Warning for Abiy Ahmed and All Ethiopian Leaders. Abiy, You MUST kick out all "AID" spies OUT if u want to save Ethiopi
Posted: 26 Aug 2021, 22:47
Warning for Abiy Ahmed and All Ethiopian Leaders. Abiy, You MUST kick out all "Humanitarian AID" spies OUT of the country if you want to save Ethiopia from destruction!!
Read the following and see how USA and EUROPE helped TPLF to defeat Derg in the name of Humanitarian AID.
Wise person learns from others mistakes. Abiy Ahmed, if you do not want to face Mengistu Haile mariam's FATE, Kick out all these USA and Europe spies that are working in the name of "humanitarian AIDS" in Tigray.
Factors that contributed and helped TPLF to won Derg
1. it is wiser to look at some concrete factors that have undoubtedly contributed to the success of TPLF
1. The indispensable role played by Ato Gessesew Ayele, alias “Sihul”, in protecting and guiding the inexperienced university students to establish a safe base area for the start of the guerilla struggle.
2. The early identification of the TPLF movement with the “weyyane” uprising of 1943.
3. The 3rd probably the most important contribution of the young intellectuals, was the strict observance of Maoist principles of “people’s war”. These ranged from abstention from harassing or exploiting the peasants as opposed to the behavior of traditional “shiftas”, who regularly looted, killed and maltreated the peasants.
4. the adoption of a Leninist/Stalinist (alias “Communist”) system of political organization and leadership. Initially, the leftist activists in the TPLF followed the general ideas of “democratic centralism”, probably without giving much thought to the concept.
5. A fifth factor that contributed to change the balance of forces in favor of TPLF (and EPLF) was the opportunity to solicit international support
due to the famine of 1984/85. In connection with a discussion about the formation of MLLT in 1985, Aregawi mentions an incident in which a representative of REST (Relief Society of Tigray), i.e. the Humanitarian wing of TPLF, came to the MLLT Congress with 100 million US dollars, donated by Western Relief Agencies. Meles allegedly suggested that 50% be used for MLLT, 45% for TPLF and 5% for the famine victims. A few years ago, a journalist quoted this fact and it became hot news. Meles, as prime Minister of Ethiopia, vehemently denied the allegation. The alleged suggestion may have been wrongly interpreted by Aregawi or the suggestion may have been rejected by the other leaders. Nevertheless, the receipt of generous cash donations from Western donors to EPLF and TPLF has been reported by others as well.
One such report can for example be found in a book with the curious title “Without Troops & Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia
and Eritrea” (Duffield and Prendergast: 1994). The authors present many details about the Cross Border Operations of an organization called The Emergency Relief Desk (ERD) from Sudan into Eritrea and Tigray. ERD was established in 1981 to channel relief aid from Protestant Churches to “war-ravaged areas in Eritrea and Tigray”. ERD in turn established partnership with the relief agencies of the two fronts, i.e. the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA), affiliated to EPLF and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), affiliated to TPLF. As the famine intensified and allegations about misappropriation of aid by the military regime in Ethiopia escalated, ERD became “a legitimate, though unorthodox, channel for resources into front held territory” (ibid: 7); and this included official aid from the USA and the European community.
The title of the book itself, with reference to troops and tanks in connection with humanitarian aid, is intriguing. In the absence of an explanation in the book about why this particular title was relevant, one has to assume that it was a code word telling the initiated that the “humanitarian” aid businesses were able to topple Mengistu´s government without the need to supply troops and tanks. The authors have furthermore made it clear that they were fully aware of the fact that aid channeled through REST and ERA was being used to strengthen the war-efforts of the Fronts, who “combined the provision of public welfare with mass mobilization” (ibid: 12). In plain language, this means that the Fronts could use the aid provided through the Cross Border Operations to pose as successful providers of public welfare.
In total, the authors indicate, “ERD alone made available around US $350 million in cash and goods” to the two fronts. After mentioning
that “the diversion of relief assistance was not part of the Fronts’ political practice”, the authors indicate nevertheless that “the principle
of fungibility” (exchangeability) “would suggest that the substitution did allow the Fronts to concentrate their available resources on securing
their defense and ultimate military victory”.
