Is Dr. Abiy Becoming an Oromo Hero as an Oropianist?
By Fayyis Oropia
Nowadays, we are hearing that Dr. Abiy Ahmed is interested in dismantling the existing ethnic federal system in order to establish a geographic federation. That is not necessarily a bad idea, but the key question is: What kind of geographic federation? Will it be one dominated by Amharic (i.e., Amapia), or one led by Oromic (i.e., Oropia)? If he is a promoter of Oropia, then he is truly my hero. If he is moving the country back toward Amapia, then he is certainly my zero.
Judging from his recent interviews and from the fact that Oromic is expected to become the leading federal working language, the probability of a return to Amapia appears minimal, while the possibility of moving toward Oropia seems much greater. I believe it is time for Oromo nationalists to support the Prime Minister if this direction is genuine. His efforts to highlight the Oromo historical presence in northern Ethiopia and his vision of reuniting Eritrea with a future Oropia are, from this perspective, commendable.
Ethiopia’s contemporary political crisis is frequently framed as a contest between two competing ideological and national projects: Amharanet, which seeks to preserve the historical dominance of the Amharic language and Abyssinian political culture, and Oromummà, which represents not only Oromo liberation but also the broader struggle of Ethiopia’s historically marginalized nations. Within this polarized context, political leaders—particularly those occupying the highest offices of state—are often viewed as aligned decisively with one camp or the other.
In this framework, Oromummà extends beyond Oromo identity alone. It symbolically encompasses the aspirations of other historically marginalized communities, including the Tigrayan, Somali, Afar, Gurage, Sidama, and many others whose political, cultural, and linguistic rights have long been subordinated to Amharic within the Ethiopian state.
Against this backdrop, Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s political identity and trajectory invite critical examination. Rising to power on the momentum of the Qérrô movement, which embodied Oromo youth resistance and demands for structural change, Dr. Abiy was initially perceived as a product of the Oromo liberation struggle. However, his record in office raises a fundamental question: Does he represent a strategic defender of Amharanet, or an Oromo leader whose political orientation ultimately reinforces Amharic dominance?
If Abiy Ahmed is best understood as an elite aligned with Amharanet, his rise may be interpreted as a calculated strategy that successfully mobilized Oromo grievances to stabilize and preserve Ethiopia’s traditional power structures. If, on the other hand, he is viewed as an Oromo leader disconnected from Oromummà, then his leadership reflects a recurring historical pattern in which Oromo elites, once empowered, distance themselves from the liberation project that enabled their rise.
Historically, Oromo individuals have held prominent positions within Ethiopian governments, yet many adopted Amharic cultural and political norms rather than advancing Oromummà. From this perspective, Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s leadership represents not merely political pragmatism but a significant departure from the Oromo liberation agenda. His administration’s actions—including the marginalization of Oromo nationalist voices and the repression of key Oromo political organizations—have reinforced this perception.
Notably, even segments of the Oromo nationalist movement, including factions associated with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), initially supported Abiy Ahmed. Over time, however, that support has diminished as Oromo language, symbolism, and political priorities have, in the view of many critics, been sidelined in favor of a renewed emphasis on Ethiopian unity expressed through the dominance of Amharic political culture. The contrast with leaders such as Bulcha Demeksa, who asserted Oromo linguistic rights even under difficult political circumstances, has become increasingly apparent.
Dr. Abiy may therefore be described as a complex figure shaped by multiple identities—biological, marital, and ideological. Yet his political conduct suggests a stronger affinity with Amharanet than with Oromummà. Through this orientation, his administration has effectively curtailed the growing influence of Oromo nationalism and the broader liberation movements of Ethiopia’s historically marginalized peoples.
This shift has had significant political consequences. In the lead-up to the 2021 elections, pro-Amharanet elites increasingly viewed Abiy’s leadership as an opportunity to reclaim influence through the language of reform, democracy, and national unity. Meanwhile, the Oromo liberation project has, in the eyes of many observers, experienced what may be regarded as its third major setback, following the turning points of 1974, 1992, and the current political transition.
Each of these historical moments reflects a similar pattern: Oromo-led political change being undermined from within. After 1974, the Mengistu regime dismantled Oromo nationalist forces. In the early 1990s, Oromo political elites aligned with dominant external actors, weakening Oromo self-determination. Today, critics argue that Abiy Ahmed’s administration has again marginalized Oromo nationalists, suppressed dissent, and enabled the re-emergence of traditional ruling elites.
The growing division among Oromo political actors, particularly between pro- and anti-Abiy factions, has further weakened the Oromummà movement. This fragmentation has created strategic opportunities for entrenched power structures to reassert themselves.
One of the most troubling manifestations of this crisis is the armed conflict between the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces under Abiy’s command. While some initially viewed this confrontation as a strategic maneuver against centralized domination, the imprisonment and intimidation of OLF leaders undermine that interpretation. If these actions are not part of a broader and carefully coordinated strategy, they represent a serious political miscalculation.
Despite internal weaknesses and leadership challenges, the OLF remains a powerful symbol of bilisummà (freedom) for many Oromo. Efforts to dismantle or delegitimize it are therefore widely perceived as attacks on the Oromo liberation struggle itself. Through these actions, the Prosperity Party, once viewed by some as a transitional vehicle for reform, has increasingly come to resemble earlier Ethiopian ruling elites.
At this critical moment, Dr. Abiy and his party face a defining choice: either realign with genuine Oromo liberation forces and facilitate a transfer of power consistent with Oromo self-determination, or continue reinforcing a centralized political system that many Oromo regard as historically hostile to their aspirations. The former path offers the possibility of historical redemption; the latter risks permanent alienation from Oromo political consciousness.
Finally, it is important to clarify common misconceptions regarding divisions within the OLF. Although the organization currently operates through multiple factions, its foundational objective remains unchanged: securing the Oromo people’s right to self-determination. Differences among OLF factions reflect strategic disagreements shaped by changing political circumstances rather than any abandonment of core principles. These strategies range from independence within a voluntary union of free nations, to self-determination through a referendum, to complete independence outside such a union.
As the International Crisis Group has observed, despite organizational fragmentation, the OLF continues to hold profound symbolic and emotional significance for many Oromos. This enduring legitimacy is rooted not merely in organizational structures but in a deeply internalized liberation consciousness shared by millions.
Political rhetoric may change, and tactical positions may evolve, but the underlying conviction remains the same: the Oromo people will determine their own political future. Attempts to dilute, delay, or delegitimize this aspiration have repeatedly failed and, according to this perspective, will continue to fail.
The struggle for Oromummà endures—not only as an organized political movement but also as a collective national consciousness. Its journey may be long and contested, but its direction remains unchanged.
Galatôma.
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/0 ... pid-oromo/