Look where Saleh is after realizing wedi komarit is a vicious animal.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Zombie,
Look where Saleh is after realizing wedi komarit is a vicious animal.
Look where Saleh is after realizing wedi komarit is a vicious animal.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Woyane’s Fraudulent Casus Belli To Wage War Of Aggression (P1)
Semere Tesfai
http://awate.com/woyanes-fraudulent-cas ... ession-p1/
March 4, 2015
If the Woyane spin-doctors and their Eritrean agents were to have the last word, this is how they would’ve written the history of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war (of course I’m paraphrasing).
The days prior to 12 May 1998 were all happy cheerful and sunny days. But after seven delightful and tranquil years, Isaias, erratic that he is he woke-up one morning and unexpectedly ignited the Badme border war. Not for any apparent rational reason, but just because he felt like it. And ever since that tragic day, things have never been the same again. And that’s why we all are finding ourselves in this terrible predicament today.
But is that so? Were the days prior to 12 May 1998 all that sunny? Did the Badme border-war really start because of the personal whim of a one mad man (Isaias)? Was Isaias/Eritrea the aggressor? Was it even border dispute the cause of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean conflict?
Of course not! Any idiot knows these are all bogus claims and boldfaced lies. Let’s be real: prior to May 1998, EPLF leaders wanted to be so close to Ethiopia they were saying publicly – borders are irrelevant; free movement of people goods services and capital is the way to move forward; dual citizenship for those who wanted it (Eritreans and Ethiopians) is what brings the two people closer; single currency single monetary policy single foreign and diplomatic policy is what serves the two people best; having synchronized defense and security policy under unified central command is what makes the two people safe and secure; moving towards integrated economy under some kind of regional confederation is what brings stability and economic prosperity to the people of this region…… and many more were EPLF leaders public positions.
Again, EPLF leaders were so close to Woyane’s Ethiopia, and wanted to remain even closer that the current opposition leaders were outraged by their cozy relation with Ethiopia – accusing them of “abandoning our traditional Arab Allies”. EPLF leaders were so close to Ethiopia, the Arab Region was infuriated by their constant Arab bashing and their close relation with Ethiopia Israel and the West. Western powers were so elated about the Ethio-Eritrean close relation they were calling the leaders of both nations “close allies”, “visionaries”, “the new breed of African leaders”….. And the hope of Ethio-Eritrean close relation wasn’t just an empty-wish of EPLF leaders based on, unbalanced unfair and unattainable dream driven by insatiable Eritrean greed as some allege, but a seemingly achievable hope anchored on concrete agreement reached by both countries through the 1993 Agreement of Friendship and cooperation commission headed by the then two vice presidents – Tamrat Layne and Mahmoud Sherifo.
The point: in the greater scheme of things, at best, the Badme border issue was a hiccup; if that. But, even though the 1993 Ethio-Eritrean agreement was the best good news the two people ever heard in more than a century (of course it could be tweaked), to the disappointment of many Ethio-Eritrean relation failed miserably. And there is a lesson to be learned here: Ethio-Eritrean relation failed because it was a relationship destined to fail. Not because of the content of the agreement and its intended security economic and social objectives, not because the agreement was a lopsided agreement that favored Eritreans at the expense of Ethiopians, but because of the identity and the perceived shadowy political motive of its architects and its framers. Simply put: it failed because Ethio-Eritrean relation is more than a close relation of the two Tigreans.
And that was where the Ethio-Eritrean close relation was anchored; and that was the precise reason why the Ethio-Eritrean relation ended-up being polarizing and toxic relation that lacked the confidence of most Eritreans and Ethiopians (of course I’m not minimizing the “we’ve to restore Ethiopian pride by punishing Eritrea” and the “Eritrea should not be rewarded for having-it her own way” type ultranationalist factors in the overall political equation). And the minute the rubber hit the road, as expected, the weakest link (Woyane) gave way due to its internal pressure. Then and only then it dawned on all that the 6% Tigreans were, are, and will always be incapable of negotiating and delivering close Ethio-Eritrean relation while at the helm. And when the Woyanes reversed all their long held positions a complete 180° in the blink of an eye for political expediency (aligned themselves with gun-toting ultranationalists ነፍጠኛታትን ትምክሕተኛታትን in order to govern) to those who were hoping and wishing to see a lasting Ethio-Eritrean close relation, the writing was on the wall.
Therefore, trying to describe the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war, as a war that was fought solely over small patches of barren arid lands or as a war that was fought just because of a sudden impulse of a one “madman” is either mischaracterization of the facts, naïve and simplistic explanation of the facts or is being deliberately disingenuous about the real facts of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. But again, if, “Eritrea/Isaias was the aggressor” is what you believed all along, and if you’re not still persuaded by the reasoning of my argument, please read the comment below and pay attention to every little detail of – all the unverifiable claims and accusations, all the myth, all the half-truth, and all The Kidney Heist type Urban Legends that were being disseminated by the Addis political machine to vilify Eritrea and Eritreans prior to 06 May 1998.
I completely understand – since the Awate commenter was making a blanket statement (all X are Y and all W felt Z type assertions) his comment can’t be portrayed as an accurate descriptive account of the whole attitude of all Eritreans and Ethiopians. But it sure does explain the relentless political campaign that was waged to shape Ethiopian public opinion (vis-à-vis Eritrea and Eritreans) prior to 12 May1998. And guess what! Once a gun-toting regime successfully shapes public opinion to its liking, what follows is a no brainer: a policy that fits “public opinion”. And that was exactly the whole objective of the hollow propaganda of the Addis political machine: to mold Ethiopian public opinion.
Again, to piece together the events that lead to the 1998 senseless war, please read and pay attention to every little detail of the comment below; because the comment is a perfect prototype of the daily political propaganda that was waged to vilify and demonize Eritrea and Eritreans prior to 06 May 1998. And as a case in point, this comment is selected by this author to serve as an appetizer for the whole argument of this article. Good read.
Eyob Medhane – a diehard Woyane/EPRDF supporter in his own words explaining the “feeling of Ethiopians” toward Eritreans pre-May 12, 1998 – Awate.com, September 22, 2013 at 2:42 pm – Chronology of Eritrea’s Reform Movement @ the comment section.Ethiopians belief that Eritreans contempt to Ethiopia and Ethiopians is deep rooted and beyond the manplation of their leaders. During the first seven years of Eritrean independence, the behavior of many Eritreans (particularly Kebesa Eritreans, who were in Ethiopia) was simply unbearable. Especially, their favorate targets were those Ethiopians, who were very emotional about Ethiopia losing a sea port and feared Eritreans independence would lead to disintegration of the rest of the country. They were targets of a relentless mockery, insults with lots of humiliating verbal and psychological abuses. Furthermore, EPLF gave an impression to the rest of Ethiopians and especially to its Eritrean supporters that it has an upper hand on TPLF/EPRDF, and even a kind of impression that they control EPRDF and through it Ethiopia.
Hence, Eritreans, especially, the elites and those who lived in Ethiopia felt that they had a free reign over everything and anything in Ethiopia. Many couldn’t control themselves and openly started belittling Ethiopians, as just tools to be used by Eritreans. Eritrea was packaging Ethiopian coffee and market it in the world, as ‘Eritrean’. Large businesses, factories and financial institutions were getting bough and obtained by those, who pledged aligence to Eritrea, leaving the owners of the country Ethiopians somewhat pushed aside.
When Isayas invaded Ethiopia, they had the audacity to openly fund raise in Addis and regional towns for his war effort. I don’t think you can under estimate a kind of resentment that could create among Ethiopians. That is why, during Bademe war, when EPRDF declared it’s divorce from EPLF and Eritrea and called young people to enlist to go to war, it’s call was recieved enthusiastically and eventually, Ethiopia managed to win the war. It is a human nature to seek a revenge against those, who you feel deeply hurt you, and Ethiopians can not be different. There are good number of Ethiopians, who would want those, who humiliated them to be humiliated. Those, who dehumanized them to see what it looks like to be insulted and belittled.
So, what do you think? Does the above comment reflect the Ethiopian political reality that existed prior to May 1998? Do you think the comment is still defensible? Why or why not?
Anyway, regardless of one’s position to the above comment, the glaring fact is – that was exactly the insidious false propaganda the Ethiopian political machine was feeding its public prior to 12 May 1998. The reason: to go to war you have to prepare your country for war. And as a vital component of your war preparation, vilifying and demonizing your enemy to a point where there is no sympathy left for him, is job one. And that was exactly what the Addis political machine was doing prior to 06 May 1998. And the question that comes to mind is: was there similar propaganda campaign on the Eritrean side prior to 12 May 1998? And the answer is – absolutely not. And that in itself tells a story. Because it defies the logic of war (if one wants to claim that the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was started by Eritrea). And to this day, even though there is no any Ethiopian who could back-up the accusation (claim) that was/is leveled against Eritrea and Eritreans with a verifiable data and documentation, regrettably, the effect of that insidious propaganda → the false accusation, the hate, the anger, the resentment, the vindictive attitude……toward Eritrea and Eritreans is still alive and well.
But to anyone who could put two and two together, it was abundantly clear that the bloody 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was never about land dispute. Badme, the “disputed” border region, didn’t have much to do with the bloody “border war” then, and it has nothing to do with the current ‘no-war-no-peace’ Addis policy. Badme was a casus belli for a premeditated aggression then, and it is land held hostage at a gunpoint as a bargaining-chip to achieve a favorable concession from Eritrea, now – a concession that was impossible to achieve in 1991 to be exact. And for that reason and that reason alone, it shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone if Badme remains a hostage for many, many years to come. But many people are calling the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war ‘the Badme border war’ simply because the war was started at Badme and it was fought under the pretext of Badme border dispute. But in reality, the war was planned, instigated, provoked and declared by the Tigrean hardliners. The reason: grudge, territorial expansion, to heal and restore the pride of a wounded divided defeated Nation, to liberate themselves from the general public-perception (pawn of ShaEbia), to earn legitimacy to govern Ethiopia, and most of all to turn the clock back to 1991 in order to “negotiate” future Ethio-Eritrean relation, with a divided defeated humiliated Eritrea, led by a worthless Woyane installed puppet government. And the plan worked – well, almost.
Yes, the Woyanes failed to topple the Eritrean government. Yes, the Woyanes failed to occupy Eritrea. Yes, the Woyanes dream to assume supreme authority over Eritrea’s government and its sovereign territories until Eritrea signs a declaration of defeat that would meet all Ethiopian demands (including but not limited to, unfettered access to the Red Sea) failed miserably. Yes, the Woyanes didn’t add much of an Eritrean land to their beloved Greater Tigray. But they sure did get something else.
As a direct result of their naked aggression, Ethiopian unity and stability was solidified. As a direct result of their naked aggression, their popularity soared sky-high and continued to soar even higher every time they bled, humiliated, raised their threat level.…. towards Eritrea and Eritreans. As a direct result of their naked aggression their popularity was night and day the day before and the day after 13 May 1998. And most of all, as a direct result of their naked aggression, their image was improved in the eyes of many Ethiopians, making life easier for them to govern. Simply put: the Woyanes immensely benefited from their aggression and that was the exact motive behind their decision to back-stub and bleed their former ally. And that’s why their former allies are calling them ጠላማት.