The “humanitarian” assistance provided through the Cross Border Operations (CBO) and perhaps through other channels thus made a significant contribution to the success of the Fronts79. As far as military supplies were concerned, the Fronts did not need any cash to buy arms. They could get enough military supplies from Government troops who fled or surrendered to the Fronts. What the CBO provided was, in addition to the use of food aid for political mobilization, a modern transportation fleet, other communications hardware, international know-how to build their organizational capabilities and above all possibilities of communication with the international diplomatic community. Paul Henze, who has devoted particular attention to the last years of Mengistu’s regime, gives us in his book “Layers of Time” a glimpse of the role played by the United States Government in stage-managing the relatively smooth transfer of power from WPE to TPLF/EPRDF in May 1991. He informs us in a footnote how the US Ambassador to Ethiopia succeeded to convince Mengistu “about the hopelessness of his situation and the desirability of extricating himself in time to save his life.” (Henze: 2004: 325) At this juncture, it should be pertinent to ask how Mengistu Haile Mariam, who at the time was, inter alia, “Commander-in-Chief” of one of Africa’s largest armed forces, could get into such a hopeless situation that he could be enticed by representatives of the USA, whom he had been denouncing as his arch enemy, to flee for his safety.
To begin with, one can without doubt observe that Mengistu Haile Mariam was no political leader but a streetwise and unscrupulous demagogue. Without these qualities, it is hard to imagine that he would have dared to lead a hotchpotch collection of low-level commissioned officers, NCOs and privates in the Armed Forces of Haile Selassie to topple the age-old monarchy. Likewise, the decision in November 1974 to massacre 59 prisoners to cover up the embarrassment of having killed General Michael Andom, whom they actually needed to gain some legitimacy, can only be the work of a ruthless demagogue. Ironically, in the political culture of Ethiopia (and in many other cultures for that matter), such behavior usually invokes grudging admiration. There is no doubt that Mengistu was a popular hero at the height of his power, in much the same way that Hitler was in Nazi Germany or Mussolini in Fascist Italy.
********
Request:
I request anyone who has a PDF copy of this book to share with us. Thank you in advance.
"Without Troops & Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea” (Duffield and Prendergast: 1994)
Read the following and see how USA and EUROPE helped TPLF to defeat Derg in the name of Humanitarian AID.
Wise person learns from others mistakes. Abiy Ahmed, if you do not want to face Mengistu Haile mariam's FATE, Kick out all these USA and Europe spies that are working in the name of "humanitarian AIDS" in Tigray.
Factors that contributed and helped TPLF to won Derg
1. it is wiser to look at some concrete factors that have undoubtedly contributed to the success of TPLF
1. The indispensable role played by Ato Gessesew Ayele, alias “Sihul”, in protecting and guiding the inexperienced university students to establish a safe base area for the start of the guerilla struggle.
2. The early identification of the TPLF movement with the “weyyane” uprising of 1943.
3. The 3rd probably the most important contribution of the young intellectuals, was the strict observance of Maoist principles of “people’s war”. These ranged from abstention from harassing or exploiting the peasants as opposed to the behavior of traditional “shiftas”, who regularly looted, killed and maltreated the peasants.
4. the adoption of a Leninist/Stalinist (alias “Communist”) system of political organization and leadership. Initially, the leftist activists in the TPLF followed the general ideas of “democratic centralism”, probably without giving much thought to the concept.
5. A fifth factor that contributed to change the balance of forces in favor of TPLF (and EPLF) was the opportunity to solicit international support
due to the famine of 1984/85. In connection with a discussion about the formation of MLLT in 1985, Aregawi mentions an incident in which a representative of REST (Relief Society of Tigray), i.e. the Humanitarian wing of TPLF, came to the MLLT Congress with 100 million US dollars, donated by Western Relief Agencies. Meles allegedly suggested that 50% be used for MLLT, 45% for TPLF and 5% for the famine victims. A few years ago, a journalist quoted this fact and it became hot news. Meles, as prime Minister of Ethiopia, vehemently denied the allegation. The alleged suggestion may have been wrongly interpreted by Aregawi or the suggestion may have been rejected by the other leaders. Nevertheless, the receipt of generous cash donations from Western donors to EPLF and TPLF has been reported by others as well.
