Conditional Oromo Support for the Fànnô Movement: Recognition of Agaw and Oromo Self-Determination as a Prerequisite
By Fayyis Oromia*
The gradual emergence of a centralized leadership within the Amhara national struggle is a notable political development. There is little dispute that the Fànnô movement represents a segment of the Amhara people’s quest for political freedom and democratic rights. However, for this movement to gain legitimacy beyond its ethnic base—particularly among the Oromo—it must recognize and respect the parallel liberation struggles of other nations, especially the Agaw and the Oromo.
A principled position requires Fànnô leadership to explicitly acknowledge the right to self-determination of the Agaw Himira of Lalibela, the Qemant of Gondar, the Agaw Awi of Bahir Dar, and the Oromo of Finfinné. These aspirations are neither new nor illegitimate. If the Fànnô movement does not oppose the liberation and self-rule of these peoples, there is no inherent reason for Oromo political forces to reject its struggle. Irreconcilable conflict arises only if Fànnô seeks to perpetuate historical domination by suppressing the political rights of the Agaw and the Oromo.
Provided that Fànnô affirms the principle of equal self-rule for all nations in Ethiopia, it could secure meaningful support from Oromo, Tigrayan, and Agaw political actors, including the OLA, TDF, and Agaw organizations.
Ideological Ambiguity within the Fànnô Movement
While Fànnô has increasingly evolved into a mass movement among the Amhara population, its ideological direction remains unclear. It is essential to ask whether the movement genuinely challenges the incumbent authoritarian regime—often described as a third incarnation of the Derg under Biltsiginà—or whether it seeks to revive the historical Naftagna system of domination over non-Amhara nations, particularly the Oromo.
The dominant rhetoric emerging from some Fànnô circles raises serious concerns. Hostile references to Onegawinet—the ideological foundation of Oromo liberation—along with derogatory expressions such as “Galla invasion” and attacks on Oromummà, reflect a continuation of colonial-era narratives rather than a democratic vision. Such discourse suggests that opposition to Oromo political consciousness may, in practice, take precedence over resistance to authoritarian rule.
For Fànnô to gain Oromo trust, it must decisively abandon this rhetoric, engage constructively with Qérrô—the youth movement grounded in Onegawinet and Oromummà—and redirect its struggle toward dismantling the authoritarian state rather than confronting Oromo identity.
The Necessity of Broad-Based Democratic Cooperation
The removal of Ethiopia’s current authoritarian system is unattainable without broad-based cooperation. A viable opposition must unite the Fànnô movement, the Qérrô struggle, Tigrayan democratic forces, Agaw organizations, and politically conscious youth from all nations. Such unity requires mutual respect, ideological reform, and an explicit rejection of ethnic chauvinism.
Over the past five decades, Ethiopia has been ruled by successive authoritarian systems dominated by elites from three groups: Amhara, Tigrayan, and Oromo. The Derg, largely controlled by Amhara elites; the EPRDF/Woyane, dominated by Tigrayan elites; and the current Biltsiginà system, led by Oromo elites, have all governed through repression, violence, and exclusion. Each regime claimed to represent its respective community, yet none genuinely advanced the collective interests of the people it purported to lead.
The Derg did not represent the Amhara masses, Woyane did not serve ordinary Tigrayans, and Biltsiginà does not advance the Oromo cause. The task before Ethiopians is therefore not ethnic competition but democratic collaboration among Amhara, Oromo, and Tigrayan democrats against entrenched authoritarian mentalities.
Fànnô at a Crossroads: Democracy or Authoritarianism?
A critical question remains unresolved: Does Fànnô belong to the camp of democratic transformation or to the lineage of authoritarian domination? Does it inherit the Derg’s fascist political culture, or does it align with the emancipatory ethos of the Qérrô movement? In practical terms, is it a potential ally or an adversary of the Oromo struggle?
Calls by some activists for Fànnô to confront Ethiopia’s defense forces—largely composed of Qérrô youth—are strategically irresponsible. Encouraging an under-organized and poorly equipped movement to fight a highly trained and well-armed force is neither solidarity nor sound political judgment. Such actions risk catastrophic outcomes for Fànnô and may serve the interests of the ruling regime rather than those of genuine opposition.
There is also reason to suspect that the incumbent leadership may be exploiting the conflict by infiltrating and manipulating extremist elements within Fànnô to weaken it from within. Prolonged instability may be deliberately cultivated to justify the eventual destruction of Naftagna-based political forces. History demonstrates that successive elites who attempted to instrumentalize the current leadership have ultimately been outmaneuvered.
Amharanet and Oromummà: Ethiopia’s Central Historical Contradiction
At the core of Ethiopia’s political crisis lies the long-standing conflict between Amharanet and Oromummà. This struggle dates back to the institutionalization of Amharic as the language of power in 1270 and the subsequent marginalization of Oromic and Oromo political identity. Until the emergence of the OLF in the 1970s, Amharic expanded unchecked at the expense of Oromic. The Oromo liberation struggle has since reversed this trajectory, though linguistic and political equality remains unfulfilled.
Oromic continues to face resistance as a federal working language, despite the Oromo’s demographic and geographic centrality. Pro-Amharanet elites employ three principal strategies against Oromummà: overt opposition through explicitly Amhara nationalist parties; covert dominance through Ethiopianist formations that mask Amharanet supremacy; and internal sabotage by Oromo elites aligned with Amharanet interests.
Toward an Oromummà-Led Democratic Order
Ethiopia is historically and sociologically rooted in Oromia—what may be described as Oropia. Oromo presence spans the Horn of Africa, from Eritrea to Kenya and from Sudan to Somalia. Attempts by Naftagna and later Tigrayan hegemonists to fragment and marginalize Oromo territories have failed to erase this reality.
The task now falls to Oromo national democrats to reclaim political leadership in Finfinné and institutionalize Oromic as a federal working language. This requires moving beyond symbolic Oromo elite representation toward genuine Oromummà-centered governance. The current Prosperity Party leadership has demonstrated continuity with historical patterns of Oromo elites ruling under Amharanet domination.
Assimilationist Ethiopia and apartheid Ethiopia are both defunct. What is emerging is a new democratic order—Orothiopia—grounded in egalitarianism, linguistic justice, and national self-determination. While remnants of the old Abyssinian order may mourn its decline, the new generation increasingly equates Ethiopia with Oromia and democracy rather than Abyssinia and authoritarianism.
Conclusion
Abyssinia-centered authoritarian Ethiopia is no longer viable. A democratic Ethiopia rooted in Oromummà is emerging. The future belongs to political forces that promote linguistic equality, national self-rule, and democratic governance. Any movement—including Fànnô—that aspires to relevance must choose between aligning with this future or remaining tethered to a collapsing past.
Let Oromo national democrats rise to complete the liberation struggle and shape a just political order for all nations.
Galatôma!
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/0 ... oromummaa/