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SOMALIA
Report: US military driving and exacerbating violence in Somalia

Americans have been intervening there for decades. Isn’t it past time to ask whether we are the problem?

By: Daniel Larison

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/ ... -solution/

MAY 5, 2023



Despite the Biden administration’s talk of bringing America’s endless wars to a close, the U.S. remains at war in Somalia in a conflict that shows no signs of ending anytime soon.

According to a new Costs of War Project report https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/fil ... omalia.pdf by Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ Ṣóyẹmí, U.S. military involvement, assistance, and training have all contributed to perpetuating the war with al-Shabab. Rather than bringing that country closer to peace and stability, U.S. policy has instead been one of the drivers of the conflict. As Ṣóyẹmí says,

The U.S. is not simply contributing to conflict in Somalia, but has, rather, become integral to the inevitable continuation of conflict in Somalia.

It’s bad enough that the U.S. has no vital security interests at stake in this conflict, but current U.S. policy is also exacerbating Somalia’s security problems instead of alleviating them. That makes the House’s failure https://www.politico.com/minutes/congre ... wal-fails/ to pass a war powers resolution for Somalia last month that much more disappointing. The U.S. urgently needs to reassess what it is doing in Somalia and in other countries where its programs of military assistance have been linked with the intensification of conflict. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/fil ... Savell.pdf

At the very least, the Biden administration should end direct U.S. involvement in the war in Somalia.

In the report,

Making Crisis Inevitable: The Effects of U.S. Counterterrorism Training and Spending in Somalia,

Ṣóyẹmí details how U.S. support for the Somali government and the training of its forces serve to keep the conflict going. She explains that backing the government in a top-down, coercive approach runs counter to the decentralized way that Somali politics and conflict resolution work.

While the U.S. may think that it is helping to promote security by assisting the central government, this approach is a terrible fit for the political conditions in the country. Then there is the much greater size of U.S. counterterrorism spending relative to the Somali government’s own revenues, which creates incentives to continue with the same militarized approach that has failed over the last decade and a half. This is why Ṣóyẹmí argues that

the U.S. might be doing more than merely exacerbating Somalia’s insecurity, and might be an active impediment to stability and conflict resolution in Somalia.

U.S. involvement in the war in Somalia has been relatively modest in terms of troop numbers, but it has been ongoing for more than 15 years. The Obama administration labeled https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/us/p ... malia.html al-Shabab an “associated force” of al-Qaida in 2016, and used this to pretend that the 2001 AUMF applied to military operations against a group that did not exist when the authorization was passed. The war in Somalia is exactly the sort of intervention that ought to have been debated and authorized before it started, and not retroactively added to an authorization already on the books. Congress’s failure to do its job in this case has meant that the U.S. wages a low-level war indefinitely with minimal scrutiny.

After significantly escalating U.S. drone and airstrikes in Somalia during most of his time in office, Trump withdrew U.S. forces from Somalia in the final months of his presidency. Crucially, the military continued the same mission by “commuting” from bases in Djibouti and Kenya. President Biden then reversed Trump’s quasi-withdrawal and resumed the earlier military presence in the country. The U.S. use of drone attacks and traditional airstrikes https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/us/p ... trike.html in Somalia has declined significantly from its peak under Trump, but it has not ceased. https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/21/politics ... index.html

Administration policy appears to be nothing but more of the same ineffective and counterproductive involvement that has brought Somalia to its present state. It makes no sense to expect any better outcomes from continuing to do the same things as before. Ṣóyẹmí concludes,

It is highly unlikely that continued U.S. training operations and U.S. counterterrorism spending in Somalia, along the same lines as the U.S. has acted in these areas in the past, will serve to produce anything but the continuation of conflict and unrest in Somalia.

The U.S. needs to consider the possibility that military involvement and training are not conducive to stability in cases like this one, and that it needs to look to other tools of statecraft besides military ones to manage these problems.