One such report can for example be found in a book with the curious title “Without Troops & Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia
and Eritrea” (Duffield and Prendergast: 1994). The authors present many details about the Cross Border Operations of an organization called The Emergency Relief Desk (ERD) from Sudan into Eritrea and Tigray. ERD was established in 1981 to channel relief aid from Protestant Churches to “war-ravaged areas in Eritrea and Tigray”. ERD in turn established partnership with the relief agencies of the two fronts, i.e. the Eritrean Relief Agency (ERA), affiliated to EPLF and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), affiliated to TPLF. As the famine intensified and allegations about misappropriation of aid by the military regime in Ethiopia escalated, ERD became “a legitimate, though unorthodox, channel for resources into front held territory” (ibid: 7); and this included official aid from the USA and the European community.
The title of the book itself, with reference to troops and tanks in connection with humanitarian aid, is intriguing. In the absence of an explanation in the book about why this particular title was relevant, one has to assume that it was a code word telling the initiated that the “humanitarian” aid businesses were able to topple Mengistu´s government without the need to supply troops and tanks. The authors have furthermore made it clear that they were fully aware of the fact that aid channeled through REST and ERA was being used to strengthen the war-efforts of the Fronts, who “combined the provision of public welfare with mass mobilization” (ibid: 12). In plain language, this means that the Fronts could use the aid provided through the Cross Border Operations to pose as successful providers of public welfare.
In total, the authors indicate, “ERD alone made available around US $350 million in cash and goods” to the two fronts. After mentioning
that “the diversion of relief assistance was not part of the Fronts’ political practice”, the authors indicate nevertheless that “the principle
of fungibility” (exchangeability) “would suggest that the substitution did allow the Fronts to concentrate their available resources on securing
their defense and ultimate military victory”.
The “humanitarian” assistance provided through the Cross Border Operations (CBO) and perhaps through other channels thus made a significant contribution to the success of the Fronts79. As far as military supplies were concerned, the Fronts did not need any cash to buy arms. They could get enough military supplies from Government troops who fled or surrendered to the Fronts. What the CBO provided was, in addition to the use of food aid for political mobilization, a modern transportation fleet, other communications hardware, international know-how to build their organizational capabilities and above all possibilities of communication with the international diplomatic community. Paul Henze, who has devoted particular attention to the last years of Mengistu’s regime, gives us in his book “Layers of Time” a glimpse of the role played by the United States Government in stage-managing the relatively smooth transfer of power from WPE to TPLF/EPRDF in May 1991. He informs us in a footnote how the US Ambassador to Ethiopia succeeded to convince Mengistu “about the hopelessness of his situation and the desirability of extricating himself in time to save his life.” (Henze: 2004: 325) At this juncture, it should be pertinent to ask how Mengistu Haile Mariam, who at the time was, inter alia, “Commander-in-Chief” of one of Africa’s largest armed forces, could get into such a hopeless situation that he could be enticed by representatives of the USA, whom he had been denouncing as his arch enemy, to flee for his safety.
To begin with, one can without doubt observe that Mengistu Haile Mariam was no political leader but a streetwise and unscrupulous demagogue. Without these qualities, it is hard to imagine that he would have dared to lead a hotchpotch collection of low-level commissioned officers, NCOs and privates in the Armed Forces of Haile Selassie to topple the age-old monarchy. Likewise, the decision in November 1974 to massacre 59 prisoners to cover up the embarrassment of having killed General Michael Andom, whom they actually needed to gain some legitimacy, can only be the work of a ruthless demagogue. Ironically, in the political culture of Ethiopia (and in many other cultures for that matter), such behavior usually invokes grudging admiration. There is no doubt that Mengistu was a popular hero at the height of his power, in much the same way that Hitler was in Nazi Germany or Mussolini in Fascist Italy.
********
Request:
I request anyone who has a PDF copy of this book to share with us. Thank you in advance.
"Without Troops & Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea” (Duffield and Prendergast: 1994)