Page 1 of 1

ዘመቻ ስዩም መስፍን

Posted: 12 Feb 2021, 00:19
by Zmeselo
:lol:



___________________




The LA Times, once a reputable news outlet, should be embarrassed to post a MADE UP LIE story by a person who was trained in the "Propaganda war room" of the #TPLFisaTerroristGroup when they had power @ U of Mekelle & trained as a "digital warrior" 4 the TPLF Junta. No credentials!


Mekelle University was the crucible of the #TPLFisaTerroristGroup digital terrorists. 3K digital terrorists were trained in mass dis/misinformation techniques, by this psychopath & sociopath lecturer.

Re: ዘመቻ ስዩም መስፍን

Posted: 12 Feb 2021, 02:11
by Zmeselo




When, @CNN, the mother of all Fake News, starts churning out one Big Lie after another about the situation in Tigray, leading the charge in the smear campaign against peace between Eritrea & Ethiopia, then you know we are faced with a serious propaganda "war by media".



Re: ዘመቻ ስዩም መስፍን

Posted: 12 Feb 2021, 07:59
by Zmeselo


ETHIOPIA
TPLF: A Prisoner of its Own Device

FEBRUARY 11, 2021

There is no such thing as a cakewalk in war, but if there ever was one, the capture of Mekelle would be it.

Prof. Al Mariam



TPLF as we know it is gone to never come back. After a 27-year rule of oppression, corruption, invasion, and human rights violations, the time has come for the TPLF old guards to bite the bullet and face justice.

BY SENNAY ZEMEN

https://tesfanews.net/tplf-prisoner-of-own-device/

When the reformist forces led by Dr. Abiy Ahmed took the helm of political power after chucking the TPLF out of its high handed rule and trampling their feet on the heads of their enemy, they set to introduce a number of political, economic and social reforms, which the country had been devoid of for decades.

In addition, the PM took a momentous decision to make peace with Eritrea, which was blocked intentionally for 20 years by the TPLF to advance its interests. Therefore, the new political development in Ethiopia tolled the death knell for the TPLF and posed a big threat to its political ambition and its survival.

Against this backdrop, it embarked on devising a series of devious stratagems to eliminate the PM of Ethiopia and the President of Eritrea with all its might. Needless to say, the TPLF had also been consumed with rancor against Eritrea since 1976.

When the TPLF was removed from power for the last time, it left the country at its most divided to which it worked hard at it to the bitter end for nearly five decades. That being said, the new power-holders inherited a divided nation with numerous political, economic, and social problems in addition to a country beset by public debt, high unemployment, and deep social animosity. Besides, many ethnic-based political parties were evolved but mostly devoted to promoting or defending their ethnic groups’ interests rather than national interests.

When Ethiopians hoped that things would go well with the reformist forces at the helm, the TPLF devised a destructive strategy that resonated with its political ambition. It made an audacious decision to destabilize the country and incite insurrection by all means necessary so as to capitalize on it to undo the hard-won political reforms and frustrate the peace accord.

It is not an exaggeration to assert the fact that Eritrea was included in its strategy. In plain language, it devised a scheme to make a comeback to power and invade Eritrea, as a first choice, or establish the long-dreamed “chimerical nation,the Republic, as a second choice while leaving behind a fractured Ethiopia.

The strategy, which was tantamount to a tacit declaration of war, came in all shapes and sizes and threw a huge shadow over the country in the past three years. And as such, Ethiopia had been wracked by political turmoil and suffered severely from baneful effects of social unrest which include religious conflict, ethnic clashes, displacement, destruction of properties, killings, and suchlike all sponsored and masterminded by the TPLF.

Briefly put, Ethiopia was teetering on the brink of civil war, which bore all the hallmarks of the 27-year TPLF rule plus the three years which followed. It is a shocking reality that destabilization rather than a political dialogue was believed to be a silver bullet for the success of its agenda.

No one can argue the fact that during the TPLF reign, top military ranks were overwhelmed by Tigray ethnic group. In light of this fact, in the mid of 2018, the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense set to reform or restructure its military institution in order to build a modern national army composed of all nationalities. To achieve this end, it had to make changes and withdraw troops from Tigray and others had to come to replace them. Besides, the unfair distribution of military positions needed to be adjusted, which had been a lingering problem within the Ministry for a long time. Obviously, the TPLF was not happy about the plan and designed a clever ruse to fail it.