The contrast between Somalia and neighboring Somaliland in terms of how conflict is managed could scarcely be greater. As Michael Horton has written https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/ ... than-most/ for Responsible Statecraft,

The lack of large amounts of outside aid and interference may be one of the reasons for Somaliland’s success. Rather than having ‘solutions’ imposed on it by outside powers, its institutions have developed in organic ways that are best suited to its societal contexts.

The Costs of War Project report also cites Somaliland as an example of the kind of bottom-up political approach that would stand a better chance of ending conflict in Somalia. According to the report,

the process of consolidating central control over security took many years and adopted an incremental approach building trust with local communities and working in parallel with iterative peace and political processes.

Many countries in Africa are experiencing deteriorating security conditions from armed insurgencies in their territories. The reflexive U.S. response to this deterioration has been to throw more military assistance at local governments on the assumption that additional resources for security will keep a lid on the problem. However, what we see from Burkina Faso to Niger to Somalia is that U.S. security assistance doesn’t buy these countries more security, and in some cases it seems to be actively contributing to making conditions worse.

Before the House voted down the war powers resolution for Somalia last month, opponents of the measure claimed https://todaynewsafrica.com/us-house-re ... m-somalia/ that the U.S. military presence was a stabilizing force for the country. If House members would read the Costs of War Project report on the U.S. role in this conflict, they would see that this is not the case. Not only is the U.S. presence in Somalia not a stabilizing force, but the entire approach that the U.S. has taken to this conflict has contributed to the country’s ongoing instability.

Most House members voted against the resolution on the mistaken assumption that the U.S. military presence there is making both the U.S. and Somalia more secure, but the truth is that neither country is better off because of this policy and both would be better off without it.

The U.S. has spent years and billions of dollars on a fruitless militarized approach to conflict in Somalia. The evidence shows that it hasn’t worked and isn’t likely to work in the future. The U.S. ought to end its involvement in this conflict, and not just because there are no American interests at stake there. As the Costs of War Project report shows, the U.S. is fueling the conflict and getting in the way of alternative approaches that have been proven to work elsewhere.




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[Zmeselo]

LATEST
Why RFK Jr. will probably either be our next President, or be assassinated.

By Eric Zuesse

https://theduran.com/why-rfk-jr-will-pr ... assinated/

May 4, 2023

On May 3rd, RFK Jr., whom I had wanted to primary against Obama in 2012 but declined, gave his first in-depth interview as a candidate, now 12 years later, for the 2024 U.S. Democratic Party’s Presidential nomination against Joe Biden, answering the questions of the excellent interviewer Freddie Sayers, at The Unherd, and here are representative samples from it:

Robert Kennedy Jr: America needs a revolution

https://archive.is/un1BS

The 2024 outsider on Biden, Ukraine and Covid misinformation

3 May 2023

BY FREDDIE SAYERS

https://web.archive.org/web/20230503185 ... Y89a_zXi9s

RFK Jr:

I’m talking about issues that I think most Americans and probably most Democrats are concerned about: the systematic gutting of the middle class; the elevation of corporations — particularly polluting corporations; and, from the financial industry to the military-industrial complex, the corrupt merger of state and corporate power. Through wars, bank bailouts and lockdowns, we’ve been systematically hollowing out the American middle class, and printing money to make billionaires richer. During the Covid lockdown, there was a $4.4 trillion shift in wealth from the American middle class to this new oligarchy that we created — 500 new billionaires with the lockdowns, and the billionaires that we already had increased their wealth by 30%.

That’s just one of the assaults, and then you go to the bailout of the Silicon Valley Bank, and the war in Ukraine, which is costing us $113 billion; the war in Iraq and the wars that followed that have cost us $8 trillion. The total cost of the lockdowns was $16 trillion, and we got nothing for any of it. Is it any wonder that we don’t have a middle class left in the United States of America? Unless we rebuild the middle class, and rebuild our economy, our national security is going to fail, and our democracy is going to fail. …

Climate has become more polarised than ever, and with good reason. The crisis has been, to some extent, co-opted — by Bill Gates and the World Economic Forum and the billionaire boys’ club in Davos — the same way that the Covid crisis was appropriated by them to make themselves richer, to impose totalitarian controls and to stratify our society, with very powerful and wealthy people at the top, and the vast majority of human beings with very little power and very little sovereignty over their own lives. Every crisis is an opportunity for those forces to clamp down controls.

