Ethiopia’s Tigray Temptation
Only America Can Prevent a New War in the Horn of Africa
August 5, 2025
A woman at an internally displaced persons center in Tigray, Ethiopia, March 2025 Ximena Borrazas / Getty Images
MULUGETA GEBREHIWOT BERHE is Senior Research Associate at the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and Founding Director at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University.
ALEX DE WAAL is Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ethiopia ... temptation
Over the past 20 months, as multiple wars have swept across the Middle East, the southern end of the Red Sea has become a source of international concern. In the early months of 2025 alone, the United States spent billions of dollars on a high-profile military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, who have continued to attack international shipping in this crucial body of water in response to Israel’s war in Gaza. Yet regional and world powers have largely ignored a volatile crisis on the Red Sea’s other coast, along the Horn of Africa, that could soon erupt into a major conflagration.
The crisis involves the coastal nation of Eritrea and its larger landlocked neighbor Ethiopia, which lost access to the Red Sea after Eritrean independence in 1993. In November 2023, Ethiopian Prime Minister
Abiy Ahmed said that gaining Red Sea access has become an existential question for Ethiopia. In particular, he claims that Ethiopia should control Assab, a crucial port in southern Eritrea. Since then, tensions between the two countries have mounted, and Ethiopia may be preparing to march its forces directly to Assab, which is only 37 miles from the Ethiopian border. Although Abiy has denied that Ethiopia has plans for a military conflict, both sides have been buying military equipment, including armed drones, drone defenses, missiles, mechanized firepower, and desert terrain armored vehicles. In recent weeks, both have also moved military forces to the border near Assab and are engaging in escalating exchanges of hostile rhetoric.
A battle over the Red Sea port would be dangerous. But what makes the looming conflict even more threatening is the likelihood that it could quickly spread to Ethiopia’s volatile Tigray region, which borders Eritrea and which was the epicenter of a devastating 2020–22 war between the Ethiopian federal government in Addis Ababa and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. In the aftermath of that war—which cost as many as 600,000 lives, including hundreds of thousands of civilians, and left a dismal legacy of displacement and destruction—a peace agreement was supposed to bring new stability to the region. But since then, few of the agreement’s provisions have been implemented. Eritrean troops are still present in the region and large parts of Tigray have been de facto annexed by Ethiopia’s neighboring Amhara region. More than one million Tigrayans remain unable to return home. Most worrying of all, the leadership of the TPLF has split into contending factions, which are forging rival alliances with Ethiopia and Eritrea and building separate armed wings.
If fighting breaks out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Tigray will again be the main battleground, with potentially catastrophic consequences—for Tigray and for the entire Horn of Africa. Both sides have large, well-equipped armies and are prepared to inflict and absorb casualties on a vast scale. A conflict would tear up what remains of a fragile peace and security architecture in the region, and could draw in Somalia and Sudan in a region-wide vortex of violence. Further fueling instability is the rival meddling of leading Middle Eastern powers, with the United Arab Emirates supporting Ethiopia, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey leaning toward Eritrea.
A new war can be prevented. With the right kind of international pressure, the government of Ethiopia could be pushed to enforce the 2022 peace agreement, a long-standing demand of the Tigrayans. Tigrayan leaders themselves must also take steps to avoid becoming pawns of a larger Ethiopian-Eritrean fight. Indeed, if Tigray stays neutral, it would be difficult for Abiy to mount an attack on the port of Assab alone. In previous decades, the prospect of a major war in the Horn would have mobilized diplomats in Washington, in European capitals, and at the United Nations, as well as the African Union. Today, Western leaders are distracted and multinational organizations are weakened. The only actor with the leverage to bring the multiple actors to the table is the United States.
GRUDGE MATCH
Tigray’s pivotal role in the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea goes back to the aftermath of the Tigrayan war. When the war began, Ethiopia and Eritrea were on the same side, combining forces to try to defeat the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. Abiy sought to impose his will on the TPLF, which had refused to dissolve and integrate into his new ruling party in Addis Ababa. In turn, Eritrean president
Isaias Afwerki had long held a grudge against the TPLF and was determined not only to dismantle it but also to inflict so much damage on Tigray that the region’s forces could never challenge Eritrea again. The two leaders enlisted militia from Ethiopia’s neighboring Amhara region, who had their own reasons for joining the conflict, seeking to annex parts of Tigray that they claimed as historically Amhara land.
