Mereja.Forum

[Revelations]

Legal consequences

From a legal standpoint, an MoU is not considered a binding agreement like a treaty and serves as a non-committal declaration of intent without imposing legal responsibilities on the parties involved. Either party has the option to end the agreement at their discretion, often without cause and at short notice. MoUs are not subject to the legislative procedures of oversight, review, and ratification as outlined in the constitution. When utilised as a binding agreement, an MoU can become undemocratic and circumvent the constitutional safeguards put in place to preserve parliamentary sovereignty. At the international level, an MoU is not governed by treaty law and breaches do not result in international responsibility, nor is it obligatory to be registered under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. Hence, neither Ethiopia nor Somaliland have the legal standing to make an international claim regarding the MoU before an international court, and breaches do not automatically lead to compensation or reparations. Although it holds great political, diplomatic, and geopolitical significance, the MoU can be considered a mere “gentleman’s agreement”, with its true value lying in the realm of politics rather than law.


The Elephant - African analysis, opinion and investigation

[Revelations]

Political implications and geopolitical repercussions

For Ethiopia, the MoU diverts attention from internal conflicts, famine, and economic woes. For Somaliland, it potentially opens doors to international recognition, legitimising President Muse Bihi Abdi’s government, but it may also intensify conflicts in areas such as Laascaanood and Sool. For Somalia, it represents a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, necessitating an outright rejection of the MoU and the seeking of support from regional allies such as Egypt, Eritrea, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Somalia has already begun its diplomatic campaign, declaring the MoU null and void. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud had a phone call with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Hamad Thani, while similar conversations are likely or have already taken place with Eritrea and the KSA, and possibly with the Djiboutian leader. This, in turn, consolidates opposition to Somaliland’s bid for recognition and outside interference.

What is more, the MoU and its diversion of attention could alleviate the rising tensions and possibility of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but the potential causes for these are still on the horizon. Geopolitically, if and when the MoU is implemented, Ethiopia will have naval forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden that are aligned with the UAE’s strategic interests. The UAE, with the support of Somaliland and Ethiopia, could thus reinforce its presence there. This could be perceived as a threat by the Jeddah Red Sea Council – the KSA, Egypt, Eritrea, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). In addition, it challenges Djibouti’s role, especially its monopoly over port services to Ethiopia – the second-largest population in Africa.

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IGAD and its predicament

Moreover, Djibouti, as the IGAD chair, could also see the MoU as undermining its mediation efforts between Somalia and Somaliland. Nairobi’s response might be more cautious than expected, influenced by its growing diplomatic rift with Addis Ababa, closer ties with Asmara, and domestic political considerations. Sudan’s divided representation, with the SAF opposing and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) potentially supporting the MoU, adds complexity. Uganda and South Sudan, as IGAD members, may initially remain neutral, but this could gradually change. Recently, Sudan, Chad, and the UAE were involved in a diplomatic tiff, resulting in the reciprocal expulsion of each other’s diplomats. The RSF is gaining control of Khartoum and could use the opportunity to declare itself the legitimate representative of the Sudanese state, placing the UAE in indirect control of Sudan. The RSF (under Hemeti) and the Coordination Body of the Democratic Civil Forces (Taqaddum, led by the former prime minister Abdallah Hamdok) recently held a meeting in Addis Ababa, and diplomatic support from Ethiopia may propel Hemeti to advance this claim as the legitimate representative of Sudan to IGAD and through that to the AU and the UN. This is a long shot, but not unthinkable. Uganda and South Sudan, as part of IGAD, could shift from their neutral stance, potentially exacerbating the challenges in IGAD, already strained by regional conflicts. The IGAD chief’s latest statement, which refrains from mentioning or criticising the MoU and instead calls for a de-escalation between Ethiopia and Somalia, has been met with displeasure by Somalia. The Somali government has cited a bias towards Ethiopia in the statement and requested an immediate apology from the Executive Secretary, along with a retraction of the statement and the implementation of appropriate corrective actions, thereby highlighting IGAD’s predicament.

