The OLF Is Demasking Amhara Elites by Removing Their External (Ethiopiawinet) and Internal (Amharanet) Masks to Reveal Their Prior Identity – Agawinet or Oromummà!
By Fayyis Oromia*
Thanks to the OLF in particular and the Oromo movement in general, Amhara elites have finally removed their external mask of “Ethiopiawinet” and begun to openly embrace their Amharanet identity—an identity they once concealed. The OLF strategically infiltrated the OPDO (originally formed by the TPLF to suppress the Oromo) and transformed it into a new instrument: the OPP. Through this political maneuver, the Oromo movement has reclaimed the symbolic label of “Ethiopiawinet” and stripped it from the Amhara elites, leaving them no option but to identify with Amharanet.
However, this step is not enough. The OLF must continue the demasking process. Amharanet, in fact, is itself an internal mask—a constructed identity adopted by some Agaw communities in Gojjam and Gondar, as well as certain Oromo groups in Shewa and Wollo since the rise of Yekuno Amlak in 1270. These groups, having lost their prior identities over the past 750 years, must be taught to rediscover and reclaim their true heritage. They should be re-Agawized and re-Oromized, learning the original languages—Agawigna and Afaan Oromo—for the purpose of full identity restoration. I am hopeful this transformation will happen in both the near and distant future.
Dr. Abiy and the Politics of Language and Identity
After witnessing the recent move to shift religious language practices in the Orthodox Church in Oromia, I dare to say that Dr. Abiy appears to be returning from the pro-Amharanet bloc he once served to the pro-Oromummaa camp. He successfully extracted the rhetoric of Andinet (unity) and Ethiopiawinet from the former bloc and rebranded them within the context of Oromo politics. Yet, one major shortcoming remains: he has not yet initiated the necessary steps to promote Afaan Oromo as the primary working language of the Ethiopian federation in place of Amharic.
Still, his introduction of Afaan Oromo within the Orthodox Church is a promising gesture. This move could play a key role in reconciling Dr. Abiy and his party, the OPP, with the Oromo people. He should now build on this momentum and seek to unite Oromo nationalists, including those supporting the OFC, OLA/OLF, and OPP. By reframing Andinet, Ethiopiawinet, and Orthodoxawinet in Oromo terms—an idea originally envisioned by Dr. Haile Fida—Dr. Abiy could usher in a transformative political era. In such a future, where Afaan Oromo becomes the primary working language of the federation, Ethiopia would naturally evolve into “Oropia,” a state led by Oromummaa and broader than Oromia itself.
There’s no doubt that Dr. Abiy previously aligned himself with the pro-Amharanet bloc and attempted to deceive the Oromo. He frequently invoked the Gadaa value of aqaafinet (accommodation) to delegitimize the Oromo national struggle, suggesting that asserting national rights contradicts Oromo cultural values. However, the critical question remains: Accommodation in what context? Should Oromummaa accommodate Amharanet, or should it foster pride in Oromo identity?
The Gadaa system was never meant to validate Amharanet or revere Amharic above Oromiffa. Yet Dr. Abiy and his EPP allies went to great lengths to maintain the dominance of Amharic and the ideology of Amharanet—masquerading under the guise of Ethiopiawinet. They persecuted genuine Oromo nationalists in the OFC and OLF while preaching ethnic federalism. But in practice, EPP’s federalism was merely a continuation of TPLF’s centralized system with Amharic as the dominant language.
In contrast, OFC and OLF advocate a democratic federalism where Oromiffa and Oromummaa take the lead—naturally fitting, considering the Oromo’s demographic majority. To maintain their control, the dominant groups clung to a dictatorial federalism masked as unity. Dr. Abiy, serving this neo-Naftagna agenda, insisted that Oromo accommodation must occur within Amharanet disguised as Ethiopiawinet. But true aqaafinet, in line with Gadaa philosophy, lies in preserving our authentic identity—Oromummaa—not in replacing it with Amharanet. Is Dr. Abiy now sincerely back in the pro-Oromummaa camp?
Triangular Politics and Oromo Magnanimity
It is also fascinating to observe how Oromo politicians in power at Tulluu Daalattii Palace are working to balance the long-standing triangular conflict in Ethiopia, attempting to transform it into a triangular dialogue among the country’s three historic competitors: the Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo elites. For centuries, the political struggle in Ethiopia has revolved around these three groups. Today, as both Amhara and Tigrayan elites appear weakened, Oromo elites are adopting a new, inclusive approach.
