Is Dr. Abiy Ahmed Gradually Implementing Dr. Baro Tumsa’s and Fayyis Oromia’s Vision for the Oromo?
It seems that Dr. Abiy is slowly but surely becoming more aligned with Oromummà, moving away from his earlier pro-Amharanet stance. He is increasingly disappointing those elites who had hoped to use him in the mold of Mengistu Hailemariam or Hailemariam Desalegn. Notably, he has also prevented Isayas Afewerki from exploiting and exporting Oromian coffee, as was the case during Meles Zenawi’s era. Instead, Dr. Abiy appears to be gradually implementing Dr. Baro Tumsa’s vision for the Oromo people. If he continues on this path and elevates Oromic to become the primary working language of all federal institutions—such as the palace, parliament, cabinet, courts, military, and security apparatus—he may eventually be remembered as a national hero in Oromo history, standing alongside Dr. Baro Tumsa.
The three leaders mentioned above were, to varying degrees, instrumentalized by others for their own agendas. Mengistu Hailemariam was used by the Neftegna establishment. Hailemariam Desalegn was manipulated by the Woyane, and Meles Zenawi was exploited by Shabiya to dismantle the Ethiopian army and facilitate the disintegration of Ethiopia—particularly to secure Assab and ultimately the full independence of Eritrea.
Dr. Abiy, by contrast, has denied both the Neftegna and the Woyane the leverage they sought over him. He may even prove bold enough to reverse the injustices inflicted by Shabiya, and perhaps, one day, reclaim Assab—if not Eritrea entirely.
When Dr. Abiy first came to power, he received triangular support from the three major ethnic groups: Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo. The Amhara elites saw in him a figure similar to Mengistu Hailemariam—someone they could use under the guise of Ethiopiawinet. The Tigrayan elites thought they could manipulate him as a puppet, just as they had with Hailemariam Desalegn. Some Oromo elites, on the other hand, saw in him a potential implementer of the vision outlined by Dr. Baro Tumsa.
Over time, all three camps have come to realize that he was none of the figures they had hoped for. At the very least, it is clear that the Amhara elites have failed to instrumentalize him as they did Mengistu, and the Tigrayan elites failed to use him as they did Hailemariam. What remains to be seen is whether he can truly be considered a follower of Dr. Baro Tumsa’s legacy. At this point, he appears more like the antithesis of Baro. Whether his recent efforts to realign with the Oromo camp will change that trajectory is still uncertain.
At that time of Dr. Abiy’s coming to power, I wrote: “Baro’s message has already been fulfilled—the Oromo are in power. But are we ready to implement Fayyis’ idea of keeping Oromo power in Caffee Arara by any means?” Now, seven years later, I doubt whether Dr. Abiy is the right person to fully realize Dr. Baro’s vision.
Obbo Baro Tumsa (1938–1978)—a pharmacist, lawyer, Oromo nationalist, and political leader—is considered one of the primary founders of the OLF. He was a revolutionary student of the 1960s, once proclaiming:
“We, the Oromo, must capture state power by any means necessary. To do this, we must clandestinely organize all sectors of our society. It is the responsibility of educated Oromo youth like you to disseminate the spirit of Oromo nationalism (Oromummà) when you return to your respective communities. We can only change the deplorable condition of our people by being tolerant of one another and reestablishing necessary Oromo national unity. In this way, we can build a strong organization, capture state power, and take actions that facilitate fundamental social transformation.”
Echat, one of the legal opposition parties during the Derg era, was also led by Baro Tumsa. He was a true Oromo liberation leader who saw nonviolent struggle and armed resistance not as opposing strategies but as complementary tools. Sadly, different Oromo organizations have often alienated one another over their differing approaches, viewing each other as enemies simply for choosing one method over the other. It is disheartening to hear Oromo nationalists treating fellow Oromo activists as adversaries just because of strategic differences.
It is equally unfortunate that Dr. Abiy appears to preserve the dominance of Amharanet over Oromummà and other national identities. In that regard, he seems more like the antithesis of Dr. Baro Tumsa.
It feels as though Obbo Baro Tumsa spoke to the Oromo youth of the 1960s with a solution that still resonates today. Let’s recall his five-point prescription:
- Disseminate the spirit of Oromo nationalism (Oromummà)
- Be tolerant of one another and reestablish Oromo national unity
- Build a strong organization
- Capture state power
- Take actions that facilitate fundamental social transformation
Is our level of national consciousness and practice today really different from what it was then?
Much has changed over the years. The spirit of Oromo nationalism has been widely disseminated. We now know that without tolerance and unity, success is elusive. While we speak often about building a strong organization, we continue to lag in practical implementation. We have realized that capturing state power at Caffee Arara is key—whether we aim to democratize Ethiopia or decolonize Oromia. Since 1991, we’ve seen how the power to effect transformation becomes accessible only after this key is secured.