[Zack]

MOU only becomes binding when an official agreement is signed and this has not happend so far between Ethiopia and the Break away republic


Dr Zackovich

[Revelations]

Middle powers and UAE-KSA rivalry

Amid the intense competition among the great powers, regional powers such as the UAE and KSA are forming new alliances, carving out their own geopolitical spheres of influence. In Africa, these reach beyond the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, connecting the Middle East with North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel. The ongoing war in Gaza has disrupted shipping routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, revealing the interdependent nature of security in the Middle East and Africa. This is crucial, as over 15 per cent of global shipping passing through the strategic Suez Canal has been disrupted by these threats, particularly at the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. As a result, shipping companies are delaying entry into this key maritime corridor, leading to rising shipping costs and increased war-risk premiums. With the UAE and KSA competing for influence, resources, and markets, both seek arable land, ports, and markets for their projected manufacturing and port development and management projects. This has led to the emergence of new power alliances between Middle Eastern countries and regimes in Africa, primarily driven by security concerns, resource access, and power politics. Their involvement in the Horn of Africa is driven by a combination of personal relationships, military strength, and financial influence, transitioning from state-centric to personality-driven and corporate-like powers. A key factor in this competition between the two blocs is the rivalry between their leaders and their desire to consolidate their personal power.

First the alliance and now the rivalry between the KSA-led and UAE-led blocs are reshaping regional dynamics, with both blocs actively engaging in proxy wars and power politics across the Horn and North Africa. The involvement of Russia and Turkey in various regional contexts further complicates the situation. Key factors influencing this shift include the Gaza war, the Abraham Accord, and the Saudi-Iran rapprochement under Chinese auspices. The UAE and the KSA increasingly occupy pivotal positions, impacting the peace and security of African nations amid the perceived decrease in the US’s influence. These developments are part of the broader multipolar dynamic, with shifting focuses from traditional conflicts such as the Gaza war towards broader geopolitical strategies. Notably, the UAE’s growing military investments in Africa – particularly in Ethiopia and the Sudanese RSF – give it an advantage over the KSA which, owing to internal constraints, avoids such involvement. Generally, however, leaders in these two blocs face few domestic constraints on their power.

[Revelations]

Reactions from international actors

The MoU has elicited various reactions from international organisations. The AU Commission stressed the importance of respecting the unity, territorial integrity, and full sovereignty of all African Union member states, including Somalia and Ethiopia. The Arab League expressed full solidarity with the Somali government’s decision to reject the MoU. The League considered the memo invalid, unacceptable, and a breach of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial sanctity. ​The European Union (EU) and Egypt have issued statements expressing their support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU unequivocally stated the importance of respecting the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia as per its constitution and the foundational instruments of the AU and UN. The UN is yet to pronounce itself.

The US State Department called for diplomatic dialogue to de-escalate tensions in the Horn of Africa following the MoU and reaffirmed its acknowledgment of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia within its 1960 borders. It is not entirely apparent which border is being referenced, but the message remains the same – a plea for diplomatic engagement.

A clear US position, influenced by global concerns and its 2024 elections, is crucial. On the one hand, the only other power with significant leverage is the US, although the EU and China can also exert influence, to some extent. On the other hand, the US’s position is influenced by broader global concerns such as the Gaza war and maritime security. Despite its hyperpower status, the US has seen its role in maintaining global order diminish, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. This can be traced back to former US president Barack Obama’s policy of “leading from behind”, aimed at withdrawing from the protracted US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, responsibilities were delegated to the KSA, the UAE, and Israel. For instance, in the wars in Yemen and Tigray (Ethiopia), as well as the Jeddah mediation in Sudan, the Western world, particularly the US, seems to have outsourced responsibilities to the KSA. Internal governance issues continue to weaken the US’s role in maintaining global order. The new development must also be seen in light of escalating maritime threats in the region, partly owing to the Gaza war, with the effectiveness of the US’s “Operation Prosperity Guardian” facing severe curtailment. As observed in the conflicts in Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Tigray in Ethiopia, the UAE, although a close partner of the US, does not always align its policies with those of the US. The pertinent question is: how do Gulf states like the UAE diverge from US policies while the US remains the primary guarantor of their security? In the case of the Gulf states, their special relationship with the military-industrial complex gives them enough clout to influence politics in the West and East.