Even though the Oromo emerged victorious in their freedom struggle, their leaders now show magnanimity—seeking not revenge, but reconciliation. They are extending a hand to incorporate the interests of those from the defeated camps. Unlike Amhara elites who ruled until 1991, and Tigrayan elites who exercised power for 27 years, the current Oromo leadership—particularly under Dr. Abiy—is taking a more inclusive path. He appears intent on balancing the interests of the three major national groups.
How magnanimous are the children of Abbaa Gadaa! The question now is whether the two Habesha elites (Amhara and Tigray) can recognize this magnanimity and contribute positively to the democratic process, or whether they will revert to their familiar ye sera poletika (mischievous political games). Time will tell whether Dr. Abiy’s political generosity will lead to lasting democratic transformation—or whether it will ultimately doom Oromo politics to failure.
This triangular contest—long defined by rivalry—could now evolve into a triangular cooperation. To understand what’s at stake, one only needs to observe the rising Oromo model of magnanimous politics.
The TPLF’s Divide-and-Rule Tactic and the Missed Alliance
For years, a troubling question weighed on the minds of many Ethiopians: Why was it so easy for the TPLF to dominate Ethiopia after 1991? And why might it be just as easy for them to regain power if given the chance? The answer lies, in large part, with the misguided strategies of the two largest national groups—Oromo and Amhara elites.
The TPLF skillfully cornered both sides. On one hand, they labeled Amhara elites as centralist and chauvinist; on the other, they portrayed Oromo nationalists as narrow separatists. This positioning allowed the TPLF to claim the ideological “middle ground”—a union of ethnic groups under its version of ethnic federalism. By doing so, it discredited the demands of both Oromo and Amhara camps and ruled unchallenged.
In reality, both peoples were victims of this manipulation. There were moments of hope—for example, in 2006, when visionary leaders from both groups attempted to form an alliance. They understood the importance of neutralizing the TPLF’s divide-and-rule tactic. The historical tension between “Habeshanized” Cushites (the Amhara) and non-Habeshanized Cushites (the Oromo) had long served TPLF interests. The Oromo-Amhara conflict was the fuel that kept the TPLF machine running.
Had Oromo and Amhara elites resolved their differences earlier, Ethiopia’s peoples could have been spared decades of authoritarian rule. The alliances forged in the past were a good start, but they lacked sustainability. Today, there are renewed efforts by these elites to find common ground—and it is high time. The past enmity has only served to enable the subjugation of all nations under the TPLF’s control.
Setting aside the criminal ruling classes of the past and present, both the Amhara and Oromo peoples were victims of European colonial schemes in the 19th century. During the “Scramble for Africa,” colonial powers manipulated ethnic divisions to serve their geopolitical interests. The French advanced from Dakar to Djibouti; the British moved from Cape Town to Cairo. To avoid direct confrontation in the Horn of Africa, they chose a proxy.
The Amhara—predominantly Christian—were selected as the “civilizing” force. Equipped with European weapons and guided by foreign advisers, they were used to suppress other nations, including the Oromo. As a result, both the Amhara and Oromo peoples lost their autonomy and dignity. Despite appearing to be on opposing sides, they were both denied true freedom under European-backed rulers.
Three Decades Under TPLF and the Prospect of a New Alliance
Over the last thirty years, the TPLF regime operated as a neo-colonial servant force, instrumentalized to suppress not only the Oromo and Amhara, but also other historically marginalized nations in Ethiopia. Despite being natural allies due to their shared oppression, the Oromo and Amhara often remained divided, distracted by conflicting visions of the Ethiopian state.
On one side, Amhara elites pushed for unconditional unity—often perceived by others as a veiled attempt to restore the old empire. On the other side, some Oromo elites insisted on unconditional independence for Oromia, which made many Amhara forces fear future marginalization or retribution. These polarizing stances played directly into the TPLF’s hands, preventing a united democratic front.
Yet there is nothing inherently incompatible about a strategic alliance between democratic Amhara forces and Oromo liberation movements. The practical difficulties lie in the mutual distrust and the failure to reach a workable compromise. Both camps must now learn to tone down maximalist goals: Amhara elites should stop demanding unconditional integration, while Oromo elites should consider the potential of voluntary union—rather than unilateral separation.
The TPLF thrived by exploiting this ideological rift. It framed the Amhara as “chauvinist centralists” and the Oromo as “narrow separatists,” portraying itself as the rational middle ground. The antidote to this manipulation is straightforward: both sides must concentrate on shared goals—freedom and democracy.
An achievable compromise could be national freedom within a voluntary Ethiopian union. Free Oromia and free Amhara states within such a union could lay the foundation for a more just and democratic future. This would not only liberate each nation from authoritarian domination but also offer a shared platform for future cooperation, even including other nations in the Horn.