And then you also see, with climate, there’s been a shift — from habitat preservation and regenerative farming to trying to reduce the power of the carbon industry — towards corporate carbon capture, which can be monetised by the corporations and exploited without seeing any real benefit on the ground. And also with geoengineering solutions, which I oppose. It tends to be that the people who are pushing them also have IP rights — in other words, patent rights in a lot of those technologies. There is definitely an optic of self-interest.

He’s the only prominent public figure who speaks about the hypocrisy of billionaires and

Bill Gates and the World Economic Forum and the billionaire boys’ club in Davos.

And:

FS:

That takes us to this pressing question: one thing you talk about a lot is that America is in a permanent state of war and you want to put an end to that. With regard to Ukraine, how do you propose to do that?

RFK Jr:

Settle it. The Russians have repeatedly offered to settle. If you look at the Minsk accords, which the Russians offered to settle for, they look like a really good deal today. Let’s be honest: it’s a US war against Russia, to essentially sacrifice the flower of Ukrainian youth in an abattoir of death and destruction for the geopolitical ambition of the neocons, oft-stated, of regime change for Vladimir Putin and exhausting the Russian military so that they can’t fight anywhere else in the world. President Biden has said that was his intention — to get rid of Vladimir Putin. His Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, in April 2022, said that our purpose here is to exhaust the Russian army. What does that mean, “exhaust”? It means throwing Ukrainians at them. My son fought over there, side-by-side with the Ukrainians and we’ve sacrificed 300,000 of them. The commander of the special forces unit in the Ukraine, which is probably the most elite fighting force in Europe, has said 80% of his troops are dead or are wounded and they cannot rebuild the unit. Right now, the Russians are killing Ukrainians at a ratio of either 1:5 or 1:8, depending on what data you believe. …

We should have listened to Putin over many years. We made a commitment to Russia, to Gorbachev, that we would not move NATO one inch to the east. Then we went in, and we lied. We went into 13 NATO countries, we put missile systems in with nuclear capacity; we did joint exercises with Ukraine and these others for NATO. What is the purpose of NATO? This is what George Kennan asked; this is what Jack Matlock asked. All of the doyens of US foreign policy were saying:

Russia lost the Cold War. Let’s do to Russia what we did in Europe when we gave them the Marshall Plan. We’re the victors — let’s lift them up. Let’s integrate them into European society.

…

FS:

So you would have had Russia inside NATO?

RFK Jr:

I think that that’s something we should have considered. What is the purpose of NATO other than to oppose Russia? [Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin requested for Russia to receive an invitation to join, but both requests were snubbed by the U.S., never considered.] If you’re addressing Russia in a hostile way from the beginning, of course their reaction is going to be hostile back. And if you’re slowly moving in all of these states, who we said would never become part of NATO. What happened in the Ukraine is that the US supported essentially a coup d’etat in 2014, against the democratically-elected government of Ukraine. We have telephone call transcripts of Victoria Nuland, one of the neocons in the [Obama] White House, handpicking the new cabinet that was hostile to the Soviet Union [he meant there “Russia”]. If you look at that, and you put yourself in Russia’s position, and you say:

Okay, the United States, our biggest enemy, is treating us as an enemy, has now taken over the government of a nation and made them hostile to us, and then started passing laws that are prejudicial to this giant Russian population.

If Mexico did that and then started killing — they killed 14,000 Russians in Donbas, the Ukrainian government — if Mexico did that to expatriate Americans, we’d invade in a second. We have to put ourselves in the shoes of our opponents. And it doesn’t mean saying that Vladimir Putin is not a gangster — he is. Or he’s not a thug — he is. Or he’s not a bully — he is. But going to war is not in his interest, either. And he repeatedly told us: these are red lines, you’re crossing.

His publicly calling Putin “a gangster” and “a thug” and a “bully” causes me to ask,

Would Putin publicly say that George W. Bush and Barak Obama and Donald Trump and Joe Biden are ‘gangsters’ and ‘thugs’ and ‘bullies’, or has he instead been above doing that?

