Mereja.Forum

[Zmeselo]

በቀረው ዓለም ከእዝያ በፊት በታሪክ ማን ከማን ጋር ለምን ያክል ግዜ ረጅም የሆነ ውግያ እንደ ተዋጋ፡ በውል የማውቀው ነገር የለም። በእኛ ዘመንና በአዲስቱ ኢትዮጵያ ከተካሄዱት ጦርነቶች ግን፡ ከኤርትራ አማጽያን እንዳደረግነው ውግያ ግዙፍና ብዙ ዋጋ ያስከፈለ አለ ለማለት እቸገራለው።

ካማንም ባዕድ ጦር ጋር ብንዋጋ፡ ከዚህ ጦርነት የበለጠ ዋጋ አንከፍልም። ለምን? መካድ አንችልም! ሰዎቹ ተዋጊዎች ናቸው፡ ይዋጋሉ።

ለዚያ (ለኤርትራ ጦርነት) የተከፈለው መስዋዕትነት ቀላል አልነበረም፡ የወጣው ገንዘብና ሎጂስቲክስ ቀላል አልነበረም፡ በአንድ ታዳጊ ሀገር ረዥም፡ ብዙ የጠየቀ፡ ብዙ መሳርያ የተሰለፈበት ምናልባት ከኮርያ ጦርነት በመለስ የእኛ ጦርነት ነበር። ይኼንን ሁሉም ይቀበለዋል።

I don’t know for sure, in history, what war was fought the longest. However, from the wars that have taken place in our time and in modern Ethiopia, I hesitate to say that there was a war as massive and costly as the one we fought against the Eritrean rebels.

Even if we fought against any foreign army, it would not be more costly than we did in that war. Why? We cannot deny it! The people (Eritreans) are warriors; they fight!
The sacrifice paid for that (the Eritrean war) was not small. The money spent and the logistics were not small, either. For a young nation, it was long, it demanded a lot, and involved a massive deployment of weapons—perhaps, after the Korean war, it was this war. Everyone acknowledges this fact.

Former President of Ethiopia Mengistu Hailemariam, 2024

FACTS:

-The Eritrean armed struggle was the longest armed national liberation struggle in Africa & a highly developed & effective armed struggle, in the world. Many of the largest battles and military operations after WWII; the Red Star 1982 Operations, Nadew 1988, Fenkil 1990 & others, were fought in Eritrea.

-Between 1974 & 1991, Ethiopia lost about 479,589 troops (1% of Ethiopia's then population of 46 million) fighting in Eritrea. Eritrea, lost more than 65,000 of her finest freedom fighters in the liberation war. 30% of Eritrean freedom fighters, were women.

-From 1985-1991, the EPLF released 136,000 Ethiopian POWs. In 1985, 8000, in Dec. 1989, 10,000, in early 1991, 30,000, in Jan. 1990, about 2500, and after Independence in 1991, about 86,000 POWs including 900 officers & 3 Soviet Officers were released.

-Mr. Fasika Sidelil, Derg's Economic Policy Chief, recently revealed that from 1974-1991, Ethiopia spent 50% of its GDP to fight against the Eritrean Armed Struggle for self-determination. From 1961 to 1974, Emperor Hailesilassie spent about 500 million U.S dollar, close to 5 billion U.S dollar worth today, for defense budget. This was mainly to fight the war in Eritrea.

-In 1991, 200 tanks, 50, 130 mm & 171, 122 mm artillery, 44 BM-21 & 18 BM-24 rockets, 127-ZU-23 anti-aircraft, 1038 mortars and a very large number of ammunition were also taken from the defeated Ethiopian Army in Eritrea.

-In 1991, the EPLF destroyed the Ethiopian Navy once and for all.

-In 1984, EPLF commandos destroyed 33 Ethiopian military aircraft including 16 MIG fighters.

-On 17 July 2001, the government of Ethiopia announced that Ethiopia spent $3 billion in the war with Eritrea (from 1998-2000).

-In 1999, Ethiopia spent 700 million U.S dollars, 9.5% of its GDP, to launch one of the biggest Offensive in history to invade Badme, and in 2000 Ethiopia's defense budget was 620 million U.S dollars to unleash the 3rd Offensive against Eritrea.

The government also admitted that the conflict caused massive devastation with staggering human costs, demolished the country’s social and physical infrastructure, and diverted a great portion of the economically active population. History of Eritreaታሪኽ ኤርትራ.تاريخ إريتريا: @Erihistory








Eritrean Independence war




In the so called, border war

[Zmeselo]

General
Eritrea’s Statement at the Meeting of High – Level Officials of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

https://shabait.com/2019/04/22/eritreas ... f-of-aden/

Dec 22, 2023



Mr. Chairman

Distinguished Participants

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me first to express our profound gratitude for the kind invitation extended to us to participate in this important conference.

The geo-strategic and geo-political importance as well as complexity and sensitivity of the Red Sea are too evident to merit extended discourse here. Furthermore, the vital importance of this international water way; its intrinsic regional and global significance, will not diminish but rather augment with time.