With an eye to launching an attack to cripple the entire Northern Command army and loot its huge weapons so as to gain the upper hand in the military, the TPLF, under the veneer of
Eritrea would invade Tigray,
organized a large mass protest to prevent the army from leaving Tigray.

To make it clearer, the plan was to ‘slaughter’ the entire Northern Command as sacrificial lambs for its political ambition. In addition to this, the TPLF was confident of winning the war because the top military officers (colonels and generals), as well as the rank-and-file Tigrains, were ordered to desert and join its troops. Indeed, the overconfidence blinded its mind from grasping clearly the reality on the ground.



According to the TPLF algorithms, the Northern Command was more equipped with large modern weapons and had a large number of armed forces, more than 50,000 troops, and, by far stronger than the other Command Forces in the country combined together.

Besides, the army has more combat experience because it fought for 20 years in Ethio-Eritrea ‘Border War.’ According to the TPLF calculations, once the whole army was brought under its control together with its weapons, there would be no force in Ethiopia that could stop it from heading towards the capital. But the fact remains that the plan was absurd, ridiculous, and utterly quixotic.

It stands to reason that Tigray had been in a state of war in all sense of the word. The TPLF engaged in building its own strong army believing that having such an army would its ambition be realized. To this effect, it trained hundreds of thousands of poor Tigrains, stole secretly huge arms from the government, and purchased modern weapons from a number of countries through METEC.



It was performing military drills to display its ostentatious military strength accompanied with massive provocative propaganda and seditious speeches. It waged a war of nerves in order to undermine the Federal government army fighting spirit and its credibility. The war hawks TPLF were clamoring for war which appeared to be the dawn of future worst-case scenario in the country. Out of blatant or sheer ignorance, the TPLF had been exaggerating its military power to frighten its enemies. It is no wonder that war for the TPLF was just like plain sailing in a calm sea.

In addition, the old guards blockaded their minds by walls of narrow nationalistic egoism and vainglory and went all out to glorify the TPLF as the only true representative of the people. They bamboozled their people into the belief that
TPLF is the most powerful and undefeatable that cannot be easily succumbed to any enemy force.
They practiced on the people’s credulity and were lying to them with false, cheap, hostile propaganda to push them to carry guns and fight along with Tigray forces against Ethiopia and Eritrea on different TPLF controlled media outlets, which became the flavor of the day.

We cannot ignore the fact that the TPLF’s stilted inflammatory rhetoric had impressed many Tigrians and many were confused by its media mumbo jumbo. They tried hard to blind their people with so many tissues of lies but how lies and arrogance can lead to horrible disaster can be learned from the TPLF. In short, all the provocation of the TPLF was aimed at inviting the Federal government to military confrontation. To make its strategy more successful, the TPLF was training, arming, and financing many Oromo and other groups, including Eritrean stooges.

There is no ground around the fact that the Northern Command was ‘under siege’ for three years. The movement of its forces from one place to another was strictly controlled, monitored, and sometimes harassed in many towns before being wantonly attacked by ruthless and barbarous special forces and militias of the TPLF. Out of haughtiness, the TPLF also banned top military generals from entering Tigray.

The TPLF was uncomfortable with the fact that the Federal army could defeat its ‘mighty army’ since its own army was more powerful than the Federal army by all measurements. Blinded by hubris, the TPLF flexed its muscles to carry out its hidden agenda.

On 01 November 2020, at 11 pm, the TPLF forces cordoned off all the military camps and launched a surprise and perfidious attack https://tesfanews.net/tplf-spokesman-ad ... -ethiopia/ on the Northern Command army throughout Tigray. The Ethiopian army had never imagined in its mind that the TPLF would make such an attack on them and could hardly believe their ears when they were attacked.

The TPLF stabbed them in the back and shamelessly boasted that
it took only 45 minutes to bring the Northern command under its full control.
Indeed, the attack exposed to the cruel fact that the TPLF is the most disingenuous and [ deleted ] knave on earth, its whole history proves it.

Many of the Northern Command forces who defied giving up their weapons and uniforms were fought to the last bullet before being captured or mercilessly killed and their dead bodies were left naked and unburied for days. A significant number of the army crossed the border to a neighboring country with their weapons intact. Top military officers, who were organizing development activities to support poor Tigray people, were sent to Eritrea naked. The other captives were inhumanly treated or humiliated and stayed for days without food and water until they were rescued by their ‘comrades.’ Other monstrous cruelties of the TPLF include cutting off breasts of female army members, thrusting knives at their private parts and raping, the likes of which have never been seen or heard in Ethiopian past history.