He has been above, and beyond, the public usage of such pandering political terms — especially against a national leader with whom he might end up negotiating, and who has always had far higher approval-ratings from the Russian public than any of those American Presidents have had from Americans. But no one is perfect, and only fools would demand any of them to be. Not even RFK Jr. (and Col. Douglas Macgregor, who would probably be his best V.P. choice, and whom I hope will soon be endorsing RFK Jr.’s candidacy). I think that he was unfortunately influenced by his own conservative son, Conor, who strongly supports America’s policy on Ukraine and volunteered to go to Ukraine to help Ukrainians kill Russians. Conor told him that, as RFK Jr, recounted to PEOPLE magazine, https://archive.is/ktUiD#selection-1899.1-1905.164 on 26 October 2022:

I knew his views about the war were not aligned with mine. … He doesn’t like Putin. He thinks he’s a gangster and a bully and he doesn’t like bullies. He’d been arguing vociferously for the U.S. intervention and he didn’t want to be one of these people supporting a war and sitting on the sidelines.

Obviously, the influence ought to have been in the reverse direction there; but, in any case, RFK Jr.’s being now a Presidential candidate, his terminology in this matter was inappropriate, whatever his beliefs about Putin are.[/quote]

FS:

Speaking of truth, and returning to the subject of vaccines for a moment, do you acknowledge that you went too far at any stage? Do you think that you yourself might have lost perspective?

RFK Jr:

Here’s what I would say: show me where I got it wrong. Show me one fact that I’ve said in all of my social media postings that was factually erroneous. If you show me that, I’ll fix it, I’ll change it. And if it’s appropriate, I’ll apologise for it. But, that’s not what’s happened. What’s happened is, the media has said:

Oh, he passes misinformation.

And I say:

What piece of misinformation?

Everything I post is cited and sourced to government databases, and to peer-reviewed publications. I have probably the most robust fact-checking operation in America today. I have 320 MD physicians and PhD scientists, including, until recently, Nobel Prize-winner Luc Montagnier, on our advisory board looking at everything I post. If I get something wrong — and I will ultimately get something wrong — but so far, nobody’s been able to show me anything that I’ve gotten wrong.

He even volunteered to say of the U.S. intelligence agencies,

There’s no accountability and these agencies need to be accountable, and I would break up the CIA in a way that would make them accountable.

How likely is a serious contender for the U.S. Presidency who speaks the truths that he speaks, to become assassinated?

If U.S. Government policies are not (and long have not) been intended to serve the public on the basis of truth, instead of to serve billionaires on the basis of lies, then how likely is it that what will happen to him, will be what happened to his father, and to his uncle, and to Martin Luther King, and to Abraham Lincoln?

Consequently, given these realities, his exposure to the public, from this point in time onward, ought to be preventing him from anything that places him within shooting distance of anyone except individuals whom he already knows, and knows to be a supporter. Instead, only electronic means of communication ought to be employed in his campaign, and in his own outreach.

He speaks too much truth, for him to be able reasonably to feel safe in any crowd of strangers. He has to be enormously courageous to have entered this contest.

He’ll need a lot of luck. But I think that if he survives this campaign, he’ll likely beat Joe Biden and then beat any Republican. And, afterward, he’ll need to avoid any proximity to strangers throughout his term, or terms, in the White House. I intend to vote for him, especially because there is no other Democratic or Republican contender whom I would vote for: U.S. politics right now is strictly a billionaires’ game, and the candidates are only fronts for those individuals — represent their mega-donors, and not the public. Right now, and throughout recent decades, it has been purely pay-to-play.

[Temt]

Interview with President Isaias Afwerki
May 6, 2023



As it may be recalled, local media conducted an extensive, four-part, interview with President Isaias Afewerki on domestic and international issues during the months of February and March 2023. The current interview deals with, and is focused on the dynamics, ramifications, and future trajectory of the conflict in the Sudan.