And rallying the defeated Amara hardliners, inline soldier-style was not that hard. All it took was a suggestive gesture to bring back Assab and a firm conviction to restore Ethiopian pride by “breaking Eritrea’s spine”. That’s all. And the minute the gun-toting Tigrean and Amara hardliners tied the knot, the fate of the Ethio-Eritrean Alliance was sealed. Why did the Woyanes back-stub their former ally? Because then, now, and forever, there is no way in hell for the 6% Tigreans to dominate and govern ethnically divided Ethiopia without the overwhelming support of the Amaras (or the Oromos(???) with the intent to deny the Amaras Power). And by the same token then, now, and forever, there is no way in hell, in which the Tigreans could sleep with the ambitious Amaras and still fall in love with Eritreans. Sleeping with the ambitious Amaras and falling in love with Eritreans are incompatible. And let me explain the obvious:
When at the helm, the Tigreans could only sleep with one, and not with the other: with Eritreans or with the Amaras. And the Tigreans won’t dare sleep with Eritreans (when at the helm) as a strong bond of the two Tigreans is an impediment to the Amara’s ambitious dream of getting to the helm. And the Amaras are not going to give-up on their dream; and rightly so. Therefore, in the 1990s, in order to govern, the Woyanes didn’t have any other choice but to do the obvious: to take the bow (accept the 3000 year baggage) and tie the knot. And to make their new marriage work they didn’t had any other choice but to make good on their solemn-vow. And there was only one way to make good on their solemn-vow: to divorce their former lover, and divorce it in a very, very, very, very…. convincing way. And that is exactly what they did. They planned, instigated, provoked and escalated a war that would get them up-to and including regime change. And why did they cook a bloody plan that goes as far as regime change? Well:
1. To prove to their new lovers in no uncertain terms that their old marriage is over
2. To turn the clock back to 1991 to cleanse the “colossal national-sin” they committed
But it all failed. Thanks to the bravery of the Eritrean people and their gallant Warsai-YkeAlo forces, all their crafty deceit, all their engineered blueprint, all their radiant-thinking and mind-mapping ended-up being just a pipe-dream. Yes! After all the – Zeraf, Geday, Zwesede Gzie Ywsed, Hibri Aynkhum Des Entezey Eluna….brouhaha, the Tigrean hardliners were forced to settle for a whole lot less: no-war-no-peace policy. Yep! Hoping against hope, one day their well-crafted no-war-no-peace policy to bankrupt and bring Eritrea to its knees. Yes, the Eritrea they always believed – was “economically unviable state” without the goodwill of Addis regimes (without access to Ethiopian resources). And as they say, the rest is history.
Mind you: I don’t have any illusion about the size, magnitude, and intellect of those who swear, the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was caused and triggered by the Eritrean regime. I hear them every single day. Yes, those from the South of the Mereb River and their Eritrean agents who swear “Eritrea was the aggressor” (of course for obvious reasons) and those from the Eritrean opposition who cut off their nose to spite their face – just to do harm to the PFDJ regime. But both sides don’t have a winning argument. Their “facts” are so wrong and their arguments are so weak and riddled with inconsistencies, it won’t even withstand a minor scrutiny.
But I’m not here to ask the “Eritrea was the aggressor” crowd to take my word for it and call it a day. No, no, no, no…. I’m here to make a compelling case argument for it; and I’m daring and challenging them to prove me wrong. And I’m doing this for one and only one reason. This is an Eritrean issue (not Isaias or PFDJ) and I believe we all Eritreans are duty-bound to contribute our part to set the record straight. And that is exactly what I’m trying to do here. Not that my argument is going to change anyone’s mind, but I just want to prove to the whole world that the “Eritrea was the aggressor” crowd don’t have any credible argument to offer other than to mislead, to deceive, to dwell in darkness and, to argue on trivialities and side issues. And explaining the motive, the opportunity and the means of the 1998 Woyanes war of aggression, and presenting a compelling case argument that:
1. The 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was instigated and provoked by the Woyanes
2 . The 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was triggered and escalated by the Woyanes
3. History will be very kind to the EPLF government leaders for their handling of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean “border” war
4. Ethiopian regimes will never, never find a friend like Isaias and an ally like the PFDJ regime for a long, long, long time if any
5. We Eritreans bled for our independence no doubt about it; but the Woyanes wanted Eritrean independence (in 1991) more than the Eritreans themselves
And more would be the argument of these series of articles. Let’s roll:
Argument #1
The 1998 Ethio-Eritrean War Was Instigated And Provoked By The Woyanes
To make a compelling case for this argument, let’s start with the following critical questions and logical statements.
Question And Logical Statement #1. Were the Woyanes in and around Badme, harassing intimidating arresting evicting and killing Eritrean citizens, and confiscating properties of Eritrean citizens consistently prior to 06 May 1998? And the answer is emphatic YES. Did the Woyanes completely alter the social-demography of the whole Badme region (on both sides of the border divide) by evicting tens of thousands 3-4 generation Eritreans, and by settling Tigreans in their place? And the answer is emphatic YES. Was their action, a provocative action tantamount to declaring war on Eritrea and Eritreans? Yes it was. Then, assuming the duty of any given government is to protect its citizens, the EPLF government was within its rights to stand-up to the aggression of the Woyanes to defend its citizens.
Question And Logical Statement #2. Did the Woyanes try to alter the century old (1900–1991) Ethio-Eritrean border with the intent to incorporate large swaths of Eritrean territories into Tigray (Badme region being one of them)? Again the answer is emphatic YES. Did they try to create facts on the ground using force (to reflect their newly created map)? YES they did. Was their action a provocative action tantamount to declaring war on Eritrea and Eritreans? Yes it was. Then, assuming the duty of any given government is to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation it is governing, the EPLF government was within its rights to stand-up to the aggression of the Woyanes to defend the territorial integrity of Eritrea.
Question And Logical Statement #3. Did the Woyanes try to dismantle Eritrean local administrations by force in the “disputed” border areas to reflect their newly created map? Yes they did. Was their action a provocative action tantamount to declaring war on Eritrea and Eritreans? Yes it was. Then, assuming the duty of any given government is to protect its branch governments and its public servants, the EPLF government was within its rights to stand-up to the aggression of the Woyanes, to defend its local governments and its public employees.
Question And Logical Statement #4. Now, let’s be fair to the Woyanes. Even when the EPLF government believed Badme to be sovereign Eritrean territory, did the EPLF government dismantled any Ethiopian local government, at any of the “disputed” border areas including the Badme local administration (which was administered by Tigray Killil) prior to may 6 May 1998? And the answer is a resounding NO. Did the EPLF government altered the century old (1900–1991) Ethio-Eritrean border with the intent to incorporate some swaths of sovereign Ethiopian territories into Eritrea? Again, no it did not. Did the EPLF government harassed, evicted, killed or confiscated properties of Ethiopian citizens at the “disputed” border areas? No it didn’t.
Therefore, in order the – ‘Eritrea was the aggressor’ argument to fly:
1. One has to deny all the statements above (1,2,3 and 4) or
2. One has to deny the EPLF government’s right to defend its people, its local governments and its sovereign territories
And no Tigrean/Ethiopian worth his salt would dare deny the ordeal of tens of thousands Eritrean families, who were facing the wrath of the Woyanes for twenty long years, when thousands of them are still walking on their own two feet on this planet. Therefore, not only the two decade (1978 – 1998) Woyanes consistent provocation was real, but also it was unsustainable. That kind of life – life of constant and never-ending border encroachment, harassment, fear, killing, eviction and confiscation of properties was unsustainable. It was inevitable – at some point, some day, some Eritrean government was going to be forced to stand-up to the aggression of the Woyanes, to defend Eritrean citizens and sovereign Eritrean territories. And that day happened to be May 12, 1998. And the question that comes to mind is:
Ok, the Woyanes were constantly provoking Eritrea/the EPLF government for war. We got that. But that doesn’t prove the Woyanes started the 1998 war. How could you prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was ignited by the Woyanes? Well, that and more would come in part II of this article in about two weeks.
Suggested readings for this article and to the following series:
WashingtonPost.com: Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/lon ... erview.htm
Badme border dispute: Why Ethiopia Won’t back down on Eritrean …
www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDlN5cbjSfE
Greater Tigray : welkait.com
Eritrean–Ethiopian War – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border ConflictEthiopian raid on Eritrean bases raises fears of renewed conflict …
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Badme: Woyane’s Fraudulent Casus Belli To Wage War Of Aggression- P2
Semere Tesfai
http://awate.com/badme-woyanes-fraudule ... ession-p2/
July 12, 2015
On part one of this article, we said – ok the Woyanes were constantly provoking Eritreans (the EPLF government and prior to it) for war. We got that. But that doesn’t prove the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was started by the Woyanes. How could you prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was instigated ignited and escalated by the Woyanes? Well, there is only one way to prove it: by making a compelling argument for it. And this is my take:
1. The 1998 Ethio-Eritrean War Was Instigated, Ignited And Escalated By The Woyanes
2. History Will Be Very Kind To The EPLF Government Leaders For Their Handling of The 1998 Ethio-Eritrean “Border” War
Now, I’m going to make the case for the above arguments and let the Woyane-cadres and their Eritrean agents debunk the arguments – and you just be the judge. Let’s roll:
Argument #1
The 1998 War Was Instigated, Ignited And Escalated By The Woyane
To make a compelling case for the above argument, let’s build two pillars of abstract reasoning to support the argument.
Abstract #1:
Anyone who believes nations could wake-up one morning and start full-fledged war the next day, is just plain stupid. War is a symptom; not a cause. War is a symptom of unresolved underlying problems that have been simmering for quite some time. War is not an independent phenomenon. It is a political tool aimed to achieve a well planned political and economic objectives. Though wars are fought under different pretexts, the cause of all wars could be traced to a simple objective: power control and influence. And the objective of asserting power control and influence through military muscle is to enjoy the spoils of war-success → natural resources, expansion of land, access and control of strategic locations and trade routes, to engulf and chock a competitor, to solidify internal power, for religious ethnic cultural dominance.…. And all these and more, wealth fame and influence in mind. Simply put: all wars are well calculated political decisions with clearly defined political and economic objectives. Therefore, anyone who couldn’t see the cause of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war beyond the few bullets that flew on the first two weeks of May 1998 is either extremely naïve, avid Woyane cadre with political agenda, or a hired agent who earn a living serving foreign interests.
Now, taking the above premise as a valid premise, we can say with absolute confidence that the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war was never an accidental/random war but a well calculated, well planned, premeditated war of aggression (by the Woyanes) with the intent to reap the spoils of their war-victory. Again, the spoils of their war-victory being territorial gain for their Greater Tigray project; to liberate themselves from the widely perceived (then) public perception (pawn of ShaEbia); to assert political and military supremacy over Eritrea; to secure unfettered access to the Red Sea; to heal and restore the pride of a wounded defeated divided nation; to present themselves as true Ethiopian nationalists (as opposed to ethnic warriors) who would defend Ethiopia and Ethiopian interest; and most of all to “correct”/reverse the post 1991 dark boxed state of irrelevance that their Ethiopia found itself-in.
To be precise: if the Woyanes manage to reverse/correct their “mistake” successfully, they would become the mighty Neighborhood Sheriff with the biggest gun. And as a chief enforcer of Western policies and as a chief subcontractor of Western projects, overnight, Woyane’s Ethiopia would become highly influential power-player not only in the Red Sea-Horn Region but also as far as – The Arabian Gulf, The Indian Ocean, The African-Great Lakes, and beyond. And as a result of their mighty-power, greater control, far reaching influence and easy access to the ears of global powers, their Tigray (and by extension Ethiopia) would become a shining star on a mountain-top for years and decades to come. Well, nothing earth shattering concept here; just same old song and dance. At least for the past six decades, that has been the unbridled ambition of successive Addis-regimes; and that has been the blueprint of Western powers Horn-policy. And caught between a vindictive neighbor, and global geopolitics that is alien to them, the Eritrean people have been bleeding for the past four generations at no fault of theirs.
Abstract #2:
Again, to shed more light to the same argument, let’s add a little more in depth analysis to the argument; but this time from a different angle. Though every war has its own unique causes and characteristics, all wars have a common set of events and circumstances that precede the shooting phase of it. And these are the three common stages of war prior to the shooting phase.
Stage I. The cause of war: The cause of war is always a chronic problem (between the warring Nations) that has been simmering for a quite some time; but just a little below the boiling point. During this stage, emotions on both sides are extremely high but kept under the lid, the rage and anger is evident but pent-up, the situation is very volatile but contained. And if the underlying problems don’t get the proper solution they deserve, the eruption of violence is a sure thing.