The huge risk posed by the TPLF pressed the need for action in order to limit the magnitude of the crisis and save the country from total collapse. Therefore, in response to the attack, the Federal government declared a military operation https://tesfanews.net/ethiopian-declare ... lf-tigray/ against the TPLF in order to enforce or maintain rule of law and bring the perpetrators to justice, if nothing else.

After the Federal army contained the attack and launched instead a counter-offensive against the TPLF forces, the situation on the ground swiftly took a turn for the worse against the TPLF expectation.

In no time the Ethiopian army put the TPLF forces to rout and started easily heading towards vast areas of western Tigray by crushing any resistance on their way. As a result, many towns and strongholds fell one after another into the hands of the Federal forces without much resistance from the TPLF.

Despite its vain boast that
Tigray would be a graveyard for the invaders
its forces were unable to confront the offensive and turned their tail and fled in disarray after sustaining heavy human and material losses.

Many of the special forces and militias of the TPLF dropped like flies and others run to remote areas to escape capture or try to fight a losing battle against the government forces. It should be noted that though a significant number of weapons including tanks, heavy artillery, rocket launchers and others were seized by TPLF, all were retaken and/or destroyed during the battles that followed.

When the Ethiopian military forces routed the TPLF, they were advancing to Mekelle without much resistance from the so-called “invincible Tigray forces.” When they were inch closer to the capital, the political fate of the TPLF took a tragic turn. The TPLF junta had no choice but to flee the capital in humiliation with their families and other impediments to hole up in the rugged and perilous mountains of Tigray.

Against the expectation of many people, including their supporters and foreigners, Mekelle was captured without bloodshed. Drunken by arrogance, they had never imagined that such humiliation would face them one day in their lifetime.

In a nutshell, the military feat designed by the TPLF military strategists to capture Addis Ababa and Asmara so as to topple the two leaders has ended in fiasco due to sublime ignorance of military science of modern war and ignoring the huge gap between fantasy and reality.

It goes without saying that the humiliating defeat also rattled Tigray political parties which share similar anti-Ethiopia political stand or belief with the TPLF. This is to say that there is a fine line between the parties and TPLF. Furthermore, the defeat was a heavy blow to some Oromo groups, terrorists, TPLF Diaspora, Eritrean stooges, foreign governments and others.

Finally, the TPLF had run the whole gamut of political gambits for five decades but in the end forced to face a disastrous end. The defeat marked the inglorious end of the TPLF and, as such, many of the TPLF leaders are either killed or captured, https://tesfanews.net/tplf-seyoum-mesfi ... nder-army/ from the sublime to the ridiculous.

This is to mean that the
long-time most powerful and wealthiest political leaders, who were dreaming of expanding their glory over Ethiopia and Eritrea,
are now arrested and going to stand trial on a number of charges. They ignored the old adage: law sometimes sleeps, but never dies.

This being said, after a hiatus of more than 30 years, the time has come for the old guards to bite the bullet and face justice. Whether its loyalist likes it or not, the TPLF has consigned to the garbage heap of history, where it really belongs. Indeed, it is a prisoner of its own making; it devised it itself

… THE END.

Re: ዘመቻ ስዩም መስፍን

Posted: 12 Feb 2021, 10:56
by Zmeselo



Photo: ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP via Getty Images

COMMENTARY
Five Ways to Set Up a Special Envoy for Success in the Horn of Africa

February 9, 2021

https://www.csis.org/analysis/five-ways ... orn-africa

When in doubt, dispatch an envoy. That’s become an old diplomatic standby, and it is currently under consideration for the Horn of Africa, where a civil war rages in Ethiopia and has ensnared neighboring Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. The conflict, which broke out in November 2020, has left millions in dire need of lifesaving humanitarian assistance. The UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide recently warned https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethi ... SKBN2A52QJ that
the risk of atrocity crimes in Ethiopia remains high and likely to get worse.
If the crisis continues to fester, it will have grave consequences for U.S. interests in a region situated on the crossroads between Africa, Europe, and the Middle East.

