The Negotiation Between OLA and OPP Is Mandatory Before Reclaiming Assab!
By Fayyis Oromia*
The current political realignment in the Horn of Africa appears to be dividing into two camps: one aligned with Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed, and the other with Eritrea’s President Isayas Afwerki. For Dr. Abiy to be victorious in his political struggle against Isayas, he must first put his own house in order. It seems that many Habesha elites from the north are not standing with him. In this critical time, his most reliable allies are his core constituency—the Oromo people.
To gain full support from the Oromo, there is no alternative but to negotiate with the OLF, OFC, and OLA in order to secure their alliance.
Currently, negotiations among Oromo forces are ongoing. It is said that the OLF seeks to govern Oromia, while allowing the federal administration of Ethiopia—or Oropia, led by Oromummà principles—to remain under the OPP. If true, this would be a highly strategic compromise. OLF leadership in Oromia would provide a strong backbone for Dr. Abiy to govern Ethiopia more securely and stably. At the same time, it would marginalize anti-Oromo forces eager to retake the palace in Finfinne and resume exploiting Oromia.
Now is a pivotal moment for Dr. Abiy to seize this opportunity and make history in Oromo politics. If successful, the Oromo political scene could crystallize into two major parties: the ruling OPP and a future Oromo Republican Party (ORP)—a coalition of the OLA, OFC, and OLF. In the next election, this ORP could even come to power at the federal level, governing an integrative Oropia where Oromic becomes the federation’s primary working language, replacing Amharic. In such a system, the rights of individuals, nations, and institutions would be fully respected.
Territorially, this would also mean that all areas once taken from Oromia by Woyane—such as Finfinné, Dire Dawa, Rayya, Wollo, Wambara, Moyale, and others—would be restored under Oromia’s legislative rule.
On the ground, we see that some previously pro-Amharic-domination Oromo activists—who once supported the EPP and opposed Oromo republicans—are now changing their positions. This shift is largely due to growing pressure from well-organized Amhara neo-Naftagna elites. These activists, once hopeful in Dr. Abiy, now see him as manipulated by Amhara elites intent on weakening the pro-Oromic-leadership movement. Many are now urging Oromo republican leaders to publicly declare their positions.
There is no doubt that Oromo republicans stand firmly for Oromic-leadership, while Dr. Abiy appears increasingly aligned with Amharic-domination. It’s clear that Oromo leaders are diverging in their political orientations: Dr. Abiy is gravitating toward Ethiofederalists like Dr. Berhanu Nega’s ECS, whereas the republicans remain loyal to ethnofederalism. The political spectrum in Ethiopia—or Oropia—is shifting toward the center. Both the Derg-style Ethiofascists and the Woyane-era Ethnofascists seem to have lost influence, possibly for good.
Ultimately, it appears that the freedom fighters—whether Ethiofederalist or Ethnofederalist—have triumphed ideologically.
Even many Ethiocentralists who once demanded a unitary Ethiopia now lean toward Ethiofederalism. Likewise, some ethnoseparatists now envision a more inclusive ethnofederalism. In short, we are left with two major opposition forces: Ethiofederalists and Ethnofederalists. The incumbent administration seems to be attempting to accommodate both.
Among Oromos, support for either form of federalism depends on their vision for Oromia’s sovereignty and their interpretation of Oromo history.
Oromo Prosperitans tend to favor Ethiofederalism, even if it risks dismantling Oromia as a distinct region.
Oromo Republicans, by contrast, emphasize the preservation of ethnofederalism—even if it means risking the dissolution of Ethiopia as we know it.
Being an Ethiofederalist isn’t necessarily problematic—but being pro-Amharic-domination at the expense of Oromic-leadership is. A truly integrative Oropia could, in fact, be more beneficial than an independent Oromia, as long as Oromic is respected.
When we examine Oromo history, we must always ask: Who wrote it?
Was it:
- The Habesha elites, who claimed the Oromo came from a river in the south to delegitimize our presence?
- The Oromo nationalists, who argue we originated in Mada Walabu and were colonized by Abyssinia?
- Or the modern historians, who trace our roots to ancient Meroe in northern Sudan, asserting that the name “Ethiopia” originally belonged to the
Cushitic Oromo—not the Habesha?
Did the Oromo migrate from the south to the north—or were we pushed southward from the north?
Personally, I leave this debate to historians. But I am not so naïve as to deny that the Oromo are indigenous to the Horn of Africa. Historically, we were squeezed into our current territory by invading Christian Europeans, Muslim Arabs, and Ottoman Turks. As Wàqeffannà believers, the Oromo resisted these Abrahamic religions and preserved our spiritual identity.
Important questions remain:
- Are the Christianized and Habeshanized Amhara and Tigray biologically Oromo?
- Are they descendants of other Cushitic peoples, like the Agaw?
- Are the Islamized (Arabized) Afars and Somalis also originally Oromo?
Some historians argue that the Oromo are the ancestral roots of nearly all Cushitic peoples in the Horn.
Different historical narratives support different political visions:
Habesha elites portray the Oromo as outsiders to justify territorial claims and preserve a unitary empire.
Pro-independence Oromo fronts assert that Oromia was colonized in the 19th century, justifying full secession.