Stage II. The Trigger of war: The trigger of war is always a tiny spark in a very volatile atmosphere. And this is how the spark start. At some arbitrary place and time, by some arbitrary event and players, a minor isolated incident (violence) would takes place by some people from Nation A1. And some people (someone) from Nation A2 are (is) killed. This minor incident (violence) that could have been ignored or easily contained under normal circumstance, becomes a catalyst for a violent chain-reaction, thus exacerbating the situation by opening the lid of the pent-up anger and resentment of the reactants (people from both nations). Then, before the ordinary small group of local players at the theatre fully comprehend the enormity and magnitude of their actions, the wheels of a bloody war are set in motion.
Stage III. Reaction and counter-reaction to the incident: At this stage, to defend itself (its citizens), Nation A2 reacts (or falls in to the planned trap instigated by N1) to the incident with fuming anger and emotion. And for the exact same rational (to defend itself), nation A1 reacts to the reaction of Nation A2 with even more anger and more outrage upping the ante. And before the people of the warring nations fully realize it, they are in the middle of a shooting war.
Now based on our abstract reasoning, let’s try to answer these questions. What was the cause the 1998 war? When did the 1998 war start? And who was the arsonist? And to help us identify the real cause, the precise time, and the real arsonist, let’s look at the chronology of events:
1. Unprovoked, on May 06, 1998 Woyane militias killed about half a dozen Eritrean servicemen/women from the Eritrean Border Patrol Unit.
2. Outraged by the Woyanes provocation on May 12, 1998 the EPLF government reacted to the incident with overwhelming force. Large Eritrean mechanized forces pushed the Tigrean forces in the area and captured, the disputed Badme border area and some uncontested sovereign Tigrean/Ethiopian territories in the LaElai Adiabo and TaHtai Adiabo Woredas (districts).
3. Then, the Woyane led Ethiopian government reacted with outrage to the Eritrean reaction, and escalated the war by declaring war on Eritrea through its parliament (May 13, 1998); launching an air attack on Asmara airport (on June 05, 1998 which the EPLF government retaliated by attacking Mekele airport); deporting thousands of Ethiopians of Eritrean origin (starting June 18, 1998), widening the war theatre from the Badme area to the whole Ethio-Eritrean border region (Tserona, Zalambessa, Alitena and Bure) and by declaring their final war-objective – which was to march all the way to Asmara for regime change.
And that’s how the 1998 war started, and that’s how it quickly escalated from a border skirmish into an all-out war. Now tell me: when did the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war started (as when did WWI started)? And who was the arsonist?
1. Did the Ethio-Eritrean war start when the Woyanes pulled the trigger, bullets started flying, Eritrean blood was shed and Eritrean lives were lost (May 6, 1998)?
2. Did the Ethio-Eritrean war start when the EPLF government reacted to the provocation of the Woyanes with excessive force (May12, 1998)?
3. Did the Ethio-Eritrean war start when the Woyane led Addis regime reacted to the EPLF government reaction, and declared an all-out war including regime change?
Of course, the Ethio-Eritrean war started the minute the Woyanes pulled the trigger; of course the war started the minute Eritrean blood was shed; of course the war started the minute precious lives of young Eritrean servicemen/women was lost; of course the Woyanes were the arsonist who torched the 1998 war. What other logical explanation is there but the obvious?
And this is the Achilles’ heel of the “Isaias/Eritrea started the war” argument. When you ask the Woyane-cadres and their Eritrean agents – what was the cause of the war? Their answer is Isaias rolled his tanks and occupied disputed and undisputed Ethiopian territories around Badme. When you ask them – what was the trigger for the war? Their answer is, Isaias rolled his tanks and occupied disputed and undisputed Ethiopian territories around Badme. When you ask them – how did the war escalated from a border skirmish into an all out war? Again their answer is, Isaias rolled his tanks and occupied disputed and undisputed territories around Badme. According to their logic, the cause of the war, the trigger for the war, and the reason for the escalation of the war are all Isaias rolled his tanks to Badme and occupied disputed and undisputed Ethiopian territories. And that’s all baloney.
The truth: while the trigger and the reason for the escalation of the 1998 war is self evident, the cause of the war was brewing long before Isaias and his EPLF government showed-up to the theatre. The war just waited for such a long time:
1. Because of the interdependence of the EPLF and the TPLF ultimate objectives
2. Because of the EPLF leadership miscalculation or as the EPLF leaders would like to call it “ተገሪህና” – or we didn’t see that coming. Let me explain:
The interdependence of ultimate objectives: the Woyanes desperately needed EPLF’s help to get to Menelik’s Place and to stabilize Ethiopia in order to govern; and the EPLF leaders desperately needed Woyane’s help for speedy referendum and full recognition of Eritrean sovereignty.
The miscalculation of EPLF leaders: the EPLF leadership (including most Eritreans) believed in their heart of hearts, after all the two people have been through together (Eritreans and Tigreans), the Woyanes would never double-cross their kin and burn all bridges. The reason: (a) the Woyanes are always going to need free access to the Red Sea in order to make their Tigray, the Tigray they want it to be (b) the Woyanes are always going to need a reliable and trusted ally (people-to-people based) that would help them secure their southern borders to live in peace and prosper. Again the assumption being, any conceivable threat to Tigray and Tigreans could only come from one direction: their South. That was the sole reason, why the EPLF leadership and most Eritreans were looking the other-way even when the Woyanes were mistreating Eritrean citizens at the border. That was the sole reason, why the EPLF leadership was looking the other-way even when the Woyanes were in the business of recruiting and arming opposition to the EPLF organization/government (1983-1998) right under their nose. And that was the sole reason why the war was shelved for such a long time.
But as the EPLF government and we all Eritreans found out the hard way, the Woyanes had a political calculus of their own: to bleed, starve and humiliate Eritrea. And itching for a fight, first, they started incorporating large swaths of sovereign Eritrean lands to their Greater Tigray project; then they started evicting Eritrean citizens from the lands they called home for generations (settling the area with Tigreans); and to give-it a nice finishing touch to their Greater Tigray project, they started re-naming the newly inhabited areas with brand new “Tigrean” names. But again, don’t take my word for it. This is what the Washington Post said in print regarding the cause of the Ethio-Eritrean war. Note: “the major source of contention” is the operative word here, as land was not the sole reason for the war:
Mind you: I’m not ignorant about the findings of the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC). I know the EECC position is very clearly stated. It saidThe major source of contention involved an area known as the Yirga Triangle, a barren, 160-square mile stretch of land that both sides claimed as part of their territory. Eritrea has accused Ethiopia of sending in thousands of settlers to the area in an attempt to push out Eritreans. Ethiopia claims the territory is part of its Tigre province. In 1996, a border commission was set up, but was unable to settle the issue.
Also regarding the May 13, 1998 Ethiopia’s decision to mobilize its forces for a full assault against Eritrea, the EECC saidgiven the absence of an armed attack against Eritrea (since the May 06, 1998 killing was carried-out by “Woyane militias”) the Eritrean attack that begun on 12 May 1998 can’t be justified as lawful self defense under the UN charter.
And these EECC words, and these words alone, are the only lifeline that the Woyane-cadres and their Eritrean agents have for their “Eritrea was the aggressor” argument. And I admit the EECC finding has been a valuable-tool to the Woyane-cadres and their Eritrean agents to confuse the naïve and the gullible. But that’s all. Just to confuse and mislead the naïve and the gullible. And let me explain the reason why:Ethiopia’s move was in essence an affirmation of the existence of a state of war between belligerents, not a declaration of war (as Eritrea allege) and Ethiopia has notified the United Nations Security Council as required under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Reason #1. At any given time, any Eritrean government has every right to defend its people, its servicemen and women, its sovereign territories from any foreign aggression (Woyane’s aggression in this case). And it is the Eritrean government’s prerogative how, when, were to respond if and when the rights of its citizens and the territorial integrity of its nation is violated.
Reason #2. The whole EECC finding is about a single event that happened in a single day: May 12, 1998. Yep, a one day event out of 7,300 plus days (20×365); as a single small tissue-sample in a complex human physiology; as a one page out of 7,300 pages of litigation papers. Now, even in the best of all findings (if one assumes the EECC finding is the final verdict of the whole war package – cause trigger escalation – which it is not) how impartial fair and balance could the EECC finding be if it is based on a single snap-shot of a moment in time? Not much. Right?
And if my understanding is right, the EECC didn’t deny Eritrea’s right to defend itself. The EECC didn’t deny the cause of the conflict (the simmering problems that existed for twenty long years). The EEC didn’t deny Woyane’s daily provocation prior to May 12, 1998. The EECC didn’t say Eritrea’s land-claim is unfounded. In fact Eritrea was awarded most of the “disputed” territories including the town of Badme. It just said (a) on that specific day (May 12, 1998) Eritrea’s use of overwhelming force can’t be described as self-defense because Ethiopia didn’t attack Eritrea with overwhelming force prior to that specific day (b) Ethiopia’s response the next day (13 May 1998) was not a declaration of war but an affirmation of a state of war between belligerents (c) Eritrea didn’t notify the UNSC in advance as required under Article 51 of the UN Charter before it made its military move; but Ethiopia did. That’s all. Therefore the only thing one could possibly argue about the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean conflict is, Eritrea’s failure to notify the UNSC in advance. Now, is, not notifying the UNSC in advance a big deal? Well, for a matter of optics? Probably! For substance that count? Hell No! Again let me explain:
Just for the sake of argument, let’s say Eritrea made a colossal diplomatic blunder by not notifying the UNSC in advance as required under Article 51 of the UN Charter. And fair enough, the EPLF government did fail to notify the UNSC in advance. Now tell me: due to the EPLF government diplomatic “blunder” what did we exactly miss? What would have exactly changed had the EPLF government notified the UNSC in advance? Had Eritrea notified the UNSC in advance, do you truly believe the UNSC would have forced the Woyanes to stop their nonsense and demarcate the border fair and square? And if the Woyanes refuse to comply, do you truly believe they would’ve came down on them like a ton of bricks? Do you think the Woyane militias and their Teraros would have stopped terrorizing Eritreans and encroaching deep into sovereign Eritrean territories the day after Eritrea notified the UNSC? Absolutely not!
One has to be extremely naïve and gullible to fall for that kind of nonsense. The argument that – Eritrea didn’t notify the UNSC as required under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and as a direct causation, “the whole world community” is standing against Eritrea is simply preposterous. The reality: it is not what a tiny poor black African country (Eritrea) did or didn’t do at any given time that determines the position of the UNSC and its powerful global powers, but the effect of that poor black African country’s move at the ground level vis-à-vis their regional policy and their national interest that determines their position. And that is always constant.
The impotent UN, the corrupted continental organizations, the worthless regional bodies, the commissions and agencies that are formed (delegated) by them, are all tools of global powers. Their findings and their decisions are not – fair balanced and impartial legal decisions. They are skewed and lopsided political decisions. Their findings and their decisions are so biased and so predictable, you don’t even need to read their final print to know what is in it. They are that predictable and they are that awful. But of course, knowing full well the findings and the decisions of these UN agencies is a joke, their findings and their decisions are used selectively every day by governments of all colors and stripes if it (the UN agencies findings) converges with their policies and interests.
So, what is new if the Woyane-cadres and their Eritrean agents conveniently cherry-pick and publicize the EECC finding like everything else? Like UN agencies report on corruption, torture, failed (fragile) states index, fairness and transparency of elections (or lack of it), human rights abuse, rate of economic growth, social development index, freedom of this and freedom of that….. Isn’t that what all governments do every single day: Cherry-pick and publicize what they like and strongly oppose/condemn what they don’t like? Then what makes the EECC finding any different from the rest of them? But again, just to prove a point, let’s see how the “world community” (The UN, The SC, The Continental organizations….) run their daily business.