This will remain true irrespective of the turns and twists of history or changing circumstances. In the event, the attention that must be accorded to safeguard the security of the Red Sea must be high and fully consonant with its paramount importance.

Dear Participants,

As we all agree, this important maritime route had sadly become a theatre for reckless regional and international interferences in the past thirty years largely due to misguided exogenous agendas. This somber state of affairs in turn entailed a perplexing reality of stampede and unnecessary complications. This was in addition to the legacy of the Cold War.

It must be noted here that the interferences that stem from regional and international agendas could not have materialized without the complicity and connivance of local players. In this perspective, the whole affair warrants a sober and comprehensive review that is not dented by emotional or presumptive approaches.

In these times, the proliferation of institutions is increasingly becoming the norm all over the world. This is also true in our region. The various initiatives usually emanate from a reservoir of political goodwill. Indeed, they are launched to advance lofty objectives. Unfortunately, the institutions that stay the course, gain traction and consolidation over time to deliver the desired results are few.

By the same token, initiatives undertaken in the past years to foster appropriate institutional frameworks and ties of cooperation in the Red Sea, or to launch conferences for submission of research papers, have been considerable indeed. Here again, those that have produced impacting results are few.

The formulation of a viable framework of cooperation and attendant functional institution on the basis of consensus and mutual understanding will therefore require a patient and methodological approach. Continuous and serious consultations will thus remain a matter of necessity rather than choice.

In our modest view, the requisite consultations should incorporate the following cardinal procedural and substantive issues. They must also be conducted in a manner that will avoid wastage of time or opportunity loss. The key parameters are:

1. Comprehensive and unbiased assessment of the current realities of the Red Sea and associated matters, in all their dimensions and perspectives in a realistic manner;

2. Full clarity on the desired objectives and goals;

3. Detailed mapping of the threats to the peace and security of the Red Sea; and, categorization and specification of these parameters;

4. Formulation of a viable strategy that will ensure achievement of constructive objectives and goals;

5. Formulation of strategies to contain and eliminate the threats in tandem with the positive policies of cooperation;

6. Mapping out detailed schemes and plans that will ensure holistic implementation of the twin strategies;

7. Stipulation of the implementation mechanisms, associated structures and mobilization of the requisite resources;

8. Ensuring that all the organizational configurations and frameworks that are developed are anchored on respect of sovereignty and international law;

9. Ensuring that all littoral States build and possess their own effective defense capabilities and naval forces (without delegation to others);

10. Supplementing, through collective efforts and synergy, those specific tasks that cannot be met through individual domestic capabilities and resources;

11. All relevant States will create appropriate modalities of cooperation with “external forces” for tasks or missions that are beyond their collective capability on the basis of a consensual framework;

12. Creation of competent committees to address all these issues in a comprehensive and professional manner.

Dear Participants,

Let me conclude by expressing our sincere hope that the modest views we have outlined above will enrich the deliberations of this Conference.

I thank you.

[Zmeselo]

The Horn of Africa is entering a new period of rupture. The risk of rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea escalating into a new war is becoming apparent. Ethiopia’s internal turmoil, the power struggle in Tigray, and Eritrea’s instinct to protect its independence are creating a multi-dimensional crisis in the region.

To elaborate, after the 2020-2022 Tigray War, Abiy Ahmed’s administration has reportedly struggled to maintain stability, with discussions emerging about his inability to maintain central control beyond Addis Ababa. In recent times, a significant failure against FANO in Amhara, increasing opposition in Oromia, and complaints from many Oromo elites against Abiy Ahmed indicate various problems. Additionally, Abiy Ahmed’s desire to gain access to the Red Sea and his 2023 rhetoric about reclaiming Eritrean ports have significantly escalated tensions in the region.

Moreover, the Somali region, which was perhaps the only peaceful area in recent times, claims that the October 2018 agreement between ONLF and the Ethiopian federal government has not been implemented. Looking at the recent statements, ONLF’s position is clear with the assertion that “all options are open” to defend their rights. This means an implicit threat of war.

Looking at the broader picture, it is clear that Abiy Ahmed is facing serious challenges in domestic politics. At the same time, another visible issue is that Abiy Ahmed is preventing the consolidation of power by creating dual structures both in Tigray and in Ethiopia’s Somali region.

Because of these and past developments, Eritrea remains a state that historically resists Ethiopia’s policies and is in constant military readiness. In fact, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki sees Abiy Ahmed’s policies as a threat to Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeps his army prepared for war.

Looking at the roots of today’s problem, it is important to recall that Tigray is governed by a transitional administration (TPLF-G) formed under the Pretoria Agreement. It should also be noted that TPLF-G does not have an armed force. However, this TPLF-G has not been widely accepted across the region. There are also different factions. In this context, the TPLF-D faction, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, stands out. It is important to note that TPLF-D’s armed forces are quite strong, with claims suggesting it has around 200,000 armed fighters.