There is certainly merit to urgently deploying a point person to stitch together a coordinated response in the face of a complicated, multi-faceted, and urgent crisis. The challenge, however, is getting it right, and too often the U.S. government doesn’t. With war clouds darkening in the Horn of Africa, it is imperative to tightly scope the mission of a prospective regional envoy, ensure the support of the president or secretary of state, and arm the envoy with enough resources to do the job. https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/ ... oy-red-sea

The Envoy Shuffle

The United States has a long history of appointing envoys to troubled spots in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1969, President Nixon named Clarence “Clyde” Ferguson https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documen ... rian-civil as the U.S. special coordinator on relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. President Bill Clinton appointed three envoys during his presidency: Jesse Jackson https://allafrica.com/stories/199710090082.html as special envoy for the president and the secretary of state for the promotion of democracy in Africa; diplomat Paul Hare https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ ... 026e7b90f/ as U.S. special representative for the Angolan peace process; and former representative Howard Wolpe https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/wo ... kes-region as special envoy to Africa's Great Lakes. President George W. Bush asked former senator John Danforth https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives ... 906-3.html to serve as special envoy to the Sudan, a position later filled by Andrew Natsios, Richard Williamson, Scott Gration, Princeton Lyman, and Donald Booth. President Barack Obama resurrected https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/07/10/wo ... es-region/ the special envoy for the Great Lakes position, asking Wolpe to return to his post and a few years later appointing former senator Russ Feingold and former representative Tom Perriello to carry the torch. President Donald Trump brought in Peter Pham https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/09/po ... ial-envoy/ as Great Lakes envoy and later shifted him to the newly-created special envoy for the Sahel position.

The record of these envoys, however, has been uneven at best. Too often, the U.S. government has established these positions as concessions to domestic and foreign pressure. At a National Security Council meeting in 1969, participants fretted https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... ve05p1/d30 that the naming of a relief coordinator would
embody more form than substance.
The envoys tend to have vague mandates, and their responsibilities overlap with U.S. ambassadors in the field and regional bureaus back in Washington, D.C. It is not a surprise that many envoys find themselves in constant battle over access, authorities, and resources. Representative Wolpe, in his study of the Burundi peace process, bemoaned https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/ ... r-genocide that severe resource constraints—combined with a risk-averse bureaucratic culture and divergent views from regional embassies—posed considerable hurdles to successful negotiations. https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/ ... -diplomacy

Form Follows Function

In the Horn of Africa, there is a pressing need to address several interlocking challenges, including opening humanitarian access; preventing further atrocities; demobilizing ethnic militias; expelling Eritrean (and possibly Somali) troops from Ethiopia’s Tigray region; de-escalating the border conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia; negotiating a peaceful resolution to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute; and steering Ethiopia back toward the path of inclusive elections. In a recent article, Hardin Lang and David Del Conte argued https://www.justsecurity.org/74530/five ... in-tigray/ that an envoy could
help coordinate efforts of the African Union, the European Union, and Ethiopia’s bilateral benefactors to bring concerted pressure
on Ethiopia’s belligerents.

Secretary of State Tony Blinken told
U.S. senators that he would consider such an appointment.

Instead of rushing to an appointment, it is essential to consider—and determine—what the specific mission is and why an envoy is required. It is unwise and plainly unmanageable to delegate all of the aforementioned tasks to a special envoy. However, it is eminently sensible to tap an envoy to apply diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia and its neighbors to walk back from the brink of a regional conflict. The State Department only has chargés d'affaires posted in Asmara, Eritrea, and Khartoum, Sudan. While the Biden administration should move quickly to appoint and confirm an ambassador to Sudan (the United States has not had an ambassador to Eritrea since 2010 due to human rights concerns), the United States would also benefit immediately from a Washington heavy hitter to deal with Eritrean president Isaias and the civilian-military transitional government in Sudan. The U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia and the Africa Bureau’s senior officials would work closely with an envoy and his/her team in negotiating humanitarian access, preventing mass atrocities, and salvaging the country’s elections. It will certainly require a politician’s tact and gravitas—not always in the diplomat’s DNA—to go toe-to-toe with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy. Finally, an envoy could transcend the bureaucratic seams between the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and Bureau of African Affairs (AF) to deal with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over the GERD and the Gulf States’ increasing influence across the region.