Whenever Israel rolls its tanks to Lebanon or Palestine and start carpet-bombing neighborhoods to the stone-age, the response of the “world community” is always – get over it; Israel has every right to defend itself. Bidding Western projects, whenever Ethiopia rolls its tanks deep into Somalia, killing citizens and destroying properties of a sovereign UN member nation, the “world community” doesn’t have any problem justifying Ethiopia’s aggression. Whenever Ethiopia crosses Eritrean borders (unprovoked) and whenever it declares regime change in Eritrea (which is a declaration of war in itself) in front of the whole wide world, the “world community” doesn’t have any problem looking the other way in silence. Whenever Russia violates the sovereignty of its weaker neighbors (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea) the “world community” just talks and talks and talks….. with no substance. Whenever the US and its allies unilaterally invade and topples governments of sovereign UN member-Nations half the world away, and whenever the US bombs countries covertly and overtly at will, the “world community” is just a silent witness. Now tell me: what good has done “notifying the UNSC in advance as required under Article 51 of the UN Charter” for the sovereign UN member nations who found themselves at the short end of the stick? Nothing! Right? And that’s exactly my argument.
The point: it’s a dog-eat-dog world. Sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation are achieved and preserved through strength (sweat and blood), not by crying and begging at the lobbies and corridors of the corrupt AU/UN headquarters. In this planet – your only security, your only defense, your only safety, your only insurance, the only truth/democracy that matters…..is the size of your military muscle, and the size of your alliance (coalition). The bigger the size of your military muscle, the bigger the size of your alliance…. the safer you are. If you are a mighty power carrying a big stick, always every word you utter is “the truth”. But if you are a lone lamb in this vast wilderness, you are the first one to be consumed. That’s why, the small islands and the small communities who called those islands home for centuries (in the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Oceans and near the poles) are not sovereign small nations but properties claimed by mighty global powers from half the world way.
And in a parallel reasoning, we can imagine, in a hypothetical distant future, if vital resources become scarce (over-population, draught, melting of polar ice caps.….) which “savages” would be the first ones to be “liberated” from their “homegrown tyrants”. Of course, vengeful locals lending a helping hand in the invasion of their country and in the mayhem and destruction of their communities – as history has attested time and again since the days of slavery. I mean – if the “savages” fail to notify the UNSC as required under Article 51 of the UN Charter that is. Well, I’m sure, the dead-souls who are down on their knees begging the Woyanes (or anyone with a big gun) to invade Eritrea in order to bring them to power, and the one man/woman institutions who are on the payroll of the West under the guise of journalists, human-rights advocates, faith based charities, pro-democracy movement leaders, media personalities…… would beg to differ. And that’s given.
ግን: ሓቁ ክነግረኩም ዋርሳይ ኤረ፡ forget about Badme a small piece of land, even when we fought for thirty long years to liberate the whole country, we never gave an advance notice (about our military plans and moves) to any global continental regional powers or their agencies. Never! Not out of arrogance or ignorance, not that we didn’t try or didn’t need their support, but because we learned early in the game it wasn’t going to do us any good – as we knew exactly where they all stood. We only notified them once. And that was from the gates of Menelik Palace. And to tell you the truth, they were not thrilled at all. They just accepted our sovereignty with a heavy heart. And the question that comes to mind is, with all their global reach, with all their influence, with all their mighty power, why in the world did they accept our sovereignty with great reluctance? Well, because we controlled the ground and we gave them two “bad” choices: to accept Eritrean independence or to witness the disintegration of their poster-child. And they chose the obvious. That’s how we made history. Of course our demand was wrapped-with “Genuine Northern Alliance” ready to serve their interest in the region for better or (for) worse. Guaranteed. At least that was what we thought it was. But, in any case, it served its purpose.
ሕጅውን: ሓቁ ክደግመልኩም ኣናብር ሳዋ’፡ Literally, “against all odds” – after our boys entered Addis and started smoking cigars inside Menelik Palace, for mission accomplished and for a job well done, we all patted each-other on the back Tegadelty-Style, and for months, nonstop, danced 24×7 ወሰደየ ጅግና በዓል ስረ….... from dawn to dusk to dawn…. in every corner of this planet including on the streets of Addis. Then, after all the non-stop crazy festivities and euphoria, and after we all felt Ethiopia was stabilized and our sovereignty was irreversible, we all danced one more farewell round ‘ኣንትን ትሃርማና፡ ኣንትን ትድስቓና – ካብ ሎሚ ምሸተ….’ in Addis and beyond. And then our mechanized infantry loaded their armored personnel carriers and headed home to turn the page and start a new chapter – of course believing we won’t be betrayed by those whom we helped and trusted the most. And you know what happened next.
But seriously, having said all that, no doubt, there are many honest questions that deserve honest answers. Does the EPLF government bear any responsibility whatsoever for the 1998 war? Did the EPLF government made any favor (be it to itself or to the Eritrean people) by rolling its tanks into the disputed and undisputed territories? If the Woyanes were itching for a fight as you (Semere) allege, was falling into their trap the wisest thing to do? Could we’ve done things differently? And more are honest questions that deserve honest answers.
And the answer for all these questions and more, is not rocket science. The job of any given government is to protect its citizens and to guard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation it is governing. Back then, the EPLF government did exactly what any government worth its salt would have done under similar circumstances. And without a doubt, history will be very, very kind to the Isaias led EPLF leadership for their handling of the 1998 “border” conflict. And let me explain the obvious:
Argument #2
History Will Be Very Kind To The EPLF Government Leaders For Their Handling Of The 1998 Ethio-Eritrean “Border” War
To make a compelling case for the above argument, again let’s recap the facts:
Fact #1. Prior to 1978, Eritreans in the Badme region constituted the great majority of the inhabitants on both sides of the Eritrea-Tigrean border. But ever since the Woyanes showed-up to the theatre (around 1978) things started changing; and changing forever. Today, much less Eritrean clear majority on both sides of the Woyane controlled Badme border region, I doubt if there are any Eritrean farmers left in the area, and I very much doubt if there still exists, a single name of a place given by Eritreans prior to 1978.
Fact #2. Prior to 1991, the center of border contention was limited to the coordinates of point B at the Settit River, and some areas around the straight border-line that goes from the confluence of Mereb-Mai-Ambessa (point A) to the Settit River (point B). But after 1991, the “contested” border areas kept expanding. The Woyanes started encroaching deeper into sovereign Eritrean territories in all regions of the border. And each time, after they claim the land, they were harassing and evicting Eritrean farmers from the very place they called home for decades – Hazo at Upper Indeli 30 December 1993, a dozen villages of Adi-Mahrai (Zibra) June 1996, Denbe Hinbrty July 1996, Gheza Sherif August 1996, Adi-Murug July 1997, Enda Tchi July 1997…… just to mention few.
Fact #3. High level Ethio-Eritrean meetings were held many times (20 July 1994, 20 April 1997, June 1997, 08 and 16 August 1997……) to settle the border issue and to protect the rights of Eritrean citizens at the “contested” border areas; but only all to end in vain.
Fact #4. Spoiling for a fight, the Tigrean hardliners upped the ante (after 1997) from harassing evicting and killing Eritrean civilians and uprooting whole Eritrean villages in the ever-growing “contested” border areas, into dismantling local Eritrean government administrations and killing Eritrean service men/women. And the killing of half a dozen Eritrean border patrol unit on May 06, 1998 by the Woyanes was – so to speak, the straw that broke the camel’s back.
Back then, faced with such reality, any Eritrean government leaders (EPLF, opposition, or any other leaders for that matter) would’ve done only one of these choices:
1. Bury their head in the sand, cross their fingers, and hope and pray one day the Woyane hardliners to change their mind and become Eritrea-friendly.
2. Retaliate in a limited way – by dismantling few Tigrean local administrations and by killing half a dozen Tigrean militias, hoping the Woyanes to understand – and stop being hostile towards Eritrea and Eritreans.
3. Use overwhelming force to stop Woyane’s adventure once and for all.
And we all know what the EPLF government did. And I believe (like most Eritreans do) the EPLF government-response was the right response. But don’t take my word for it. Assuming leaders of a nation are judged by history based on the accomplishment of their decisions, let’s see if the May 12, 1998 EPLF government decision could pass the strict scrutiny test:
1. Did the 1998 EPLF government decision stop the [ deleted ] Woyanes, their unruly militias, and their vindictive ጠራሮ from terrorizing harassing evicting Eritreans and confiscating properties of Eritrean citizens once and for all? Yes it did.
2. Did the 1998 EPLF government decision forced the Woyane dominated Addis regime, to sit and talk seriously about the Ethio-Eritrean border issue? Yes it did.
3. Did the 1998 EPLF governments decision forced the Woyane dominated Addis regime, to sign a final and binding border decision knowing full well, it is a whole lot less than what they promised their constituents (in the shadow of darkness) and a whole lot less than they dreamt to achieve? Yes it did.
4. Did the 1998 EPLF government decision, made the legitimacy of Eritrean sovereignty and the Ethio-Eritrean territorial borders crystal clear (for the second time I might add) to Eritreans, to Ethiopians and to the whole wide world? Yes it did.
Now, ask the ardent opponents of the 1998 EPLF-leaders decision what they would have done differently to achieve the same result without bloodshed. And all you hear from the self-acclaimed brainiacs is, a blank-stare, incoherent talks, unintelligible hypothesis and endless arguments about trifling issues. Yes, after a decade and half of badmouthing the PFDJ regime, after a decade and half of Monday-morning quarterbacking judging and criticizing with hindsight, still they don’t have any credible alternative idea they can sell to the Eritrean people; except to ride on the back of Ethiopian tanks from Mekele to Asmara. And in the name of bringing change, to subject the Eritrean people to the nightmare of Ethiopian occupation (round two), is a political blunder that fly in the face of the three-generation Eritrean sacrifice at best, and downright treason at worst. That’s why the Eritrean opposition that are cuddling in bed with the Addis regime are in a vegetative state. And that’s why I’m saying, after all the dust is settled and the smoke is cleared, history will be very generous to the EPLF government leaders for their handling of the 1998 “border” conflict.
Final note: Every calendar year, (beside our religious and mass organizations annual celebrations) there are national holidays we Eritreans celebrate very religiously. And our national holidays are so personal and so touching to each and every one of us, every single year we make preparations for months to make them better than the previous years.
On the 1st of January, we all celebrate the New Year’s Day with music dance and fireworks….. wishing to have a peaceful and prosperous year.
On the 8th of March, as we all celebrate the unparalleled contribution of the Eritrean-Woman in molding the Eritrean identity and in achieving the Eritrean people’s aspiration to determine their destiny, we all gather to assess our achievements and failures (in the journey of gender equality) of the previous year(s). And based on our assessment, we renew our commitment with great vigor to work harder than ever, to empower the Eritrean-woman economically socially and politically. We pledge to achieve gender equality because – to us Eritreans – gender equality is not an issue of morality but an issue of national security; and our economic military social political…. strength is predicated upon the empowerment of the Eritrean-woman.
On the 24th of May, we all celebrate our independence-day united with great zeal jubilation and pride waving our flag, dressed colorfully, styled with different hairstyles, eating and sharing great variety of Eritrean cuisine, playing different music, dancing different dances…. to celebrate Eritrea’s birthday and to show the whole world our unique Eritrean identity.
On the 20th of June, we all gather together in silence, united by our shared experience: grief (as death and suffering was in every family) to hold candlelight vigil to honor, to remember and to appreciate the sacrifice of our fallen heroes and heroines. And each year, during our candlelight vigil, we renew our pledge to change the quality of life of the Eritrean people for the better, and to defend Eritrea (wherever we are) true to the spirit of our fallen heroes and heroines.
On September 1st, we all gather together with passion to celebrate the launch of our armed struggle, to honor and to remember our National hero Hammed Idris Awate and the selfless brave men and women who followed his footsteps to make Eritrean independence a reality.
And no matter how small of a community, no matter how far from home, each year, we all gather together with great passion and enthusiasm to celebrate our national holidays in every corner of this planet except in Woyane’s Ethiopia.
And that begs the question: is the Woyane dominated Addis regime, against the PFDJ regime or against the very concept of Eritrean sovereignty? If the current Addis regime is against the very concept of Eritrean sovereignty (which it is), how is it different from its predecessors? In Woyane’s Ethiopia, who is against Eritreans celebrating their national holidays? The regime? The Ethiopian elite? Both? Do we (Eritreans) have to tone-down celebrating our national holidays with enthusiasm and pride to have “good” relation with Ethiopia?