In fact, steps have already been taken. The 2006 attempt to build a coalition between Oromo and Amhara forces briefly disrupted TPLF’s narrative. Unfortunately, the alliance was short-lived. But today, with the TPLF weakened and under pressure from multiple fronts, the opportunity for lasting cooperation has reemerged. Whether this moment lasts one year or a decade, the writing is on the wall: the TPLF’s era is ending.
Just as the Derg regime passed into history, so too will the TPLF. Future generations in Tigray may view the TPLF as Germans now view the Nazi regime—with shame and rejection. But that outcome depends on the political maturity of all actors involved, especially Oromo and Amhara elites, who must rise above past grievances and seize the moment for unity through democratic self-determination.
Empire vs. Union — Competing Visions of Ethiopian Sovereignty
To understand the ongoing debate between Amhara and Oromo elites, it’s essential to distinguish between two fundamentally different concepts: empire and union.
An empire is inherently coercive—built and sustained by force. A union, by contrast, emerges through free will and mutual consent. Unfortunately, much of Ethiopia’s political legacy has been shaped by empire: a centralized system where domination, not dialogue, defined the relationship between its peoples.
Some Amhara elites claim to support democracy, yet often advocate for unconditional unity—without recognizing that genuine unity must be voluntary. They must ask themselves: What if the Oromo people, through free and fair decision-making, choose independence over unity? Would they accept it and move on—or resist it as a threat?
Furthermore, if unity is their goal, what kind of unity do they envision? A union of equals or a return to a centralized state dominated by Amharic language and culture? Even the most liberal voices among Amhara movements often fall short of advocating for a union based on true self-determination. Instead, they tend to frame unity as non-negotiable.
Some even draw flawed parallels to American history—claiming that, just as the U.S. was preserved through a civil war, Ethiopia must also be held together by force. But this comparison is misleading. America is a nation of immigrants who accepted a singular identity and language. Ethiopia, by contrast, is a multi-national state with deep-rooted indigenous identities and languages. Trying to forge a similar melting pot through coercion ignores this fundamental difference—and undermines the principle of self-determination.
Ironically, many Amhara themselves are descendants of Agaw and Cushitic peoples who were linguistically and culturally assimilated. Today, they wear the mask of “Ethiopiawinet” with the content of “Amaranet” or “Habeshawinet,” concealing their original identity. Reclaiming their Agaw heritage would be a step toward healing historical wounds and fostering more authentic solidarity with other nations.
As long as the unity being proposed is rooted in domination—rather than free will—it will remain unacceptable to Oromo nationalists and to many others in Ethiopia. The only viable future lies in a union of free peoples, each exercising their right to self-determination, including the right to say no.
Federalism, Self-Determination, and the Democratic Dilemma
The ongoing standoff between Amhara and Oromo elites is not just about unity versus independence—it’s also about what type of federal system should govern Ethiopia, if a union is to exist at all.
Amhara forces often favor geography-based federalism, which divides administrative regions by arbitrary territorial lines, downplaying or ignoring ethnic identities. Their view sees ethnic federalism as a recipe for division and instability. In contrast, most Oromo nationalists and other oppressed nations advocate for ethnic federalism—a system built on the recognition of nations, nationalities, and peoples, with their right to self-rule and self-expression constitutionally guaranteed.
For Oromo elites, ethnic federalism is not just a political preference—it’s a minimal compromise in lieu of full independence. It ensures cultural preservation, language rights (like prioritizing Afaan Oromo), and political representation. The Amhara preference for geographic federalism is seen as an attempt to re-centralize power under the guise of administrative neutrality.
Now, if both sides truly believe in democracy, the only legitimate way to resolve this debate is to let the public decide—through referendums, popular consultations, and free elections. Just as people can vote for a government, they must also be allowed to vote on the structure of the federation they live in.
This is where the contradiction of some “democratic unitarists” becomes obvious. While they talk about democracy, they oppose the idea of referenda on self-rule, fearing that people might “vote against their own interest.” But democracy includes the right to be wrong. It is not about dictating what people should want—it’s about letting them choose freely.
Some Amhara elites express concern that people could be “brainwashed” into making the “wrong” decision—like Americans electing George Bush, they say. But this kind of paternalism is anti-democratic. In a real democracy, all sides have the chance to inform, persuade, and campaign. If the Oromo choose independence after an open debate, that must be respected. Likewise, if the public votes to remain in a union, then that union gains legitimacy.
In a free competition of ideas, both camps—those who advocate for a strong, integrated Ethiopia and those who call for independent Oromia—must be willing to accept the public verdict. That is the only way to build a legitimate, sustainable state.