Pan-Cushitic theorists argue that all Horn peoples are originally Cushitic (possibly Oromo), advocating for a Cushland led by Oromo leadership.
Personally, I find the third view most plausible. But I respect the right of all linguistic and ethnic groups to national autonomy, as supported by the theory of ethnogenesis.
Two key pillars of Oromo identity are the Gadà system—an indigenous democratic model—and the Wàqeffanà faith—a native monotheistic African belief system. The Gadà system should be modernized as an alternative to Western-style democracy, which often fails in African contexts. Likewise, reviving Wàqeffannà would represent a spiritual renaissance for Africa, reclaiming pre-colonial beliefs that were demonized by Abrahamic religions.
Historically, the Oromo have endured national oppression. Yet our ideological compass—the OLF—and the collective struggle of freedom-loving Oromos are still active in pursuing full liberation. I see this liberation manifesting on three levels:
The OPP maintains a limited cultural autonomy to prevent a return to the pre-1991 era when there was no Oromia or Afaan Oromo recognition.
The OFC, as political opposition, pushes for genuine autonomy within a federal Ethiopia free from Abyssinian or submissive Oromo elites.
The OLA and other free Oromo organizations fight for full national liberation—through armed resistance or political transformation.
Leaving historical disputes aside, we must unite around our common goal: the realization of Oromo sovereignty—either as a fully autonomous Oromia within a federation, or as an independent nation. We must distinguish our interests from those of our historical oppressors.
Abesha elites demand unconditional allegiance to a centralized Ethiopia dominated by Amharanet. In contrast, Oromo nationalists call for self-determination, which may lead to either autonomy in a union or full independence.
To shape our future—whether it becomes Oromia or Oropia—we must align with continental trends. Africa is gradually moving toward a federal model: the United States of Africa. Oromianists seek to establish a State of Oromia within this larger African federation, with Finfinne as the capital of both Oromia and Africa.
We hope that democratic Abesha elites will one day share this vision, enabling true cooperation between groups like ECS and Oromo fronts like the OLF.
But there is no doubt: the unity of Oromo political organizations is key. The main obstacle remains the authoritarian EPP. To overcome this, we must:
- Unite all Oromo organizations to consolidate the freedom of the Oromo people.
- Form coalitions with other oppressed nations seeking similar goals.
- Build strategic alliances with democratic Abesha forces—those who respect Oromo freedom, even if they oppose full sovereignty.
With such alliances, we can move one step closer to our vision: a United States of Ethiopia (USE)—a truly federated Ethiopia based on language and culture. This federation could serve as a stepping stone toward the United States of Africa.
This shift explains why both ethiocentralists and ethnoseparatists are moving toward the center. Ethiofederalists are consolidating through mergers (e.g., ECS, MEAD, Hibir, ANM). Ethnofederalists remain stronger in principle but are still politically fragmented. Despite this, their ideological clarity and deep-rooted connection to the national liberation struggles of their respective nations make them a formidable force.
Currently, Dr. Abiy appears to be leaning toward the Ethiofederalist camp, aligning with parties such as ECS and others advocating for a more centralized but multicultural federation. In contrast, Jawar Mohammed and other Oromo republican leaders are strengthening the Ethnofederalist camp, which prioritizes the self-determination of nations within Ethiopia.
For Oromos, either system—Ethiofederation or Ethnofederation—can be acceptable, provided that three pillars of Oromo identity are respected in Finfinne:
- Afàn Oromô as a primary working language,
- Àdà Oromô (Oromo cultural values) as a guiding moral system,
- Àngô Oromô (Oromo political power) as a central part of the federal arrangement.
The central uncertainty is not the form of federation, but whether Dr. Abiy will continue to promote the pro-Amharanet authoritarian EPP, or whether he will evolve into a genuine democrat supporting a fair, multilingual, multicultural federal system.
If he continues down the authoritarian path, he should step aside.
If he pivots toward democratic Ethiofederalism and wins the next election through inclusive politics, then he may rightfully continue to lead.
Either way, the time has come for Oromo republican leaders—especially Jawar Mohammed—to take the lead in mobilizing the Ethnofederalist camp. They must rally all Oromo organizations toward a shared political vision. That vision is not merely about resistance; it is about governance, unity, and long-term sovereignty within a just and balanced federal system.
Final Reflections: Toward a Shared Future
May Waaqa guide us toward visionary leaders who can unite all nations and peoples of Oropia under a system that respects diversity, guarantees autonomy, and fosters cooperation.
The road ahead requires:
- Strategic unity among Oromo organizations,
- Solidarity with other historically oppressed nations,
- Tactical alliances with democratic forces among the Habesha,
A clear, actionable political program that moves beyond rhetoric to institution-building.
Let us aim not just for the liberation of Oromia, but for the transformation of Ethiopia into a truly equitable federation—a United States of Ethiopia, where no nation dominates another, where languages and cultures thrive equally, and where the Oromo people take their rightful place at the center of African political innovation.
In the long run, our dream aligns with that of other progressive forces across the continent—a United States of Africa, where Finfinné could one day become not just the capital of Oromia, or even of Ethiopia, but the political heart of a liberated and united Africa.
May freedom, dignity, and unity guide our journey forward.
Galatôma
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2019/01/1 ... ist-oromo/