After two years of intense fighting, including a starvation siege that plunged Tigray into famine, the Tigrayans sued for peace. The United States brought the Ethiopian government and the TPLF to the table in Pretoria, South Africa, under the auspices of the African Union, and in November 2022, the two sides signed a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement. But the deal contained several flaws. First, it was hastily contrived and had weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Despite claiming the Pretoria Agreement as a diplomatic triumph, the United States did little to enforce it. Both sides mostly ignored the provisions of the deal, and even basic humanitarian assistance needs for Tigray went unmet.
Worse, the Pretoria negotiations had failed to include Eritrea and the Amhara leaders—the other major parties to the conflict. The mediators had worked on the assumption that both would follow Abiy’s lead. Instead, they quickly fell out with him. In early 2023, Abiy ordered the Amhara region to disarm its militia, known as FANO, and to have its special forces downgraded to riot control police. They refused. Within weeks, FANO had launched an insurgency against Ethiopian forces across vast swaths of the Amhara region, which continues today. Every month there are reports of scores, sometimes hundreds, killed in skirmishes, civilian massacres, and drone attacks; the UN has estimated half a million displaced people need urgent assistance.
Meanwhile, Eritrea felt betrayed by the peace deal. Isaias, the Eritrean president, had wanted to continue military action until the TPLF was completely destroyed. He also distrusted Addis Ababa’s growing ties to Washington and feared that the Pretoria Agreement was designed to marginalize him. As relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea deteriorated, each side sought new ways to pressure the other. Addis Ababa began backing opposition forces in Eritrea; Asmara backed opposition forces in Ethiopia and sent arms to the FANO militia in Amhara. Then, in November 2023, Abiy announced that Ethiopia not only needed access to the Red Sea for economic security but also had a historic right to the port of Assab. It wasn’t clear whether he was simply posturing to try to force an Eritrean concession or was actually contemplating military conquest.
In early 2024, tensions subsided somewhat when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, the self-declared republic on the shore of the Gulf of Aden, whose independence from Somalia is not recognized by any international body. According to the memorandum, in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland’s independence, Ethiopia would gain a seaport in Somaliland, thus satisfying Abiy’s quest to bring his country back to the coast. But the plan collapsed amid staunch opposition from Somalia, which has long opposed Somaliland’s independence and fears Ethiopia’s dominance of the region. In December 2024, Turkey brokered a reconciliation between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, and Abiy turned his attention back to Assab.
If Abiy decides to go to war again, his forces could, in principle, march directly to Assab, which is far from Asmara and the main population centers of Eritrea. But whatever the outcome of that action, it would almost inevitably incite military operations in Tigray, where both sides have deep interests. At the center of this is the Tigray Defense Forces, the formidable, 274,000-strong regional army that emerged in response to the brutal outbreak of war in 2020, and which answers to the regional government controlled by the TPLF. The TDF is led by veterans from the previous war of 1974–91, as well as by soldiers whom Abiy had purged from Ethiopia’s national army and by fresh volunteers. Now, both Addis Ababa and Asmara have been jockeying to build support in Tigray, including from the TDF.
RIFT VALLEY
Amid the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Tigray’s tenuous stability is collapsing. For all its many dysfunctions, the TPLF-led interim administration in the Tigrayan capital, Mekele, set up after the Pretoria Agreement, embraced the end of the war and the push to stabilize the region. The legacy of fighting was severe. Cities and towns had been ransacked; people were starving and displaced; schools and hospitals were not functioning. A huge task awaited. For a while, it seemed that the regional administration was beginning to address these problems.
But Tigrayan unity proved illusory. The TPLF quickly pulled apart into rival factions, with one group, headed by the former TPLF Chair
Debretsion Gebremichael, aligning itself with Asmara, and another, led by
Getachew Reda, aligning with Addis Ababa. The TDF senior command, which had remained out of the factional politics, also split, with the TDF commander General
Tadesse Werede taking the helm of the regional government. Behind the faction that is aligning itself with Eritrea is a Tigrayan businessman based in the Persian Gulf,
Dawit Gebregziabher, who has visited Asmara on several occasions. Other TPLF cadres—and, according to some reports, TDF generals—have been talking with Asmara.
The rationale for the Tigrayan outreach to Eritrea isn’t clear. Some justify it as a step toward breaking away from Ethiopia and achieving an independent Tigray. Others say that because Addis Ababa has abandoned the region, Tigrayans should make common cause with fellow Tigrinya speakers in Eritrea on the other side of the border. The official TPLF line is that it is entitled to deal with anyone that helps it advance Tigrayan security interests. For its part, Eritrea has welcomed its new Tigrayan allies, which serve its interest in weakening Tigray’s unity and building a new military coalition against Ethiopia.
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Amid the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Tigray’s tenuous stability is collapsing.