At the same time, since 2020, Eritrean soldiers are also rumored to be present in Tigray. On the other hand, TPLF-D views the current administration, TPLF-G, as an extension of Addis Ababa. It also seeks to prevent TPLF-G from emerging as a proxy military force against Eritrea.

As is known, TPLF-D is against Tigray becoming a new battleground. However, this also creates a dilemma. While TPLF-D wants to prevent a war between Abiy Ahmed’s TPLF-G and Eritrea in Tigray, it also increases the risk of a new civil war within Tigray.

If we look at the possible developments, first, it is noteworthy that Abiy Ahmed aims to counter the perception that his central authority is weakening. However, the second and more important factor is the risk of war over Eritrean ports.

But the state of Ethiopia’s military capacity and the extent to which Eritrea is willing to act are factors that could change the situation.

If Eritrea believes that Addis Ababa cannot sustain a war, it may respond harshly. This scenario would lead to great uncertainty in the Horn of Africa, creating a new proxy war theater. It is also important to note that Afwerki has ties with Saudi Arabia, while Abiy Ahmed has support from the UAE. This means that any potential conflict would have global implications.

Another scenario is that tensions between TPLF-G and TPLF-D could escalate, leading to a new civil war. In this case, Eritrea would seek to support TPLF-D to prevent Abiy Ahmed’s military expansion into the region. A second war for the Ethiopian army in Tigray would undoubtedly affect Addis Ababa.

The intertwined nature of the region’s threats is quite extensive. Considering the recent developments in the Red Sea, Türkiye’s positioning and stance regarding regional developments will become even more significant.

[Fiyameta]

I think the worst thing about a mercenary war is, the mercenaries have no idea that they would ultimately be left carrying a huge amount of debt incurred by their weapons purchase. Ethiopia's $68.9 billion debt is proof of that.

It's bad enough that they waste millions of lives fighting wars on behalf of wealthy nations, but to be forced to pay for the weapons they used in the war is perhaps the most costly tragedy of mercenary wars. Ukraine is also being asked to pay back billions of dollars for the weapons it received to fight a mercenary war. Damn!

[Zmeselo]

I think the worst thing about a mercenary war is, the mercenaries have no idea that they would ultimately be left carrying a huge amount of debt incurred by their weapons purchase. Ethiopia's $68.9 billion debt is proof of that.

It's bad enough that they waste millions of lives fighting wars on behalf of wealthy nations, but to be forced to pay for the weapons they used in the war is perhaps the most costly tragedy of mercenary wars. Ukraine is also being asked to pay back billions of dollars for the weapons it received to fight a mercenary war. Damn!

My conclusion from deep reading of history of Eritrea & Ethiopia as modern nations—especially post WW2—leads me to the sad conclusion that successive ruling/political class of Ethiopia never learn from history vis-a-vis Eritrea—expansionist warmongering, a la curse of Sisyphus.

Elias Amare

[Zmeselo]

ብገለ ወገናት ዝደጋገም ክሲ “ህላወ ሰራዊት ኤርትራ ኣብ ክልል ትግራይ ናይ ኢትዮጵያ” ቅንጣብ ሓቂ ዘይብሉ፣ ግጭት ንምስዋር ኰነ ኢልካ ዝጋዋሕ’ዩ። ሰራዊት ኤርትራ ኣብ ልኡላዊ መሬቱ ጸኒሑን ኣሎን።

Apparently, another heyday for the usual Conflict Entrepreneurs!

Genuine concern to avert any bout of conflict - Intra-State or Inter State - in the Horn of Africa is of course noble and commendable. Silencing the Guns must indeed be the collective commitment of those who care for the well-being of all the peoples in our region.

But the various postulates and "scenario analyses", as well as calls for "external intervention", peddled by most of these Conflict Entrepreneurs lack depth as well as objectivity, and seem mired in unhealthy motives and underlying agendas. And as ever, sullying the image of Eritrea and using it as a convenient political punch-bag seems to be an organic part of these schemes.

In the event, let us reiterate Eritrea's unflinching commitment to peace on the basis of fundamental pillars of international law and the interests of regional stability.

In this respect,

1. The often repeated accusations of "Eritrean troop presence in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia" by certain circles is utterly false and floated to create a pretext for stoking conflict. Eritrea's troops were and remain fully deployed within its sovereign territories.

2. As underlined in unequivocal terms on many occasions in the past, Eritrea has no interest whatsoever in scuttling the Pretoria Peace Agreement; which is essentially an internal Ethiopian affair,

3. Similarly, Eritrea has no interest to exacerbate internal schisms within the political factions of the TPLF which it believes can only entail unnecessary and avoidable suffering to the people of Tigray.

4. Along with other toxic agendas, (ethnic and religious polarization etc.), territorial irredentism has remained the principal cause of endemic and cyclical inter-State and Intra-State conflicts in the Horn of Africa Region. In this context, constant inflammatory statements issued day-in and day-out by various political forces in Ethiopia regarding the Red Sea continue to be a recipes for unnecessary tension. This must be condemned in the strongest terms without any equivocation.

[Zmeselo]