Sovereignty: Abesha’s Dictatorial Style vs Oromo’s Democratic Way!
By Fayyis Oromia*
Abesha’s style of sovereignty is dictatorial (Amara’s dictatorial centralism, Tegau’s dictatorial federalism and Eritrea’s dictatorial separatism), whereas Oromo’s way is a democratic choice between the three types of sovereignty (centralism, federalism and separatism). According to the ongoing discussion in Oromo nationalists’ circle, the three types of sovereignty, in forms of Amara’s model (assimilative), Tegaru style (imperial) and Eritrean type (exclusive) are not as such bad for the Oromo people in the future if chosen democratically, but preferable is the Oromo’s best way (Oromummà led rainbow union). Amara’s model in Oromo term is an assimilative like having democratically free development and use of Afàn Oromo at the federal level, which will assimilate the other neighboring language groups into being Oromo, thus practically Ethiopia = Oropia (Oromummà led state). The dictatorial assimilative approach must be distinguished from the democratic accomodative and integrative option of the Oromo’s way in the suggested rainbow union. Tegaru’s style is an imperial, where the Oromo people having free Oromo state, and at the same time, ruling over other nations. Such imperial rule is also not the same to democratic autonomy for all nations and nationalities in the Oromo’s option. Eritrean type is an ‘independent Oromo state’ as separate nation-state, free from other nations; this Eritrean way in a democratic term can be a rule-out result, in case all other nations refuse to live with us and leave the Oromo way of rainbow union.
The new approach, which can now be pursued by Oromo organizations and Oromo people, if we want, is an optimal option, so that we necessarily ought not be fixated on only the option of “separation.” That is why the endless cry of Habesha cadres, who do lament day and night about their claim to “know the fact” that OLF is a “secessionist” organization and their accusation of Oromo nationalists as “separatists,” does not hold water. On contrary, the Gadaa people with our principle of freedom and democracy do prefer Oromo’s method leading us to our desired optimal sovereignty. We want to give chance to rainbow union; and only if this noble Oromo’s choice fails to be materialized, due to the possible arrogance and authoritarian nature of Abyssinian elites, Oromo people will be obliged to move towards the choice of being exclusive and reject the possible union with them.
As far as Oromo people and our liberation organizations are concerned, we can even try to promote the type of unity, which the “pro-unity” forces want to realize. But, these forces have to be sure that the language into which we all need to melt will be the two Afàn Oromo’s, that means – not only Amarigna, but also Oromiffà. Now, some Oromo nationalists seem to support this view, hoping that the “pro-unity” forces do agree with this way of solving the language issue. Amarigna was in reality created by Oromo nobility in the year 1270 around Hankobar in central Oromia. The Oromo nobility just wanted to have a language, which was different from that of ordinary Oromo, thus created “Lisane Negus” – Amarigna. Now, both Amarigna and Oromiffa are suggested to be considered as Afàn Oromo (languages of Oromo people). Sure is that Oromiffà is language of Oromo heroes, who did start liberation struggle of Oromo people from the Habeshanized rulers of Agaw and Oromo, whereas Amaringa is unfortunately still associated with domination and subjugation of Gadà people by this Abyssinized part of Cush nations.
This theory now seems to be entertained by the ongoing Oromo liberation movement. By the way, was Nagàsô Gidàdà’s UDJ party not one of those with the mentality of Habeshanized Cushites? When we look at program of the party, its §3.2.4 said: “Amarigna shall serve as working language of the federal state; when approved by referendum, there can be another language, in addition to Amarigna, that serves as working language of the federal state.”
Why not referendum on Amarigna, whereas it is compulsorily needed to allow Oromiffà to have the same status? Is this not a double standard? Why did Dr. Nagàsô and other Oromo nationalists in this party fail to put Oromiffà as one of the federal working languages explicitly, just as they did Amarigna? Are they not making the same mistake committed by emperor Minilik Càlà and his best general Gobanà Dàcé? Both of these members of the nobility, being Oromo (the first being Habeshanized Oromo, the second non-Habeshanized), they could have promoted Oromiffà to be the working language of Ethiopian state they built, instead of making “Lisane Negus” the only one officially used in the country.
Now, Oromo liberation movement should take heed of Habesha organizations, which want to repeat the same mistake. No other move, except the following three ways of OLF movements, is acceptable to Oromo people: the first-generation OLF, which concentrates on achieving only an ‘independent Oromia,’ as a fair goal without influencing other nations; the second-generation OLF talking about either an ‘independent Oromia’ or an ‘autonomous Oromia;’ and the third-generation OLF being more inclusive and open for an ‘independent Oromia,’ an ‘autonomous Oromia within rainbow union’ and an ‘integrative Oropia (Oromummà led geo-federal Ethiopia).’ I think these three options of our future sovereignty are not bad, but the question lies on the timing of stressing one of the alternatives vis-à-vis the other two. Clear is that any nation under oppression and with a threatened security prefers and stresses independence, whereas the nation, which does have a confidence to survive, to thrive and which is even sure to be able to lead other nations do emphasize the other two alternatives, the most confident nationals opting for an integrative Oropia.
