Dr. Lamma Magarsa and Dr. Abiy Ahmed: Ethiopia’s Mandela and de Klerk?
By Fayyis Oromia*
Abstract
Ethiopia appears to be approaching a historic political inflection point, potentially transitioning from authoritarian rule toward democratic governance. Within this context, parallels have been drawn between Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed and F.W. de Klerk of South Africa, as well as between Dr. Lamma Magarsa and Nelson Mandela. This article examines these analogies by situating them within Ethiopia’s political history, Oromo national struggles, internal elite divisions, and the enduring influence of Western geopolitical interests. It argues that Ethiopia’s democratization is inseparable from the Oromo national question and that any sustainable political transition must confront both authoritarianism and historical patterns of domination.
Ethiopia at a Political Crossroads
Ethiopia may be nearing a decisive juncture—one that could mark a transition from centralized authoritarianism toward democratic governance. In such moments of structural transformation, leadership choices become historically consequential. Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed has been likened to F.W. de Klerk, the South African leader who presided over the dismantling of apartheid, while Dr. Lamma Magarsa has been compared to Nelson Mandela, a unifying nationalist figure capable of leading a post-authoritarian democratic order.
Whether these comparisons are merely rhetorical or reflective of deeper political possibilities remains an open question. What is clear, however, is that Ethiopia’s future trajectory is inseparable from the resolution of its long-standing national contradictions—particularly the Oromo question.
External Actors and Internal Elite Fragmentation
The political transition currently underway is not occurring in isolation. Western actors, particularly the United States and its allies, are actively engaged in Ethiopia’s political process. Historically, Ethiopia has served as a strategic buffer against Arab and Islamic influence in the Horn of Africa, a role that has shaped Western alliances with Christian Habesha elites while marginalizing the predominantly Muslim Oromo population.
Within Oromo politics, polarization has intensified. Longstanding divisions between Oromo elites—most notably between factions aligned with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and those associated with Jawar Mohammed—have hindered collective action. These divisions are not merely personal or ideological but reflect divergent strategic responses to perceived existential threats.
Competing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Dilemmas
At present, Oromo political actors confront two perceived adversaries. The first is the authoritarian regime of Biltsiginna, which currently holds state power and has been accused of perpetuating centralized rule and linguistic and cultural subordination. The second is the resurgence of Northern political forces—often associated with historical domination—seeking to reclaim control of the Finfinne (Addis Ababa) palace.
This dual-threat environment has produced a strategic dilemma. Some Oromo elites argue that temporarily accommodating the Biltsiginna regime is necessary to prevent a return of Northern dominance. Others insist that opposing Biltsiginna, even at the risk of indirectly empowering Northern forces, is essential to ending authoritarianism. The result has been deepening polarization among Oromo nationalists, divided into pro- and anti-Abiy as well as pro- and anti-Jawar camps.
The Case for Strategic Unity
Despite these divisions, both camps articulate legitimate concerns rooted in the broader Oromo struggle for freedom, sovereignty, and dignity. The unresolved question is not whether Oromo nationalism is justified, but how it should be advanced under current conditions.
A compelling argument can be made that Oromo political forces—whether within the OLA, OFC, or OLF—must pursue unity against both authoritarian governance and the restoration of historically oppressive power structures. Strategically, preventing the return of Northern domination may be a necessary first step, followed by a concerted effort to dismantle the existing authoritarian system. Such sequencing does not imply endorsement of dictatorship but rather reflects a pragmatic assessment of immediate threats.
Western Interests and the Management of Oromo Dissent
Western skepticism toward the Oromo national liberation movement has deep historical roots. From the Bale and Rayya uprisings to the marginalization of the OLF in the early 1990s, external powers have often sought to contain Oromo political mobilization. One recurring tactic has been the elevation of Oromo individuals into symbolic leadership roles during moments of crisis.
The rise of figures such as Birtukan Mideksa after the 2005 uprising and Dr. Abiy Ahmed in 2018 can be interpreted within this framework. Both were presented as reformist Oromo leaders capable of preserving Ethiopian unity while deflecting deeper structural challenges to the state. Whether these appointments reflected genuine reformist intent or strategic co-optation remains contested.
Historical Context: Oromo Resistance and State Formation
The Oromo people have historically resisted external domination, whether from Christian, Islamic, or European forces. Wàqeffatà Oromos maintained religious and political autonomy for centuries, and the term “Gàllà”—often used pejoratively—originally signified resistance and refusal to submit.
Historical evidence suggests that many populations now identified as Shewa Amhara or Wollo Muslims were originally Oromo communities. The so-called 16th-century “Oromo migration” is better understood as a defensive expansion in response to external pressures rather than an invasion. Oromo dominance during the Gonder period lasted for centuries before being dismantled by Christianized Agaw elites with European backing, culminating in Menelik II’s conquest of Oromia using European weaponry.
This legacy of external legitimation and internal domination continues to shape Ethiopia’s political architecture.
Abiy Ahmed: Reformer or Regime Manager?
Dr. Abiy Ahmed entered office promising reform and reconciliation. His historical role remains unresolved. He may yet choose to dismantle entrenched systems of domination and facilitate a genuine democratic transition, including allowing the Oromo people to determine their political future through autonomy or independence. Alternatively, alignment with reactionary elites risks perpetuating instability and deepening national grievances.
History offers cautionary examples. Leaders of Oromo origin—Menelik II, Haile Selassie, Mengistu Haile Mariam—failed to advance Oromo national interests. Political identity, in this sense, is defined not by ancestry but by commitment to liberation and justice.
Conclusion: Ethiopia’s Mandela?
Ethiopia’s struggle for democracy is now inseparable from the Oromo struggle for liberation. The long-standing assumption that Oromo aspirations must be subordinated to Ethiopian unity has been fundamentally challenged. Increasingly, democratization in Ethiopia is understood as either the liberation of Oromia or the transformation of Ethiopia into a genuinely Oromic-led polity.
Whether Dr. Abiy Ahmed will emerge as Ethiopia’s de Klerk—willing to relinquish authoritarian power in favor of democratic transition—remains uncertain. If such a transition occurs, Ethiopia will still require a Mandela: a unifying, principled leader capable of guiding the country through reconciliation, justice, and democratic reconstruction.
Whether Dr. Lamma Magarsa can fulfill that role is a question for the future.
What is certain is this: no force has permanently suppressed the Oromo liberation movement, and none is likely to do so. As long as Oromia remains subordinated, peace and democracy in the Horn of Africa will remain elusive. Supporting the Oromo cause is not a threat to stability—it is a prerequisite for it.
Galatôma.
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2020/05/3 ... -birtukan/