Question: The Al-Bashir regime had posed a considerable security threat to the region at large, and neighboring countries, including Eritrea, in particular, on account of its fundamentalist religious agenda. Its subsequent ouster from power in 2019 due to the wrath of the Sudanese people gave rise to an atmosphere of hope and optimism in the Sudan as well as the region. The new reality ushered in a restoration and enhancement of bilateral ties between Eritrea and Sudan that was reflected in continuous diplomatic shuttles and consultations. Taking into consideration the legacy of the Al-Bashir regime, what are the causes and defining features of the unnecessary conflict that has engulfed the Sudan at the present time

In view of Sudan’s geostrategic importance in the Horn of Africa, the Red Se, and beyond, the developments that have unfolded in the Sudan cannot be underestimated or taken lightly. The post-2019 era is characterized by specific dynamics that raise questions about its genesis and development. But, it must also be examined within its historical context; from whence it came and how it unfolded.

The principal challenge for all peoples, whether in the Sudan or in any other underdeveloped country, is nation-building with its different dimensions; specifically, its socio-economic, cultural, and security aspects. Any discussion of the current situation must accordingly begin with examining its origins. If the aim is indeed to bring a lasting solution, stability, peace, growth, and development, then the root challenges must first be solved.

The period from Sudan’s independence in 1956 until 2019 can be roughly divided into three stages; the Al-Azhari period (1956-1969); the Nimeiri years (1969-1989); and the National Congress Party or Islamic Revolution (1989-2019) regime. Relative to other African countries, the Sudan occupied a more developed status – by all measures – during the first two stages. The nation-building process was quite advanced in these phases. This was especially true in the first 20 years of the Numeri period in which the process gained acceleration and was moving in a positive direction. This does not mean it was completely free of challenges. There were problems in the South and other regions. Nevertheless, the process was progressing well in spite of these challenges.

In 1989, however, Political Islam, which technically began in 1983 during the last years of Numeri’s rule, took center stage. This Islamic movement, spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood (al-aKhwan al-Muslimin), was a continuation of what was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. But throughout the decades, it failed to make any discernible influence within the ranks of the Sudanese people. Political movements based on this philosophy did not have any influence that exceeded 4 or 5 percent of the population. In 1983, however, owing to the general conditions of the Cold War, this movement began to readjust its position, alongside various other parties.

I will not delve into all the myriad details. Suffice it to say that beginning in 1983, the Islamists expanded their murky network in the subsequent six years and seized power in 1989 through a coup. Once they usurped power, they began to derail the nation-building process. This in turn triggered unprecedented protests throughout the country – in the south, west, and east. The eventual legacy of the NCP/NIF regime was the eventual fragmentation of the Sudan; the most significant of which was the issue of South Sudan.

Symptoms of fragmentation were also manifested in the Blue Nile, Kurdufan, and Darfur areas. Indeed, instead of bolstering nation-building, the next 30 years saw a phenomenon of disintegration and fragmentation in the country. More ominously, the Sudan became a hub for terrorism during this period.

The purported aim was to change the world using their version of Political Islam; not the real Islam. Bin Laden set camp in eastern Sudan and he was there until 1996. Thus, instead of working for domestic reconstruction, the Sudan became embroiled in elusive regional and global agendas of fomenting chaos.

The biggest mistake in Sudanese history was the secession of South Sudan. South Sudan should not have been separated – by any argument. The liberation movement of South Sudan was about the right to self-determination. Indeed, whether it is John Garang or any of the leaders of the time, their choice was 99% in favor of unity. The desire to separate was perhaps 1%. So why did secession happen? Was it because the North wanted it? Was it influenced by others? In retrospect, a lot of analysis can be made regarding this matter.

Internal developments were pushed and goaded. But they were pushed and relegated to ultimately opt for secession in 2011. At the same time, the protests in the West and East did not subside. The situation in the South itself was not over. There are still unresolved issues such as Abyei and others. Disputes on whether there should, or should not be, oil allocation remains. Similarly, the Darfur problem continues; same with Kurdufan and the Blue Nile – none of these have been resolved until yesterday.