Pulled apart by these opposing factions, Tigray’s political order is breaking down. Many suspect that the growing divisions among Tigrayan leaders are driven by corrupt dealings. Since the end of the war, gold fever has taken hold and large-scale artisanal mining is now underway in parts of the region. Private fortunes are being made through licensed and unlicensed mining, smuggling, and sales to the central bank of Ethiopia, which is desperate for hard currency amid the country’s continuing economic meltdown. Tigray’s borders have become lawless, with the interim Tigrayan administration documenting—but not yet publicizing—evidence of human trafficking. Medical clinics report dozens of survivors of sexual abuse arriving daily, often coming from areas of Tigray that are still controlled by Eritrean troops.
Meanwhile, the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement have been openly flouted. Amhara forces that occupied much of western and northwestern Tigray have not withdrawn. Eritrea maintains defense lines inside Tigrayan territory. More than 1.5 million people remain displaced, living in camps or seeking refuge in public buildings. Schools are still closed, clinics and water systems have not been rebuilt, and public sector salaries remain unpaid. More than 200,000 TDF soldiers have not been given their demobilization packages, and those who were injured in the war continue to lack basic rehabilitation services.
Across Tigray, hunger is widespread, a problem that has been compounded by the precipitous decline in U.S. humanitarian assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development. In 2022, the United States accounted for more than 50 percent of the $2.3 billion in international humanitarian aid provided to Ethiopia. This year, with humanitarian distress higher, the country has received just 6.7 percent of an already bare-bones UN appeal for $612 million, with American aid practically at a standstill.
This chaotic situation has made a return to fighting all the more plausible. It is not difficult to find soldiers and former soldiers in Tigray who are eager to take up arms again to break out of what feels to many like a hopeless spiral. A new war in Tigray would almost certainly lead to further bloodshed, destruction, and starvation, this time without any clear path to peace and reconstruction.
WASHINGTON, NOT WAR
For all the region’s troubles, keeping Tigray out of a future conflict should not be difficult. For one, the region could simply refuse to take sides in the Ethiopian-Eritrean standoff. The rival TPLF factions have common interest in avoiding an internecine fight that will damage them both. Despite their tactical political alliances, they could forge a shared position to avoid taking part in a broader cross-border war.
In fact, Tigrayans hold considerable leverage with Addis Ababa and Asmara. Ethiopia and Eritrea would have little reason to initiate a conflict without backing from a strong Tigrayan armed contingent, and neither side could sustain a war for long if Tigray stays resolutely neutral. A war between the two countries for the port of Assab would be akin to two bald men fighting over a comb. If Ethiopia succeeded in capturing the city, such a move would violate international law and international shipping companies would avoid the port; it would also invite pariah status for a government that has long relied on extensive Western support. Moreover, it is far from clear that gaining Assab would strengthen Abiy’s power. In this corner of the Danakil Desert, Eritrea has no conventional military options other than defense. Should Eritrea lose the port, however, it would have no difficulty in finding discontented groups within Ethiopia to fight against Addis Ababa, plunging Ethiopia further into turmoil and instability.
Along with receiving desperately needed humanitarian aid, the real need for Tigray—and for Ethiopia—is to see the terms of the Pretoria Agreement finally implemented. The provisions of the deal are neither onerous nor complicated: the withdrawal of Amhara forces and the restoration of the prewar administrative boundary of Tigray, the return of displaced people to their places of origin, and the opening of a political dialogue to enable Tigray to find its place in Ethiopia’s national politics. Yet these steps have never been carried out because the more powerful of the two parties—the Ethiopian government under Abiy—hasn’t been pressed to make good on the agreement.
Western governments and regional powers could do much to change this picture. Ethiopia received billions of dollars in foreign aid and concessionary finance in 2024 alone, and donor governments could make further aid payments contingent on the Abiy government doing what it has already formally promised. The Tigrayan administration, for its part, needs resources to deliver on the people’s demands for assistance and reconstruction. With real pressure from Washington, Addis Ababa and the Tigrayan administration should be able to marginalize the reckless factions that are seeking to exploit the situation—and finally bring to heel the Middle Eastern powers that have for too long enjoyed free rein to meddle in the Horn of Africa. If the Trump administration could pull off such a deal, it would be a meaningful diplomatic victory with long-term dividends for U.S. power and for renewed prosperity in the war-scarred region.
Whatever the outcome of the current tensions, Tigray has a long road to recovery. Ultimately, rebuilding the region will require sustained effort to rebuild accountable institutions and civil society, as well as the economic foundations needed to provide lasting stability. None of this will be possible, however, if there is another war. The most urgent task today is to prevent that from happening.
