nationalists for the key to the CA. Before 1991, that key was in the hands of Amhara warlords. Since then, it has been the turn of Tigray elites. For Oromo freedom fighters to retain the key they recently acquired, Obbo Bàrô Tumsà’s prescription is still necessary. To be successful, I believe both Oromianists (those who want to decolonize Oromia) and Oropianists (those who wish to democratize Ethiopia, i.e., Oromummaa-led Ethiopia) need to agree on this common denominator: capturing and keeping state power at CA. Once that is achieved, the decision will be in our hands—whether to realize an independent Oromia (600,000 sq km) or an integrative Oropia (1,130,000 sq km). Thus, we must continually remind Oromo nationalists of the importance of uniting to keep the power at CA. State power there means, for the Oromo, the realization of bilisummà (freedom), abbà-biyyummà (self-rule of our own national area), hiré-murtéfannà (self-determination), àngô siyàsà (political power), and walabummà (sovereignty).
Both examining the status quo and reassessing the validity of the five points is now crucial in order to move forward and efficiently fulfill the mission of Obbo Bàrô Tumsà’s message. The spirit of Oromo nationalism remains the best element to mobilize the Oromo people. Unfortunately, we still observe the RR-factor (regional and religious divisions) influencing certain Oromo elites, hindering necessary coordination. This factor needs to be effectively addressed. Tolerance among activists of different Oromo organizations is still lacking; it is disappointing to hear some cadres and leaders of our organizations fighting one another instead of focusing on the real enemy. While we know the importance of a strong organization to preserve our freedom, we remain neither adequately organized nor united for the common goal of keeping the state power at CA. The fifth point will only be realized if the fourth is achieved. It is in the final phase that we will decide whether to decolonize Oromia and/or democratize Oropia. Therefore, it makes little sense to quarrel now over these two post-freedom types of sovereignty. Whether we want to democratize Oropia or decolonize Oromia, the key first step for both is to retain state power at CA.
The importance of opting for either of the two sovereignty models now lies only in instrumentalizing them for the sake of mobilizing people. However, both the mobilized people and the leading parties must first consolidate power at CA and then take action to implement their version of sovereignty. Alternatively, the two Oromo camps could synthesize a common post-freedom agenda: an integrative Oropia as an optimal solution for the largest nation, which is present almost all over the country, allowing other nations to decide their own fate (independence vs. union). In addition to the presence of the Oromo across the country, here are some other reasons why we can claim the entire country of Ethiopia and rename it as Oropia:
Tigray elites reduced both Oromia and the Oromo almost by half, as planned by their leader Meles Zenawi—transforming the majority Oromo into a minority. Thus, it is better to reclaim the entire country rather than accept the less than half of Oromia ruled by ODP.
Oromo is Cushitic, and Cushitic peoples (including Amhara and Tigray nations, who deny their Cushitic roots) in the country are offspring or progenies of the Oromo, so they can be part and parcel of Oromia.
Some scholars argue that the entire country belongs to the Oromo and that all the past kings and leaders were Oromo, with Amharas merely being soldiers of past regimes.
The heart and brain of the country (Finfinné) is at the center of the Oromo nation. Therefore, any country administered from that center can be called Oromia.
The Oromo are the demographic majority (about 60%), and Oromia covers more than 60% of the country.
The economy of the country, especially exports (coffee, gold, hides and skins, flowers, chaat, etc.), is based in the Oromo region.
Most of the heroes and heroines who built and sustained the country as it is now are Oromo, and most athletes who contributed to the country’s fame are also Oromo.
Even Gojjam, parts of Gondar, and southern Tigray were once Oromo and belong to Oromia.
The original Cushitic language in Meroe was closely related to Afan Oromo, and other Cushitic languages are branches of it, so all peoples in the country can claim Oromo as their common root.
Wàqeffannà, the indigenous religion of the Cushites (also Abraham’s religion before Judaism), is still preserved among the Oromo and should be revived as a unique religion of the country.
The holy tree (mentioned in the Bible), under which pre-Judaism religious peoples sacrificed to their Wàqa, is still revered in Oromo society.
The known verse “Oromia stretches its hand to Wàqa” is referred to as Cush by the Jews and as Ethiopia by the Greeks.
Abraham Ashine of Akkasum (Axum), who was Cushite, is believed to have been more Oromo in character and reportedly had Oromo fighters during his invasion of Asia (Yemen).
The Oromo are considered the indigenous people on whom other groups in the Horn region are grafted.
Studies of Egypt reveal more similarities between Afan Oromo and ancient Egyptian inscriptions than between Amharic and Egyptian.
The present country was built at the cost of the Oromo people, both in terms of lives and resources.
The Oromo people are the demographic majority, and their land is the geographical center where all peoples of the country live in harmony.
The Oromo died to build and preserve present-day Ethiopia, and thus we deserve to claim the name Oropia, with Oromia as the core region.
Theoretically, after overthrowing the system of domination and reclaiming our freedom, we can now choose from the following five sovereignty models:
Ethiopian model: The Oromo could adopt Afan Oromo as the federal language and incorporate Cushitic values into Ethiopiawinet, which would be free of domination.
Anglican model: Just as the English liberated themselves from 700 years of Roman rule, Oromia could be autonomous, unite with neighboring regions, and form a new Ethiopian union with Afan Oromo as the working language.
Russian model: Oromia could become independent, and the newly formed state could have economic and military influence over neighboring countries, similar to the Russian federation.
Indian model: Oromo people could fight for their freedom alongside other nations, rename the country Oromia, and promote Afan Oromo as the working language.
Oromian model: Oromia could be an autonomous “Oromo Regional State” within a future Oropian union. This model is a new approach that has not been fully explored.
I personally advocate for the Oropian model, as it could offer an optimal solution for the ongoing conflict among Oromo elites: “Oropian democratization vs. Oromian liberation.” There are five possible solutions to resolve this conflict: 1) all Oromo nationals agree to accept a union Ethiopia; 2) all agree to achieve an independent Oromia; 3) all try to reach consensus on Oropia; 4) agree to follow our respective paths and concentrate on the common goal—consolidating power at CA; 5) struggle to defeat each other, which would benefit the enemy. The practical solution seems to be option 4.
In conclusion, the Oromo could take control of the state power at CA, rather than merely striving for autonomy for peripheral minority nations. Let other distant nations form their own states, while Oromo nationalists keep power at CA. If we agree on the validity of Obbo Bàrô Tumsà’s five-step plan and work towards it, we will ultimately consolidate state power at CA and decide whether to pursue independent Oromia or integrative Oropia. Can OPP and/or OLF realize this vision? Unfortunately, Dr. Abiy’s OPP has already disappointed the Oromo in this regard. But surely, Ethiopia will either give birth to Oromia or transform into Oropia. For this, we must follow Fayyis Oromia’s advice: keep the Oromo power at CA by any means possible—not just for the Oromo elites, but also to promote Oromummaa as the primary element of future Ethiopiawinet, with Amaranet taking second place.
May Wàqa help us retain power at CA and leave the decision on post-freedom sovereignty to the Oromo people!
Galatôma!
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/03/1 ... aro-tumsa/