The Sudan, with all of its resources, is considered the breadbasket of the region. The country’s current situation, however, shows otherwise; its economy has been embezzled; it is drowning in debt; and the economic difficulties of its population have worsened. The past thirty years have thus halted the relative progress in nation-building of the preceding period to entail fragmentation of the country.

The worsening economic and security situation and the deterioration in livelihood caused bitterness among the population. This resulted in spontaneous and powerful revolts. This eventually led to the overthrow of the regime in 2019. The popular revolts were not led or directed by any particular entity. But although the people may not have articulated their wishes through a written manifesto, the message was clear and unequivocal: “We have had enough”.

When the regime was overthrown by a popular uprising in 2019, the country stood at a crossroads. It needed to move away from the 30-year-long NCP regime to a new rule. The path was clear: move away from the fallen regime towards a transitional stage and then from a transitional stage towards a gate of safety (or a new and healthy political dispensation). This is the shortest and easiest route. To enter the gate of safety, it would have been necessary to install a new system of government by gleaning key lessons from the accumulated experience. In turn, the new system of government, acceptable to the Sudanese people, would have enabled the country to cross the gate towards safety. Unfortunately, the path deviated and was derailed from this route.

The post-2019 period was littered with what I refer to as “distortions”. Different groups began to claim the revolution as exclusively their own; to claim to have brought about radical change for the people and country on their own. A spontaneous popular revolt, which happened in response to dire internal developments after years of unresolved grievances and patience, was now being claimed as the project of one group or another. Some began to claim “I’m the revolution”, and “We did this”. Different groups began to sprout from all corners. The country had never witnessed such confusion. The question remained; how can you claim to have brought about the change that the population itself brought about spontaneously? And if you are going to say that you have contributed in any way, now is not the time.

Similarly, if you are going to contest power, now is not the time. Once you have crossed the critical stage where you have secured stability, then you can talk about, or envisage, competition for power. This is a transitional period and there is no reason to contest power during this period. It is also not the time to divide people along military and civilian lines. This is a transitional stage brought about by a popular uprising. Its roadmap is clear. The key goal at this time is to design the bridge that can take you across to the gate leading towards safety. How you get there should be the leading question.

For the Sudan to reach the gates of safety, a new situation must be in place. This new situation will be crystallized in a new system of government which must be chosen and elected by the people. This is the debate that began during the first month of the first year. The distortion of the main process or direction had led to a wrong outcome or inclusion in the case of South Sudan and associated instability.

As stressed earlier, it is counterproductive to fight over ownership of the revolution at this point in time. This is not the time for settling scores or squabbling about power. This is a transitional phase and these divisive trends must not be contemplated. They may arise once the destination is reached.

The war between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is a legacy of the NCP’s attempt to build its own army and create security institutions in its own image over the past 30 years. What does the Sudanese army really look like? What do the country’s security institutions look like? How were they established? Much can be said about all of these. What’s the difference between the RSF and the SAF? Both belonged to the same regime – they were created from it. One can raise a number of issues regarding the structure of the former Sudanese Armed Forces; both with respect to political and ideological tendencies. But this is not the time to do so. Furthermore, there are armed groups in Darfur, Kurdufan, Blue Nile, and the East that have not been incorporated into the process. In the event, the building of a national, sovereign defense institution has its own process whose crystallization will require a long time. There is no reason to presume that it has a direct linkage with the transition process in question and that it must be resolved first.

One of the disruptions raised in recent times was the issue of integration of the army. The demand was for the RSF to integrate its forces with the army. This should not be controversial in principle. The question of a unitary army is not controversial or a matter that must be glossed over. But it does not have to be implemented in haste now, tomorrow, or after tomorrow. Implementation must be carried out through meticulous preparations. For purposes of emphasis and clarity, it must be underlined that in principle and as a Sovereign State, Sudan must have a unitary defense institution.

How this is built is another process that should not be conflated with the transitional phase. Raising this matter will only be seen as a pretext or distraction. Indeed, it cannot be established prior to the formation of a civilian government. The formation of a civilian government is in fact a significant topic in and by itself. One has to reach a satisfactory answer on this topic first. To say that military unification must occur prior to the establishment of a civilian government may be tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. Where will this then lead?