Many of the Eritrean opposition leaders are snug in bed comfortably with the Woyane dominated Addis regime. But the only right Eritreans inside Ethiopia (their “constituents”) have is, to be herded and to be paraded into anti PFDJ government demonstrations that are staged by the Addis regime. That’s a fact! Now tell me: Do the Addis based opposition leaders represent the aspiration of the Eritrean people? Is the love of Woyane worth, not celebrating Eritrean independence? Is the love of Woyane worth, not holding candlelight vigil to remember our heroes and heroines?
Anyway, when it comes to the Ethio-Eritrean politics, there are two types of people that baffle me the most: the sensible Ethiopians who couldn’t understand why Eritreans feel uneasy about Addis regimes and the Eritreans who swear – ‘the Woyanes are friends of the Eritrean people and defenders of Eritrean sovereignty’, when in reality, the Woyane dominated Addis regime is as hostile to Eritreans as its predecessors, and when in fact the Woyane-Dinosaurs (the only Ethiopians who supported Eritrean independence) are crawling out of the woodwork one after the other, making speeches and writing books “repenting their sin” (their prior position on Eritrea) right in front of their very eyes. How true the age-old Eritrean adage: ፈሊጡ ዘስቀጠስ (ዝደቀሰስ): ሓርማዝ ነይንቕንቖ::
Suggested readings:
WashingtonPost.com: Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict
Badme border dispute: Why Ethiopia Won’t back down on Eritrean … www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDlN5cbjSfE
Greater Tigray
Eritrean–Ethiopian War – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict
Ethiopian raid on Eritrean bases raises fears of renewed conflict …
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Zombie,Semere Who?
The Boundary Commission found wedi komarit guilty of starting the war.
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/13 ... age-awards...Among the more significant holdings of the Commission were: that Eritrea unlawfully invaded Ethiopian-controlled territory at the start of the conflict,[5]unlawfully conducted or permitted the killing, rape or abduction of civilians and the looting of property,[6] abused or provided improper care and treatment to Ethiopian prisoners of war,[7] and failed to provide expelled civilians with appropriate protection and treatment;[8]...
About the Author
Michael Matheson, a member of ASIL and the AJIL Board of Editors, is on the international law faculty of the George Washington University Law School. He was formerly Acting Legal Adviser at the U.S. State Department and a member of the UN International Law Commission.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Read the article, fuzo. 
It's described perfectly there, why the EECC came to that conclusion!!!!
Even your 'awate' people, find you unpalatable.
People like you are described in the article, precisely how we described you here.
A through & through weyanay at best or their Eritrean stooge, at worst.
It's described perfectly there, why the EECC came to that conclusion!!!!
The whole EECC finding is about a single event that happened in a single day: May 12, 1998. Yep, a one day event out of 7,300 plus days (20×365); as a single small tissue-sample in a complex human physiology; as a one page out of 7,300 pages of litigation papers. Now, even in the best of all findings (if one assumes the EECC finding is the final verdict of the whole war package – cause trigger escalation – which it is not) how impartial fair and balanced could the EECC finding be if it is based on a single snap-shot of a moment in time? Not much. Right?
Even your 'awate' people, find you unpalatable.
People like you are described in the article, precisely how we described you here.
A through & through weyanay at best or their Eritrean stooge, at worst.
Awash wrote: ↑23 Jul 2019, 02:18
Semere Who?
The Boundary Commission found wedi komarit guilty of starting the war.
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/13 ... age-awards...Among the more significant holdings of the Commission were: that Eritrea unlawfully invaded Ethiopian-controlled territory at the start of the conflict,[5]unlawfully conducted or permitted the killing, rape or abduction of civilians and the looting of property,[6] abused or provided improper care and treatment to Ethiopian prisoners of war,[7] and failed to provide expelled civilians with appropriate protection and treatment;[8]...
About the Author
Michael Matheson, a member of ASIL and the AJIL Board of Editors, is on the international law faculty of the George Washington University Law School. He was formerly Acting Legal Adviser at the U.S. State Department and a member of the UN International Law Commission.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Chronology of Events Leading up to 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia War
Chronology of Events Leading up to 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian War to the Signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement
BY BEREKET KIDANE
Although May 6, 1998, is generally considered the beginning of the 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia War, a border-related conflicted started earlier. Unreported incidents went as far back as 1992.
In 1993, Tigray Administrative Region initiated “Border Rectification Project” to redraw unilaterally its border with Eritrea. Eritrean farmers were forcibly removed from their land. Crops and livestock were confiscated. Several attempts were made to resolve the problem between 1993-1996 without much progress. The problem deteriorated beginning in 1997. What follows is a partial timeline of the dispute that started initially as a border dispute, but later expanded into a much wider war.
Events leading up to the war
April 20-21, 1997: A meeting to discuss border issues that had surfaced in the course of the previous year was held in Shire, Tigray, Ethiopia between the Vice President of the Tigray Region of Ethiopia, and the Deputy Governor of the Gash-Barka Region of Eritrea.
June 22-27, 1997: A sub-committee designated in accordance with the Shire decisions met to make a tour of the “demarcations,” a length it determined at about 40 kms. It was established then that at least three demarcations, each creeping into Eritrea had been laid on the ground.
June 1997: Tigrayan authorities ordered that no Eritrean farmer was to plough fields or build houses or sheds beyond the “unilaterally demarcated” line and that the inhabitants of Eritrean villages were to be evacuated.
July 18-19, 1997: Three truckloads of Ethiopian troops entered the Badme area and planted radio communications equipment. Eritrean territory inside the “unilaterally demarcated” area was, thus, put under patrol. Subsequently, massive expulsion of Eritreans begun.
July 19, 1997: Two battalions of the Ethiopian Army came to Adi Murug and their commander met with representatives of the Eritrean Army in the area. The Ethiopians explained that they were there to chase armed Ethiopian opposition groups that they believed to be in the Badda area, and requested entry. The battalions were let in on this understanding.
July 24, 1997: Ethiopian administrators instructed the Eritrean administrators to disband – they were taking over. They declared Adi Murug Ethiopian territory and appointed their own administrative committee.
August 8, 1997: Two Eritrean officials traveled to Addis Ababa to discuss Adi Murug and Badme with their counterparts in Ethiopia.
August 16, 1997: Less than a month after the Adi Murug and Badme incidents of July 19, President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea wrote a letter to his counterpart Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia formally protesting Ethiopia’s actions. He called on the Prime Minister to take all necessary measures to put a stop to Ethiopia’s border incursions.
August 25, 1997: President Isaias Afewerki wrote another letter to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. This time suggesting that a joint border commission be set-up – the Eritrean side to be led by General Sebhat Efrem, Minister of Defense. The first meeting for this commission was scheduled for November 1997.
October 17, 1997: Weyin, the official organ of the TPLF, printed a new map of Tigray Region, which for the first time in almost a hundred years, altered Eritrea’s colonial borders with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Mapping authority also officially printed this “illegal” map of the Tigray Region. Here, the straight line linking the Setit (Tekezze) River to the Mereb River at its confluence with the Mai Anbessa had disappeared and was replaced by an oblique line entering deep into Eritrean territory.
November 1997: A joint High Commission on Demarcation met in Asmara and agreed to meet again within three months. There was no discussion on substantive matters.
January 1998: Ethiopia tried by military means to occupy sovereign Eritrean territory on the Bure area (Assab-Dessie road). Unfortunately, Eritrean efforts to solve the problem amicably and bilaterally failed as the Government of Ethiopia continued to bring under its occupation the Eritrean territories that it had incorporated into its map.
War Breaks Out
May 6, 1998: Ethiopian troops fired at an Eritrean patrol unit on routine duty along the border around Badme. It triggered a chain of reaction on both sides and several people were killed.
May 13, 1998: The Ethiopian Parliament declared war on Eritrea.
May 14, 1998: The Eritrean Government called for peace and invited neutral parties to examine the circumstances leading to the incident on May 6.
May 14, 1998: The Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Eritrea proposed a five-point peace plan.
May 30-31, 1998: US-Rwanda Peace Plan presented to Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Governments of the United States and Rwanda, in an attempt to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, presented both parties a four-point peace plan.
June 1, 1998: While the US-Rwanda Peace Plan was under discussion, Ethiopia launched an attack on Eritrea along the Ambesete-Gleba area.
June 3, 1998: The State Department issued the following statement:
June 5, 1998: (morning): The Eritrean Government issued the following statement:
June 5, 1998: At 14:00 and 14:30 hours, local time, Ethiopian fighter planes launched an air strike on Asmara. They hit Asmara International Airport, killing and wounding 30 people, and damaging a Zambian cargo plane parked on the runway. About an hour later, an Eritrean plane retaliated by hitting military targets in Makelle, Ethiopia – destroying several Ethiopian fighter planes. Inadvertently, it also hit an elementary school near the airport killing and wounding 47 people. The Eritrean Government apologized for the incident.
June 6, 1998: At 09:40 hours local time, two Ethiopian fighter planes bombed the southern outskirts of Asmara; because of Ethiopia’s imposition of indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, most foreigners living in Asmara were evacuated. An Ethiopian fighter jet (a MiG 23) was shot down by Eritrea’s Air Defense Units. Ethiopia further imposed an air blockade and maritime access blockade to Eritrean ports through the threat of incessant and indiscriminate air bombing.
June 10, 1998: In violation of the agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia that citizens of each country do not need visas to visit the other country, Ethiopia instructed all carriers not to board Eritreans who do not have a valid visa to Ethiopia.
June 11, 1998: Eritrea called on the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to take urgent measures to ensure the safety of international air and maritime navigation in the area.
June 12, 1998: Ethiopia announced that it was expelling an unspecified number of civilian Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin in the country for “security reasons”
June 12, 1998: Eritrean Air Force pilots bombed military targets in Adi Grat.
June 13, 1998: The Government of Ethiopia ordered the deportation of thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin from the country; it also fired thousands of others from their jobs.
June 14, 1998: The Governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia accepted the proposal put forward by the United States Government on a total ban of air strikes by both sides.
June 17, 1998: Ethiopia begins large-scale deportations. About 800 Eritrean residents of Ethiopia arrived at the Eritrean border town of Um Hajer in the southwestern tip of the country.
June 25, 1998: The Government of Ethiopia ordered the families of the deported to mortgage their businesses and property and leave the country within one month. By this time, the number of deportees was about 1150, most of them were prominent businessmen and professionals.
June 26, 1998: The Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that condemned “the use of force” and demanded,
July 1, 1998: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Mrs. Mary Robinson expressed her serious concern over Ethiopian expulsions of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin from Ethiopia.
July 1, 1998: Ambassadors from Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Rwanda and Zambia held talks with Eritrean officials as part of an initiative by the OAU, following the failed US-Rwanda Plan.
July 9, 1998: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, in an interview with Ethiopian television and in reaction to Mary Robinson’s statement about Ethiopia’s human rights violations, boasts that his government
Aug 1-2, 1998: The Organization of African Unity Ministerial Committee met for two days of talks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Its main aim was to resolve the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
August 6, 1998: The US Department of State issued a statement condemning the detention and expulsion of Eritreans from Ethiopia and called on the Ethiopian Government to respect international human rights norms and standards.
August 6-12, 1998: About three thousand Eritreans expelled from Ethiopia arrive in Eritrea. Some of them came through the border town of Zalambessa. The number of Eritrean deportees from Ethiopia reaches over 16,000.
August 13, 1998: Ethiopia gave Eritreans working for international organizations and embassies in Addis Ababa one month to leave the country. The Ethiopian government also admitted that it had served notice to some 87 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin working in embassies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to leave the country.
September 16, 1998: The US Government communicated to Eritrea its desire to launch a new initiative. This new initiative was to be led by Mr. Anthony Lake, the former National Security Advisor (1993-1997) under President Bill Clinton. Mr. Anthony Lake becomes President Clinton’s Special Envoy to Eritrea and Ethiopia.