Like it or not, the essence of the struggle in Ethiopia is a triangular conflict between Amhara elites, Tigray warlords, and Oromo nationalists for control of the key to Caffé Aràrà (CA). Before 1991, that key belonged to Amhara warlords. After 1991, it passed into the hands of Tigrayan elites. Now, it is Oromo freedom fighters who have the opportunity to retain it. But to do so, Baro Tumsa’s five-point prescription remains essential.
To succeed, both Oromianists (those advocating for Oromia’s decolonization) and Oropianists (those supporting democratization under Oromummà leadership) must agree on the fundamental point: keeping power at CA. Once state power is secured, we can then choose whether to pursue an independent Oromia (600,000 sq. km) or an integrative Oropia (1,130,000 sq. km).
In that light, we must constantly remind Oromo nationalists that unity and organization are crucial for keeping power at CA. Capturing the state means achieving: bilisummà (freedom), abba biyyummà (self-rule), hire murteffannà (self-determination), àngô siyàsà (political power), and walabummà (sovereignty).
Reassessing the status quo and the relevance of Baro Tumsa’s five points is now more critical than ever. Oromo nationalism remains the most effective tool to mobilize our people. But we still observe the RR-factor (regional and religious division) undermining necessary coordination among Oromo elites. This division must be overcome. Internal intolerance and rivalry continue to sap the strength of our organizations. Instead of fighting the real enemy, some cadres are busy undermining each other. While we understand the importance of building a strong organization, we are not yet sufficiently united around the shared goal of maintaining power at CA.
The fifth step in Baro’s plan—social transformation—can only be achieved once we fulfill the fourth: capturing state power. The debate over post-freedom sovereignty—whether to decolonize Oromia or democratize Ethiopia (as Oropia)—can wait. For now, the first step must be consolidating state power at CA.
There are valid arguments for claiming the entire Ethiopian state as a future Oropia rather than accepting a partitioned Oromia. Among them:
- Tigrayan elites reduced Oromia by nearly half, rendering the majority into a minority; reclaiming the whole country may be more strategic.
- Oromo is a Cushitic language, and many people—including Amhara and Tigrayans—are historically Cushitic.
- Some scholars argue that past kings and leaders were Oromo, and Amharas were just soldiers of previous regimes.
- Finfinné (Addis Ababa), the political and geographic center, lies at the heart of the Oromo nation.
- The Oromo are the demographic majority (~60%) and control most of the land and resources.
- Oromo contributions to national identity (military, athletics, and economy) are unparalleled.
- Historic Oromo regions include parts of Gojjam, Gondar, and Tigray.
- The Cushitic connection to ancient Egypt and Meroe supports the idea of Oromo indigeneity.
From this historical and cultural foundation, we can theoretically choose among five sovereignty models:
- Ethiopian model – Oromic as federal language, infused with Cushitic values in Ethiopia
- Anglican model – Oromia as autonomous within a restructured Ethiopian union
- Russian model – Independent Oromia with regional influence, especially in economics and security, akin to post-Soviet Russia
- Indian model – A multi-ethnic democratic federation renamed Oropia, with Oromic as the working language
- Oromian model – Oromia as an autonomous regional state within a newly conceptualized union: Oropia
Among these, I personally advocate for the Oropian model, as it offers a balanced and realistic pathway between the two dominant views among Oromo elites: Oromian liberation and Oropian democratization. This model provides a framework to resolve internal conflict and focus on the shared strategic goal—capturing and retaining power at Caffee Arara.
To reconcile the divisions, we must consider five possible paths forward:
- All Oromo nationalists agree to remain within a unionized Ethiopia
- All agree to establish an independent Oromia
- All agree to pursue the idea of Oropia
- Agree to follow different approaches, but unite around the common goal of keeping state power at CA
- Continue to fight each other—thereby empowering anti-Oromo forces
Option 4 is the most pragmatic and unifying. Regardless of our long-term ideological differences, we must focus first on consolidating Oromo power at the federal center. Whether we democratize Ethiopia or decolonize Oromia should be a post-victory decision—one made from a position of power, not weakness.
In conclusion, the Oromo should prioritize capturing and maintaining control of state power at CA. Rather than seeking partial autonomy or peripheral accommodation, we must become the core force in the country’s political architecture. If we accept the validity of Dr. Baro Tumsa’s five-step strategy and unite behind it, we can position ourselves to either declare an independent Oromia or shape an integrative Oropia.
But the sad reality is that Dr. Abiy’s OPP (Oromo Prosperity Party) has largely failed to meet these expectations. It has disappointed the Oromo masses and lost credibility as a vehicle for liberation or democratization. Nonetheless, Ethiopia will either give birth to Oromia or transform into Oropia—this is inevitable. For that to happen, we must follow Fayyis Oromia’s core advice:
“Keep Oromo power at Caffee Arara by any means necessary.”
This is not just for Oromo elites but for the larger Oromo nation. It is to promote Oromummà as the central organizing principle of future Ethiopiawinet, with Amharanet taking a subordinate role in a new national order.
May Wàqa grant us the strength and wisdom to retain power at Caffee Arara, and leave the decision of post-freedom sovereignty—Oromia or Oropia—to the Oromo people themselves.
Galatôma!
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/03/1 ... aro-tumsa/