We may then ask: which position should the Oromo people, who are still under Amaranet domination need to emphasize now? Surely, we need to stress independence, just as the first-generation OLF correctly had done and is still doing. Even though it is not bad that the second-generation accepted a possible autonomy within a union as another option, and the third-generation has now started to further entertain even the third alternative of an ‘integrative Oropia,’ the smart side of all the three generations is that they have never given up and will never give up the independence option. As long as Oromo people are under oppression, the question for ‘independence’ is mandatory as a rule-out result. But, care must be taken for this position is mis-used by Biltsigina cadres as a means to neutralize the “pro-unity” Amara forces, which are also nowadays archenemies of Biltsigina. Clearly, Biltsigina regime is surviving and thriving by making these Amara forces and the pro-independence Oromo fronts neutralize each other. Thus, it is better to tone down the independence rhetoric and emphasize the union option.
As repeatedly mentioned, the common denominator of the three OLF generations is ‘freedom of the Oromo’. The first-generation is for freedom of the Oromo + independence of Oromia. The second-generation for freedom + independence (in a form of Oromia’ or a ‘union of autonomous nations). The third-generation is for freedom + independence (in a form of an ‘independent Oromia’ or a ‘union of autonomous nations or an ‘integrative Oropia’). As I do see, we are moving from the status quo occupied Oromia of subjugated Oromo people — through the smaller OPP’s Oromia — small OLF’s Oromia — the Oromia proper — to Oropia with respected and realized freedom of all nations.
When we look at such theoretical options and moves, Oromo people are actually in a very advantageous position regarding the possible three future outcomes of political struggle. The three outcomes are 1. a ‘disintegrated Oropia’ resulting in multiple independent nation-states, including an independent Oromia, 2. a ‘federated Oropia’ like it is now (just changing its fake status quo to the true federation) and 3. a ‘transformed Oropia’ from its Abyssinized empire nature (Ethiopia with Oromo oppression and Habesha domination) to a rainbow union (with freedom for all citizens and nations). Oromo nationalists can use these three options to our advantage for all three options are not against the required freedom of Oromo people. Amara elites are limited to the third option in which they think Amarigna will be the only federal language of all in Ethiopia, so they do hate the second option and do fear the first option, because the first and second options do limit expansion of Amarigna. Tegaru elites could use the second option as long as they did dominate Ethiopian politics, and they opted to the first option as they started to lose their domination, but they can never be able to exploit the third option for it will not give them the opportunity to dominate other nations in rainbow union.
Interestingly, we can see that the first-generation OLF is shooting against domination forces from only one position (from position of an ‘independent Oromia’); the second-generation from two positions (from positions of an ‘independent Oromia’ and a ‘autonomous nations within rainbow union’); the third-generation from three positions (from an ‘independent Oromia,’ a ‘ union of autonomous nations’ and an integrative Oropia). Furthermore, we do also observe clear supportive position of all the three generations for an independent Oromia; yet, all Oromo nationalists of these three generations just should take care not to play into hands of some Habesha cadres, who also continuously sing “supporting” the unconditional independence of Oromia. The motive of these cadres is not hard to understand. They want to antagonize Oromo movement for liberation with pro-democracy movement of the Amhara people. We should try to kill this divide-and-rule machination of the regime. Otherwise, the third-generation OLF, with an additional vision of transforming the Abyssinian-Ethiopia (the hitherto Ethiopia characterized by oppression, hunger, exploitation, tyranny and torture) to Oromian-Ethiopia (Cushitic Ethiopia of liberty, freedom, democracy and autonomy of nations), is really great. Oromo liberation struggle has already compelled Abyssinian elites to sing about these values of Oromian-Ethiopia, the values which are actually against their own culture and nature. Thus, the anti-thesis of Obbo Born Barràqà’s Abyssinian-Ethiopia (http://gadaa.com/oduu/10224/2011/07/26/ … -ethiopia/) is this suggested Oromian-Ethiopia.
We like it or not, Oromia can never go back to the past Amara-dominated country, and keeping the Tigrean domination sustainably was also not an easy job. Slowly but surely, the country is changing because of the pressure from Oromo liberation movement, and it will continue to change from Abyssinian-Ethiopia to Oromian-Ethiopia. It is up to Oromo people to choose which form of Oromia to have in the future: OPP’s map, OLF’s map, present Ethiopia being transformed to Oropia or the future Oromia’s map being the same to that of the Cushitic Ethiopia extending from Meroe to Mombasa? The idea of the second-generation OLF in thinking about the second type of sovereignty (autonomous Oromia within a union) as another option of Oromo’s sovereignty, which is alternative to the original goal (independent Oromia) was very disappointing for the first-generation OLF and its supporters. In the meantime, this second option seems to have been accepted by many Oromo nationalists, as long as the Oromo public will decide in the future per referendum. Now, the third alternative sovereignty (an integrative Oromia or geo-federation), which is now entertained by the third-generation OLF seems to be “disturbing,” not only for the first generation, but also for the second-generation. It may take a long time till Oromo nationalists of these two generations will start to realize that Oromo people, as a majority in the region, will have no disadvantage in all the three types of sovereignty, if really the future politics of the region will be that of freedom and democracy. Fortunately, the world is developing and moving in this direction of politics; the Horn of Africa can not be an exception.