October 6, 1998: U.S. Special Envoy Anthony Lake arrives in Eritrea to make a second attempt at finding a peaceful solution to the five-month border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The first attempt was the US-Rwanda plan drafted by President Clinton’s Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Susan Rice. The US-Rwanda plan was terminated on June 4, 1998.
October 29, 1998: Ethiopia shelled southwestern Eritrea (Badme area). Several villages were destroyed, more than a hundred crop fields burned, and a farmer and a child instantly killed. On the same day in the Senafe area, barrages of Ethiopian shelling similarly destroyed villages, burned crop fields and killed three peasants.
November 2, 1998: The United Nations “vigorously” protested Ethiopia’s decision to expel some 30 U.N. staffers working for various U.N. agencies around Addis Ababa as “persona non grata.”
November 7-8, 1998: The Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Summit was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. At this time the OAU presented a Framework of Agreement that had 11-points. The OAU document was identical to the US-Rwanda plan. Except that the latter four points instead of eleven.
November 11, 1998: Ethiopia formally announced that it had “accepted” the OAU proposal.
November 19, 1998: The UN Security Council passes a resolution unanimously urging nations to restrict arms sales to African countries embroiled in a conflict.
December 6, 1998: U.S. Special Envoy Anthony Lake arrives in Asmara – his third visit to Eritrea.
December 12, 1998: Eritrea submitted a list of questions on the OAU’s Framework for Agreement seeking clarifications.
December 17, 1998: Three people were killed and at least 24 wounded when Ethiopia shelled the Eritrean town of Tsorona.
December 17, 1998: The OAU’s Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution began its meeting Ouagadougou. About 20 Heads of State and Government attended the meeting. The meeting endorsed the High-Level Delegation’s 11-point proposal for solving the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict.
December 18, 1998: Ethiopia formally announced that it has accepted the Proposal for a Framework Agreement as endorsed by the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou.
January 3, 1999: One thousand three hundred sixty seven (1367) Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin expelled from various towns in Ethiopia arrive in Assab. By this date, over 47,000 Eritreans had been deported from Ethiopia.
January 18, 1999: Anthony Lake, President Bill Clinton’s former National Security Advisor, once again shuttled between Addis Ababa and Asmara and held a fourth round of talks with Eritrean officials. His first round was in October 1998.
January 20, 1999: The US State Department warned US citizens against travel to Eritrea. It gave the excuse
January 29, 1999: The UN Security Council voted unanimously to support efforts made by the OAU to end the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
January 29, 1999: Amnesty International released a document on Ethiopia’s gross human rights violations of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin.
February 5, 1999: The Ethiopian government alleged Eritrean fighter planes bombed the town of Adigrat, Ethiopia. The allegation was proved to be false by independent journalists and foreign governments.
February 6, 1999: Ethiopia breaks the US-brokered air moratorium and bombs Eritrean towns and villages. Ethiopia launched a massive offensive on the Badme Front on February 6, 1999 and February 8, 1999 on the Tsorena Front.
February 6, 1999: The Ethiopian Government launched a large-scale attack against Eritrea on the Mereb-Setit Front.
February 7, 1999: The Ethiopian Government shelled the town of Adi Quala killing eight and wounding 23 civilians.
February 8, 1999: Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso and OAU Chairman for 1998-1999, called on Eritrea and Ethiopia to put an end to their fighting “immediately and without conditions.”
February 9, 1999: The Ethiopian Government declared Eritrea’s Ambassador to Ethiopia, Girma Asmerom, “persona non grata” and asked him to leave Ethiopia immediately.
February 10, 1999: The UN Security Council passed a US-drafted resolution that demanded an immediate halt to the fighting and strongly urged all states to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea.
February 12, 1999: Ethiopian authorities ordered troops who had surrounded the Eritrean Ambassador’s residence in Addis Ababa to break into his residence. Their actions violated Article 22 of the Vienna Convention which guarantees the inviolability and immunity of premises and property of diplomats and diplomatic missions.
February 14-15, 1999: Ethiopia started an offensive along the Burie Front. Eritrean defense forces shot down one MI-24 helicopter gunship.
February 16, 1999: Three Ethiopian fighter planes dropped bombs on a water reservoir near Assab.
February 17, 1999: Ethiopia attempted for the third time to attack water reservoir that it missed twice. This time its Antonov planes dropped six bombs in the area of the reservoir.
February 17, 1999: The OAU High-Level Delegation urged both Eritrea and Ethiopia to put an immediate end to the fighting and to re-commit themselves to a peaceful resolution of the dispute based on the OAU proposals for a framework agreement.
February 21, 1999: Ethiopia’s Antonov bombers targeted the airstrip in Assab dropping 12 bombs. All of the bombs missed their target. On the same day, Ethiopian Antonovs bombed the village of Mai Aini near Tsorena. They destroyed homes and property in the village killing four (4) civilians and leaving several others wounded.
February 22, 1999: The U.S. Department of State released a statement of regret of use of air strikes by Ethiopia.
February 23, 1999: Ethiopia launched yet another offensive on the Mereb-Setit (Badme) Front.
February 24, 1999: Intense fighting continued on the Mereb-Setit Front. Ethiopian forces backed by heavy artillery, mechanized units and aircraft attempted, for a second day, to dislodge Eritrean forces from their positions.
February 26, 1999: Eritrea announced to the world that Ethiopia had broken through its defense lines at one point on the Badme Front. Since this made Eritrea’s fixed defense lines vulnerable Eritrean armed forces withdrew and re-established a new frontline.
February 27, 1999: Eritrea informed the UN Security Council that it has accepted the OAU peace plan and was ready to implement it. The plan was submitted on November 8. The UN Security Council welcomed Eritrea’s decision to accept the OAU peace plan previously agreed to by Ethiopia.
February 28, 1999: Ethiopia launched a fresh offensive in the Badme area.
July 14, 1999: Eritrea accepted the Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement that was endorsed and tabled by the 35th Regular Session of the OAU Heads of States and Governments in Algiers.
July 21, 1999: Ethiopia accepts the Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement.
August 5-6, 1999: The OAU presented the Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the peace plan to Eritrea and Ethiopia on August 5 and August 6 respectively. At that time, Ethiopia requested that the Technical Arrangements be non-amendable and was written accordingly. Both countries were expected to send formal replies to President Abdulaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, the OAU Chairman.
August 7, 1999: Eritrea officially accepts the Technical Arrangements in its entirety, and commits to its full implementation. The document calls for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of troops to positions held prior to May 6, 1998, and the demarcation of the border.
August 11, 1999: Ethiopia seeks clarification on the OAU’s “unamendable” Technical Arrangements.
August 23, 1999: OAU provides clarifications to Ethiopia.
December 6, 1999: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi officially rejected the Technical Arrangements.
February 22-March 8, 2000: The United States Special Envoy, Anthony Lake, and Personal Representative of the OAU Chairman, Ahmed Ouayahia, shuttled between Asmara and Addis Ababa to get an agreement on a new document referred to as the “non-paper,” a replacement for the Technical Arrangements document.
April 1, 2000: Ethiopia rejected Eritrea’s offer to let the Port of Assab be used for shipments of food aid to avert the looming famine threatening millions of Ethiopians.
April 29-May 3, 2000: Eritrea and Ethiopia held proximity talks in Algiers. But the proximity talks failed because Ethiopia refused to sign the two substantive documents of the OAU Peace Plan: The Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation. Ethiopia also rejected a cease-fire agreement, which was the first and key provision of the OAU Peace Plan.
May 8-9, 2000: The United Nations Security Council sent seven of its ambassadors to Ethiopia and Eritrea as a “last-ditch attempt” to avert war. But the delegation’s effort bear no fruit because Ethiopia told the delegation that it had invested heavily on the war and wanted a quick return on it.
May 12, 2000: Ethiopia launched a massive offensive against Eritrea.
May 24, 2000: The OAU tabled a peace plan in order to bring about an immediate end to hostilities. Eritrea stated its readiness to respond immediately and favorably to the OAU plan and agreed to withdraw to pre-May 1998 positions. Ethiopia for its part responded by saying,
May 26, 2000: Taking advantage of Eritrea’s withdrawal and rearrangement of its defense forces, Ethiopia proceeded to occupy Senafe and Tserona, areas that were not under dispute.
May 28, 2000: Ethiopian aircraft bombed the new power plant at Hirgigo in the Northern Red Sea region of Eritrea causing serious damage to the project. The power plant, which was near completion, was financed under a loan agreement with a consortium of international financiers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Italy, OPEC and BADEA.
May 29, 2000: Ethiopia’s fighter planes bombed Asmara International Airport. The bombing sparked a grass fire at the airport and sent clouds of dirt flying over Airport Road. The attack came hours after delegations from Ethiopia and Eritrea flew to Algiers for a new round of talks.
May 30, 2000: Ethiopia-Eritrea peace talks opened in Algiers.
May 31, 2000: Ethiopia spurning UN appeal rejected calls to cease hostilities, saying it
June 2, 2000: A day after it declared the war is over, Ethiopia carried a bombing raid near Assab.
June 3, 2000: Deploying two divisions, Ethiopia opened a fresh ground attack to take the Port of Assab. The fighting was underway deep inside Eritrean territory forty kilometers from the port along a line to where Eritrean forces had withdrawn at the request of peace mediators. By the end of the day, Eritrea announced that it had foiled the Ethiopian attack, decimating Ethiopia’s 38th division and killing, wounding or capturing 3,755 Ethiopian troops.
June 4, 2000: Meles said that they
June 9, 2000: The OAU presented its Proposal on Cessation of Hostilities and asked the two parties to reply within 24 hours. Eritrea accepted the proposal within the 24-hour deadline.
June 10, 2000: Ethiopia announced that it had opened another attack on all fronts: Guluj on the west, the Assab Front, and the Senafe area. Meanwhile, OAU’s deadline for reply to its proposal passed without Ethiopia’s reply and the OAU had to extend the deadline by another week to accommodate Ethiopia. In a statement he released, Ahmed Ouyahia said,
June 14, 2000: Ethiopia said it accepted the OAU proposal for the cessation of hostilities.
June 18, 2000: Eritrea and Ethiopia sign the OAU’s Cessation of Hostilities proposal. The proposal calls for the deployment of UN peacekeeping mission under the auspices of the OAU along a 25 km temporary security zone inside Eritrea and withdrawal of Ethiopian forces to their pre-May 1998 positions.
June 30, 2000: The Security Council, by its Resolution 1312 (2000) established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) consisting of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorization.
September 15, 2000: The UN Security Council by Resolution 1320 (2000) authorized the deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,300 troops.
December 12, 2000: A Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was signed. The Peace Plan called on the parties to “permanently terminate military hostilities between them” and to refrain from the threat of use of force against each other. The Agreement, among other things, required the establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission to “delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border” and a neutral Claims Commission which would decide on claims from either side and calls for an independent investigation into the origins of the conflict.
Chronology of Events Leading up to 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian War to the Signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement
BY BEREKET KIDANE
Although May 6, 1998, is generally considered the beginning of the 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia War, a border-related conflicted started earlier. Unreported incidents went as far back as 1992.
In 1993, Tigray Administrative Region initiated “Border Rectification Project” to redraw unilaterally its border with Eritrea. Eritrean farmers were forcibly removed from their land. Crops and livestock were confiscated. Several attempts were made to resolve the problem between 1993-1996 without much progress. The problem deteriorated beginning in 1997. What follows is a partial timeline of the dispute that started initially as a border dispute, but later expanded into a much wider war.
Events leading up to the war
April 20-21, 1997: A meeting to discuss border issues that had surfaced in the course of the previous year was held in Shire, Tigray, Ethiopia between the Vice President of the Tigray Region of Ethiopia, and the Deputy Governor of the Gash-Barka Region of Eritrea.
