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Re: JOKE OF Z CENTURY:Terrorist-Tplf Coward ጻድቃን Said, "It's Easy 2 Destroy ሻዕቢያ Aka Eplf"(((HAHAHA)))!!! WEEY GUUD !!!
ጀነራል ፃድቃን ወ/ትንሳኤ ኢስያሳ፣ ኢሳያስ፣ ኢሳያስ፣ ኢሳያስ፣ .....
'' ኢሳያስ ትግራይን ለመውረር ቢሞክር እኔን ጨምሮ አብዛኞቹ አዛዦች አለን'' ሌተናንት ጀነራል ፃድቃን ወ/ትንሳኤ
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Why General Tsadkan Broke into Tears in the 1998-2000 Border War with Eritrea?
Why General Tsadkan Broke into Tears in the 1998-2000 Border War with Eritrea?
Translated from Tesfaye Gebreab’s recently published memoir of the 1998-2000 Ethiopia – Eritrea border war titled “የደራሲው ማስታወሻ” – An account of an Ethiopian army colonel.
Why General Tsadkan wept?
General Tsadkan tried to call the meeting to order but he could not hide his emotions and broke down crying. He wept. All of the meeting participants cried with him.General Tsadkan later said to the participants, “I have led many battles in my career. I have fought in many wars. I have seen a lot. I have never experienced this kind of utter failure. It is bad.”
BY BEREKET KIDANE
“Good morning Colonel?”
“Greetings Mr. Journalist”
“I appreciate your punctuality.”
“Well, I am a soldier aren’t I?”
“So let’s get to it. You had said that you were going to tell me all about General Tsadkan and the Tsorona Front. So where should we start? Should we start from the beginning or middle?”
“I will just tell you things as they come to me and as I remember them.”
“Great! Tell me things as they come to you and I will write them down and make sure they are passed on to future generations.”
* * * (Page 249) * * *
“Weyane took 10 divisions to the war front against Eritrea. Of those ten divisions, one was a fully mechanized division. There was also one brigade of commandos among them. When war broke out in 1998, Weyane’s armed forces were ready to attack on four fronts, namely Burre, Zalambessa, Tsorona and Badme.
The first round of the 1998 war was extremely screwed-up and gruesome. Looking back on it as a commander and a military professional, it was an extremely inept and embarrassingly flawed war plan from the beginning. It was badly planned. It is very sad that no one to date has been held accountable for the wasted treasure in blood and national resources that was expended on the war effort.
We had anywhere from 250,000 to 300,000 of our soldiers killed on the war effort in Eritrea during the Haile Selassie and Dergue era. But if we compare that to the Weyane era, in just one year we had 98,700 of our soldiers killed and 194,300 wounded. These are figures I got from our Ministry of Defense in Ethiopia. The figures I retrieved from the records of Ordinance Command is that two-thirds of our heavy weaponry was destroyed during the first round of Ethio-Eritrean border war. The field generals of this nihilistic and meaningless war were Seare Mekonen, Samora Younis, Yohannes Gebremeskel, Tadesse Werede, Quarter (Abraha Woldemariam) and Berhane Negash.
The Central Command leaders were Meles Zenawi, Siye Abraha, Tewolde Woldemariam, Alemseghed Gebreamlak, Tefera Walwa, Tsadkan Gebretensae and Kinfe Gebremedhin.
* * * (Page 250) * * *
The Ethio-Eritrean War archive is still not open to the public. We may hear some really surprising stories in the future. We can easily list some very basic military errors that were committed during the first round of the 1998 war. Tadesse Werede was assigned to the Burre Front. The commands given to him were once he captures Assab, he would go up the Red Sea coastline destroying the Eritrean forces along the way and seize Massawa.
Abraha Woldegebriel was assigned to Tsorona while Berhane Negash was assigned to Zalambessa (the front that General Tsadkan closely supervised). They would both attack from two directions and meet up in Segeneiti to combine forces and proceed to Asmara under a single command.
Seare Mekonen, Yohannes Gebremeskel and Abebe Tadesse were to lead the Badme Front under close supervision from Samora. They were instructed to capture and control the entire lowland of Eritrea.
Extensive military exercises and preparations were held for this military effort. The ultimate mission of the war effort was also communicated at all levels to the military leaders. There were many disagreements and debates on the final mission of the war. For instance, the Commander of the 23rd Division, Colonel Berhe Gebremariam, had asked many questions regarding the political loss and condemnation that would follow if they invade Eritrea, whether the Ethiopian Armed forces had any motivation to fight or if they could even be trusted. He had asked for a revision of the war plan. The response he received from General Tsadkan was “Unless we destroy Shaebia, we can not exist. Shaebia is weak. Eritrea’s economy is weak. We have the upper hand when it comes to armaments. This is a decision made by the government so everyone has to follow it.”
* * * (Page 251) * * *
The lower level commanders were doubtful whether the mission could be accomplished. They were doubtful whether success could be achieved. Questions and doubts were also raised in the Badme and Burre fronts. But just as in the Adigrat meetings, the response received was “This is a government decision and has to be followed.”
So the war was carried out.
The war started with the Badme front. The three divisions that opened the attack suffered great human and material losses so an additional mechanized division and a commando brigade had to be added to the Badme front. Two additional divisions were also sent later to try again but the attack failed again. The human and material losses were adding up. It became clear to General Tsadkan that things were not going according to plan in the Badme Front so he ordered to continue the attacks on the Tsorona Front instead.
Read more
https://www.tesfanews.net/general-tsadk ... order-war/