The Union of Free Peoples – A Democratic Compromise
The only durable and democratic solution to Ethiopia’s historical and ongoing tensions lies in a compromise model: a Union of Free Peoples, built upon mutual consent and the right of each nation to self-determination. This union would not be an empire held together by military force or cultural assimilation, but rather a voluntary political project, much like the European Union.
This vision acknowledges the sovereignty of each nation—Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, and others—while creating a shared framework for cooperation on matters of common interest: economy, security, infrastructure, and regional diplomacy. In such a union, national freedom is the foundation, not an obstacle. Sovereignty and solidarity would not be mutually exclusive but coexistent.
This model avoids the extremes: it neither forces Oromo or any other nation to remain in Ethiopia against their will, nor does it advocate for complete fragmentation without any shared future. Instead, it offers a third path, where free nations form a democratic federation or confederation by choice, not coercion.
Such a model requires both Amhara and Oromo elites to mature politically:
Oromo leaders must recognize that some degree of regional cooperation can enhance national self-determination rather than threaten it.
Amhara democrats must accept that unconditional unity is a relic of imperial politics—and that only a consensual union can ensure legitimacy and peace.
In fact, several Oromo thinkers argue that even the so-called “Habesha” (Amhara and Tigrayans) are Habeshanized Cushites, whose ancestors were once part of the broader Cushitic family. From this view, the goal is not to separate from the Habesha but to de-Habeshanize and reconnect with Cushitic roots, ultimately uniting as equals under a new political project.
This would mark a historical transformation—from a colonial empire into a post-imperial union. It would be a decisive break with the past 150 years of domination and assimilation. And it would open the door to a more inclusive and modern political identity—perhaps even a rebranding of Ethiopia itself as Oropia, a state shaped and led by Oromo values of democracy, inclusivity, and self-rule.
The ultimate benefit of such a union is that it can accommodate both national independence and regional integration—two goals that are often framed as opposites but are, in fact, complementary.
Democratic Leadership, Pan-Horn Integration & Abiy’s Magnanimity
For this vision of a Union of Free Peoples to materialize, it demands not only conceptual clarity but also democratic leadership—leaders who are committed to principles over power, who prioritize popular legitimacy over elite arrangements, and who reject domination in all its forms.
In this context, Dr. Abiy Ahmed’s role becomes especially significant. While his past alignment with pro-Amharanet blocs raised concerns among Oromo nationalists, recent shifts suggest he may be repositioning toward the Oromummàcamp. His symbolic move to promote Afaan Oromo within the Orthodox Church—an institution long dominated by Amharic and imperial culture—was a bold step. It signaled a break from the old order and a return to the Oromo people’s linguistic and cultural dignity. But this alone is not enough.
For Dr. Abiy to regain the trust of Oromo nationalists—and possibly lead the transformation toward a new union—he must go further:
Formally prioritize Afaan Oromo as a primary working language of the federal government.
Unite Oromo political actors—those in OFC, OPP, and even OLA/OLF—around a shared national platform.
Balance the power triangle between Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray not by suppressing any group, but by fostering inclusive governance.
His “magnanimous politics,” if genuine, can become the catalyst for a broader shift—from conflict to cooperation, from empire to union, and from coercion to consent.
Moreover, this vision need not be confined to Ethiopia alone. In the long term, a regional union in the Horn of Africa—including Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and others—based on free will, not imposed borders, could bring long-awaited peace and development to one of the world’s most volatile regions. The idea of a United States of Africa, starting from a “Union of Free Peoples” in Ethiopia, is not a fantasy—it is a historical necessity. But for now, the immediate challenge remains domestic: to dismantle the empire and build a voluntary union where all peoples—big or small—exercise equal sovereignty.
Final Reflections: The Choice Ahead
In conclusion, the only path to a peaceful and democratic Ethiopia is through a genuine ethnic federalism that respects self-determination, enables mutual cooperation, and opens the door to a new post-imperial identity. Whether it’s called Ethiopia or Oropia, the foundation must be freedom.
Elites of the two largest nations, Amhara and Oromo, must learn from the past. Their mutual mistrust only served the interests of dictators like the TPLF. Now, they must rise to a historic responsibility: to cooperate, not dominate; to negotiate, not suppress.
The time for “andinet by force” is over. Now is the time for arinet by consent—for building a union of equals, not a prison of nations.
If Dr. Abiy embraces this vision fully—not just symbolically but structurally—he may well become the bridge between past pain and future possibility. But if he continues to waver or be swayed by chauvinist voices, the opportunity may slip away.
May Waaqa guide the people and leaders of Ethiopia to choose justice, truth, and reconciliation over revenge, deception, and domination.
Galatôma!
Read more: https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/02/1 ... aile-fida/