The Oromo Can Support Fànnô as Long as It Accepts the Agaw Movement and the Oromo Struggle!
By Fayyis Oromia*
It is encouraging to see the Amhara national struggle slowly developing towards a centralized leadership. There is no doubt that the Fànnô movement is the Amhara people’s struggle for liberty and democracy. The only thing the Fànnô leaders need to recognize is the parallel emancipation movements of the Agaw and the Oromo. They must explicitly acknowledge that the Agaw Himira of Lalibela, Qemant of Gondar, and Agaw Awi of Bahir Dar deserve liberation and self-rule—just like the Oromo of Finfinné. If they are not opposed to such liberation movements of the Agaw and the Oromo, then there is no reason to oppose the Fànnô struggle. An irreconcilable problem will only arise if Fànnô seeks to subjugate and suppress the right of self-determination for the Agaw and Oromo. As long as Fànnô is not against the self-rule of all nations in Ethiopia, it can enjoy strong support from the OLA, TDF, and Agaw parties.
It is also notable that the Fànnô movement is increasingly becoming a mass movement among the Amhara. However, the true motive and purpose of the struggle remain unclear. Is it genuinely against the oppressive incumbent regime—essentially a third wave of the Derg, i.e., Biltsiginà—or is it intended to continue the historical domination of the Naftagna over the Oromo in particular and other nations in general? Is it a neo-Naftagna movement aiming to resurrect the slowly declining Amharanet domination?
The dominant rhetoric we’ve heard so far from the Fànnô bloc targets Onegawinet (the very symbol of the Oromo liberation struggle), uses derogatory language like “Galla invasion” (echoing the old Naftagna narrative), and attacks Oromummà (the fundamental identity and shared ideology of the Oromo). In this sense, the Fànnô movement appears more focused on opposing the Oromo than confronting the real oppression under the current regime. To gain Oromo support, the Fànnô movement must shift its rhetoric, engage constructively with Qérrô—who uphold the Onegawinet mindset and Oromummà ideology—and unite against the incumbent.
The only path to removing the current oppressive regime is through cooperation between the Fànnô movement and the Qérrô struggle, including the involvement of Tegarus, Agaws, and the younger generation of other nations in an inclusive opposition. To achieve this, Fànnô leaders and members must change their discourse, begin respecting Onegawinet and Oromummà, and stop their harmful rhetoric about the so-called “Galla invasion.”
There is no doubt that we have been under the brutal rule of three dominant groups over the past 50 years: Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo elites, following the fall of the monarchy. The fascist Derg, dominated by Amhara elites; the fascist Woyane, led by Tigray elites; and the fascist Biltsiginà, under Oromo elites, have all ruled Ethiopia with an iron fist, killing countless citizens. While Derg favored Amharas, Woyane privileged the Tegarus, and Biltsiginà now attempts to hide behind Oromo identity.
However, the reality on the ground shows that Derg did not truly represent the Amhara, Woyane did not genuinely privilege the Tegarus, and Biltsiginà is not a promoter of the Oromo cause. Now is the time to wake up and foster a triangular cooperation among democrats from the Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo communities against the dictatorship mentality embedded in the Derg, Woyane, and Biltsiginà systems.
The critical question remains: Is Fànnô part of the triangle of democrats or the triangle of dictators? Does it carry the fascist Derg mentality, or does it embody the pro-freedom mindset of Qérrô? Is it a friend or a foe to the Oromo nation?
When I hear some political activists encouraging Fànnô to fight Ethiopia’s defense forces—primarily composed of Qérrô—I wonder if they are truly friends of Fànnô or not. How can a friend push a poorly organized, disgruntled youth force into battle against a highly armed and trained group like the Qérrô? Isn’t that like urging a cat to fight a lion? Isn’t that suicidal for the cat?
I even suspect that Dr. Abiy may be training some cadres to pose as pro-Fànnô supporters only to infiltrate and weaken the Naftagna forces from within. He might be prolonging the conflict deliberately, using it as a pretext to crush the Naftagna forces for good. Some fools misinterpret this as a Fànnô victory. But truthfully, if Dr. Abiy wanted, eliminating Fànnô would take Qérrô barely a week. Just as he once used arrogant Tigray elites to undermine the Woyane, he is now using chauvinist Amara elites to destroy the Naftagna base. Woyane wanted to use him as a Hailemariam Desalegn; Naftagnas tried to use him like Mengistu Haile Mariam. But Dr. Abiy has proven to be neither. Perhaps, as some of his supporters claim, he is “Abichu Aba-Mela.” At the very least, he hasn’t actively harmed the Oromo cause—though he has also not been the loyal advocate we hoped he would be, like Baro Tumsa.