Making It Work

As the Biden administration considers whether or not to appoint an envoy for the Horn—and if so, who that person should be and how to structure his/her role—policymakers should consider five critical factors in determining an envoy’s success in driving U.S. policy and exerting influence in the region and with partners:

1. Access to Power: The bureaucratic processes that turn the wheels of foreign policy boil down to competing ideas, personalities, and egos, and the most effective envoys have been able to speed up—or even run an end around—those processes through direct access to the highest levels of government. The ability to engineer a shift in U.S. policy, tee up a call from President Biden to another head of state, or put a sharply worded statement at the front end of a White House or State Department press briefing will flow directly from the access an envoy has and the relationship s/he builds with key officials, including Secretary Blinken and other seventh floor principals; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) administrator (Biden’s nominee is Ambassador Samantha Power); the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations (Biden’s nominee, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, is awaiting Senate confirmation); key National Security Council Staff, including National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer; and the president himself. And just as important, the perception of an envoy’s closeness to the real levers of power will be critical to an envoy’s influence with the key actors in the region and in forging multilateral consensus on a given issue. Foreign governments are, for the most part, savvy enough to figure out who has policymaking juice in Washington and who doesn’t. An envoy who is understood to speak with the voice of the most powerful officials in U.S. foreign policy will be in the best position to succeed.

2. Solid working relationships at the State Department and USAID: While the influence of the White House in determining foreign policy has ebbed and flowed, the implementation of U.S. policy comes down to the national security agencies and the bureaucracies. The State Department, where an envoy would likely sit, will be the most important of these agencies in dealing with the challenges in the Horn. Within the department, regional bureaus have the biggest voices on policy and the most resources—including management of U.S. embassies—to bring to bear on a given issue. An envoy for the Horn who does not enjoy a strong partnership with the assistant secretary for African affairs and the assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs will end up fighting internecine bureaucratic battles instead of marshalling the full weight of the State Department to develop and implement a cohesive set of policies. And given the catastrophic humanitarian situation unfolding in Tigray and USAID’s role in leading U.S. humanitarian response and providing development assistance (a key point of leverage), any envoy will need a close relationship with senior officials in the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance and other relevant USAID bureaus.

3. Ownership of the policy within the interagency: A successful envoy will need to be fully engaged in the often messy, frequently combative policymaking process known as “the Interagency.” These National Security Council-chaired meetings—from the working level up to meetings led by the president—are where the details of foreign policy priorities are hammered out and ultimately stamped for approval. Absent policy coordination within the State Department facilitated by the working relationships outlined above, interagency meetings can frequently devolve into various officials from the department arguing about what its policy should be rather than presenting a united front. An envoy will have to be the driving force at these meetings, representing a unified State Department position in meetings at the assistant secretary level and drafting the department’s position papers for and participating in deputies- or principals-level meetings. An envoy who tries to sidestep this process will be operating without the full understanding of polity deliberations—including appreciating trade-offs and unintended consequences—of a particular course of action.

4. Robust staffing: Coordinating and executing U.S. policy toward the range of crises—political, security, and humanitarian—in the Horn is a big job and an important responsibility, and any envoy must have a large, strong staff including recognized experts on the region. S/he must also staff up quickly, and, given the slow pace of traditional government hiring, make use of as many traditional and non-traditional hiring mechanisms as possible to get the right team in place. An envoy’s office can secure detailees from within AF and NEA, other bureaus at the State Department (the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, or CSO, has helped staff previous envoys), other national security agencies (including area and functional experts from USAID and the intelligence community), non-competitive civil service appointments to bring in security and regional affairs experts (called Schedule Bs), and outside contractors.

5. Control over resources: As noted above, regional bureaus at the State Department have a major say in how the United States spends various pots of money—from development and capacity building to security assistance. To fully empower an envoy, AF and NEA should cede control over at least some of these funds—ideally in the most flexible accounts, such as Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)—to give the envoy additional leverage in negotiations with regional actors and international partners.

The mounting external and internal pressure for a special envoy to the Horn of Africa is understandable. The urgency of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Ethiopia demands that the U.S. government move quickly, but the administration must carefully consider the requirements of the job in filling the position. Only an empowered individual with strong relationships at the highest levels in D.C. and the region and a clear mandate with corresponding staff and resources will succeed in addressing the interconnected crises that threaten to plunge the Horn of Africa into a full-blown regional conflagration.

Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Colin Thomas-Jensen is a senior expert at the United States Institute of Peace and was the special advisor to the White House envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from 2010 to 2013.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

WRITTEN BY


Judd Devermont
Director, Africa Program

Colin Thomas-Jensen
Senior Expert for Peace Processes, USIP

MEDIA QUERIES
Contact H. Andrew Schwartz
Chief Communications Officer
Tel: 202.775.3242

Contact Caleb Diamond
Media Relations Manager and Editorial Associate
Tel: 202.775.3173