Mereja.Forum

[Noble Amhara]

Key Reasons for Failure of MoU

Somalia's Strong Opposition and Sovereignty Claims: Somalia viewed the MoU as a direct violation of its territorial integrity, labeling it an "act of aggression" and "null and void." President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying the deal, recalled Somalia's ambassador from Addis Ababa, expelled Ethiopia's ambassador, and closed Ethiopian consulates in Somaliland and Puntland. Mogadishu rallied support, framing it as Ethiopian annexation of Somali land.

International and Regional Pressure on Ethiopia: The deal faced widespread condemnation from the African Union (AU), Arab League, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), EU, US, and others, who reaffirmed Somalia's sovereignty. Threats included relocating the AU headquarters from Addis Ababa and excluding Ethiopian troops from the post-2024 African Union mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) against al-Shabaab. Former Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi later stated Ethiopia was "overpowered" by this pressure, particularly from Arab states and the OIC, forcing it to back down.

Ambiguity and Lack of Follow-Through: The MoU's text was never publicly released, leading to conflicting interpretations (e.g., naval vs. commercial focus). Ethiopia never formally recognized Somaliland or advanced implementation, reportedly due to the backlash. Past Ethiopian deals (e.g., a 2018 Berbera stake) had failed similarly over payments and commitments.
Broader Regional Tensions and Al-Shabaab Gains: The controversy boosted al-Shabaab recruitment and attacks, empowered by anti-Ethiopian sentiment. It strained Ethiopia's relations with Egypt (over Nile issues) and Eritrea, while Somalia aligned closer with them.

Turkey-mediated talks culminated in the Ankara Declaration on December 12, 2024, where Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to resolve the dispute, with Ethiopia gaining commercial sea access respecting Somalia's sovereignty (technical talks ongoing into 2025). This implied Ethiopia pausing or withdrawing from the Somaliland MoU, phrased as "no return to the past." By early 2025, diplomatic ties were restoring, with visits and troop inclusions in AUSSOM.

Somaliland insists the MoU remains valid and has reiterated commitment, but Ethiopia has not pursued it amid the Somalia deal. No naval base or recognition occurred, marking the MoU's effective failure. Ethiopia now seeks alternatives (e.g., via Somalia or Djibouti), while Somaliland's recognition hopes were dashed. The episode highlighted Ethiopia's sea access frustrations but underscored the high costs of bypassing Somalia's claims.

[Noble Amhara]

Critics, including Ethiopian analysts, argue Abiy's Assab focus is propaganda to deflect from failures: economic crisis, unresolved civil wars, and legitimacy issues. Ethiopia already pursues alternatives: a 2024 MoU with Somaliland for Berbera access (though contested by Somalia), investments in Djibouti (handling 95% of trade), and potential deals elsewhere. Planned rail projects to Red Sea ports remain aspirational and unfeasible without Eritrean consent.

In summary, while Ethiopia's need for affordable sea access is legitimate (paying $1.5–2 billion annually to Djibouti), claims on Assab are unrealistic due to unbreakable legal barriers, military impracticality, Eritrean resolve, and viable alternatives.

Force would invite disaster; diplomacy—mutual leases or transit agreements—remains the only path, though stalled by mistrust. As of November 2025, tensions persist without resolution, risking broader Horn of Africa instability.