The Gaza war and rising tension in the Horn of Africa may lead the US to re-engage more robustly with these regions albeit not during the upcoming electoral campaign. The US has the necessary power and capabilities – economic, demographic, military, and technological – but its politics of identity challenges have weakened its assertive position in ensuring world order. With the 2024 elections approaching, the US’s engagement in the region may be affected, and the potential for disruptive actions by military adventurers in the region cannot be ignored. This illustrates the complex geopolitical dynamics involving the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the US, and highlights the reduced agency of African nations in shaping domestic politics.

As diplomatic manoeuvres unfold, the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland symbolises the rising geopolitical significance of Africa and the effects of competition among great and middle powers. This MoU will be used by two alliances: the Saudi-led bloc, increasingly collaborating with Somalia, Turkey, and Qatar, and the UAE-led bloc, comprising Ethiopia, Somaliland, and the RSF. These developments showcase the intricate interplay of domestic politics, geopolitical interests of extra-continental powers, and the agency of Pan-African institutions. National interests and various forms of power (economic, military, technological, demographic, and diplomatic) are projected, forcing new alliances and intensifying global competition. This scenario indicates escalating pressure on African institutions from both great and middle powers to align with specific blocs.

Due to the ineffectiveness of the multilateral system and the dispersed power polarity, Africa faces strategic policy dilemmas and complex questions regarding partnerships. The African Agency’s effectiveness hinges on its readiness and preparedness, which in turn depends on the quality of leadership, institutional strength, and governance. Consequently, Africa must navigate tough decisions on various global issues. A key question emerges: How should the AU and IGAD approach these decisions? What principles should inform their decision-making in this context? To ensure Africa’s voice is influential and respected by great and regional powers, and its concerns and aspirations are considered by the international community, Africa’s positions should be based on three core principles: Pragmatism – The AU and its member states should eschew dogmatic or idealistic stances in favour of a practical approach that prioritises the tangible improvement of living conditions in Africa. Dynamism – The AU and its member states must be ready to quickly adapt their policies in response to changing regional or global circumstances, including revising foreign or maritime policies and enhancing African countries’ capabilities.

Consequently, Africa must navigate tough decisions on various global issues. A key question emerges: How should the AU and IGAD approach these decisions? What principles should inform their decision-making in this context? To ensure Africa’s voice is influential and respected by great and regional powers, and its concerns and aspirations are considered by the international community, Africa’s positions should be based on three core principles: Pragmatism – The AU and its member states should eschew dogmatic or idealistic stances in favour of a practical approach that prioritises the tangible improvement of living conditions in Africa. Dynamism – The AU and its member states must be ready to quickly adapt their policies in response to changing regional or global circumstances, including revising foreign or maritime policies and enhancing African countries’ capabilities.

To ensure Africa’s voice is influential and respected by great and regional powers, and its concerns and aspirations are considered by the international community, Africa’s positions should be based on three core principles:

Pragmatism – The AU and its member states should eschew dogmatic or idealistic stances in favour of a practical approach that prioritises the tangible improvement of living conditions in Africa.

Dynamism – The AU and its member states must be ready to quickly adapt their policies in response to changing regional or global circumstances, including revising foreign or maritime policies and enhancing African countries’ capabilities.

A collective unified voice – Given the diversity and fragmentation in the AU and its 55 member states’ approach to partnerships with extra-continental actors, a unified stance is crucial. This collective action is vital in augmenting their agency and shielding Pan-African and regional decision-making from external interference. The AU must continue to issue common African positions, now extending this practice to partnerships with extra-continental actors. This involves defining shared interests, building overlapping consensus, and steering a common rule-based effort.

Such a unified voice would amplify Africa’s agency and international clout, helping to counterbalance the asymmetries in international relations. It might require the AU to assert sovereignty over foreign affairs; while member states can enter agreements with third parties as sovereign entities, they should commit to a unified stance and act in unison, ensuring these agreements align with a commonly agreed position. These broad continental issues call for a pan-African transformation, necessitating national introspection and a revamp of the AU’s interventionist and integrationist mandate.

[Revelations]

MOU only becomes binding when an official agreement is signed and this has not happend so far between Ethiopia and the Break away republic


Dr Zackovich

What do you mean?