Winning All the Battles but Losing the War (Hannibal!) General Tsadkan Cried During the 1998-2000 Border War
Posted: 01 Nov 2021, 21:12
by Robert O'Connell
Robert O'Connell holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Virginia.
Winning All the Battles but Losing the War, Just Like Hannibal
In late 218 B.C.E. Hannibal led an army across one of the highest passes in the Alps and invaded Italy. Staging the assault from his family’s base in Spain, itself an empire-within-an-empire, he had basically dragged the home city and metropolis of Carthage into an entirely problematic war with Rome, one that would have been destined for a quick and disastrous end had it not been for one factor: Hannibal himself.
Almost immediately he gathered his bedraggled, freeze dried near-wreck of an army, and led them to two sharp victories over the Romans, with the latter one at the River Trebia wiping out most of a major consular army. He followed that up the next spring by annihilating another consular army in a giant ambush at Lake Trasimene.
By now he had Rome’s full attention. The hyper-warlike city on the Tiber, destined soon to rule the Mediterranean basin, responded by fielding a crusher of a field force, essentially four consular armies welded together, and invited Hannibal to fight. With breathtaking guile, Hannibal surrounded the Romans on August 2, 216 B.C.E. on a plain near the abandoned town of Cannae, and then over the course of an afternoon chopped it to bits, killing more men on that day than the United States lost in battle during the entire Vietnam conflict.
Hannibal assumed the authorities on the Tiber would be ready to talk terms and sent a delegation, but Rome was just getting started. In the words of Fabius Maximus, the city’s shrewdest military leader: “We are carrying on war in Italy, in our own country…Hannibal, on the other hand, is in a foreign and hostile land….Do you doubt that we shall get the better of a man who is growing weaker by the day?”
So Rome kept fielding armies, drawing on huge manpower reserves, gradually producing better fighters and generals. Yet Hannibal, to an amazing degree, kept beating them, never losing a significant battle during his entire time in Italy. Still, as the years piled up he found himself steadily further south, until he occupied just the toe of the Italian boot, leaving finally in 203 B.C.E., soon to preside over Carthage’s surrender.
Thus ended history’s most flagrant example of winning all the battles but losing the war – a sort of military oxymoron that often leaves armchair strategists scratching their heads. But such a phenomenon is more than just a freakish occurrence; it can be the starkest kind of barometer of effectiveness, one those involved ignore at their own risk.
Consider the fate of the Spanish in their efforts to suppress the rebellious Dutch in the late sixteenth century, sending the best and most experienced army in Europe to the Netherlands to deliver a succession of poundings virtually whenever their hapless adversaries ventured beyond fortifications. Yet the rebellion refused to be stifled. The Dutch even seemed to prosper, while the Spanish found themselves increasingly short of cash, their unpaid troops mutinous, and they gradually lost hold of the situation.
The lessons should have been obvious. Spain’s power was over-extended, its armies were operating in a hostile environment, and military leverage was non-existent. When you win all the battles and nothing good happens, it should be a sure sign that the whole operation is not working. Instead, Spain hung tough and went into centuries of decline. It’s also worth remembering that an aroused Rome went on to completely obliterate Carthage, an act of genocide if there ever was one.
All this would be academic if it were not for the fact that winning all the battles but losing the war seems to keep happening .......
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What about the over gloating junior "Hannibal" of Ethiopia? Did he learn anything from Badme war? I doubt it!
How Ethiopian General Tsadkan Cried During the 1998-2000 Border War
By Bereket Kidane,
May 14, 2017
፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠
"..........We had anywhere from 250,000 to 300,000 of our soldiers killed on the war effort in Eritrea during the Haile Selassie and Dergue era. But if we compare that to the Weyane era, in just one year we had 98,700 of our soldiers killed and 194,300 wounded. These are figures I got from our Ministry of Defense in Ethiopia.".................
Colonel Alebel Amare
***The Ex. Ethiopian Soldier, who was interviewed by Tesfay Ghebreab, was Colonel Alebel Amare. The 94,700 died and 198,300 wounded Ethiopia Soldiers during the TPLF adventure to reoccupy Eritrea in 1998-2000 was occurred only in one Year. So, the above account does not included the whole loss of another year of the war.
፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠
http://dehai.org/dehai/basic/153245
Robert O'Connell holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Virginia.
Winning All the Battles but Losing the War, Just Like Hannibal
In late 218 B.C.E. Hannibal led an army across one of the highest passes in the Alps and invaded Italy. Staging the assault from his family’s base in Spain, itself an empire-within-an-empire, he had basically dragged the home city and metropolis of Carthage into an entirely problematic war with Rome, one that would have been destined for a quick and disastrous end had it not been for one factor: Hannibal himself.
Almost immediately he gathered his bedraggled, freeze dried near-wreck of an army, and led them to two sharp victories over the Romans, with the latter one at the River Trebia wiping out most of a major consular army. He followed that up the next spring by annihilating another consular army in a giant ambush at Lake Trasimene.
By now he had Rome’s full attention. The hyper-warlike city on the Tiber, destined soon to rule the Mediterranean basin, responded by fielding a crusher of a field force, essentially four consular armies welded together, and invited Hannibal to fight. With breathtaking guile, Hannibal surrounded the Romans on August 2, 216 B.C.E. on a plain near the abandoned town of Cannae, and then over the course of an afternoon chopped it to bits, killing more men on that day than the United States lost in battle during the entire Vietnam conflict.
Hannibal assumed the authorities on the Tiber would be ready to talk terms and sent a delegation, but Rome was just getting started. In the words of Fabius Maximus, the city’s shrewdest military leader: “We are carrying on war in Italy, in our own country…Hannibal, on the other hand, is in a foreign and hostile land….Do you doubt that we shall get the better of a man who is growing weaker by the day?”
So Rome kept fielding armies, drawing on huge manpower reserves, gradually producing better fighters and generals. Yet Hannibal, to an amazing degree, kept beating them, never losing a significant battle during his entire time in Italy. Still, as the years piled up he found himself steadily further south, until he occupied just the toe of the Italian boot, leaving finally in 203 B.C.E., soon to preside over Carthage’s surrender.
Thus ended history’s most flagrant example of winning all the battles but losing the war – a sort of military oxymoron that often leaves armchair strategists scratching their heads. But such a phenomenon is more than just a freakish occurrence; it can be the starkest kind of barometer of effectiveness, one those involved ignore at their own risk.
Consider the fate of the Spanish in their efforts to suppress the rebellious Dutch in the late sixteenth century, sending the best and most experienced army in Europe to the Netherlands to deliver a succession of poundings virtually whenever their hapless adversaries ventured beyond fortifications. Yet the rebellion refused to be stifled. The Dutch even seemed to prosper, while the Spanish found themselves increasingly short of cash, their unpaid troops mutinous, and they gradually lost hold of the situation.
The lessons should have been obvious. Spain’s power was over-extended, its armies were operating in a hostile environment, and military leverage was non-existent. When you win all the battles and nothing good happens, it should be a sure sign that the whole operation is not working. Instead, Spain hung tough and went into centuries of decline. It’s also worth remembering that an aroused Rome went on to completely obliterate Carthage, an act of genocide if there ever was one.
All this would be academic if it were not for the fact that winning all the battles but losing the war seems to keep happening .......
===================================================================================
What about the over gloating junior "Hannibal" of Ethiopia? Did he learn anything from Badme war? I doubt it!
How Ethiopian General Tsadkan Cried During the 1998-2000 Border War
By Bereket Kidane,
May 14, 2017
፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠
"..........We had anywhere from 250,000 to 300,000 of our soldiers killed on the war effort in Eritrea during the Haile Selassie and Dergue era. But if we compare that to the Weyane era, in just one year we had 98,700 of our soldiers killed and 194,300 wounded. These are figures I got from our Ministry of Defense in Ethiopia.".................
Colonel Alebel Amare
***The Ex. Ethiopian Soldier, who was interviewed by Tesfay Ghebreab, was Colonel Alebel Amare. The 94,700 died and 198,300 wounded Ethiopia Soldiers during the TPLF adventure to reoccupy Eritrea in 1998-2000 was occurred only in one Year. So, the above account does not included the whole loss of another year of the war.
፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠፠
http://dehai.org/dehai/basic/153245