June 22-27, 1997: A sub-committee designated in accordance with the Shire decisions met to make a tour of the “demarcations,” a length it determined at about 40 kms. It was established then that at least three demarcations, each creeping into Eritrea had been laid on the ground.
June 1997: Tigrayan authorities ordered that no Eritrean farmer was to plough fields or build houses or sheds beyond the “unilaterally demarcated” line and that the inhabitants of Eritrean villages were to be evacuated.
July 18-19, 1997: Three truckloads of Ethiopian troops entered the Badme area and planted radio communications equipment. Eritrean territory inside the “unilaterally demarcated” area was, thus, put under patrol. Subsequently, massive expulsion of Eritreans begun.
July 19, 1997: Two battalions of the Ethiopian Army came to Adi Murug and their commander met with representatives of the Eritrean Army in the area. The Ethiopians explained that they were there to chase armed Ethiopian opposition groups that they believed to be in the Badda area, and requested entry. The battalions were let in on this understanding.
July 24, 1997: Ethiopian administrators instructed the Eritrean administrators to disband – they were taking over. They declared Adi Murug Ethiopian territory and appointed their own administrative committee.
August 8, 1997: Two Eritrean officials traveled to Addis Ababa to discuss Adi Murug and Badme with their counterparts in Ethiopia.
August 16, 1997: Less than a month after the Adi Murug and Badme incidents of July 19, President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea wrote a letter to his counterpart Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia formally protesting Ethiopia’s actions. He called on the Prime Minister to take all necessary measures to put a stop to Ethiopia’s border incursions.
August 25, 1997: President Isaias Afewerki wrote another letter to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. This time suggesting that a joint border commission be set-up – the Eritrean side to be led by General Sebhat Efrem, Minister of Defense. The first meeting for this commission was scheduled for November 1997.
October 17, 1997: Weyin, the official organ of the TPLF, printed a new map of Tigray Region, which for the first time in almost a hundred years, altered Eritrea’s colonial borders with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Mapping authority also officially printed this “illegal” map of the Tigray Region. Here, the straight line linking the Setit (Tekezze) River to the Mereb River at its confluence with the Mai Anbessa had disappeared and was replaced by an oblique line entering deep into Eritrean territory.
November 1997: A joint High Commission on Demarcation met in Asmara and agreed to meet again within three months. There was no discussion on substantive matters.
January 1998: Ethiopia tried by military means to occupy sovereign Eritrean territory on the Bure area (Assab-Dessie road). Unfortunately, Eritrean efforts to solve the problem amicably and bilaterally failed as the Government of Ethiopia continued to bring under its occupation the Eritrean territories that it had incorporated into its map.
War Breaks Out
May 6, 1998: Ethiopian troops fired at an Eritrean patrol unit on routine duty along the border around Badme. It triggered a chain of reaction on both sides and several people were killed.
May 13, 1998: The Ethiopian Parliament declared war on Eritrea.
May 14, 1998: The Eritrean Government called for peace and invited neutral parties to examine the circumstances leading to the incident on May 6.
May 14, 1998: The Cabinet of Ministers of the Government of Eritrea proposed a five-point peace plan.
May 15, 1998: The Government of Eritrea expressed its readiness to accept an independent inspection by any third party to verify the facts of the matter on the ground.1. The Government of Eritrea condemns the logic of force as it firmly knows and upholds that border disputes of any kind can only be resolved through peaceful and legal means, and not through military means.
2. On the basis of this principle, each party shall publicly announce to the peoples of Eritrea, Ethiopia and the international community the territories that it claims – if any – and designate them on the political map with clear geographical coordinates. Each party shall also accept that the dispute can not, and should not, be resolved by force, but through peaceful negotiations.
3. Both parties shall agree that all negotiations and understandings shall be carried out in the presence and through the mediation of a Third Party. The latter will act as a witness and guarantor.
4. Areas under “dispute” shall be demilitarized temporarily and be free from the presence of armies of both countries. The enforcement of this understanding shall be guaranteed by the Third Party.
5. If the above proposal for resolving the dispute through the involvement of a Third Party and without complications is not acceptable, the matter is to be referred to an international adjudication.
May 30-31, 1998: US-Rwanda Peace Plan presented to Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Governments of the United States and Rwanda, in an attempt to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, presented both parties a four-point peace plan.
June 1, 1998: While the US-Rwanda Peace Plan was under discussion, Ethiopia launched an attack on Eritrea along the Ambesete-Gleba area.
June 3, 1998: The State Department issued the following statement:
June 4-5, 1998: Ethiopia, while announcing acceptance of the US-Rwanda Peace Plan went ahead and bombed the Eritrean capital, Asmara. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, while announcing his government’s “acceptance” of the US-Rwanda plan, ordered his troops to attack Eritrea.the United States and Rwanda regret that these recommendations have not yet been accepted by both sides as the basis for a peaceful resolution of this dispute.
June 5, 1998: (morning): The Eritrean Government issued the following statement:
Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1998.The four-point recommendations that have evolved in the facilitation process address the paramount issues that the Government of Eritrea has been raising and are, therefore, not controversial at all to the Government of Eritrea. At the same time, the Government of Eritrea believes that the facilitation process has not been consummated and that there are still serious issues of detail and implementation that need to be worked out in the period ahead.
June 5, 1998: At 14:00 and 14:30 hours, local time, Ethiopian fighter planes launched an air strike on Asmara. They hit Asmara International Airport, killing and wounding 30 people, and damaging a Zambian cargo plane parked on the runway. About an hour later, an Eritrean plane retaliated by hitting military targets in Makelle, Ethiopia – destroying several Ethiopian fighter planes. Inadvertently, it also hit an elementary school near the airport killing and wounding 47 people. The Eritrean Government apologized for the incident.
June 6, 1998: At 09:40 hours local time, two Ethiopian fighter planes bombed the southern outskirts of Asmara; because of Ethiopia’s imposition of indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, most foreigners living in Asmara were evacuated. An Ethiopian fighter jet (a MiG 23) was shot down by Eritrea’s Air Defense Units. Ethiopia further imposed an air blockade and maritime access blockade to Eritrean ports through the threat of incessant and indiscriminate air bombing.
June 10, 1998: In violation of the agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia that citizens of each country do not need visas to visit the other country, Ethiopia instructed all carriers not to board Eritreans who do not have a valid visa to Ethiopia.
June 11, 1998: Eritrea called on the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to take urgent measures to ensure the safety of international air and maritime navigation in the area.
June 12, 1998: Ethiopia announced that it was expelling an unspecified number of civilian Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin in the country for “security reasons”
June 12, 1998: Eritrean Air Force pilots bombed military targets in Adi Grat.
June 13, 1998: The Government of Ethiopia ordered the deportation of thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin from the country; it also fired thousands of others from their jobs.
June 14, 1998: The Governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia accepted the proposal put forward by the United States Government on a total ban of air strikes by both sides.
June 17, 1998: Ethiopia begins large-scale deportations. About 800 Eritrean residents of Ethiopia arrived at the Eritrean border town of Um Hajer in the southwestern tip of the country.
June 25, 1998: The Government of Ethiopia ordered the families of the deported to mortgage their businesses and property and leave the country within one month. By this time, the number of deportees was about 1150, most of them were prominent businessmen and professionals.
June 26, 1998: The Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that condemned “the use of force” and demanded,
June 10, 1998: OAU calls for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its 34th Summit in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, called for a peaceful solution to the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict.both parties immediately cease hostilities and refrain from further use of force.
July 1, 1998: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) Mrs. Mary Robinson expressed her serious concern over Ethiopian expulsions of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin from Ethiopia.
July 1, 1998: Ambassadors from Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Rwanda and Zambia held talks with Eritrean officials as part of an initiative by the OAU, following the failed US-Rwanda Plan.
July 9, 1998: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, in an interview with Ethiopian television and in reaction to Mary Robinson’s statement about Ethiopia’s human rights violations, boasts that his government
July 11, 1998: Following Meles’ speech that Ethiopia can deport even for not liking someone’s color of eyes, by Ethiopian admission, more than 2400 Eritreans were rounded up, 1000 in Addis Ababa alone. They were deported the next day.has the unrestricted right to expel any foreigner from the country for any reason whatsoever…Any foreigner, whether Eritrean or Japanese lives in Ethiopia because of the good will of the Ethiopian government. If the Ethiopian government says 'Go' because we don’t like the color of your eyes, they have to leave.
Aug 1-2, 1998: The Organization of African Unity Ministerial Committee met for two days of talks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Its main aim was to resolve the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
August 6, 1998: The US Department of State issued a statement condemning the detention and expulsion of Eritreans from Ethiopia and called on the Ethiopian Government to respect international human rights norms and standards.
August 6-12, 1998: About three thousand Eritreans expelled from Ethiopia arrive in Eritrea. Some of them came through the border town of Zalambessa. The number of Eritrean deportees from Ethiopia reaches over 16,000.
August 13, 1998: Ethiopia gave Eritreans working for international organizations and embassies in Addis Ababa one month to leave the country. The Ethiopian government also admitted that it had served notice to some 87 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin working in embassies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to leave the country.
September 16, 1998: The US Government communicated to Eritrea its desire to launch a new initiative. This new initiative was to be led by Mr. Anthony Lake, the former National Security Advisor (1993-1997) under President Bill Clinton. Mr. Anthony Lake becomes President Clinton’s Special Envoy to Eritrea and Ethiopia.
October 6, 1998: U.S. Special Envoy Anthony Lake arrives in Eritrea to make a second attempt at finding a peaceful solution to the five-month border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The first attempt was the US-Rwanda plan drafted by President Clinton’s Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Susan Rice. The US-Rwanda plan was terminated on June 4, 1998.
October 29, 1998: Ethiopia shelled southwestern Eritrea (Badme area). Several villages were destroyed, more than a hundred crop fields burned, and a farmer and a child instantly killed. On the same day in the Senafe area, barrages of Ethiopian shelling similarly destroyed villages, burned crop fields and killed three peasants.
November 2, 1998: The United Nations “vigorously” protested Ethiopia’s decision to expel some 30 U.N. staffers working for various U.N. agencies around Addis Ababa as “persona non grata.”
November 7-8, 1998: The Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Summit was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. At this time the OAU presented a Framework of Agreement that had 11-points. The OAU document was identical to the US-Rwanda plan. Except that the latter four points instead of eleven.
November 11, 1998: Ethiopia formally announced that it had “accepted” the OAU proposal.
November 19, 1998: The UN Security Council passes a resolution unanimously urging nations to restrict arms sales to African countries embroiled in a conflict.
December 6, 1998: U.S. Special Envoy Anthony Lake arrives in Asmara – his third visit to Eritrea.
December 12, 1998: Eritrea submitted a list of questions on the OAU’s Framework for Agreement seeking clarifications.
December 17, 1998: Three people were killed and at least 24 wounded when Ethiopia shelled the Eritrean town of Tsorona.
December 17, 1998: The OAU’s Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution began its meeting Ouagadougou. About 20 Heads of State and Government attended the meeting. The meeting endorsed the High-Level Delegation’s 11-point proposal for solving the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict.
December 18, 1998: Ethiopia formally announced that it has accepted the Proposal for a Framework Agreement as endorsed by the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou.
January 3, 1999: One thousand three hundred sixty seven (1367) Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin expelled from various towns in Ethiopia arrive in Assab. By this date, over 47,000 Eritreans had been deported from Ethiopia.
January 18, 1999: Anthony Lake, President Bill Clinton’s former National Security Advisor, once again shuttled between Addis Ababa and Asmara and held a fourth round of talks with Eritrean officials. His first round was in October 1998.
January 20, 1999: The US State Department warned US citizens against travel to Eritrea. It gave the excuse
January 26, 1999: The OAU gave a reply to the 26 questions Eritrea raised on the framework agreement on December 12, 1998. The OAU took forty five (45) days to reply.given the continuing tensions and the possibility for renewed tensions.
January 29, 1999: The UN Security Council voted unanimously to support efforts made by the OAU to end the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
January 29, 1999: Amnesty International released a document on Ethiopia’s gross human rights violations of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin.