How does the issue of military integration morph into a cause for conflict? And what is the actual reason for conflict? What does a power struggle between two individuals mean in this context? As we have seen over the past 30 years, when substantive issues are mishandled, they result in meaningless conflicts and complications. This is inexcusable. As I mentioned earlier, there is no force other than the army as a whole (as an impartial force) that can shoulder the burden of the transition process toward the gates of safety. That is why we as neighbors and partners, maintained our direct relationship and all our consultations with Burhan. Not because this is his own personal issue, but because, at this particular stage, the national army is the body that can move the country towards the gates of safety; because it is an impartial force; and because it is deemed as capable of guaranteeing the safety and stability of the country.

Why did this war break out? What is the reason for the conflict? Is it a conflict between civilians and the military? Is it a conflict within the army? Where did the conflict originate to cause such destruction? With what arguments can you justify any of it?

At any rate, it must be reiterated that the transitional phase must remain in the hands of the army. It cannot be replaced. Anyone watching from the outside, as we are watching the developments closely as neighbors, cannot inject arbitrary parameters or qualifications of capacity and/or age for preference of one against the other. The crucial thing is that the army must shoulder the burden of the transitional stage and steer the process to reach the gates of safety. It must then hand over power to the Sudanese population who will subsequently establish its own institutions of governance.

To dwell on the consequences of the war will only compound and eclipse the quest for a lasting solution. One must understand the conflict’s historical genesis and the sequence of events that led to it. The media tends to focus and exaggerate the consequences. This will only add fuel to the fire.

The approach must be reversed. War must stop – without any debate or equivocation. The actual causes that led to the conflict must be properly identified to prevent any recurrence of such a tragic situation in the future. In a nutshell, the underlying problem must be resolved. And all of us have to work on this.

Sudan’s neighbors are the countries that are most affected by the unfolding events. It is accordingly imperative for the countries of the region to work in partnership and to hold consultations on the resolution of these problems as was indeed the case in the past with the problem of South Sudan. But most importantly, the central role will invariably be played by the Sudanese people. This must be accepted as an operational principle. Within this framework, the most urgent task at this point in time is to bring an immediate end to the war. After ensuring a permanent end to the war, all the complications that triggered the conflict must be addressed and removed. The transitional phase must subsequently be allowed to progress unhindered and move the country toward the gates of safety.



Question: For obvious historical and geographical reasons, Eritrea is one of the neighboring countries that are closely and directly affected by the situation in Sudan. In addition to bolstering warm bilateral ties, Eritrea has been playing a modest role, in a discreet manner, in the promotion of the objectives of the transitional phase and beyond, especially in view of its good ties with all Sudanese political forces. Eritrea’s role stems from its conviction in the neutrality of the Armed forces and the need for a participatory transitional political phase. In this respect, what is Eritrea’s stance and outlook on a lasting solution to the conflict and, more generally, on the peaceful political peace process in the Sudan?

What I have discussed so far, in very broad terms, can be viewed as setting the historical context and the backdrop to the current events. As far as we are concerned, our commitment to the Sudanese cause is not anchored on a random whim or mood. Eritrea’s profound relations with the Sudan do not require a novel explanation because the memories are still fresh from our recent history. The extent to which developments in the Sudan over the past 30 years affected us is a well-known fact. So, our engagement with the cause of the Sudanese people is not optional or a matter of choice. Stability, peace, and development in the Sudan are shared and common interests for both of our peoples. As such, there is no reason why we should not contribute to the extent that we can in this endeavor. This does not detract from the fact that the issue of the Sudan is first and foremost the responsibility of the Sudanese people.

In general, the stability of other countries in our neighbourhood is not optional and is a matter of choice. Regional stability is vital because it reinforces domestic stability; makes it reliable and ensures sustainability. One cannot walk away from it. As such, when the popular uprising happened in 2019, our engagement became stronger as required by the circumstances. We did not choose to remain on the sidelines and “pass the buck” to others. We carefully analyzed the evolving situation and assessed the prospects of acting positively. How can we demonstrate our friendship to the people of the Sudan in their hour of difficulty?

