Is the OLA Pursuing Heftegna Without Scrutinizing Seftegna? A Critical Reflection
By Fayyis Oromia*
Recent political developments in Ethiopia invite comparison with the transformative events of 1991. In the current context, actors commonly described as Seftegna (Semenawi-neftegna)—including groups such as Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane—appear to be coordinating political strategies in opposition to what is characterized here as a Heftegna (Hybrid-neftegna) government based in Finfinne. Central to this dynamic is the perceived effort by Seftegna-aligned forces to identify and cultivate proxy actors, particularly within emerging Neo-OPDO circles, who might mobilize Oromo constituencies in support of broader strategic objectives.
Within this framework, concerns have emerged regarding the potential involvement of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in such a role. This possibility warrants careful consideration. Oromo political elites are urged to avoid repeating historical patterns in which legitimate popular grievances were instrumentalized by more experienced regional actors pursuing their own agendas. While opposition to the repressive and authoritarian tendencies attributed to the current administration under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed may be justified, such opposition should not facilitate the re-emergence of political forces whose past governance records have been associated with exclusion and conflict. Historical precedent suggests that such outcomes could prove detrimental.
It is widely argued that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed operates within an ideological framework that privileges the dominance of the Amharic language and the broader political culture often referred to as Amharanet. His continued support for Amharic as the sole federal working language—despite the demographic and historical significance of Afaan Oromo—has been interpreted as reflective of this orientation. Political actors invested in maintaining Amharic cultural and linguistic primacy have, in this view, found alignment with Abiy Ahmed’s leadership.
The political positioning of Jawar Mohammed, however, remains subject to differing interpretations. Some observers regard him as aligned with Seftegna elite interests, while others see him as a strategic actor attempting to navigate and challenge entrenched power structures. Oromo society is presently marked by significant internal divisions, including opposing stances toward both Abiy Ahmed and Jawar Mohammed. This polarization raises an important question: whether these figures are functioning as unifying leaders or contributing to deeper fragmentation within Oromo politics.
Abiy Ahmed: Integrator or Divider?
In public speeches, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has invoked two distinct strands of Oromo historical identity. On one hand, he has acknowledged Oromo nationalist figures such as Mamo Mezemer and Alemu Qixessa, associated with struggles for Oromian self-determination. On the other, he has referenced individuals linked to Ethiopianist traditions, including Habtegiorgis Dinagde and Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin.
Historically, Oromo political elites have struggled to reconcile these narratives. Elements within the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) have emphasized Oromianist perspectives, while segments of the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) have foregrounded Ethiopianist interpretations. Although Abiy Ahmed’s rhetoric may appear to bridge these traditions, his governance has, in practice, been associated with increasing polarization. Oromo political actors have become divided between anti-Abiy currents and pro-government loyalists.
The Prime Minister now faces a critical decision: to continue along a path that risks further fragmentation or to pursue meaningful political reintegration. Such a shift would likely require tangible measures, including the release of political prisoners and the initiation of inclusive dialogue with opposition groups such as the OLF and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). Absent such steps, there is a risk of further alienation among Oromo constituencies.
Centralization and the Question of Timing
The administration’s perceived inclination toward centralizing state power, potentially at the expense of Ethiopia’s ethnofederal system, raises questions about both timing and feasibility. While a more centralized, pan-Ethiopian framework may hold theoretical appeal, critics argue that it fails to account for ongoing concerns regarding cultural and political marginalization, particularly among the Oromo.
In this context, ethnofederalism is often viewed as a necessary transitional arrangement. Its continued relevance is tied to the need to safeguard linguistic, cultural, and political rights. Any future evolution toward a more integrated federal model would likely require the meaningful inclusion of Afaan Oromo as a central component of national governance, rather than a peripheral one. The extent to which current policies advance or undermine this goal remains a matter of debate.
Oromo Political Futures: Leadership or Liberation
Two broad strategic pathways are frequently identified for the Oromo political project: pursuing transformative leadership within Ethiopia or seeking full political independence. The former would require a redefinition of Ethiopian national identity in a manner that places Oromo language, culture, and political agency at its core. Proponents argue that such a transformation would reflect demographic realities and historical contributions.
Achieving this vision would entail the elevation of key elements of Oromo identity, including language, cultural practices, and collective political institutions. Critics contend that existing political structures, including the Oromo Prosperity Party, have not demonstrated sufficient commitment to such an agenda. Alternative political formations—potentially involving coalitions among groups such as the OLA, OLF, and OFC—are sometimes proposed as vehicles for advancing these objectives.
Decolonization and Democratization
Despite significant political changes in recent years, including the decline of TPLF dominance, critics argue that the ideological and institutional legacy of Amharic linguistic and cultural dominance persists within federal structures. Historical patterns indicate that leaders of diverse backgrounds have often governed within this framework, raising questions about the extent to which current leadership represents a substantive departure.
From this perspective, democratization is seen as inseparable from processes of decolonization. Efforts to promote national unity that do not address underlying asymmetries in cultural and political power risk reproducing existing inequalities. A sustainable and inclusive political system would need to be grounded in the voluntary participation and consent of Ethiopia’s constituent nations.
Toward a Democratic Liberation Alliance
This analysis points to the potential value of a renewed democratic alliance among various national and regional groups, including Oromo, Amhara, Sidama, Somali, Afar, Wolayta, Gurage, and Benishangul-Gumuz communities, as well as neighboring actors in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Such an alliance would ideally be based on shared principles of mutual respect, political inclusion, and ideological clarity.
Ethiopia’s contemporary political challenge can thus be understood as twofold: the pursuit of liberation from historical domination and the construction of a genuinely democratic, multinational state. Past experience suggests that democratization efforts that do not address underlying structural inequalities are unlikely to succeed.
Conclusion
The Oromo population has, in various ways, expressed resistance to political and cultural domination. However, critics maintain that institutional structures reflecting such dominance remain influential within Ethiopia’s central government. The pursuit of justice and equality, in this view, depends on the recognition of Afaan Oromo as a foundational component of national identity and governance.
Upcoming electoral processes present both risks and opportunities. While disengagement may reinforce existing power structures, strategic participation—combined with civic mobilization and nonviolent resistance—could contribute to meaningful political change.
Ultimately, the call is for a balanced and vigilant political approach: to challenge perceived systems of domination while critically assessing the intentions and strategies of all actors involved. The aspiration is for a future grounded in justice, equality, and self-determination, achieved through unity, strategic clarity, and sustained commitment to democratic principles.
Galatôma.
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Re: Is the OLA Pursuing Heftegna Without Scrutinizing Seftegna? A Critical Reflection
Recent political developments in Ethiopia invite comparison with the transformative events of 1991. In the current context, actors commonly described as Seftegna (Semenawi-neftegna)—including groups such as Fanno, Shabiya, and Woyane—appear to be coordinating political strategies in opposition to what is characterized here as a Heftegna (Hybrid-neftegna) government based in Finfinne. Central to this dynamic is the perceived effort by Seftegna-aligned forces to identify and cultivate proxy actors, particularly within emerging Neo-OPDO circles, who might mobilize Oromo constituencies in support of broader strategic objectives.