There is no denying that Ethiopia’s central conflict today is between Amharanet and Oromummà. This struggle has persisted since 1270, when Amharic became the language of the ruling elite. From then until the 1970s formation of the OLF, Amharic continued expanding at the expense of Afàn Oromo. Thanks to the OLF, which began respecting Afàn Oromo rather than idolizing Amharic, that trend has slowly begun to reverse. We’ve made progress, but still haven’t achieved the legitimate leadership and prominence that Afàn Oromo deserves, given our demographic and geographic weight.
Afàn Oromô is still suppressed as a federal working language. Today, pro-Amharanet elites employ three strategies to fight Oromummà:
- Explicit opposition: All Amharas organized under open Amhara parties like NAMA, who openly denounce Oromummà. These are visible enemies and easier to resist.
- Implicit promotion: Ethiopianist parties like EZEMA, who subtly elevate Amharanet while ignoring Oromummà. These are more dangerous because of their deceptive Ethiopianist façade.
- Internal betrayal: Oromo parties like the OPP, filled with Amharanet-leaning elites who speak Afaan Oromo but revere Amharic. These are the most dangerous, as they look Oromo but work against Oromummà from within—examples include pro-Amharanet Oromo figures like Abiy Ahmed.
Ethiopia is, in fact, Oropia—a nation shaped by Oromummà. The Oromo are at home from Barentu in Eritrea to Borana in Kenya, from Beegi near Sudan to Barbara in Somalia. The Horn is Greater Oropia. Amhara Naftagnas tried to de-Oromize Ethiopia, thereby weakening Oropia. Tigray hegemonists reduced our land to a smaller Oromia, excluding many Oromo territories.
Now, it is up to Oromo nationalists (Republicans) to reclaim Ethiopia. The current Oromo Prosperitans, led by Abiy, are unsuitable for this mission. They are more aligned with Amharanet than Oromummà. They continue the historical pattern of Oromo elites—like Qusé Dinagdé, Yilma Dhéresà, Teferi Banti, and Nagàsô Gidàdà—ruling under Amharanet domination. The Prosperitans are no different.
The next step must be to bring Oromummà—not just Oromo elites—to real leadership. Our goal should be to reclaim Oropia, not merely preserve the diminished Oromia kilil. To realize this, Oromo Republicans must take power in Finfinné and promote Afaan Oromo as the federal working language, making Ethiopia de facto Oropia.
Thanks to the resilient Oromo struggle, Abyssinian-dominated Ethiopia is dead and will not return. An Oromian-led Ethiopia will now rise. The Derg’s EWP promoted assimilation. Woyane’s EPRDF advanced apartheid. The Oromo struggle destroyed both. OLF-aligned leaders like Obbo Léncô tried to build a new Oromo-led party (EPP) for a democratic, accommodative Ethiopia. Unfortunately, hybrid elites with Amharanet mindsets, led by Abiy Ahmed, hijacked EPP and turned it against Oromummà.
I hope that genuine Oromo nationalists promoting Oromummà and Afàn Oromô will soon regain leadership in EPP to complete the Oromo liberation struggle and end Amharanet dominance. When we speak of Ethiopia, we see two meanings:
Abythiopia: The old, Abyssinian-dominated, dictatorial, Semitic Ethiopia—now dying.
Orothiopia: The new, Oromian-led, democratic, Cushitic Ethiopia—emerging.
The first aligns with Abyssinia and authoritarianism; the second reflects Oromia and egalitarianism. That is why the new Oromo generation equates Ethiopia with Oromia, while the old generation equated it with Abyssinia.
Historically, Abesha elites loved Ethiopia and Oromo elites hated it—based on the first meaning. But now, Abythiopia is dying, and Orothiopia is thriving. In this context, Abesha may begin to hate the new Ethiopia, and Oromos will embrace it. Assimilative Ethiopia (Ankober elite version) and apartheid Ethiopia (Adwa elite version) are both obsolete. Orothiopia is the future.
Still, confusion persists. Abyssinians nostalgically mourn the dead Abythiopia, while Oromians celebrate the birth of Orothiopia. Both claim to love Ethiopia, but for entirely different reasons. EWP and EPRDF are gone. EPP will soon follow. Only genuine pro-Oromummà forces will prevail—promoting Afàn Oromô, defending Oromummà, and resisting the continued efforts of pro-Amharanet elites.
Let all Oromo nationals rise to the occasion.
Galatôma!
Read more:https://orompia.wordpress.com/2023/01/0 ... oromummaa/