How Habesha Elites Pushed Me to Support the “OPDO” I Used to Hate!
By Fayyis Oropia
Nowadays, when Habesha elites curse the OPDO, it often sounds like a code word for opposing anything Oromo. To oppose the Oromo right to Finfinne and to sabotage the promotion of Oromic as a working language of the federation, many Habesha elites denounce the OPDO as the cause of their political losses. If the OPDO is responsible for such national gains for the Oromo, then I am a supporter of the OPDO I once hated.
I actually commend Dr. Abiy Ahmed and his party for moving toward promoting Oromummà rather than attempting to preserve the historically Amharic-dominated Ethiopian political order. Such a political position suggests that the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) is becoming increasingly influenced by the OLF mindset of sovereignty and moving away from the OPDO mindset of servitude.
The intensifying tensions between the hybrid political regime of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and segments of the Amhara elite within the broader Habesha political sphere represent a significant development in contemporary Ethiopian politics. This moment may be interpreted through the well-known observation attributed to Dr. Léncô Latà: “When Amhara elites support me, I ask myself whether I have done something wrong; when they oppose me, I know I am doing the right thing.” Viewed from this perspective, the current confrontation may indicate an important shift in Ethiopia’s political alignment.
As Dr. Abiy came to power through the sacrifices of Oromo youth—the Qérrô and Qarré movements—Amhara elites quickly sought to win him over to their side. They did everything possible to instrumentalize him, much as they had previously done with Mengistu H. Ayàna during the Derg era. To some extent, they succeeded, as Dr. Abiy cracked down on genuine Oromo liberation forces. Over time, however, they lost confidence in him and eventually sought to remove him from power. Today, they denounce him and his administration as an “oppressive, racist OPDO.” In current political discourse, “OPDO regime” has become a code word replacing the phrase “evil Oromummà,” which had previously been used to demonize Oromo political aspirations.
The emerging divide between the northern hegemonist forces—often associated with Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane—and the ruling Prosperity Party (Biltsiginna) suggests that the Prime Minister may be recalibrating his political position. This repositioning appears to bring him closer to Oromo political constituencies, whether out of strategic necessity or evolving political conviction. Attempting to balance fundamentally opposing political blocs has become increasingly untenable, illustrating the political risks of divided loyalties.
Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to maintain support among both Amhara and Oromo elites have gradually eroded trust on both sides. Initially benefiting from broad-based support, his administration has struggled to satisfy the divergent expectations of these constituencies. More recent indications of alignment with Oromo interests have further alienated segments of his earlier Amhara support base. If this shift proves substantive rather than tactical, it may represent a move toward greater political coherence. Policy measures such as elevating Afaan Oromoo within federal institutions could further signal a meaningful departure from historically entrenched linguistic hierarchies.
Ethiopian political history reveals recurring patterns of alliance and instrumentalization. Under Menelik II, figures such as Gobana played pivotal roles before eventually falling out of favor. Likewise, Emperor Haile Selassie confronted political challenges involving Lij Iyasu, while the Derg regime under Mengistu H. Ayàna executed Haile Fida. More recently, the imprisonment of Jawar Mohammed reflects similar tensions. In each instance, Oromo actors were incorporated into state structures in ways that often undermined independent Oromo political aspirations.
During the 1974 Revolution, despite substantial Oromo participation, political power ultimately consolidated under Mengistu H. Ayàna, whose government suppressed ethno-political movements, including Oromo nationalism. This pattern underscores the broader dynamic in which centralized state authority has frequently overridden the political agency of Ethiopia’s constituent national groups.
Comparable dynamics have persisted in the contemporary period. Although Oromo participation was instrumental in the political transition that brought Abiy Ahmed to power, the Prosperity Party leadership maintained core elements of centralized governance and linguistic continuity. This approach contributed to conflicts involving both the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), reflecting unresolved tensions within Ethiopia’s multinational political framework.
Historically, resistance to the Naftagna system—associated with cultural and political centralization—has been widespread among Ethiopia’s diverse national groups. Critics argue that elements of this system continue to persist within contemporary political institutions. Opposition movements, including Oromo and Tigrayan forces, continue to challenge these structures, although their efforts have been complicated by fragmentation and political ambiguity.
Within Oromo political discourse, skepticism is growing regarding the prospects for meaningful reform within existing institutional arrangements. Longstanding arguments advanced by organizations such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)—namely, that the Ethiopian state structure resists substantive democratization—are receiving renewed attention.
The characterization of certain political actors as “pan-Ethiopian” has also come under increased scrutiny. Critics contend that this label may obscure underlying continuities in linguistic and cultural dominance, particularly the continued privileging of Amharic within federal institutions. This has implications for political participation and representation, especially for non-Amharic-speaking populations.
At the same time, there are indications of evolving perspectives among segments of Amhara political thought, including greater engagement with concepts such as internal colonization. Such developments may create opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between Oromo and Amhara political actors. In this context, the principal point of contention is increasingly framed as the structure and direction of the current political system rather than as interethnic rivalry.
Expectations of external support for democratization also warrant critical reassessment. Historical experience suggests that international actors often prioritize stability and strategic interests over transformative political change. As a result, domestic political agency remains the decisive factor in shaping Ethiopia’s future political trajectory.
Looking ahead, the political evolution of the Horn of Africa may be significantly influenced by the relationship between Oromo and Amhara political forces. Constructive engagement between these groups could play a role comparable to other historical examples of regional cooperation. Such collaboration, however, would require mutual recognition, political equality, and a shared commitment to democratic principles.
The Prosperity Party continues to face opposition from multiple fronts while also employing strategies aimed at preventing unified resistance. These include political fragmentation, narrative control, and the exacerbation of societal divisions. Addressing these challenges will require both greater internal cohesion within political movements and broader coalition-building efforts.
Ultimately, sustainable political transformation in Ethiopia will depend on the ability of its diverse national groups to articulate a shared vision grounded in equality, self-governance, and voluntary cooperation. Whether pursued through a strengthened federal system or alternative constitutional arrangements, the emphasis is likely to remain on creating inclusive political institutions capable of accommodating the country’s complex social fabric.
In this context, the central political challenge remains clear: achieving systemic reform while avoiding further polarization. From this perspective, the rejection of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed by northern hegemonist forces may be interpreted as an indication that he is moving in the direction described by Dr. Léncô Latà’s observation.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/1 ... -h-mariam/