The hitherto main mistakes done by both Amara elites and Oromo elites, so that TPLF could beat them turn by turn, are the facts that Amara elites still think as if they are in control of Finfinne palace and as if they do have political domination demanding from Oromo elites to give up the agenda of “Oromia’s independence” as a precondition to an all-inclusive alliance. Oromo elites, on the other hand, think as if we have less power and influence, compared to Amara elites, so that we still fear the comeback of old “era of darkness.” TPLF cadres knew this fallacy of both groups and played with their emotion in order to polarize the opposition camp. The recent move of the OLF to correct these faults is an indication of a growing Oromo self-confidence to tackle such impasse and make a difference, not only in Oromia, but in the whole Oropia, that is why it is a nice step. Of course, this will be fruitful only if the effort towards the third alternative of sovereignty (an integrative Oropia) is going to be seen on the real ground. A move in this direction is yet more of a theory rather than being the ongoing practice; nevertheless, I think the plan of an Oromian-Ethiopia (Ethiopia being transformed into Oropia) is a best vision, and it will be a possible reality in the future. Only if the Abyssinian elites and their Western handlers try to hinder the realization of this vision, then Oromia’s independence within African union’ is the other option we need to strive for. The truth, in general, is that in all three ways of achieving Oromia’s sovereignty, the hitherto oppressed Oromo people will have nothing to lose in the future.
What we can’t deny is that there are significant number of Oromo nationals supporting either of the three types of sovereignty (either an independence, or autonomy within union or an integration), and none of these three groups do prefer a ‘dominated Oromo’ to a ‘liberated Oromo’. Thus ‘liberated Oromo’ is a common denominator for these three political views in Oromo community. Even though they do have the same stand on freedom, they do differ on the type of ‘sovereign Oromia’ to realize. The difference is based on version of the Oromo history each generation does have in mind and based on personal life experiences of their respective members. If the OLF manages to accommodate these three sections of Oromo society (pro-independence, pro-federalism and pro-integration), it can then surely be pragmatic, inclusive and smart. Liberated Oromo from domination under the Abyssinian system of colonization is unconditional; but the types of sovereignty, which we, as a nation, want to realize, be it an ‘independent Oromia within African union’ or an ‘autonomous Oromia within Oropian union’ or an ‘integrative Oropia by transforming the Abyssinian-Ethiopia of dictatorship to Oromian-Ethiopia of democracy’ can be conditional, which depends on the future referendum of Oromo public in particular and that of all concerned nations in general.
The best way to attack and defeat TPLF (which was using two cards of either ‘imperial Tigrai’ or ‘independent Tigrai’) was that the Oromo concentrated on the third alternative, on an ‘integrative Oropia,’ rather than on only an ‘independent Oromia’; the two methods (independence and autonomy) being theoretically the same ideology to that of TPLF, who in reality exercised an ‘imperial position.’ Fortunately, TPLF could not use card of an integration for it is representative of minority nation. Thus, according to the opinion given in this essay, an ‘independent Oromia’ (Eritrean style sovereignty) is not the only type of sovereignty for the Oromo and Oromia, the people and land, which are at the center and core of politics in the country. An ‘autonomous Oromia within Oropia’ and only an ‘integrative Oropia’ are also other advantageous ways of securing Oromo people’s freedom and Oromia’s sovereign. Otherwise, we do see that Amara elites have only one political card (that of integration) to play; Tegaru elites have only two cards (that of ‘imperial Tigrai’ and ‘independent Tigrai’); but Oromo nationalists have three cards to play – cards of ‘independent Oromia,’ ‘autonomous Oromia within Oropia’ and ‘integrative Oropia’. Time will show us whether Oromo politicians are smart and wise enough to use these three cards to an advantage of Oromo people and to serve an interest of Oromoland.
As far as I am concerned, so long Oromo people are under oppression, we should fight for an independent Oromia without giving in and giving up. But, Oromia and the Oromo are neither geographical periphery nor demographical minority, like Eritrea and South Sudan, in order to opt for separation as the only best remedy. Integrative Oropia (transforming Abyssinian-Ethiopia to Oromian-Ethiopia) can also be a very good version of our sovereignty; of course, an ‘autonomous Oromia’ being a temporary and transitional solution towards either an ‘independent Oromia’ or an ‘integrative Oropia,’ both as an alternative lasting solutions. So let’s Oromo nationals act as members of a nation with both geographical central position and demographical majority in the country, believing in ourselves and being confident that we can change our condition of political minority to our legitimate status of majority and convert our current situation of being in a political periphery towards becoming political center. Habesha cadres, who continuously accuse Oromo liberation movement as a “separatist” movement should be told that it is illogical to talk about Finfinne’s “secession” from Finfinné, whereas the simple fact is that the peripheral Maqele and Bahirdar can secede from the center – Finfinné. Common sense tells us that the one who is the minority and at periphery claims secession from the major nation at the center, not vice versa!
Galatôma!
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2017/06/1 ... mos-way-2/