Taking stock of all of the turbulent winds, no one could afford to ignore the potential consequences of the preoccupying developments in the Sudan with its ramifications both inside the country but also in the region as a whole. The news that was being churned out was unsettling… “Nubians have been killed in eastern Sudan”, “killings took place in the Blue Nile region”, “villages have been set on fire in Darfur,” etc. This cannot but engender concern in the neighbourhood.

After 30 years of oppression, the betrayal of the Sudanese people has given rise to this current point. The country has embarked on a transitional phase toward a better future.

For us, the modest role that we can play must be predicated on a clear strategy of engagement. The primary concern was some discernible negative trends that could derail the process. These emanated mostly from opportunistic movements that seemed bent on sowing discord within the transition process.

As it will be recalled, the Sudanese army chose to stand by the people during the popular uprising in 2019. It refused orders to “arrest” and “kill”. It chose to stand by the people as it knew their aspirations and wishes. Also because it is a product of the people. The role it played in those crucial times cannot be underrated. For this reason, it possessed all the credentials to shoulder the burden of transition. These considerations prompted us to initiate our engagement and maintain continuous consultations with the Sovereign Council. Obviously, they know their case better. Nonetheless, we maintained constant discussions and shared our views in order to contribute what we can. In this spirit, we also put forward our proposal which cannot be fully discussed here for paucity of time. As I stated earlier, the historical contexts and trajectories are taken into account to draw appropriate lessons from the past.

The nation-building process invariably encompasses different aspects – of peoples, of citizenship, of opportunities. Even if we look at the experiences of others, the reference points are clear. The trajectory involves a transitional phase to catalyze a cogent climate for a new, viable, and sustainable political dispensation that allows and guarantees the Sudanese people to ultimately make their choice. With this in mind, our proposal clarifies the strategic vision, from our perspective, for the transitional phase and beyond.

Obviously, there may be several initiatives from different quarters. For our part, we are not really interested in competing in a bazaar. We will not be prompted to start an initiative in a competitive spirit. Our focus is on what we can really contribute; without publicity and in a very discreet mode. We have been working along these lines for the past four years. This is squarely based on partnership, understanding, and mutual respect; not our presumptuous preferences. And of course, it is based on listening to the opinion of others.

It is always counterproductive to try and “analyze” and “solve” issues after they have flared up. For this reason, we have been in constant communication, before the conflict erupted, with the stakeholders and provided our views and suggestions in a timely manner. In this context, we explained that the merging of the forces and the establishment of a sovereign army in Sudan is not a controversial topic in and of itself. But its implementation has its own dynamics or process. Obviously, the doctrine, configuration, capabilities, composition, size, and other fundamental military parameters are also part and parcel of the institutional building of a unitary army,

Unfortunately, the journey of the past 30 years has completely hampered this process. In addition to this, as mentioned earlier, armed forces were established that are outside the arena of the national army. Taking all of these factors into account, it is counterproductive to place the issue of the merging of all forces and the building of a unified army as a precondition. This would only hinder the political transition process. In this spirit, we had indeed made our opinion clear; that this issue should not be used as an excuse to trigger any conflict.

We did not publicize it, but we made our position clear to all the stakeholders. We persisted in our consistent engagement and exerted all necessary efforts to avert the eruption of any potential conflict. Still, we will continue to engage to bring restoration to the process that has been derailed. Our engagement cannot be erratic that is interrupted or abandoned when the conditions are not conducive. It is an obligation – not a choice.

Indeed, as far as we are concerned, the Sudan is unlike any other neighbor. Our relationship bears unique historical characteristics. As such, whether for the short-term or for the future, we are committed to a judicious engagement, and this goal is not something we can postpone.

What is disconcerting is the trend that we see and that may further exacerbate the situation. The war must stop. Disinformation that aggravates the situation must also cease.

Editor’s Note: The second and final part of the Interview with President Isaias Afwerki will be published in our next edition.