February 5, 1999: The Ethiopian government alleged Eritrean fighter planes bombed the town of Adigrat, Ethiopia. The allegation was proved to be false by independent journalists and foreign governments.
February 6, 1999: Ethiopia breaks the US-brokered air moratorium and bombs Eritrean towns and villages. Ethiopia launched a massive offensive on the Badme Front on February 6, 1999 and February 8, 1999 on the Tsorena Front.
February 6, 1999: The Ethiopian Government launched a large-scale attack against Eritrea on the Mereb-Setit Front.
February 7, 1999: The Ethiopian Government shelled the town of Adi Quala killing eight and wounding 23 civilians.
February 8, 1999: Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso and OAU Chairman for 1998-1999, called on Eritrea and Ethiopia to put an end to their fighting “immediately and without conditions.”
February 9, 1999: The Ethiopian Government declared Eritrea’s Ambassador to Ethiopia, Girma Asmerom, “persona non grata” and asked him to leave Ethiopia immediately.
February 10, 1999: The UN Security Council passed a US-drafted resolution that demanded an immediate halt to the fighting and strongly urged all states to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea.
February 12, 1999: Ethiopian authorities ordered troops who had surrounded the Eritrean Ambassador’s residence in Addis Ababa to break into his residence. Their actions violated Article 22 of the Vienna Convention which guarantees the inviolability and immunity of premises and property of diplomats and diplomatic missions.
February 14-15, 1999: Ethiopia started an offensive along the Burie Front. Eritrean defense forces shot down one MI-24 helicopter gunship.
February 16, 1999: Three Ethiopian fighter planes dropped bombs on a water reservoir near Assab.
February 17, 1999: Ethiopia attempted for the third time to attack water reservoir that it missed twice. This time its Antonov planes dropped six bombs in the area of the reservoir.
February 17, 1999: The OAU High-Level Delegation urged both Eritrea and Ethiopia to put an immediate end to the fighting and to re-commit themselves to a peaceful resolution of the dispute based on the OAU proposals for a framework agreement.
February 21, 1999: Ethiopia’s Antonov bombers targeted the airstrip in Assab dropping 12 bombs. All of the bombs missed their target. On the same day, Ethiopian Antonovs bombed the village of Mai Aini near Tsorena. They destroyed homes and property in the village killing four (4) civilians and leaving several others wounded.
February 22, 1999: The U.S. Department of State released a statement of regret of use of air strikes by Ethiopia.
February 23, 1999: Ethiopia launched yet another offensive on the Mereb-Setit (Badme) Front.
February 24, 1999: Intense fighting continued on the Mereb-Setit Front. Ethiopian forces backed by heavy artillery, mechanized units and aircraft attempted, for a second day, to dislodge Eritrean forces from their positions.
February 26, 1999: Eritrea announced to the world that Ethiopia had broken through its defense lines at one point on the Badme Front. Since this made Eritrea’s fixed defense lines vulnerable Eritrean armed forces withdrew and re-established a new frontline.
February 27, 1999: Eritrea informed the UN Security Council that it has accepted the OAU peace plan and was ready to implement it. The plan was submitted on November 8. The UN Security Council welcomed Eritrea’s decision to accept the OAU peace plan previously agreed to by Ethiopia.
February 28, 1999: Ethiopia launched a fresh offensive in the Badme area.
July 14, 1999: Eritrea accepted the Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement that was endorsed and tabled by the 35th Regular Session of the OAU Heads of States and Governments in Algiers.
July 21, 1999: Ethiopia accepts the Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement.
August 5-6, 1999: The OAU presented the Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the peace plan to Eritrea and Ethiopia on August 5 and August 6 respectively. At that time, Ethiopia requested that the Technical Arrangements be non-amendable and was written accordingly. Both countries were expected to send formal replies to President Abdulaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, the OAU Chairman.
August 7, 1999: Eritrea officially accepts the Technical Arrangements in its entirety, and commits to its full implementation. The document calls for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of troops to positions held prior to May 6, 1998, and the demarcation of the border.
August 11, 1999: Ethiopia seeks clarification on the OAU’s “unamendable” Technical Arrangements.
August 23, 1999: OAU provides clarifications to Ethiopia.
December 6, 1999: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi officially rejected the Technical Arrangements.
February 22-March 8, 2000: The United States Special Envoy, Anthony Lake, and Personal Representative of the OAU Chairman, Ahmed Ouayahia, shuttled between Asmara and Addis Ababa to get an agreement on a new document referred to as the “non-paper,” a replacement for the Technical Arrangements document.
April 1, 2000: Ethiopia rejected Eritrea’s offer to let the Port of Assab be used for shipments of food aid to avert the looming famine threatening millions of Ethiopians.
April 29-May 3, 2000: Eritrea and Ethiopia held proximity talks in Algiers. But the proximity talks failed because Ethiopia refused to sign the two substantive documents of the OAU Peace Plan: The Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Implementation. Ethiopia also rejected a cease-fire agreement, which was the first and key provision of the OAU Peace Plan.
May 8-9, 2000: The United Nations Security Council sent seven of its ambassadors to Ethiopia and Eritrea as a “last-ditch attempt” to avert war. But the delegation’s effort bear no fruit because Ethiopia told the delegation that it had invested heavily on the war and wanted a quick return on it.
May 12, 2000: Ethiopia launched a massive offensive against Eritrea.
May 24, 2000: The OAU tabled a peace plan in order to bring about an immediate end to hostilities. Eritrea stated its readiness to respond immediately and favorably to the OAU plan and agreed to withdraw to pre-May 1998 positions. Ethiopia for its part responded by saying,
May 25, 2000: Eritrea completed withdrawing to pre May 1998 positions. However, President Bouteflika of Algeria informed Eritrea that the Ethiopian government was asking that Eritrea redeploy form additional places referred to as Bada and Burie. Bada and Burie were territories where there was no Ethiopian presence to May 6, 1998. Eritrea nonetheless formally informed the OAU Chairman that it commits itself to re-deploy its troops from Bada and Burie in order to deny Ethiopia any pretext.We shall negotiate while we fight and fight while we negotiate.
May 26, 2000: Taking advantage of Eritrea’s withdrawal and rearrangement of its defense forces, Ethiopia proceeded to occupy Senafe and Tserona, areas that were not under dispute.
May 28, 2000: Ethiopian aircraft bombed the new power plant at Hirgigo in the Northern Red Sea region of Eritrea causing serious damage to the project. The power plant, which was near completion, was financed under a loan agreement with a consortium of international financiers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Italy, OPEC and BADEA.
May 29, 2000: Ethiopia’s fighter planes bombed Asmara International Airport. The bombing sparked a grass fire at the airport and sent clouds of dirt flying over Airport Road. The attack came hours after delegations from Ethiopia and Eritrea flew to Algiers for a new round of talks.
May 30, 2000: Ethiopia-Eritrea peace talks opened in Algiers.
May 31, 2000: Ethiopia spurning UN appeal rejected calls to cease hostilities, saying it
June 1, 2000: Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia declares the two-year border war has ended.will not abandon its campaign until it has met all of its military objectives.
June 2, 2000: A day after it declared the war is over, Ethiopia carried a bombing raid near Assab.
June 3, 2000: Deploying two divisions, Ethiopia opened a fresh ground attack to take the Port of Assab. The fighting was underway deep inside Eritrean territory forty kilometers from the port along a line to where Eritrean forces had withdrawn at the request of peace mediators. By the end of the day, Eritrea announced that it had foiled the Ethiopian attack, decimating Ethiopia’s 38th division and killing, wounding or capturing 3,755 Ethiopian troops.
June 4, 2000: Meles said that they
June 8, 2000: Ethiopia launched another attack on the Assab Front. The attack involved three divisions or more than 20,000 troops.have proposed at the Algiers talks that the government in Asmara sign an agreement that it would not again start war with Ethiopia and that the highland areas (inside Eritrea) controlled by our defence forces be placed under international peace-keeping force when Ethiopian forces are evacuated.
June 9, 2000: The OAU presented its Proposal on Cessation of Hostilities and asked the two parties to reply within 24 hours. Eritrea accepted the proposal within the 24-hour deadline.
June 10, 2000: Ethiopia announced that it had opened another attack on all fronts: Guluj on the west, the Assab Front, and the Senafe area. Meanwhile, OAU’s deadline for reply to its proposal passed without Ethiopia’s reply and the OAU had to extend the deadline by another week to accommodate Ethiopia. In a statement he released, Ahmed Ouyahia said,
June 12, 2000: Eritrea announced that it had foiled the large-scale offensive on the Assab Front. Eritrea also announced that its defense forces had dislodged the Ethiopians from strategic and commanding heights on the Senafe Front after a daylong battle.We gave the two parties a one-week deadline to attend a ceremony to sign the cessation of hostilities in Algiers.
June 14, 2000: Ethiopia said it accepted the OAU proposal for the cessation of hostilities.
June 18, 2000: Eritrea and Ethiopia sign the OAU’s Cessation of Hostilities proposal. The proposal calls for the deployment of UN peacekeeping mission under the auspices of the OAU along a 25 km temporary security zone inside Eritrea and withdrawal of Ethiopian forces to their pre-May 1998 positions.
June 30, 2000: The Security Council, by its Resolution 1312 (2000) established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) consisting of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorization.
September 15, 2000: The UN Security Council by Resolution 1320 (2000) authorized the deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,300 troops.
December 12, 2000: A Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was signed. The Peace Plan called on the parties to “permanently terminate military hostilities between them” and to refrain from the threat of use of force against each other. The Agreement, among other things, required the establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission to “delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border” and a neutral Claims Commission which would decide on claims from either side and calls for an independent investigation into the origins of the conflict.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
The nobility we grew with/How can people live with out Christ?Sadacha Macca wrote: ↑18 Jul 2019, 17:42Source:
Shattered illusion, broken promise: essays on the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict (1998-2000)
By: Tekie Fessehatzion, pages 70-77.
Some EPLF members were training some TPLF members in fighting, in sahel, I believe.
The eritrean elders, noticed the obviously different tigrinya the tplf recruits were speaking, and grew suspicious.
Some asked the eplf: ''who are these men?''
they are tplf members, from tigray.
Elders then replied: ''sons, if you must train them, do it in their lands, otherwise, they will learn the terrain of eritrea and use it against us one day. do not trust them! we know them very well.''
the eplf members shrugged it off and assumed that the elders were just being overly paranoid...
the rest was/is history, and the elders were proven to be right.
moral of the story is two fold: 1) never trust agames politically, even if you think you have a common goal or interest, always keep an eye on them, and 2) listen to your elders! in oromo culture, the elders are highly revered. if you disrespect one, the entire community will not speak to you, they will be ashamed of you, etc.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Zombie,EEBC determined Badme village belongs to Eritrea; wedi komarit started the war. Final & binding.
Are you saying Michael Matheson and the Boundary Commission are fuzo?
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/13 ... age-awards...Among the more significant holdings of the Commission were: that Eritrea unlawfully invaded Ethiopian-controlled territory at the start of the conflict,[5]unlawfully conducted or permitted the killing, rape or abduction of civilians and the looting of property,[6] abused or provided improper care and treatment to Ethiopian prisoners of war,[7] and failed to provide expelled civilians with appropriate protection and treatment;[8]...
About the Author
Michael Matheson, a member of ASIL and the AJIL Board of Editors, is on the international law faculty of the George Washington University Law School. He was formerly Acting Legal Adviser at the U.S. State Department and a member of the UN International Law Commission.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Don't tell me this guy is Tigrawai. He fought against the woyane while you mother focken zombies were eating hamburgers. Motha fockers.
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Zombies,.
Watch "Wedi Tikabo song from Sawa ERI-Youth Festival 2012" on YouTube
Watch "Wedi Tikabo song from Sawa ERI-Youth Festival 2012" on YouTube
Re: Eritrean elders proven to be correct
Watch "Eritrean Song Kemu Eyu Zelo tiWere - Taniqo and Wedi Tikabo" on YouTube